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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN DISTRICT COURT
All parties in the district court action are listed on the caption case.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3.
ISSUES PRESENTED
A.

Did the district court commit prejudicial error by excluding the

former sworn testimony of Henry Jack Moore at trial?
This issue was raised in the district court, as evidenced in the district court's
ruling at pages 34-35 of Addendum 8, R. 2206, and page 2 of Addendum 14, R. 2213.
The fact-findings underlying a decision to admit evidence are reviewed for
abuse of discretion, and the court's legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. State
v. Widdison. 2000 UT App. 185, % 45,4 P.3d 100,101 (Utah Ct. App. 2000).
B.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Ms. Aland's

Motion to Reopen Discovery to take the deposition of Henry Jack Moore prior to trial?
This issue was raised in the district court, as evidenced in the district court's
ruling at pages 31-33 of Addendum 12, R. 2207, and pages 35-36 of Addendum 8,
R.2206.
A trial court's rulings regarding discovery are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Green v. Louder. 2001 UT 62,1j 37, 29 P.3d 638, 648 (Utah 2001).
C.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by limiting the testimony of

Ms. Aland's expert witnesses; specifically, by limiting the testimony of Joseph Fandey to
matters which American Appliance Manufacturing, Inc. and/or American Water Heater
1
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Co. had actual knowledge, and by prohibiting Chris Long from testifying as to the origin
of the fire?
This issue was raised in the district court, as evidenced by the court's ruling
at pages 29-33 of Addendum 8, R. 2206, and pages 13-14 of Addendum 21, R. 2208.
A trial court's rulings regarding the admissibility of expert testimony is
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Pack v. W.A. Case, 2001 Utah App.
232,1f 16, 30 P.3d 436, 440 (Utah Ct. App. 2001).
D.

Did the district court commit prejudicial error by requiring Ms.

Alarid to elect a single theory of recovery to submit to the jury?
This issue was raised below, as evidenced by Ms. Alarid's Complaint,
Addendum 2, R. 1-13, and her requested Jury Instructions, Addendum 35, R. 2043-46.
A trial court's refusal to give jury instructions is a question of law that is
reviewed for correctness. Star v. Daniels. 2002 UT 2, f 27, 40 P.3d 611, 620 (Utah
2002).
E.

Did the district court commit prejudicial error by refusing to submit

to the jury the issue of punitive damages?
This issue was raised in the district court, as evidenced by the district
court's ruling at pages 17-18 of Addendum 25, R. 2211.

2
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A trial court's refusal to give requested jury instructions is a question of law
that is reviewed for correctness. Star v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, % 27, 40 P.3d 611, 620 (Utah
2002).
F.

Did the district court commit prejudicial error by refusing to give a

Summers v. Tice instruction to the jury on the issue of causation and by permitting
defendants to separate as two separate defendants on the eve of trial?
This issue was raised in the district court, as evidenced by the district
court's ruling at pages 16-17 of Addendum 27, R. 2210; Addendum 32, R. 2026, and Ms.
Aland's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict. Addendum 36,
R. 2078-91.
This is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. State v. Kruger. 2000 UT
App. 60,111, 6 P.3d 1116,1118 (Utah 2000).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES.
ORDINANCES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statues, and rules are determinative
of issues in this appeal:
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 reads:
Rule 702. Testimony by experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by

3
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knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Utah R.Evid. 702.
Utah Rule of Evidence 703 reads:
Rule 703. Bases of opinion testimony by experts.
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or
made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence.
Utah R.Evid. 703.
Utah Rule of Evidence 801 (2)(C) and (D) reads:
Rule 801. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered
against a party and is . . . (C) a statement by a person
authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the
subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant
concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or
employment, made during the existence of the relationship,

Utah R. Evid. 801(2X0 and (D).
Utah Rule of Evidence 803(24) reads:
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness:
4
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(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered
by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the
general purpose of these rules and the interests ofjustice will
best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
However, a statement may not be admitted under this
exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to
meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and
the particulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant.
Utah R.Evid. 803(24).
Utah Rule of Evidence 804(a)(5) and (b)(1) reads:
Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable.
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness"
includes situations in which the declarant:

(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the
declarant's statement has been unable to procure the
declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable means.

(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:

5
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(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at
another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a
deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the
same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the
testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a
predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive
to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect
examination.
Utah R. Evid. 804(a)(5) and (b)(1).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an action brought by Anna Marie Alarid against American
Appliance Manufacturing, Inc. and American Water Heater Co. (referred to hereinafter
collectively as "American")1 for damages she sustained when vapors from a flammable
carpet adhesive were ignited by one of two side-by-side, gas-fired water heaters
manufactured by American. (A copy of the Fire Investigator's Report of July 8, 1996 is
attached hereto as Addendum 1.)
On May 29, 1998, Ms. Alarid filed a Complaint against American, alleging
negligence and strict liability based on defective design, and seeking punitive damages.
(A copy of the Complaint is attached hereto as Addendum 2, R. 1-13.)

1

American Appliance Manufacturing, Inc. and American Water Heater Co.
are sister corporations owned by the same parent corporation, Southcorp, and represented
jointly until the eve of trial. Addendum 31, R. 1766-69; Addendum 33, R. 136-37,
183-84; Addendum 36, R. 2078-91.
6
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Following her failed efforts to depose Henry Jack Moore, a former senior
vice president and safety engineer for American, Ms. Alarid sought to introduce Mr.
Moore's former testimony from a similar case which had gone to trial in March 1999. (A
copy of Ms. Aland's Notice of Deposition for Moore, as well as copies of correspondence
between Ms. Alarid and American discussing Moore's proposed deposition, and trial
transcript in Ellis v. American, are attached hereto as Addendum 3, R. 1468-71;
Addendum 4, R. 1473-74, 1476-77; Addendum 30.) American responded by filing a
Motion in Limine on April 6, 2001, which the district court granted. (A copy of
American's Mem. in Support of its Mot. in Limine, Ms. Aland's Opp'n to the Mot. in
Limine and American's Reply, as well as the judge's order, are attached hereto as
Addendum 5, R. 1333-40; Addendum 6, R. 1425-32, 1434, 1436; Addendum 7, R. 145965; Addendum 9, R. at 1981-83.)
On September 17, 2001, six weeks prior to trial, the district court ruled that
Mr. Moore's former testimony was inadmissible. Ms. Alarid then made an oral motion
requesting the opportunity to depose Mr. Moore. The district court denied this request
because the motion was not properly before the court. (A copy of the trial transcript from
September 17, 2001 is attached hereto as Addendum 8, R. 2206; Addendum 9,
R. 1981-83.)
On September 26, 2001, Ms. Alarid then moved to reopen discovery in
order to take the deposition of Mr. Moore. (A copy of Ms. Aland's Mot. to Reopen
7
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Discovery, as well as American's Opp'n, is attached hereto as Addendum 10, R. 1816-20,
1822, 1827, 1830-38, 1873-74; Addendum 11,R. 1877-88.) After hearing oral argument
on the motion on October 12, 2001, the district court denied the motion because it was
two weeks prior to trial. (A copy of the trial transcript from October 12, 2001 is attached
hereto as Addendum 12, R. 2207.)
The district court had requested Ms. Alarid provide cases regarding the
admission of former testimony, and Ms. Alarid then supplied the court with a letter on
October 19, 2001 discussing several relevant cases. (A copy of the letter referencing
these cases is attached hereto as Addendum 13, R. 1979-80.) On October 24, 2001, the
district court again heard oral argument regarding the use of Moore's former testimony.
Without considering the applicability of Utah Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1), the district
court concluded that this former testimony was inadmissible. (A copy of the trial
transcript from October 24, 2001 is attached hereto as Addendum 14, R. 2213.)
Ms. Alarid also sought to introduce expert testimony from Joseph Fandey,
who worked for the Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC") and was a senior
engineer and then branch manager over the safety of gas-fired water heaters. American
filed another Motion in Limine to exclude this testimony, as well as a Motion in Limine
to exclude certain exhibits which were central to this testimony. (A copy of American's
Motions in Limine, as well as copies of Ms. Aland's Opp'n and American's Reply to
each Motion, are attached hereto as Addendum 15, R. 1063-70; Addendum 16,
8
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R. 1344-48, 1350, 1352-56; Addendum 17, R. 1453-57; Addendum 18, R. 1294-1304;
Addendum 19, R. 1376-80; Addendum 20, R. 1499-1501.) The district court excluded
many significant exhibits relied upon by Mr. Fandey, and ruled that Mr. Fandey's
testimony must be limited to the design and safety of American's product and to
American's actual knowledge. Addendum 8 at 29-33, R. 2206.
Ms. Alarid also sought to introduce at trial the expert testimony of Jeff
Long, a trained fire investigator. The district court precluded Mr. Long from providing
any opinions as to the cause of the fire because he had not been listed as a witness by Ms.
Alarid, although his fire incident report had been provided to American prior to trial. (A
copy of relevant pages of the trial transcript of October 31, 2001, is attached hereto as
Addendum 21, R. 2208.)
American also filed a Motion in Limine regarding Ms. Aland's request for
punitive damages. (A copy of American's Mem. in Support of Mot. in Limine, and Ms.
Aland's Opp'n, and American's Reply, is attached hereto as Addendum 22, R. 1157-65;
Addendum 23, R. 1362-71; Addendum 24, R. 1446-51.) After American rested its case at
trial, the district court ruled that Ms. Alarid could not submit the issue of punitive
damages to the jury. (A copy of the trial transcript from November 7, 2001 is attached
hereto as Addendum 25 at 17-18, R. 2211.)
The district court ruled on the eve of trial that American could separate as
two independent parties. (A copy of the Court's Minute Entry, dated October 29, 2001, is
9
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attached hereto as Addendum 32, R. 2026.) As a result, Ms. Alarid requested a Summers
v. Tice instruction because the evidence demonstrated that the fire could have been
caused by either of the two side-by-side water heaters manufactured by American.
(Copies of the trial transcript from November 5 and 6, 2001 are attached hereto as
Addendum 26, R. 2209; Addendum 27, R. 2210.) The district court denied this request.
(Addendum 27 at 18-19, R. 2210.)
Finally, the district court required Ms. Alarid to elect one theory of recovery
to submit to the jury. See Addendum 2, R. 1-13; Addendum 35, R. 2043-46.
On November 7,2001, the jury returned a verdict in favor of American,
finding that the water heaters were not defective. (A copy of the Judgment is attached
hereto as Addendum 28.) Judgment was entered on November 27,2001, and on
December 26, 2001, Ms. Alarid filed her Notice of Appeal.
Statement of Facts
Rudy Gomez was the manager and maintenance person for two four-plex
apartment units located in Salt Lake City, Utah. On July 8, 1996, he was installing new
outdoor carpet on one of the four-plex units, using a flammable carpet adhesive. While
he was working on the second floor of a partially-covered outdoor stairwell, near a closet
housing two side-by-side water heaters, the vapors from the carpet adhesive ignited.
Mr. Gomez's daughter, Anna Marie Alarid, who was helping Mr. Gomez, was seriously
burned in the resulting fire.
10
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Ms. Alarid sued the manufacturers of the water heaters, American
Appliance Manufacturing, Inc. and American Water Heater Co. ("American"), alleging
negligence and strict liability based on defective design, and seeking punitive damages.
Addendum 2, R. 1-13.
In preparing her case, Ms. Alarid requested that American admit the
genuineness of prior depositions which had been given by Henry Jack Moore, Ron
Carbone, and James Berkely in an earlier case entitled Ellis v. American et al. In
particular, Ms. Alarid intended to use Mr. Moore's former testimony to establish that
American was aware of the dangers of flammable vapor fires caused by its floor-mounted
gas-fired water heaters. American agreed to produce the depositions of Mr. Moore, Mr.
Carbone, and Mr. Berkely, and Ms. Alarid was able to procure a transcript of Mr.
Moore's trial testimony from the court reporter. (A copy of Mr. Moore's Deposition, as
well as a copy of relevant portions of the trial transcript of his former trial testimony, is
attached hereto as Addendum 29, R. 1358-59, 1438-43; Addendum 30.)
Moore worked as Vice President of Engineering, responsible for safety
design of American Appliance Manufacturing and American Water Heater Company
until 1996. Addendum 30 at 4-6. Has testified on behalf of American, in cases where
flammable vapors were ignited by water heaters. Addendum 30 at 6, 8. At trial and
depositions, Moore was represented by American's lawyers. Addendum 30 at 11. His
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testimony was at the heart of Ms. Aland's case. Specifically, he testified to the
following.
For the past 40 years, air for combustion of the water heaters are two inches
off the ground because it is the most economical. Addendum 30 at 15-16. Moore knew
from CPSC reports, Z21 subcommittees, that people were burned in fires. Addendum 30
at 18. The standards for design were written by the committee Moore was on with other
water heater manufacturers. Addendum 30 at 19. Moore knew other engineers criticized
Defendants' product for taking air off the floor and other designs were available.
Addendum 30 at 20. Moore has known since the 1970's that people were injured by their
product. Addendum 30 at 22. American considered it to be a hazard of the product.
Addendum 30 at 22. Moore was familiar with CALSPAN (1975), and Moore knew from
1975 CALSPAN report that the number one hazard of water heaters was accidental
ignition of flammable vapors. Addendum 30 at 23, 24. Moore read Gas Appliance
Manufacturers Association ("GAMA") reports before 1990. Addendum 30 at 26.
In 1976, American recognized the danger of ignition of flammable vapors
by gas-fired water heaters. Addendum 30 at 27. The hierarchy of engineering requires
to design out the hazard, then guard against the hazard and lastly, warn of the hazard.
Addendum 30 at 28-29. In the 1970's, American knew elevation would reduce these
accidents. Addendum 30 at 33-37. Elevating the water heater would guard against the
hazard. Addendum 30 at 36. Moore was familiar with the National Fuel Gas handbook
12
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of 1988, where it said elevating 18 inches will prevent fires. Addendum 30 at 38-39.
American made 18-inch stands in the 1970's, which cost between $10-$12. Addendum
30 at 40-41. Elevation was recommended where flammable vapors are used. Addendum
30 at 42. Instead of guarding with elevation, American chose to warn with .35 labels.
Addendum 30 at 43-44.
American is in a better position than the consumer to know of the hazards.
Addendum 30 at 44. American knew of National Fire Protection Association ("NFPA")
(1980-1984). Addendum 30 at 44-45. American accepted as true that 300 bum victims
each year from water heater ignition of flammable vapors occurred. Addendum 30 at 48.
American made a conscious decision not to include this safety device with water heaters.
Addendum 30 at 57. One reason not to include the safety device was cost. Addendum 30
at 58. American knew when it made a conscious decision not to include the stand that
persons would continue to be burned. Addendum 30 at 60. The water heater committee
which Defendants served on along with other manufacturers could block any design
changes to the water heaters. Addendum 30 at 64-66. American's water heaters are
unsafe for the reasonably anticipated handling and use. Addendum 30 at 69. American
examined Moore extensively for 69 pages. Other than the cheapest way, there is no
reason to take air for combustion from the floor. Addendum 30 at 157.
Because the above testimony was central to her case, on February 14,2000,
Ms. Alarid served American with a Notice of Deposition for Moore, to be scheduled on
13
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March 9, 2000. Addendum 3, R. 1468-71. Three days later, on February 17, 2000,
American responded,
[Pjlease be advised that, as you know Mr. Moore is a former
employee. Accordingly, I do not have any ability to require
his attendance at deposition. I am in the process of attempting
to discern from Mr. Moore whether or not he will voluntarily
present himself for deposition at a date and time mutually
agreed. As soon as I have discerned Mr. Moore's position in
that regard, I will so advise you.
Addendum 4, R. 1473-74, 1476-77. Later that same year, on October 9, 2000, Ms. Alarid
again informed American of her desire to depose Mr. Moore. In the alternative, Ms.
Alarid asked American to stipulate the use of Mr. Moore's former deposition and trial
testimony in the EUis case. Addendum 4, R. 1473-74, 1476-77.
This time, American responded by filing nine Motions in Limine, seeking
to exclude the former testimony of Mr. Moore, Mr. Carbone, and Mr. Berkely.
Addendum 5, R. 1333-40. On April 9, 2001, Ms. Alarid filed her opposition to
American's motions, arguing that this testimony was crucial to Ms. Aland's claims and
that no prejudice would result to American as a result of its use. Addendum 6, R. 1425,
et. seq.
Ms. Alarid then made several other attempts to take Mr. Moore's
deposition. Although her initial request on September 17, 2001 to take Mr. Moore's
deposition six weeks prior to trial was denied by the district court because the motion was
not properly before the court, Addendum 8 at 35, R. 2206, Ms. Alarid tried again on
14
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October 12,2001, two weeks prior to trial, this time having filed a Motion to Reopen
Discovery. Addendum 12 at 31-33, R. 2207.
In the meantime, Ms. Alarid learned that Mr. Moore would be giving a
deposition in another case against American, Fuimer v. Craftsmaster Water Heater Co.,
on October 11, 2001, and that he would be in his/American's attorney's office on
October 10 for preparation. Ms. Alarid requested that American allow her the
opportunity to take Mr. Moore's deposition near this same time, but American refiised.
Addendum 4, R. 1473-74, 1476-77. Mr. Moore had always voluntarily appeared for
depositions when requested by American, was on American's payroll for giving
testimony, and was represented by American's counsel. Addendum 12 at 12, R. 2207;
Addendum 10, Ex. D at 1-3, 38-43, R. 1830-38, and Ex. F, R. 1873-76.
Ruling on the Admission of Mr, Moore's Former Testimony
When the district court first heard oral arguments on September 17, 2001,
on the issue of the admissibility of Mr. Moore's former deposition and trial testimony, it
ruled that the former testimony was inadmissible. Addendum 8 at 38-39, R. 2206;
Addendum 9, R. 1981.
On October 12, 2001, the district court revisited this issue. Ms. Alarid
specifically argued that the former testimony should be admissible under Utah Rule of
Evidence 804. Addendum 12 at 2-3, R. 2207. Instead, the district court simply stated
that "I don't know anything about the Ellis case" and that "every trial is a different
15
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event," and ruled that the former testimony was inadmissible. Addendum 12 at 10,
R. 2207. After the court requested Ms. Alarid submit cases regarding the admission of
former testimony, see Addendum 12 at 9, R. 2207, and Ms. Alarid sent a letter discussing
several relevant cases, see Addendum 13, R. 1979-80, the district court again heard oral
arguments on this issue on October 24, 2001.
This time, although the district court concluded that Mr. Moore met the
definition of "unavailable," Addendum 14 at 2, R. 2213, the court nevertheless expressed
concern whether the testimony given in the former trial would have been the same under
these circumstances, and concluded that the former testimony was inadmissible.
Ruling on Motion to Reopen Discovery
When the district court ruled that Mr. Moore's former testimony would be
inadmissible, Ms. Alarid moved to reopen discovery in order to take Mr. Moore's
deposition. On October 12, 2001, the district court heard oral argument on Ms. Alarid's
motion. Ms. Alarid established that American did in fact control Mr. Moore's voluntary
attendance at depositions, and that American actually prepared Mr. Moore, paid him to
attend depositions, and provided him with an attorney in other cases filed against
American. Addendum 4, R. 1473-74, 1476-77; Addendum 12 at 3-5, R. 2207;
Addendum 29 at 26, R. 1358; Addendum 10, R. 1816-20, 1822, 1827, 1830-38, 1873-74.
The district court denied Ms. Alarid's motion, however, finding that
although there might not be any prejudice to American if Mr. Moore's deposition were
16
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taken, it was simply too close to trial. Addendum 12 at 32-33, R. 2207. The district court
concluded by stating, "[I]f I've made errors, they're clearly prejudicial to you. I mean, I
would concede that in a heartbeat.... I mean, it seems to me that if I've made an error
it's clearly prejudicial so you know, no, I'm not - 1 mean, you wouldn't offend me at all
if you appeal to whoever there is to appeal to." Addendum 12 at 39, R. 2207.
Ruling on the Exclusion And/or Limitations
on Expert Testimony by Joseph Fandev
American filed a Motion in Limine seeking to exclude the expert testimony
of Joseph Fandey. See Addendum 15, R. 1063-70. The district court ruled that Mr.
Fandey's testimony must be limited to the design and safety of American's water heaters.
Although he worked for the CPSC and had been a senior engineer and then branch
manager over the safety of gas-fired water heaters, Mr. Fandey was not allowed to testify
regarding the history of the water heater industry as a whole, nor was he allowed to
discuss governmental meetings which American attended. Mr. Fandey was also
prohibited from referring to Mr. Moore's former trial testimony. Addendum 8 at 30-32,
38, R. 2206.
When he testified on October 31, 2001, Mr. Fandey testified that
American's representative, Mr. Moore, had been present at a sub-committee meeting on
standards for gas-fired water heaters when a presentation had been made regarding the
dangers of water heaters with low pilots, the number of incidents that had occurred thus
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far, and possible solutions to the problem. Addendum 21 at 100-01, R. 2208. The district
court ruled that evidence of this presentation, as well as several other key exhibits, were
hearsay and thus inadmissible. Addendum 21 at 114-15, 118-19, 124, 156-58, 164-66,
R.2208.
Ruling on the Exclusion And/or Limitations
on Expert Testimony by Jeff Long
American also protested the expert testimony of the fire investigator, Jeff
Long. Although Mr. Long had prepared the fire incident report related to Ms. Alarid's
accident, his name did not appear on the report, and Ms. Alarid was not aware that he had
prepared the report until she subpoenaed the listed author of the report who informed her
of Mr. Long's involvement. Addendum 21 at 6-7, R. 2208. Although American had been
provided with a copy of the fire incident report and attached narrative log prior to trial,
the district court ruled that because Mr. Long had not been included on the witness list, he
could not testify about his opinions regarding the origin of the fire. Addendum 21 at
12-14, 37-38, 41-42, 44-45, R. 2208.
Ruling That the Issue of Punitive Damages
Could Not Be Submitted to the Jury
On November 7, 2001, the district court ruled that the issue of punitive
damages could not be submitted to the jury. In reaching this conclusion, the district court
cited Behrens and found that there was not a high degree of probability that water heaters
would result in substantial harm to someone, and that American's conduct was not
18
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unreasonable or an extreme departure from ordinary care because American complied
with the relevant statutes. Addendum 25 at 13-14, 17-18, R. 2211.
Ruling That a Summers v. Tice Instruction on Causation
Could Not Be Submitted to the Jury
In the trial proceedings on November 5 and 6, 2001, Ms. Alarid argued that
because American was not treated as two separate defendants until the first day of trial,
and because the two companies were involved in the production of identical products,
located side-by-side, with essentially the same design, the same components, the same
materials, and the same defect, either of which could have ignited the flammable vapors,
the jury should be given a Summers v. Tice instruction on causation. Addendum 27 at 911, R. 2210. The district court concluded, however, that "Summers v. Tice doesn't
belong in this case at all," Addendum 27 at 16, R. 2210, and refused to give the
instruction to the jury.
Ruling Requiring Ms. Alarid to Select
Only One Theory of Liability to Submit to the Jury
Following both sides resting, but before the matter was submitted to the
jury, the Court required Ms. Alarid to choose one theory of liability to submit to the jury
over her objections. She had pled negligence and strict liability in her Complaint and had
proposed instructions on both theories. She ultimately chose strict liability and was
forced to abandon her negligence cause of action. Addendum 2, R. 1-13; Addendum 35,
R. 2043-46.
19
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court committed prejudicial error in several ways in this case by ruling that the former testimony of Henry Jack Moore was inadmissible, by denying
Ms. Aland's Motion to Reopen Discovery in order to take the deposition of Mr. Moore,
by limiting and/or excluding expert testimony of Fandey and Long, and by refusing to
allow Ms. Alarid to submit punitive damages and her theories of negligence and strict
liability to the jury.
First, the district court committed prejudicial error by ruling that the former
testimony of Mr. Moore was inadmissible. Mr. Moore was unavailable at the time of
trial. The testimony of Mr. Moore at the prior Ellis trial was the heart of Ms. Aland's
case, and all of the requirements of Utah Rule of Evidence 804 regarding the
admissibility of former testimony were satisfied. American conducted a thorough
examination of Mr. Moore at the former trial, and the Ellis case was similar to Ms.
Aland's case involving tragic burns to a victim when flammable vapors were ignited by
American's gas-fired water heater like the present case. Moreover, American had notice
of Ms. Aland's intended use of Mr. Moore's former testimony, and Ms. Alarid provided
American a copy of the Ellis trial transcript long before trial. The district court, however,
did not examine the similarity between the two cases, American's opportunity and motive
to examine the witness, or the content of the testimony. By failing to properly consider

i
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whether Rule 804 regarding former testimony applied, the district court committed
prejudicial error.
Second, the district court abused its discretion by denying Ms. Aland's
Motion to Reopen Discovery in order to take the deposition of Mr. Moore. Ms. Alarid
requested the opportunity to take Mr. Moore's deposition six weeks prior to trial. Since
the request was not properly before the Court, the request was denied. Ms. Alarid was
able to put the request before the Court on October 12, 2001, 19 days before trial, and the
Court denied the request as being made too close to the trial.
Third, the district court abused its discretion by excluding and/or limiting
certain expert testimony of Joseph Fandey and Jeff Long. Although he worked for the
CPSC and had been a senior engineer and branch manager over the safety of gas-fired
water heaters, Mr. Fandey was not permitted to testify about the history of the water
heater industry. Specifically, he was not permitted to testify regarding the fact that water
heaters (all made similarly from manufacturer to manufacturer) were known to cause fires
because the pilot light was not elevated to a height of 18 inches, even though an 18-inch
stand was available and American knew long ago of the danger but sought to warn
against the danger rather than reduce the danger. Moreover, Mr. Fandey relied upon
exhibits which were excluded in violation of Utah Rule of Evidence 703.
Similarly, although he had written the fire incident report for Ms. Aland's
injury, fire investigator Jeff Long was not permitted to testify regarding the cause of the
21
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fire since he had never been identified as a witness. The fire incident report and narrative
(not bearing the name of Jeff Long as preparer), however, had been provided long before
trial to American and no deposition of any fire investigator had ever been taken.
American did not show that any prejudice would result if Jeff long would have been
permitted to testify about the cause of the fire. The district court committed abuse of
discretion by improperly limiting the testimony of these experts.
Finally, the district court committed prejudicial error by refusing to allow
Ms. Alarid to submit certain issues to the jury. Specifically, the district court improperly
required Ms. Alarid to elect one theory of recovery to submit to the jury, refused to
submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury, and refused to give a Summers v. Tice
causation instruction to the jury. Ms. Alarid should have been allowed to submit both her
negligence and strict liability claims to the jury because there was ample evidence to
support both theories. The issue of punitive damages also should have been submitted to
the jury because of the large numbers of people injured annually by water heater fires and
the mere fact that American's water heaters complied with the Federal Standards is not a
bar to punitive damages. Where American knowingly and willfully continued to sell
hazardous water heaters to the public in willful and reckless disregard for safety of the
public, punitive damages are proper. A Summers v. Tice instruction on causation should
also have been submitted to the jury because the evidence pointed to either of the two
water heaters as the cause of the fire, and because American was not treated as two
22
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separate defendants until the first day of trial. The district court committed prejudicial
error by permitting American to separate and by not submitting these crucial issues to the
jury.
For all of these reasons, the decisions of the district court should be
reversed, the jury verdict should be vacated, and the case should be remanded for a new
trial.
ARGUMENT
L

THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING THAT MOORE'S FORMER
TESTIMONY WAS INADMISSIBLE CONSTITUTES
PREJUDICIAL ERROR UNDER THE CORRECTNESS STANDARD
Certain kinds of hearsay are considered to have special guarantees of

trustworthiness and are recognized exceptions to the hearsay exclusion. One of the most
important of these exceptions to the hearsay rule is the former testimony rule as outlined
in Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Under this rule, the testimony of a now unavailable witness given at another
hearing or in a deposition taken in accordance with law is admissible in a subsequent trial
as long as there is a sufficient similarity of parties and issues so that the opportunity to
develop testimony or cross-examine at the prior hearing was meaningful. Utah R. Evid.
804(a)(5); (b)(1). Here, all of the requirements of Rule 804 are satisfied.
First, Mr. Moore was unavailable. A declarant is unavailable if: (1) he is
exempted from testifying by court ruling on the ground of privilege; (2) he persists,
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despite a court order, in refusing to testify concerning the statement; (3) he testifies to
lack of memory of the subject matter of the statement; (4) he is unable to be present or
testify because of death or physical or mental illness; or (5) he is absent (beyond the reach
of the trial court's subpoena) and the statement's proponent has been unable to procure
his attendance or testimony by process or other reasonable means.
Here, Mr. Moore was unavailable for trial. Addendum 8 at 25, R. 2206.
American agreed with the district court that declarant Moore lives outside the State and
was therefore unavailable at the time of trial. Addendum 8 at 25, 33, R. 2206;
Addendum 14 at 2, R. 2213. "We hold that absence of the deponent at the time the
deposition is offered is sufficient to allow the deposition into evidence, and the party
offering the deposition need not proffer an excuse for the failure of the deponent to
appear." Brown v. Prvor. 954 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Wyo. 1998).
Second, the parties are identical. This requirement does not mean that
parties on both sides of the controversies must be identical; it only requires that the party
against whom the testimony is offered must have been a party, or in privity with a party,
in the former action. This requirement is intended merely to ensure that the party against
whom the testimony is offered had an adequate opportunity and motive to cross-examine
the witness.
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Here, Mr. Moore was the former Vice President of Safety Engineering for
American when he gave deposition and trial testimony in the Ellis case against these
defendants. Addendum 30 at 4-5.
Third, the subject matter is the same. Obviously, "the cause of action" in
both proceedings need not be identical; it is enough if the "subject matter" of the
testimony is the same. In other words, the party against whom the testimony is offered
must have had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the declarant's testimony at
the prior hearing. Again, the sole purpose of this requirement is to ensure that the party
against whom the transcript is offered had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the
unavailable witness on the relevant issue.
Here, although the Rule implicitly requires the court to compare the former
and present case to determine whether they are substantially similar giving American an
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony. This was never undertaken by
the court. See Addendum 12 at 10, R. 2207 (stating that the Court did not "know
anything about the Ellis case" and that "every trial is a different event"). The Ellis case
was substantially similar to our case. Both cases involved nearly identical water heaters
manufactured by American, where flammable vapors were ignited by pilot lights located
near the floor causing bum injures. Ms. Alarid advised the court that Ellis was
substantially similar to the present case and that American did have a similar motive and
opportunity to develop Moore's prior testimony. See Addendum 8 at 27, R. 2206.
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Furthermore, Mr. Moore was actually extensively examined at trial by
American. See Addendum 30 at 75-144. In fact, American performed a thorough crossexamination of Moore during the Ellis trial. See Addendum 30 at 75-144. Moore had
also been prepared by American for five to six hours prior to testifying at trial.
Addendum 29, R. 1358-59, 1438-43.
Fourth, the party against whom the former testimony is offered had the
opportunity to develop the testimony at the prior proceeding by direct, cross, or redirect
examination of the declarant. Here, as discussed above, American not only had the
motivation and opportunity but did in fact develop Mr. Moore's testimony in the prior
proceeding.
Finally, the former testimony was given under oath or sworn affirmation,
and the Moore deposition and trial transcripts were taken in compliance with law.
All of the requirements of Rule 804 are clearly satisfied here, and the
district court erred when it ruled that Mr. Moore's former testimony was inadmissible.
Ms. Alarid sought to introduce the former generic, non case specific, testimony of Moore
to demonstrate what American knew about the dangers of its water heaters, and cited
Foster v. Koeler for the proposition that former testimony of Defendant's expert taken in
another lawsuit is admissible in a subsequent trial. Foster v. Koeler, 779 P.2d 272, 276
(Wash. Ct. App. 1989). The Foster court concluded that the deposition fits within the
exception to the hearsay rule since the declarant was unavailable, the deposition had been
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taken in compliance with the law, and the prior proceeding had been similar in nature. Id.
at 276.
The court in Foster went on to explain that even though Plaintiff was not a
"predecessor in interest" at the time of the prior deposition, and the time frame of the
incidents were different, and defendant admitted that counsel in the prior action had no
similar motive to fully develop the testimony, the plaintiff did have a similar opportunity
to develop the testimony. IdL at 276-77. The court found that "[n]othing in the record
suggests that his (deponents) conclusion would have been different if counsel had been
examining him vigorously." Id at 277.
There is nothing in the record here to suggest that what Mr. Moore said he
knew at the time of the Ellis trial would have been any different at our trial. Furthermore,
American had the ability to bring Mr. Moore to our trial to testify. Addendum 10 at
Ex. D at 1-3, 38-43, R. 1830-38 and Ex. F, R. 1873-76. Because Mr. Moore was
unavailable at the time of trial, the trial judge was required by Utah Rule of Evidence 804
to determine whether the Ellis case was similar to our case such that American had a
similar motive and opportunity to examine Mr. Moore. The court's failure to make such
an examination is error.
The issue of whether American was similarly motivated to examine Mr.
Moore is moot since Mr. Moore was in fact vigorously examined by American at the time
he testified. The substance of Moore's trial testimony in Ellis was so generic as to the
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knowledge American had that it was unlikely to be different at our trial. Arguably
Moore's recollection of knowledge he gained while employed as Vice President of safety
engineering by American was fresher at the time of the Ellis trial than it would have been
in our case. Addendum 12 at 7, R. 2207.
The Moore trial testimony falls squarely within the purposes of Rule 804
and his trial transcript should have been admitted as evidence in our trial. The district
court found that Moore's testimony was highly relevant and probative and if the court
erred it certainly was prejudicial error. The ruling of the district court should be reversed.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF MS- ALARID'S MOTION
TO REOPEN DISCOVERY TO TAKE MOORE'S DEPOSITION
WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
In Andrew v. Bradshaw the court ordered a telephonic deposition two

weeks before trial where counsel had claimed not to receive a witness and exhibit list.
Andrews v. Bradshaw, 895 P.2d 973, 974 (Alaska 1995). The deposition was ultimately
not taken due to the failure of the attorneys to cooperate. Id at 976. "By precluding
Andrews from testifying, the trial court imposed severe sanctions for the unexcused
inaction of plaintiff s counsel." Id. at 977. "In the process, however, the court allowed
Bradshaw to reap a windfall benefit from his own counsel's equally unjustified-and
evidently-tactical inaction." Id at 977. The discovery process is meant to promote the
search for truth, not to reward gamesmanship." Id
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Here, American was aware of the former testimony of their employee Mr.
Moore given at the trial of Ellis to which they were party defendants. Ms. Alarid put
American on notice of her intentions to use the former testimony of Moore and ultimately
listed Moore on her witness list and the deposition and trial transcript of Moore and the
depositions of Carbone and Berkely on her Exhibit list. (A copy of Ms. Alarid's Exhibit
List is attached hereto as Addendum 34, R. 2006-25.) The trial court did not conclusively
find that there would be any prejudice to American if Moore's deposition were taken after
the discovery cut-off but prior to trial. Addendum 8 at 10-12, R. 2206. Nonetheless, the
court would not permit Ms. Alarid to take the deposition of Moore because the discovery
cut-off had passed. Addendum 12 at 31-33, R. 2207. Ms. Aland's request to take
Moore's deposition was made immediately following the court's ruling that his former
testimony was inadmissible. Addendum 8 at 28, R. 2206, 2212; Addendum 12 at 16-17,
35-37, R. 2207.
In the present case, Ms. Alarid had Noticed the deposition of Moore on
February 14, 2000. Addendum 3, R. 1468-71. American instructed Ms. Alarid not to
contact Moore directly. Addendum 4, R. 1473-74, 1476-77. American advised that they
would try to get Moore to appear for deposition voluntarily. Addendum 4, R. 1473-74,
1476-77. Ms. Alarid learned, following the September 17, 2001 hearing, that American
provided Mr. Moore's attorneys on cases where American were named parties,
Addendum 10 at Ex. D at 38, R. 1833, and Ex. F, R. 1873-76, and that Moore was on
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American's payroll for giving deposition testimony, Addendum 10 at Ex. D at 41-42,
R. 1836-37; and that Moore always made himself available for depositions when
requested to do so by American, Addendum 29 at 26, R. 1358. Ms. Alarid also learned
after the September 17, 2001 hearing that Moore would be present at American's office
on October 10, 2001 to prepare five to six hours for his deposition in another matter on
October 11, 2001. Addendum 4, R. 1473-74, 1476-77; Addendum 29 at 24, R. 1358.
Ms. Alarid attempted to schedule the Moore deposition immediately before or following
that deposition. Addendum 4, R. 1473-74, 1476-77; Addendum 10 at Ex. D, R. 1830-38,
andEx.F,R. 1873-76.
American represented to the district court that Moore would have
voluntarily appeared for deposition if given sufficient notice. Addendum 4, R. 1473-74,
1476-77. American should not be rewarded for its gamesmanship. American's attorney
sent a letter to the opposing counsel in Nolan regarding a deposition of Mr. Moore.
Addendum 10 at Ex. F, R. 1873-74. American stated that they had the "authority to
voluntarily produce him [Mr. Moore] for deposition in this case without the necessity of
service of a deposition subpoena," and then cautioned that service of process 4Cwould be
harrasive [sic]." Addendum 10 at Ex. F, R. 1873-74. They were given over one and onehalf years of notice to present Moore for deposition. American always had the ability to
control Moore and obtain his cooperation to appear at deposition. Addendum 10 at
Ex. D, R. 1830-38 and Ex. F, R. 1873-74; Addendum 29 at 26 R. 1358. Furthermore,
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Moore, who was on the payroll of American was an employee, and was therefore required
to appear at deposition. Addendum 10 at Ex. D at 41-42, R. 1836-37. This would make
Moore's testimony that of a party-opponent under Utah Rule of Evidence 801(2)(C) and
(D). Addendum 10 at Ex. D, R. 1830-38, and Ex. F, R. 1873-76; Addendum 12 at 4-5,
R.2207.
On October 31, 2001, the district court ruled that Mr. Moore's statements
while employed by American were statements by a party-opponent and were therefore
admissible. Addendum 21 at 129-30, R. 2208.
In the present case, American made no showing of prejudice were Moore's
deposition to have been taken. Addendum 12 at 32, R. 2207. The testimony of Moore
was highly relevant, probative and material to the issues of product defect and
American's knowledge of same. Addendum 12 at 31-32, 39, R. 2207. Without this
evidence the jury did not find that a defect in the product existed. Addendum 28. The
taking of Moore's deposition when requested six weeks before trial on the heels of the
court's ruling excluding his former testimony and again two weeks before trial to simply
read his former testimony into a new deposition was certainly reasonable, and would have
caused no prejudice to American, who knew of the contents of the testimony long before
the discovery cut-off. In view of the critical nature of the testimony, the decision of the
district court should be reversed.

31

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IH.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
EXCLUDING AND/OR LIMITING THE TESTIMONY OF EXPERT
WITNESSES JOSEPH FANDEY AND JEFF LONG
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
EXCLUDING CERTAIN SIGNIFICANT EXHIBITS RELIED
UPON BY EXPERT WITNESS JOSEPH FANDEY AND BY
LIMITING HIS TESTIMONY

Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 703 states,
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or
made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence.
Utah Rules of Evidence 703.
Utah Rules of Evidence 702 further states, "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Utah
Rules of Evidence 702.
It has often been held that "[ojnce the expert is qualified by the court, the
witness may base his opinion on reports, writings or observations not in evidence which
were made or compiled by others, so long as they are of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in that particular field. The opposing party may challenge the suitability or
reliability of such materials on cross-examination, but such challenge goes to the weight
32

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to be given the testimony, not to its admissibility." Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,
682 P.2d 832, 839 (Utah 1984) (citing State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982)).
An expert's opinion may be based upon hearsay statements contained in a
report where the source of the information is "trustworthy, reliable, and of necessity."
Lvnn v. Helitec Corp., 698 P.2d 1283, 1287 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). "Trustworthiness
comes from external indicia of reliability, such as a routine and customary business
record or preparation of a report by a disinterested, expert third party." Id The Lynn
court pointed out that the "[f]acts or data, not admitted or inadmissible, on which experts
may rely may be revealed to the trier of fact not as substantive evidence but to show the
basis of the expert's opinion." Id In the present case, Joseph Fandey and Jeff Long were
qualified as experts. The Court would not permit Mr. Fandey to testify about the data he
relied upon in forming his opinions. Addendum 8 at 29-32, R. 2206; Addendum 9,
R. 1981-83; Addendum 21 at 13, R. 2208.
Mr. Fandey had personal knowledge of American's labeling participation,
attendance at meetings and participation at GAMA and knowledge of GAMA minutes of
meetings and ANSI committee meetings including those where American were present.
Addendum 21 at 62, R. 2208. Expert Fandey reviewed memorandum of Moore and the
McFarland-A.D. Little study, and he knew Moore in context with his work with CPSC
and personally observed Moore at committee meetings on behalf of American.
Addendum 21 at 65, 67, R. 2208. Mr. Fandey worked at CPSC as Senior Engineer and
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then Branch Chief over the safety of gas water heaters. Addendum 21 at 84-87, R. 2208.
Mr. Fandey and Moore were present at the water heater sub-committee meeting on
November 13 where Ed Downing made a presentation and provided Moore with a report.
Addendum 21 at 100, 101, 104, 118, R. 2208. The Court ruled that the report was
inadmissible hearsay, and that the NFPA study was inadmissible hearsay. Addendum 21
at 104, 114, 115, 118, R. 2208. Documents provided by Downing (reports, photos) were
ruled inadmissible hearsay based on Utah Rule of Evidence 803(6) despite Ms. Aland's
argument that they were not used to prove the truth of the matter but just to show
American's notice. Addendum 21 at 119, R. 2208. A video demonstration demonstrating
a feasible fix to the problem was ruled inadmissible hearsay, Addendum 21 at 124, R.
2208, as was the CALSPAN Report finding that it would be used to show the truth of the
matter asserted and was not a government publication. Addendum 21 at 156, 158, 159, R.
2208. The Gas Heating System Report of 1982 was ruled inadmissible. Addendum 21 at
164-66, R. 2208. An offer of proof made regarding all the evidence ruled inadmissible.
Addendum 21 at 189, R. 2208.
Other documents were reviewed by Ms. Aland's experts Joseph Fandey and
John Hoffman whom relied upon these documents in forming the basis for their opinions
in this case. Addendum 19, R. 1376 and Utah R. Evid. 703. These reports were reliable,
trustworthy, prepared by a third party disinterested in this lawsuit and of the type
routinely relied upon by experts in the field and as such Ms. Aland's experts should have
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been permitted to testify about this data at trial. Ms. Alarid was substantially prejudiced
by the exclusion of this evidence at trial. The outcome of the case would have likely been
in favor of the Ms. Alarid if the jury would have heard a discussion of this evidence by
the experts.
Furthermore, this evidence falls under the exceptions to the hearsay
Rule 803, public records and business exception. It also falls under Rule 803(24), in that
it is generally trustworthy.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ALSO ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
BY LIMITING THE TESTIMONY OF FIRE INVESTIGATOR
JEFF LONG

The fire incident report was provided to American and was listed in Ms.
Alarid's Exhibit List long before trial, see Addendum 34, R. 2006-25; Addendum 21 at 6,
7, 9, 10, R. 2208, and referred to in depositions taken years before trial and listed in
Expert Hoffman's report November 16, 1999. American also saw the narrative report
attached thereto. Addendum 21 at 9-10, R. 2208. American never took the depositions of
any persons listed as those preparing the Fire Incident Report. Long's name did not
appear on the report and Ms. Alarid did not learn that Jeff Long prepared the report until
the subpoena was served on the individual whose name did appear on the report.
Addendum 21 at 7-10, R. 2208.
The trial judge ruled that Long, although a fire origin expert, could not
testify about his conclusions of the cause and origin of the fire and therefore excised out
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all the conclusions stated in the report. Addendum 21 at 12-14, 21-22, R. 2208. Nor was
Long permitted to testify about the significance of the photos, nor about his conclusions
about which water heater had the most damage nor as to the greatest area of fire damage
on the landing. Addendum 21 at 37-38, 41-42, 44-45, R. 2208.
The judge's ruling was based upon the fact that Ms. Alarid did not name
Jeff Long as a witness. American did not make a specific showing of how they would
have been prejudiced if Jeff Long was permitted to testify in accordance with the contents
of the report which American had long before trial, although the Court concluded that
prejudice would exist because they weren't able to question him before trial, Addendum
21 at 13, R. 2208, even though no deposition was ever taken of the fire investigators
named on the report. The Washington Court of Appeals held in a product liability case
where a witness was not disclosed in accordance with a pretrial order that "[i]t is only
where willful noncompliance substantially prejudices the opponent's ability to prepare for
trial that the exclusion of evidence is within the trial court's discretion." Foster v.
Fibreboard Corp. (In re Estate of Foster). 779 P.2d 272, 274 (Wash. 1989) (citing
Hampson v. Ramer. 737 P.2d 298 (Wash. 1987)).
The judge's ruling substantially prejudiced Ms. Aland's likelihood of
prevailing at trial.
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IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
WHEN IT REQUIRED MS. ALARID TO ELECT A SINGLE
THEORY OF RECOVERY TO PRESENT TO THE JURY
Ms. Alarid alleged multiple causes of action against American in her

complaint. Addendum 2, R. 1-13. The district court, at the close of Ms. Alarid's and
American's case, required Ms. Alarid to elect a single theory of liability to submit to the
jury over Plaintiff?Appellant's objection. Addendum 2, R. 1-13; Addendum 35,
R. 2043-46.
The Utah Supreme Court held that "where more than one cause of action is
submitted to the jury, if one of the causes of action is error free, is supported by
substantial evidence and provides an appropriate basis for the general verdict, we will
affirm that verdict." Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1984)
(citing Leigh Furniture & Carpet v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 301-02 (Utah 1982)). "The Utah
Supreme Court had previously ruled that the doctrine of election of remedies
"presupposes a choice between inconsistent remedie." Roval Resources Inc. v. Gibralter
Financial Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979). The "[pjurpose is not to prevent
recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single wrong." Id, (citing
25 Am Jur. 2d, Election of Remedies, section 2).
In this case, Ms. Alarid should have been permitted to present negligence
and strict liability theories to the jury since both were supported by the evidence.
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V.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY
NOT PERMITTING MS. ALARID'S PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLAIM
TO BE PRESENTED TO THE JURY
The United States Supreme Court held that mere compliance with statutory

regulations does not bar a finding of recklessness nor an award of punitive damages.
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.. 104 S. Ct. 615, 626 (U.S. 1985). "Industry standards are
merely a minimal standard that may be considered but is not conclusive." Zacher v. The
Budd Co.. 396 N.W.2d 122 (S.D. 1986); see also Restatement of Torts 2d § 288(c);
Salmon v. Parke Davis and Co.. 520 F.2d 1359, 1366 (4th Cir. 1975); Raymond v. Riegel
Textile Corp.. 484 F.2d 1025, 1027 (1 st Cir. 1973). Compliance with federal safety
standards does not preclude an award of punitive damages as a matter of law. Dorsey v.
Honda. 655 F.2d 650, 658 (5th Cir. 1981). When there are dangers of which the
manufacturer is aware, meeting federal standards will not bar a finding of liability.
Grundbere v. Upiohn Co.. 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 199 n.
"Compliance with industry standards does not constitute an absolute
defense in a product liability action." Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp.. 544 F.2d 442, 447
(10* Cir. 1976). Punitive damages are appropriate for conduct which is willful and
malicious or that manifests a knowing and reckless disregard toward the rights of others.
Lake Phileas Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co.. 845 P.2d 951,959 (Utah Ct. App.
1993). "Manufacturers have a powerful hold over the means for discovering and
correcting product hazards." Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.. 297 N.W.2d 727, 732 (Minn.
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1980). "Through the processes of design, testing, inspection and collection of data on
product safety performance in the field, the manufacturer has virtually exclusive access to
much of the information necessary for the effective control of dangers facing product
consumers." Id. at 732, 733. Compliance with a federal standard does not preclude an
award of punitive damages. Id at 734, 735.
In our case, the evidence showed that gas-fired water heaters were injuring
at least 300 people per year, year after year. Addendum 25 at 13-14, R. 2211. The
50 million water heaters in use is a constant number. Over the years thousands of people
have been injured by water heaters. (CALSPAN reports would also have shown many
fires and property damage over and above actual injuries.) It was certain that people will
be injured each year by gas-fired water heaters designed like American's product. The
fact that American's water heaters met minimum federal standards is not a defense to
punitive damages, where American knew of the dangers of their product and continued to
market their product willfully with a knowing and reckless indifference and disregard of
the safety of those coming in contact with their product. The court committed error by
refusing to allow Ms. Alarid to submit the matter of punitive damages to the jury.
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VI.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY
NOT GIVING A SUMMERS v. TICE INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY
ON THE ISSUE OF CAUSATION
Where the evidence established that either of the two water heaters

manufactured by American (jointly) could have caused the fire herein a Summers v. Tice
instruction should have been given to the jury. Addendum 26 at 7, R. 2209; Addendum
27 at 12, R. 2210. The two remaining defendants in the case at the time of trial were the
two companies, and the fire was evidenced to be caused by either of the two water heaters
manufactured by these companies.
Up until the eve of trial they were represented jointly as one Defendant.
Addendum 31, R. 1766-69; Addendum 32, R. 2026; Addendum 36, R. 2078-91. (A copy
of the Order Pro Hac Vice is attached hereto as Addendum 33, R. 136-37, 183-84.) Ms.
Alarid was ambushed by the Court's separating the two Defendants at trial, thus
necessitating the Summers instruction request.
In this situation as in Summers, where two or more persons are possibly the
sole cause of a harm, the defendant has the burden of proving that the other person was
the sole cause of the harm. See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). In this case
where the issue of actual cause is limited to the two water heaters, the application of
Summers is appropriate. Additionally, where American is in reality one and the same
company, it is unjust to allow American to escape liability by hiding behind that veil and
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maintaining that Ms. Alarid can not say which of the two water heaters was the cause of
the fire.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's refusal to admit the former trial testimony of Henry Jack
Moore was prejudicial as noted by the court. The testimony demonstrated the dangers of
the water heaters known by American and of the means of reducing or eliminating the
dangers.
Moore was actually extensively examined by American in Ellis. His
testimony met all requirements of Utah Rule of Evidence 804 for former testimony.
American should not be rewarded gamesmanship in obstructing the taking of Moore's
deposition. American controlled Moore-technically Moore was still an employee of
American who paid him $150 an hour from portal to portal to testify at depositions at the
time he testified in Fulmer and Ellis. As such, his former testimony is a party admission
under Utah Rule of Evidence 801(2)(C) and (D). The Court should have at least allowed
Ms. Alarid to take the deposition of Moore weeks before the trial (Moore was at
American's counsel's office on October 11, 2001) and allowed Ms. Alarid to read the trial
transcript of Moore into a deposition in the Alarid matter.
The Court erred by limiting of testimony and exhibits relied upon by the
experts in forming the basis of their opinions severely prejudiced Ms. Alarid.
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Plaintiff was entitled to present negligence and strict liability theories to the
jury.
Punitive damages were appropriate where American knew of the dangers of
its water heater and continued to sell. Meeting the Federal Standards is not a bar to
punitive damages. Where a person a day for the past 20 years is severely burned in gasfired water heater fires, there is a substantial likelihood of continued harm to the public.
Where American ambushed Alarid on the eve of trial by separating into two
separate defendants, this error necessitated a Summers instruction-where cause of the fire
is limited to the two water heaters and at issue.
Relief sought is reversal of the trial courts orders and judgment by the jury
and remand for a new trial with instructions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20 T H day of June, 2002.

MITCHEL ZAGER ~ / J A
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appelant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 20th day of June, 2002,1 caused to be mailed,
through the U.S. mail, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellate Brief to the
following:
John R. Lund
Snow Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellee American Water Heater Co.
Michael S. Sutton
Sutton & Murphy
26056 Acero
Mission Viejo, California 82691
Attorneys for Appellee American Appliance Manufacturing, Inc.
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SALT LAKE COUNTY FIRE DEPARTMENT
Investigations Division
Investigation Report Narrative
Details:
On July 8, 1996 at approximately 1158 hours I responded to a fire at 936 South Lincoln Street m
Salt Lake City, Utah. Upon our arrival we met with one of the on scene fire captains who
informed us that two individuals had been injured by the fire and had been transported via
ambulance to the University of Utah Medical Center.
Investigator Long assigned me to respond to the University Medical Center and attempt to
interview each of the injured parties regarding what had happened at the fire. I arrived at the
hospital at approximately 1220 hours an went to the emergency room. The emergency room staff
was working on two of the fire victims Ms. Anna Maria Alared, 03-17-66, and her father Mr.
Rudolph Gomez, 10-14-44.
As I was waiting for the medical personnel to finish so that I could interview Gomez and Alared I
saw Captain Devin Villa of the Salt Lake City Fire Department enter the emergency room
escorted by two ambulance personnel. Tasked Villa if he had been at the fire on Lincoln Street
and he told me that he had. I then asked Villa if he could tell me what he saw when he arrived.
Villa told mc that he and his crew were in the area returning from another assignment when they
heard the call go out of a structure fire at 936 South Lincoln Street. He and his crew responded
from "just around the corner''. When they arrived they"saw smoke and flames coming from and
alcove at the entry way to the apartments. They "also saw two victims of the fire King on the
ground. One female and one male victim. After seeing that these victims were being taken care of
they began rescue and suppression operations. At one point during these activities, Villas slipped
and fell in the stairwell grabbing the stairway rail. This caused the burn to his hand.
At approximately 1230 hours I met with Ms. Avelina Gomez, 03-04-45, the wife of Rudolph
Gomez. She told me that she had been at the apartments and was in her apartment when she
heard her husband yelling. She ran over to see her husband pulling her daughter Anna Maria
down the stairs as she was on fire. Gomez told mc she could see that her daughters face, arms
and feet were on fire. Gomez ran over to her daughter and husband who were then on the ground
and attempted to put out the fire on her daughter with her own hands. Ms. Gomez was treated
and released from the University Medical Center for burns to her hands.
At approximately 1250 hours I met with Mr. Rudolph Gomez who was being treated by
emergency room starf at the University Medical Center Gomez told me the following. He is the
manager of the apartment complex. He, his daughter and the owner of the apartments were
installing outdoor carpet on che stairwells and landings of the apartments using adhesive.
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Investigation Report Narrative.
His daughter was standing at the top of the stairwell in the-landing area while he was laying the
carpet about three quarters of the way up the vstairwell. He heard a sound and iooked up to sec fire
coming from under the door to the left at the top of the. stairwell. The next thing he knew there
was fire coming out from under the door onto the landing area. He could not believe how fast it
spread. He yelled to his daughter Anna Maria to run down the stairs. She did not move and told <
him that she was afraid. He ran up to her a grabbed ber. By this time she had caught fire. He
grabbed her and pulled her toward him causing them both to fall down the stairs. They landed at
the bottom of the stairs on the ground. He could see that his daughter was on fire so he attempted
to put the fire out with his hands. Gomez told me that he was aware that the adhesive was
flammable but he was sure that no one was-smoking. He-to Id me that the doors at the top of the
stairwell enter into small rooms where tha water heater and heaters are located. He told me that
he did not know the name of the adhesive, but he did know that it was carpet adhesive.
At approximately 1330 hours 1 returned to the scene and met with the owner of the apartments
Mr. Kent Nelson, who told me the following. He had bought the materials for he and Mr. Gomez
to carpet some of the stair wells and landings. Nelson told me that he had purchased a carpet
adhesive by the name of Henry's Outdoor Carpet Adhesive. Nelson told me that he was away
from the area being working at the time the'fire first started, but he ran over after hearing some of
the commotion in time to see Gomez and Alared failing onto the ground. He thought he could see
them on fire.

End of report.
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MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968
Attorney for Plaintiff
3587 West 4700 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
Telephone (801)964-6100
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—ooOoo—
ANNA MARIE ALARID,
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No

P§&&339-

AMERICAN APPLIANCE MANUFACTURING, INC., a California
Corporation, AMERICAN WATER HEATER
CO., a Nevada Corporation, INSTALLATION
PRODUCTS DIVISION OF ARMSTRONG
WORLD INDUSTRIES, INC., a Pennsylvania
Corporation, and EAGLE HARDWARE &
GARDEN, INC., a Washington Corporation, and DOES I through 25,
Inclusive,

Judge ^ x T \ > a

Defendants.
—ooOoo—

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Anna Marie Alarid, by and through her attorney Mitchel
Zager, and complains and alleges against defendants as follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. For all causes of action hereinafter stated, plaintiff invokes the jurisdiction of the
Court under section 78-3-4, Utah Code Annotated 1997.
2. Venue is proper pursuant to section 78-13-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
3. The amount in controversy, exclusive of costs, exceeds $25,000.
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DESCRIPTION OF THE PARTIES
4. At all times pertinent herein Plaintiff, Anna Marie Alarid, was, and is now a resident
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
5. Defendant American Appliance Manufacturing Corporation (hereinafter referred to
as "American Appliance"), is a California Corporation, and at all times herein was, in the
business of manufacturing water heaters to be sold to the public throughout the Continental
United States, and was doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
6. Defendant American Water Heater Co. (hereinafter referred to as "American") is, and
at all material times hereto was, a Nevada Corporation, in the business of manufacturing water
heaters to be sold to the public throughout the Continental United States, and was doing business
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
7. The Installation Products Division of Armstrong, World Industries, Inc., (hereinafter
referred to as "Armstrong") is, and at all material times hereto was a corporation in the business
of manufacturing carpet adhesives to be sold to the public throughout the Continental United
States, and was doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
8. Defendant Eagle Hardware & Garden, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as "Eagle") is,
and at all material times hereto was, a Washington Corporation, in the business of selling,
among other items, carpet adhesives to be sold to the public throughout the Continental United
States, and was authorized to do business and doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
9. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of defendants sued herein as
DOES I through 25, inclusive, and therefore sues these defendants by such fictitious names.
Plaintiff will amend this complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained.
(
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Plaintiff is informed and believe and thereon alleges that each of the fictitiously named
rN
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'
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defendants are responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged, and causetjthe
V...

damages to plaintiff as hereinafter alleged. Plaintiff will ask leave of Court to amend this
Complaint by setting forth same.
10. Defendants DOES I through 25, inclusive, at all times relevant herein were the
agents, servants and employees, each of the other and in doing the things hereinafter alleged
were acting within the course and scope of such agency and employment and with the permission
and consent of each other.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Strict Products Liability - Defective Design - Punitive Damages)
AGAINST DEFENDANTS AMERICAN APPLIANCE AND AMERICAN
11. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1
through 10 above as though fully set forth herein.
12. Defendants are, and at all times relevant herein were, engaged in the business of
designing, testing, formulating, manufacturing, assembling, selling, leasing and/or distributing
hot water heaters, among other products, for use by members of the general public.
13. As part of it's business, defendants, American Appliance and American, designed,
tested, manufactured, assembled and sold, leased, and/or distributed the water heater, a 40
gallon American Appliance, Serial number 9102311484 on or before July 8, 1996 in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, and installed at 940 South Lincoln Street, Salt Lake City, State of Utah.
14. As part of it's business, defendants, American and American Appliance, designed,
tested, manufactured, assembled and sold, leased, and/or distributed the 40 gallon U. S.
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Craftsmaster water heater Serial Number 944930189A on or before July 8, 1996 in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, and installed at 940 Lincoln Street, Salt Lake City, State of Utah.
15. All times relevant herein, said defendants, American Appliance and American and
each of them, knew and intended that the products would be purchased by members of the
general public and used by them and others without inspection for defects therein. No changes
nor modifications had been made to the Defendant's water heaters.
16. Defendants, American and American Appliance, designed, manufactured, tested,
sold, leased and distributed their products in such a way that they were defective and not fit for
use by the general public including, but not limited to their failure to raise the pilot lighter a safe
distance from the floor. As such, the defective products were inherently dangerous to the
Plaintiff and other users and/or consumers and defective when they left the defendants'
manufacturing plants.
17. On or about July 8, 1996, at approximately 11:27 a.m., plaintiff, Anna Marie
Alarid, was applying adhesive cement while laying carpet in a reasonably foreseeable manner
at 940 Lincoln Street, Salt Lake City, State of Utah. The pilot lights on both the side by side
American Appliance and American water heaters were on. Within moments after applying the
adhesive cement the product's active vapors ignited from the defendants' waterheaters' pilot
lights causing an explosion and flash fire, burning the body of plaintiff, Anna Marie Alarid.
18. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing described defects, plaintiff, Anna
Marie Alarid, sustained serious and permanent injuries to her health, strength and activity,
severe shock to her nervous system, severe burns to large portions of her head, face and entire
body, all of which has caused, and continues to cause plaintiff to suffer extreme physical and

4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mental pain and suffering in an amount to be proven at trial.
19. As a further, direct and proximate result of the defective water heaters and incident,
plaintiff, Anna Marie Alarid, was required to, and did, employ and continue to employ
physicians, surgeons and others for medical examination, treatment and care of said injuries, and
did incur medical and incidental expenses in an amount according to proof.
20. As a further direct and proximate result of the defective water heaters and incident,
plaintiff will incur future medical and incidental expenses for the care and treatment of said
injuries in an amount to be proven at trial.
21. As a further direct and proximate result of the defective water heaters and incident
plaintiff has lost past wages in an amount according to proof.
22. As a further direct and proximate result of the defective water heaters plaintiff has
lost her future earning capacity in an amount according to proof.
23. Prior to distribution of defendants' American Appliance and American water heaters,
defendants failed to utilize the state-of-technology that was available at the time of manufacture
for a pilot lighter raised to a safe distance above the floor. Defendants American Appliance and
American, chose to use less expensive, dangerous water heaters susceptible to causing fires when
heavy fumes from carpet adhesives travelled to their pilot lights.
24. Notwithstanding this knowledge, said defendants, in wilful, reckless and conscious
disregard of the safety of such persons, and plaintiff herein, wilfully, wantonly, knowingly and
recklessly, designed, tested, formulated, manufactured, sold and distributed these defective and
inherently dangerous water heaters with pilots unsafely close to the floor, causing plaintiffs
injuries as heretofore described. As a result of said defendant's wilful conduct, plaintiff is
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therefore, entitled to an award of exemplary or punitive damages in an amount calculated to
deter and punish said defendants, as well as prejudgment interest as prescribed by Utah law upon
any and all damages suffered by plaintiff as stated herein.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Strict Product Liability - Punitive Damages)
AGAINST DEFENDANT ARMSTRONG
25.

Plaintiff hereby incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 10 above as though fully set forth herein.
26. Defendant Armstrong is, and at all times herein mentioned was, engaged in the
business of designing, testing, formulating, manufacturing, selling and /or distributing carpet
adhesive including a product used by Plaintiff known as Henry 263 carpet adhesive, with the
name W. W. Henry Co. on the 3 1/2 gallon container (hereinafter referred to as the "carpet
adhesive") for use by members of the general public prior to July 8, 1996, to Defendant Eagle.
27. At all times material herein, Defendant Armstrong knew and intended that the
product would be purchased by members of the general public and used by them and others
without inspection for defects therein.
28.

Defendant Armstrong designed, manufactured, tested, formulated, sold and

distributed the carpet adhesive in such a way that it was defective and not fit for use by the
general public. Defendant used a defective formula by designing a carpet adhesive that was
extremelyflammablewhen safer non-extremely flammable formulas were available. As such,
the Defendant's carpet adhesive was inherently dangerous to the consumer and defective as tested
and formulated when it left the Defendant manufacturer.
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29. Defendant's language on the carpet adhesive container was inadequate and defective
and failed to adequately warn users, like Plaintiff, of the extremely flammable nature of the
carpet adhesive, and of a specific safe distance to keep away from flames.
30. The defendant's carpet adhesive had not been changed nor modified at the time of
the subject incident.
31. On or about July 8, 1996, Plaintiff, an inexperienced user, was applying the carpet
adhesive outdoors in a reasonably foreseeable manner and using the carpet adhesive for it's
intended purpose of securing carpet.
32. Within moments of Plaintiffs use of the carpet adhesive the fumes from the carpet
adhesive ignited with the pilot lights of Defendants' water heaters causing a fire which burned
a portion of the premise and Plaintiff.
33. Plaintiff did not know that the carpet adhesive was defective.
34. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing described defects, plaintiff, Anna
Marie Alarid, sustained serious and permanent injuries to her health, strength, activity, severe
shock to her nervous system, severe burns to large portions of her head, face and entire body,
all of which has caused, and continues to cause plaintiff to suffer extreme physical and mental
pain and suffering in an amount to be proven at trial.
35.

As a further, direct and proximate result of the defective carpet adhesive and

incident, plaintiff, Anna Marie Alarid, was required to and did employ and continue to employ
physicians, surgeons and others for medical examination, treatment and care of said injuries, and
did incur medical and incidental expenses in an amount according to proof.
36. As a further direct and proximate result of the defective carpet adhesive and incident
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plaintiff will incur future medical and incidental expenses for the care and treatment of said
injuries in an amount to be proven at trial,
37. As a further direct and proximate result of the defective carpet adhesive and incident
plaintiff has lost past wages in an amount according to proof.
38. As a further direct and proximate result of the defective carpet adhesive plaintiff has
lost her future earning capacity in an amount according to proof.
39. At all times material hereto, defendant Armstrong knew that the carpet adhesive
contained extremely flammable and highly dangerous ingredients.
40. Prior to distribution defendant failed to ensure that it's product was not distributed
to the unassuming general public, like plaintiff, who was unaware of the highly dangerous
propensities of this carpet adhesive.
41. Notwithstanding defendant's knowledge, defendant, in wilful and conscious disregard
for the safety of such persons and plaintiff herein, wilfully, wantonly and recklessly designed,
tested, formulated, manufactured and distributed this defective and inherently dangerous product
causing plaintiff s injuries as heretofore described.
42. As a direct result of defendant's wilful conduct, plaintiff is therefore entitled to an
award of exemplary or punitive damages in an amount calculated to punish and deter said
defendant.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Strict Product Liability - Punitive Damages)
AGAINST DEFENDANT EAGLE
43.

Plaintiff hereby incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in
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paragraphs 1 through 10 and 25 through 38, inclusive, as though fully set forth herein.
44. On or before July 8, 1996, Defendant Eagle at it's location 203 West 9000 South,
Sandy, Utah, was in the business of selling products including Defendant Armstrong's Henry
263, 3 1/2 gallon carpet adhesive to the general public.
45. Kent Nelson, a non-professional (not a licensed contractor) lay person, and member
of the general public unfamiliar with the extremely flammable and highly dangerous carpet
adhesive, purchased same on or before July 8, 1996 at Defendant Eagle's Sandy location.
46. Defendant Eagle knew prior to distributing the carpet adhesive to the general public
that the carpet adhesive was extremelyflammableand highly dangerous and was defective as
such. Despite this knowledge, defendant Eagle sold the carpet adhesive to Kent Nelson, a
member of the general public.
47.

The Plaintiff ultimately used the carpet adhesive, unaware of its extremely

flammable and highly dangerous propensities.
48. As a direct and proximate result of Plaintiffs use of the carpet adhesive she suffered
injuries and loses as described heretofore.
49. Defendant Eagle, in wilful and conscious disregard for the safety of the general
public and Plaintiff, wilfully, wantonly, and recklessly sold the product to inexperienced
persons, and as a direct result, Plaintiff, an inexperienced user, was badly burned and injured
as described heretofore.
50. As a direct result of Defendant Eagle's wilful conduct, Plaintiff is therefore entitled
to an award of exemplary or punitive damages in an amount calculated to deter and punish
defendant.
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence)
AGAINST DEFENDANTS AMERICAN APPLIANCE AND AMERICAN
51.

Plaintiff hereby incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 23 above as though fully set forth herein.
52. Defendants American Appliance and American and DOES 1 through 15 did so
negligently design, test, manufacture, formulate, inspect, label, instruct, warn and/or produce
regarding each of Defendant's water heaters thereby proximately causing Plaintiffs injuries and
damages as more fully hereinabove set forth. That the negligence of Defendants, and each of
them, includes a duty to potential users, like Plaintiff, to use due care in the manufacture of the
water heaters so that the design is safe, testing sufficient to ensure that the water heaters are
safe, warnings and instructions to it's distributors to warn customers of dangers, place proper
warnings which would attract the customers' attention to hazards of fire when within a specific
distance of adhesive contacts which are extremely flammable, and manufacture water heaters
with pilots a safe distance above the floor.
53. Defendants knew or should have foreseen that persons might useflammablecarpet
adhesive which would be ignited by its water heater pilot lights. Defendants breached their duty
to Plaintiff described above and failed to manufacture water heaters with pilots safely above the
floor, failed to provide a safe design, failed to test the water heaters to insure its' safety, failing
to instruct it's distributorships to warn consumers of it's dangers and failing to properly affix
adequate warnings in conspicuous places on the water heaters.
54.

As a direct and proximate result of defendants', and each of their
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negligence,Plaintiff was injured and damaged as hereinabove described.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence)
AGAINST DEFENDANT ARMSTRONG
55. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1
through 10 and 25 through 38 above, inclusive, as though fully set forth herein.
56. Defendants Armstrong, as a manufacturer, and DOES 16 through 20, and seller of
adhesive cement owed a duty of due care to the general public, of which Plaintiff was at all
times material herein a member to adequately design, test, manufacture, inspect, label, instruct
and warn regarding the 3 1/2 gallon container of Henry 263 carpet adhesive.
57. Defendants breached their duty to Plaintiff when they negligently designed the
chemical formulation of the carpet adhesive, negligently failed to test to ensure that the product
had a sufficiently high flash point to be reasonably safe for inexperienced users, negligently
failed to instruct it's distributors not to sell or provide this carpet adhesive to inexperienced users
(non-licensed contractors) negligently failed to instruct its' distributors to warn customers not
to use the product within a specific distance of water heater pilot lights, and negligently failed
to properly design adequate warnings which would attract the consumers attention to the
extremely flammable nature of the carpet adhesive, provide a specific safe distance from the
water heater pilots before using and failed to describe the extremely dangerous nature of the
carpet adhesive. Defendant knew or should have known that persons might use the carpet
adhesive cement near water heaters and that flash fires could result from adhesive cement fumes
causing injury to the user and those nearby.
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58. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' breach of duty, Plaintiff was injured
and damaged as heretofore set forth above.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence)
AGAINST DEFENDANT EAGLE AND DOES 21 THROUGH 25)
59.

Plaintiff hereby incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 10 and 43 through 48 as though fully set forth herein.
60. Defendants Eagle and DOES 21 through 25 owed a duty to Plaintiff as a member
of the general public to use due care in the sale of Henry 263, 3 1/2 gallon, carpet adhesive.
61. Defendants breached their duty to Plaintiff when they negligently sold the carpet
adhesive to an inexperienced user and when they failed to warn the customer of the extremely
flammable nature of the carpet adhesive and of it's ultra hazardous propensities to ignite when
it's fiimes reach a fire source, such as a water heater pilot flame.
62. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breach of duty, an inexperienced
and uninformed purchaser passed the carpet adhesive on to plaintiff without warning and Plaintiff
was severely injured and damaged as heretofore described above.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Implied Warranty)
AGAINST DEFENDANT ARMSTRONG AND DOES 16 THROUGH 20
63. Plaintiff hereby repeats and realleges all of the allegations of her Second and Fifth
Causes of Action as though fully set forth herein.
64. In connection with it's distribution and sale of said Henry 263 3 1/2 gallon carpet
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adhesive, defendant did impliedly warrant that said product was fit and proper for the uses and
purposes for which it was intended, was of merchantable quality and was safe for use by anyone
including inexperienced users.
65. That said representations and warranties were, in fact, false and untrue in that said
carpet adhesive was not safe for use, especially by inexperienced users, was extremely
flammable, and ultra dangerous.
66. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breach of implied warranty Plaintiff
was injured and suffered damages as more fully hereinabove set forth.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Anna Marie Alarid, prays as follows:
AS AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND EACH OF THEM:
1. For general damages in an amount to be proven at trial;
2. For special damages for medical and incidental expenses, past and future, in an
amount to be proven at trial;
3. For loss of earnings, past and future, in an amount to be proven at trial;
4. For exemplary and punitive damages in an amount calculated to punish defendants
and deter them from engaging in similar misconduct;
5. For costs of suit herein incurred;
6. For prejudgment interest on plaintiffs damages at the legal rate; and
7. For such other and further relief as this Court deems proper.
DATED this 2 7 day of May, ]998.

fitchel Zager
/)
Attorney for Plaintiff,
Anna Marie Alarid

/
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<IULMITCHEL ZAGER - 3968
3587 West 4700 South
salt Lake City, Utah 84118
Telephone (801) 964-6100
GIRARDI/KEESE
Thomas V. Girardi, Cal. BN 36603
James G. 0'Callahan, Cal. BN 126975
1126 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90017
(213) 977-0211
Attorneys for Plaintiff, ANNA MARIE ALARID
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OO0OO

ANNA MARIE ALARID,

EXPERT WITNESSES

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil NO. 980905332

AMERICAN APPLIANCE MANUFACTURING, INC., a California
Corporation, et al, and
DOES I through 25, Inclusive,

Judge ANNE M. STIRBA

Defendants.
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES,
INC.,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
W. KENT NELSON, et al.,
Third-Party Defendants.
ooOoo
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that counsel for Plaintiff, Anna
Marie Alar id, will take the deposition of Defendants' designated
expert witnesses listed below at 9:00 a.m. on the date and place
specified opposite their names, who must be present at the time and
place indicated.

Said depositions will continue from day to day
l
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until completed, Sundays and holidays excepted:
DEPONENT

DATE

^Charles Jacobsen

2/00

PIACE
jjfe03 Hamilton Springs Road, Bethesda,
Maryland

"573/00 ) GBH International, 2 Friar's Lane,
Mill Valley, California

^/Marcelo M.
Hirschler

7573 West 82nd Street, Plaza Del Ifey,
California

/ Henry Jack Moore
J John Blundell

/10/00 ^Global Investigations,Inc., 4892 S.
' Commerce Drive, Murray, "-Utah.

JJean L. McDowell

MpDowell-Owens Engineering, Inc., 1075
"KingwoodDr. , Suite 100,Kinwood,Texas

J Gary Deegear, M-D

3/14/00 diodynamic Research Corp., 9901 IH-10
--'West, Suite 1000, San Antonio, Texas

J Charles E. Morin,^
P.E *

3/15/00

^Engineering Systems, Inc., 3851
Exchange Avenue, Aurora, Illinois

/ Donald E. Wandlinc lf/16/00 handling Engineering, 923 North S&xrd
' Street, Ames, Iowa
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that request is hereby made
that said party deponents produce at the aforementioned depositions
the following documents and other things in the custody of said
party deponents and said party's attorneys, employees, agents and
investigators.
l.

Any and all reports authored by deponent in

reference to this matter.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that since deponents are designated
expert trial witnesses, each witness is request to bring his/her
deposition any and all files, notebooks or other records concerning
any activity of the witness in connection with preparation for and
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testimony during the trial of this matter•

This includes, but is

not limited to, any and all letters to or from defendant's counsel,
any and all materials supplied to the witness for examination,
consideration

and review,

any and all calculations, drawings,

diagrams, equations, or memoranda created by or used by the witness
in the course of any analysis he/she may have performed; any and
all textbooks, handbooks/ treatises, scientific articles or any
other references relied upon by the witness in reaching any opinion
held in this matter; any and all -photographs, slides, movies,
videotapes, or other graphic material viewed by the witness in
connection with his/her work on this case; any and all reports,
memoranda/ letters or other documentary materials created by the
witness (rough drafts as well as final drafts) in connection with
his analysis of this case.
All such expert witnesses are required to bring with
them and produce all reports, writings and all discoverable reports
and

writings

concerning

preparation to testify.

each

expert's

proposed

testimony

and

Non-compliance will be considered grounds

for exclusion of the witness and all of his/her testimony at the
time of trial.
DATED this /(

day of February, 2000.

[TCHEL ZAGER
Attorney for P
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CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that on this /l

>f^
day

of February, 2000, s/he served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Notice of (Defendant's) Expert Witness Depositions, on
each of the Defendants herein, by placing said copies in separate
envelopes, then placing said envelopes in the United States Mail,
postage

prepaid,

and

addressed

to

each

of

the

respective

Defendants' counsel as follows:

A/ADATED this ff
Royal I Hansen,
MOVLE & DRAPER,
City Centre I,
175 East Fourth
Salt Lake City,

day of February, 2000.

Esq.
^
P.C.
Suite 900
South
Utah 84111

John K. Mangum, Esq.
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Suite 1100
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah

Robert G. Gilchrist, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah
84110-2465
Jerrald D. Conder, Esq,
P. o. BOX 1181
Draper, Utah
84020

84111

Daniel McConkie, Esq.
KIRTON & McCONKIE
60 East South Temple,
Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Michael S. Sutton, Esq.
SUTTON & MURPHY
26056 Acero
Mission Viejo, CA
92691

John R. Lund, Esq,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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SUTTON & MURPHY
Attorneys at Law
26056 Accra
Mission Viejo, CA 92691-2765
Telephone: (949) 206-0550
Facsimile: (949) 206-0560
E-Mail: sution-murphyiSjpacbcll.net
Internet: wwwJawycrc.com/sutton&murphy

Michael S. Sutton
Thomas M. Murphy
Joseph A. Hcndrix
Patrick J. Wchage

Legal Assistants:
Laura M Johnson
Jennifer S. Fox
Lance Odcrmat

February 17,2000

Mitchcl Zager, Esq.
3587 W. 4700 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84)18
RE:

VIA FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL
& US. MAIL 801-964-6111

ALARIDVS AMERICAN APPLIANCE MANUFACTURING, INC

Dear Mr, Zager:
This correspondence will acknowledge receipt of your facsimile transmittal on February 14,
2000, wherein you asked me to "arrange to have Mr. Moore available for deposition at a place of
his convenience.'1 Further, this correspondence will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated
February 14,2000, along with your "Notice of Experts' Depositions," received in our office on
February 15,2000. Despite the fact that Mr. Moore was not designated as an expert herein, you
have purported to notice his expert deposition to proceed March 9,2000, in Plaza (sic) Del Rev,
California,
Preliminarily, please be advised that, as you know, Mr. Moore is a former employee.
Accordingly, 1 do not have any ability to require his attendance at deposition. 1 am in the process
of attempting to discern from Mr. Moore whether or not he will voluntarily present himself for
deposition at a date, time and place mutually agreed. As soon as I have discerned Mr. Moore's
position in that regard, I will so advise you.
With respect to your Notice as it relates to the truly designated defense experts, I note that you
have arbitrarily scheduled those depositions on dates where depositions have previously been
scheduled to proceed. It does not appear necessary to "double track" depositions in this case.
Therefore, I see no reason why it was necessary to double set depositions. Nonetheless, I have
now written to each of our designated experts to discern their availability for deposition in the
upcoming weeks. By virtue of the fact that the defense experts are in large part providing
rebuttal testimony to the theories, opinions and conclusions proffered by the plaintiffs experts, it
would seem only appropriate that the plaintiffs designated experts be deposed first, followed by
our experts.
As you know, given the stipulated continuance of the trial date such that this matter will now
proceed in August. 2000,1 have previously indicated a willingness to stipulate to continue the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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proceed in August, 2000,1 have previously indicated a willingness to stipulate to continue the
discovery cut-off as it relates to expert depositions for sixty (60) days. Mr. Hansen has advised
that he would be agreeable to such a continuance as well. You were going to coordinate with
Mr. Conder in this regard and I have heard nothing further from you. Perhaps this is a subject
that can be discussed by all counsel who attend Dr. Morns' deposition in Salt Lake City
tomorrow.
I am quite confident that Judge Stirba would prefer and/or insist that the attorneys work out these
scheduling matters without necessity of Court intervention. I am optimistic that wc can resolve
these deposition scheduling issues without the necessity of any Motions to Compel or Motions
for Protective Orders. However, my confidence in this regard will require your cooperative
efforts.
I look forward to bearingfromyou at your convenience.

W

Michae/s. Sutton )
/
of SUTtoN^tfMURPHY
(

MSS:kjc
cc:
John R. Lund, Esq/SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU (via fax)
Royal I. Hansen, Esq./MOYLE & DRAPER (via fax)
Robert G. Gilchrist, Esq./RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON (via fax)
Daniel S. McConkie, EsqVKlRTON & McCONKIE (via fax)
John K. Mangum, Esq./NIELSEN & SENIOR (via fax)
Jeixald D. Conder, Esq. (via fax)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SUTTON & MURPHY
Attorneys at Law

Michael S. Sutton
Thomas M. Murphy
Joseph A. Hendrix
Patrick J. Wchagc

26056 Accro
Mission Viejo, CA 92691-2768
Telephone: (949) 206-0550
Facsimile: (949) 206-0560
E-Mail; sution-murphy@pacbdl.net
Internet: www.lawycrs.com/sution&murphy

LcgaJ Assistants;
Laura M. Johnson
Jennifer K. Murray
Brian KL Waters

October 12,2000

James G. O'Callahan, Esq.
GIRARDI & KEESE
1126 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90017-1904

RE:

ALARID VS AMERICAN APPLIANCE MANUFACTURING, INC.

Dear Mr. O'Callahan;
This correspondence will acknowledge receipt of your facsimile transmittal dated October 9,
2000, as well as serve to confirm our telephone conversation of October 12,2000. I apologize
that I was not able to respond cither yesterday, or the day before, to your facsimile transmittal,
however. I have been in Philadelphia on hearings.
As I indicated to you in our telephone conversation, I am surprised at your suggestion that the
deposition of Mr. Moore needs to be scheduled. Mr. Zager had scheduled the deposition of Mr.
Moore in this case quite some time ago to proceed in California. However, he took no efforts to
have an out-of-state commission issued by the Utah Court and the deposition did not go forward
because Mr. Moore was not served with legal process. As you know, Mr. Moore is no longer
employed by any defendant in this case and, therefore, I do not have any ability to produce him
pursuant to notice.
Mr. Zager has requested on multiple prior occasions that we stipulate that deposition transcripts
of various individuals taken in other cases be used in this case with the same force and effect as
though said depositions were taken in this case. We have repeatedly declined that request.
Accordingly, I must again advise that I am unable to stipulate that you may use prior deposition
transcripts from other cases at time of trial in this case.
As we discussed, I am quite concerned that there is now a request to conduct lay witness
discovery long after discovery cut-offs have passed. As you know, there have been multiple
expert depositions all over the country at considerable expense to all concerned. It seems to me
to be quite inappropriate that any additional lay discovery from the liability perspective should
take place at this time. Clearly, I do not believe that any of us wants to incur the time, trouble
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and expense to re-depose any of the liability experts. Clearly, such a course of action would be
required if additional lay liability discovery takes place at this time.
I trust this correspondence accurately confirms the substance of our telephone conversation of
October 12, 2000, and is completely responsive to your facsimile correspondence of October 9,
2000. Should you desire to discuss this issue further, please do not hesitate to contact the
undersigned. Thank you for your continuing courtesy and cooperation herein.

MSS:kjc
cc:
John R. Lund, Esq./SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Royal 1. Hansen, Esq./MOYLE & DRAPER

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Tab 5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MICHAEL S. SUTTON
SUTTON & MURPHY
26056 Acero
Mission Viejo, California 92691
Telephone: (949)206 0550
JOHN R. LUND (A4368)
KARA L. PETTIT (A8659)
KENNETH L. REICH (A8578)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance Manufacturing
and American Water Heater Co.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ANNA MARTE ALARTD,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
AMERICAN'S MOTION IN LIMINE
REGARDING FORMER TESTIMONY

vs.
AMERICAN APPLIANCE
MANUFACTURING, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 980905332
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES,
INC.,

Judge Anne M. Stirba

Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.
W. KENT NELSON, et al.,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Third
Party Defendants.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff has indicated that she intends to offer the testimony of at least three witnesses
who were deposed or testified in a proceeding other than this one. Plaintiff has taken no fact
depositions in this case and also identifies no trial witnesses who are or were employees of
American. She apparently hopes to prove her claims of liability and punitive damages based on
testimony given at other times in other cases.
With regard to that testimony, it should not be admitted unless and until plaintiff
demonstrates that (1) the declarant has been unavailable as a witness as that term is used in Rule
804(a), Utah Rules of Evidence; (2) the document purporting to contain the testimony is properly
authenticated under Rules 901 and 902, Utah Rules of Evidence; (3) that the testimony comes
from a hearing or deposition "taken in compliance with law;" and, (4) at the time and place the
testimony was given, American had "an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony
by direct, cross, or redirect examination."1
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiffs witness list identifies four depositions, and the exhibits from those

depositions, out of a case called Ellis/Mitchell v. American Water Heater Co., which is a case filed
in Tennessee against American Water Heater Company dba Mor-Flo Industries, Inc.
2.

The first of these depositions is of a Mr. Ron Carbone who, at the time of he

deposition in November of 1998, was employed by American Water Heater Company as Senior

l

Of course the former testimony must also be relevant, non-hearsay and otherwise
admissible; however, until plaintiff specifies precisely what testimony she is offering, it is
unworkable to assert such objections.

-2-
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Vice President of Finance and Administration. Mr. Carbone came to work at American in July of
1996, well after the manufacture and sale of the water heaters at issue in Ms. Aland's case.
3.

The next deposition is of Mr. Henry Jack Moore, who was purportedly deposed in

Ellis/Mitchell on January 8, 1999. Plaintiff also identifies the trial testimony of Mr. Moore from
that case. Mr. Moore was, for many years, employed in the engineering department of American
Water Heater Company or its predecessors, acting as vice president of engineering from 1981
until 1996. Mr. Moore is no longer employed by American and had retired by the time he testified
in Ellis/Mitchell.
4.

With regard to Mr. Moore, Ms. Alarid actually did undertake to depose him in this

case. She issued a notice for that deposition to take place in Plaza Del Rey, California on March
9, 2000. However, Ms. Alarid made no arrangements for Mr. Moore to appear and was later
informed by American's counsel that American was not able to require Mr. Moore's appearance.
5.

Other than this aborted attempt to depose Mr. Moore, American is unaware of any

steps taken by Ms. Alarid or her counsel to arrange for Mr. Moore or the other declarants to be
available at the trial of this matter, or at a pre-trial deposition. Indeed, Ms. Alarid's counsel has
never asked American for information about how to reach or located these declarants.
6.

Thefinaltwo depositions proffered by plaintiff are of Ms. Deborah Hilton and Mr.

James Berkely, both purportedly taken in Ellis/Mitchell on November 17, 1999. Ms. Hilton is a
litigation assistant with custody of certain claims files and Mr. Berkeley, at the time of his
deposition, was working as a Senior Products Safety Engineer. However, Mr. Berkeley did not

-3-
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start his employment with American until May 1, 1998, long after the manufacture of the water
heaters at issue in this case.
7.

Ms. Alarid has never asked American to produce Ms. Hilton, Mr. Carbone or Mr.

Berkeley for deposition in this matter. Her counsel have traveled literally back and forth across
the country for depositions of other witnesses.
ARGUMENT
L

RULE 804 PRECLUDES THE ADMISSION OF FORMER TESTIMONY
UNLESS THE PROPONENT ESTABLISHES THAT THE DECLARANT
IS UNAVAILABLE, WHICH REQUIRES DEMONSTRATION OF A
GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO SECURE THE WITNESS' PRESENCE.
A witness is only "unavailable" under Utah law if a good faith effort was made to secure

the witness's presence at trial. State v. Oniskor. 510 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah), cert, denied. 414 U.S.
861 (1973). The Utah Supreme Court has characterized the unavailability requirement as
"stringent" and held that "in order for a witness to be constitutionally unavailable, it must be
practically impossible to produce the witness in court." State v. Webb. 779 P.2d 1108, 111.1-12
(Utah 1989).
In State v. Case. 752 P.2d 356 (Utah 1987), this rule was interpreted to mean that a
prosecutor should have utilized the available procedure for procuring the attendance of an
out-of-state witness at a criminal trial and his failure to do so meant the witness was not
"unavailable" as that term is used in Rule 804.
Likewise here, there were any number of ways for Ms. Alarid's counsel to have obtained
an order compelling out-of-state witnesses to appear and testify, if not within Utah then in their
place of residence. Given the amount of traveling done by the lawyers in this case, it would
-4-
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hardly have been an imposition for Ms. Alarid's counsel to have conducted trial depositions of the
witnesses in question. Their failure to make any such effort should not now be rewarded by
allowing them to characterize these witnesses as unavailable.
Ms. Alarid is not proposing to just use these depositions for impeachment, she apparently
intends to use them to prove some part of her case in chief As will be argued below, equity and
the right to foil and fair development of the facts require that she develop the testimony in this
case, with regard to these water heaters, their dates of manufacture and sale, their design, and this
accident date.
IL

RULE 901 AND 902 REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO ESTABLISH THE
AUTHENTICITY OF ANY FORMER TESTIMONY SHE INTENDS TO
OFFER
While the authenticity of a document is not often an issue, here it is. There may be many

editions or versions of a deposition, some signed, some not, some with the witness' changes,
other without. Indeed, this is the rationale behind the practice of keeping a deposition under seal
until the court grants a motion to publish it. For this reason, American will insist that plaintiff
take appropriate steps to meet the authenticity requirements of Rule 901 and 902.
HI.

SIMILARLY, PLAINTIFF MUST SHOW THE TESTIMONY TO HAVE
BEEN TAKEN "IN COMPLIANCE WITH LAW."
The exception to the hearsay rule for former testimony is quite explicit. The only former

testimony that can be admitted is: "Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or
a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same
or another proceeding . . . " Rule 804(b)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence.

-5-
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Here, it is not self-evident that the depositions Ms. Alarid proffers were taken pursuance
to proper and timely notice and other procedures. Unless that is established, the former testimony
should not be received.
IV.

WHOLESALE ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY FROM A DIFFERENT
LAWSUIT UNDERMINES THE PRINCIPLE OF CROSS EXAMINATION
THAT IS EXPRESSLY PRESERVED IN RULE 804(bim.
Ms. Alarid should not be allowed to simply read in the depositions of four witnesses from

a different case in order to establish the facts that are essential to her claims against American.
The exception for former testimony is only available if "the party against whom the testimony is
now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination." Rule
804(b)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence.
While American concedes that it was represented at the time the earlier testimony was
developed, it plainly did not have the same motive or opportunity to develop the testimony that it
would have in this case at the time of trial. There is no showing of a substantial similarity
between the issues and evidence in Ellis/Mitchell and this case. Indeed on the face of it, that case
involved a different make of water heater, much less a different year of manufacture, etc. At least
some of those witnesses whose testimony is proffered were not even employed by American at
relevant times. It cannot be said that American had the same reasons and opportunity to question
those witnesses as it would have if those witnesses were called in person at the trial of this case.
If the court were to hold otherwise, it would create an intolerable precedent. It would
require that a product liability defendant anticipate every possible use of its employees' testimony

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in all future cases and require that defendant to develop that testimony in cross examination in
each and every deposition or trial. It would place a party like American in the catch-22 position
of either asking its own employees every conceivable question in every deposition given or risking
the use of that deposition in a later trial without the fiill story told.
Here, if Ms. Alarid were proffering an isolated piece of testimony from someone who was
difficult to find or depose, it would be one thing. However, she proposes to introduce these four
depositions, lock, stock and barrel, as the primary proof of her case.2 That type of use of former
testimony, even if Ms. Alarid could overcome the other problems addressed above, is not
authorized by the rules and should be prohibited.
DATED this J

day of April, 2001.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

John R^fcund
KardlTPettit
Kenneth L. Reich
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance
Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co.

N:\19944\l\dcposition.mem

2

Regardless of the court's ruling on this issue, "[fjormer testimony should not go in the
jury room in either written or electronic form." Utah Evidence Law, Boyce and Kimball, p. 8-80
citinz State v. Case. 752 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1987).

-7-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF AMERICAN'S MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING FORMER TESTIMONY
was served by mailing, postage prepaid, on the *?
Mitchel A. Zager
3587 West 4700 South
Salt Lake city, UT 84114
and
5580 LaJolla Blvd. #83
LaJolla, CA 92037
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Thomas V. Girardi
James G. O'Callahan
GIRARDI KEESE
1126 Wilshire Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA 90017
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Royal I. Hansen
MOYLE & DRAPER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Armstrong World Industries,
Inc.

day of April, 2001, on the following:

Robert G. Gilchrist
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main #700
P. O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Attorneys for Eagle Hardware & Garden, Inc.
Daniel McConkie
KIRTON & MCCONKIE
60 East South Temple #1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Kent Nelson
John Mangum
NIELSEN & SENIOR
60 East South Temple #1100
P.O. Box 11808
Salt Lake City, UT 84147
Attorney for Kent Nelson
Gary E. Atkin
311 South State, #380
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for 3rd Party Defendant Gomez

Gail Mikolash
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MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968
3587 West 4700 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
801-964-6100

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

GIRARDI | KEESE
Thomas V. Girardi (36603)
James G. O'Callahan (126975)
1126 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90017
213-977-0211

Deputy deck

Attorneys for Plaintiff ANNA MARIE ALARID

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ANNA MARIE ALARID
Plaintiff,
vs.

PLAINTIFF ANNA MARIE
ALARID'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN'S
MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING
FORMER TESTIMONY

AMERICAN APPLIANCE
MANUFACTURING, INC., et al.
Civil No. 980905332
Defendants.
Judge Anne M. Stirba
ARMSTRONG WORLD
INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.
W. KENT NELSON, et al.,
Third Party Defendants.
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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff may seek to introduce at trial former deposition or trial testimony of
former employees of American Manufacturing. Much of the controversy at issue here
stems from the former testimony of Henry Jack Moore. Mr. Moore was the Vice
President of Engineering for American from 1981 to 1996 during the years in which the
water heaters at issue in this case were made. Mr. Moore was deposed on January 8,
1999 in the Ellis/Mitchell v. American Manufacturing case and subsequently gave
testimony at trial in that case.
Plaintiff has attempted for many months to set a deposition date for Henry Jack
Moore. Counsel for American has refused to produce Moore for a deposition and has
instructed plaintiff not to make ex parte contact with one of their former employees. (See
Exhibit A) Plaintiff again contacted counsel for American in October of last year to set
the deposition of its former employee, Mr. Moore. Again, American refused to produce
Mr. Moore for a deposition. (See Exhibit B)
The deposition and trial testimony of American's former employees is admissible
evidence. Not only is it evident that Mr. Moore and the other employees are unavailable,
as they are located outside the subpoena power of the Court and considering American
has refused to produce them for deposition, but the former testimony is also clearly a
party admission. Plaintiff will be able to authenticate the deposition and trial testimony
and offer the same as a non-hearsay document.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On July 8, 1996, Rudolph Gomez, the manager and maintenance person of

eight apartment units in Salt Lake City, located at 936 and 940 South Lincoln Street, was
removing and installing new outdoor carpet at both locations. While working at the 940
South Lincoln apartment landing, Mr. Gomez was assisted by his daughter Anna Marie
Alarid. Anna was picking up old pieces of carpeting after her father had removed it from
the floor.
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2.

As Mr. Gomez had just finished laying all of the carpet on the landing , he

saw a fire originate from underneath the doors of the utility closet on the second story
landing. Two gas-fired water heaters manufactured by American Appliance were located
inside the utility closet. The fire quickly spread from the door of the utility closet to the
rest of the landing. Anna Marie was still on the landing when the fire broke out. Mr.
Gomez grabbed his daughter and tried to run down the stairs. Before they could escape
down the stairs, an explosion blasted Anna Marie and her father to the bottom of the
stairs and into the front yard.
3.

While Mr. Gomez suffered burns on his hands, arms and legs were from the

fire, Anna Marie sustained third and fourth degree burns to virtually every part of her
body, including her legs, forearms, hands, face, neck and upper chest. She was in the
hospital for 31 days after the accident and doctors performed full skin grafts over the
course of three separate operations to both of her arms, hands, fingers, upper chest, both
legs, both feet, the left side of her face and her left eye.
4.

Plaintiff has attempted to depose defendant American's former employee

Henry Jack Moore. Mr. Moore is extremely familiar with American's policies and
procedures concerning water design during the time the water heater's at issue were
made. Plaintiff has noticed the deposition of Mr. Moore but American has effectively
prevented the deposition from going forward, claiming Moore was a former employee
and should not be contacted ex parte.

ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT HAS NO BASIS IN LAW TO PRECLUDE FORMER

TESTIMONY GIVEN BY DEFENDANT EMPLOYEES UNDER OATH.
By refusing to produce Mr. Moore for deposition and effectively preventing
plaintiff from contacting Mr. Moore on its own, American has waived its right to contest
the offering of former employees deposition or trial testimony. Plaintiff has tried for over

3
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a year to set the deposition of Henry Jack Moore. Counsel for American instructed
plaintiff not to contact Mr. Moore directly because his testimony involves his knowledge
gained while an employee for American. (See Exhibit A) Based on this representation,
plaintiff formally noticed Mr. Moore's deposition. American refused to produce Moore
at this time.
This case was mediated in October of last year. Again plaintiff requested that
American produce Mr. Moore for a deposition. (See Exhibit B) American to date still
refuses to produce Mr. Moore for a deposition. Plaintiff has made a concerted effort to
take Mr. Moore's deposition in this case. American's argument that plaintiff should have
found another way to get their former employees deposition is not well taken, especially
considering American's lack of cooperation in this matter.
Defendant American has consistently maintained that Mr. Moore could not be
contacted ex parte because the substance of his testimony concerned knowledge gained
while he was an employee at American. Although American claims that Mr. Moore
retired in 1996, American has continued to treat Moore as an employee. As such, Mr.
Moore's former testimony in the Ellis case may also be considered a party admission and
not hearsay. Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence.
American claims that it would be prejudiced by the offering of former testimony
because it has not been given the opportunity to cross examine this witness with this case
in mind. This argument is absurd considering American has attempted to stop Moore's
deposition from taking place since the beginning of this case. If American was truly
concerned about having the opportunity to cross-examine Moore with the Alarid case in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
4 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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mind, it would have agreed to produce Moore for deposition. American has waived this
argument.
Moore's former testimony does not involve case specific facts that would require
further cross-examination by American. Moore's testimony involves the generic history
of American's knowledge of explosions and bum incidents associated with the
conventional gas fired water heater. His testimony does not involve facts specific to the
Ellis case.
Moore lays the foundation for plaintiffs claim for punitive damages. He has
indicated in sworn testimony that American knew of the high incident of consumer bums
associated with the conventional style water heater and make a conscious decision to not
implement available alternatives. Two key passages illustrate Moore's testimony
concerning American's generic knowledge of defects in the conventional water heater
that plaintiff seeks to introduce in this case.
Q.

Did your company make conscious decision not to enclose stands with the

standard gas-fired water heater?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And that conscious decision was made certainly before 1990, wasn't it?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And that conscious decision was in part made on the basis of the added cost

of the stand, isn't that right?
A.

That was one of the reasons.
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Q.

Any your company knew—let's talk about in 1990 that if the water heaters

had been installed on stands that would reduce the liklihood that somebody gets burned,
right?
A.

It could reduce some of the instances, yes.

Q.

Any you made a conscious decision not to include that safety device with

your products, right?

. . . .

A.

Yes.

Q.

Any when you made that conscious decision, did you all know that persons

would continue to be burned as a result of ignition of flammable vapors as long as this
standard model design of water heater was being sold.
A.

Yes.

Q.

And had you all made that decision to include the stand with your product,

the safety device, then that would have effected the profits of your company, would it
not?
A.

It would have effected the sale of the product, yes.

Q.

And ultimately effected the profits of your company, isn't that right?

A.

Yes.

[Deposition of Henry Jack Moore, Ellis v. American Water Company, 135:7-137:6]

American's knowledge of the high incident of burning accidents involving conventional
gas-fired water heaters is critical to plaintiffs cause for punitive damages. Henry Jack
Moore provides the timeline for American's awareness of the risk associated with the
conventional water heater.
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Q,

And were you aware in the 1970s of actual instances of people being

involved in fires with floor-mounted, gas-fired water heaters?
A.

Our company?

Q.

Yes.

A.

I believe it was the 80s before I knew of any.

Q.

And from the time that you became aware in the 1980s, would that have

been the early 80s?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And from the time that you became aware of actual instances involving

gas-fired, floor-mounted water heaters up until the production of this particular unit
involved in this case in 1990, did your company produce any water heaters othat than
those that drew air from the bottom of the unit?
A.

We made some other products, yes.

Q.

I am talking about water heaters that drew air from other areas other than

the bottom of the unit?
A.

Yes.

Q.

So your company had the technology, and, in fact, was actually making

water heaters that drew air from other regions or other sources?
A.

Direct vent water heaters, yes.

[Deposition of Henry Jack Moore, Ellis v. American Water Company, 171:18-172:20]

American can hardly dispute the validity and accuracy of the deposition testimony
cited above and throughout the deposition that took place on January 9, 1999 in Ellis.
American provided plaintiff with a copy of the Henry Jack Moore deposition in response
to a discovery request for documents. Defendant American has waived any argument
concerning the authenticity of a deposition that it provided to plaintiff.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff reserves the right to augment its opposition with any oral argument
permitted by the Court at the hearing for this matter. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff
Anna Marie Alarid respectfully requests that the Court deny American's motion in limine
in its entirety.

DATED: April 9, 2001

GIRARDI AND KEESE

JAMES G. O'CALLAHAN
Attorney(s) for Plaintiff
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MlTCHBI, ZAGER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
3687 WEST 4.7Q0 SOUTH

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 64118
TELEPHONE (601) 964-6100
F A X 064-6*111

February 14, 2000
Michael Sutton, Esq,
SUTTON & MURPHY
26056 Acero
Mission Viego, CA 92691
Tel:
(949) 206-0550
Fax:
(949) 206-0560
RE:

ALARID V. AMERICAN APPLIANCE MANUFACTURING, INC.

Dear Mr. Sutton:
You have previously informed me not to contact Henry Jack
Moore directly, since his testimony involves his knowledge gained
while an employee for American. Therefore, please arrange to have
Mr. Moore available for deposition at a place of his convenience.
I have presently set his deposition for March 9, 2000.
I received a message from Marge, Judge Stirba's clerk, in
reply to my request for clarification of the Scheduling Order
regarding the requirement of providing an Expert Report by the 317-00 cut-off date.
It is now my understanding that "designate" means either a
report or availability of an expert ready to be deposed.
As you know, we have provided a report for each expert named
and have, therefore, complied with the Court's Order. Since you
have not provided expert reports, please have your experts
available for deposition. If any of these dates are inconvenient,
please let me know and we can reschedule those depositions.
Following the taking of your experts' depositions, you may
take the deposition of our experts.
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October 9, 2000
VIA FACSIMILE & U.S. MAIL (949) 206-0560

Michael Sutton
Sutton & Murphy
26056 Acero
Mission Viejo, CA 92691
Re: Alarid v. American
Dear Mr. Sutton:
It was a pleasure to meet you at the mediation in Salt Lake City. I am sorry that we
were not able to resolve our differences on the case.
We still need to set up the deposition of Henry Jack Moore unless your client stipulates
to allow us to use his prior transcripts at time of trial.
Would you get back to me as soon as possible with your client's decision?
Thank you for your courtesy and cooperation in this matter.
With kind regards,

60TJ«*~Jarrtfes G. O'Callahan
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MICHAEL S. SUTTON
SUTTON & MURPHY
26056 Acero
Mission Viejo, California 92691
Telephone: (949)206 0550
JOHN R. LUND (A4368)
KARA L. PETTIT (A8659)
KENNETH L. REICH (A8578)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
SaltLake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance Manufacturing
and American Water Heater Co.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ANNA MARIE ALARID,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AMERICAN APPLIANCE
MANUFACTURING, INC., et al.,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF AMERICAN'S MOTION IN
LIMINE REGARDING FORMER
TESTIMONY

Defendants.
Civil No. 980905332
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES,
INC.,

Judge Anne M. Stirba

Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.
W. KENT NELSON, etal.,
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INTRODUCTION
In response to American's motion seeking to preclude use of depositions from other cases,
plaintiff tries to sidestep her own failure to complete fact discovery in this matter by blaming
American's counsel. The record shows that American was fully responsive to plaintiffs efforts to
depose Mr. Jack Moore and that plaintiff simply never followed through with that deposition and
never attempted to depose any of the other individuals whose depositions she now seeks to use.
Moreover, there is nothing in the Rules of Evidence to suggest that a party can waive
objections to evidence in the manner argued by plaintiff Plaintiff does not even attempt to
explain how she can make the required showing of a good faith effort to secure these witnesses
for trial. Nor does she articulate how American had a similar motive to question in the 1999 fact
depositions of another case as it would have at the trial of this case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff made a single attempt to take Mr. Moore's deposition in this case and

then twice failed to follow-up on American's suggestions for completing that deposition.
2.

Plaintiff actually issued a notice for Mr. Moore's deposition to be taken in Playa

Del Rey, California on March 9, 2000. See Notice of Depositions, attached as Exhibit A.
3.

This notice was issued on February 14, 2000 by Mr. Zager's office, the same day

that Mr. Zager asked Mr. Sutton to help arrange for Mr. Moore's attendance. See Exhibit A to
Plaintiff s Memorandum in Opposition.
4.

Mr. Sutton promptly and clearly responded on February 17, 2000. Nearly a month

before the scheduled deposition, Mr. Sutton wrote: "I do not have the ability to require [Mr.
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Moore's] attendance at deposition " As a courtesy, Mr. Sutton offered to try to reach Mr. Moore
and determine if he would agree to appear at the deposition voluntarily. See Letter dated
February 17, 2000, attached hereto as Exhibit B.
5.

Mr. Sutton and Mr. Zager were together in Salt Lake City on February 18, 2000

for the deposition of Dr. Morris. Following that deposition, Mr. Sutton and Mr. Zager discussed
the Moore deposition and Mr. Sutton informed Mr. Zager that it was uncertain if Mr. Moore
could be reached because he travels quite a bit in his retirement. Mr. Sutton informed Mr. Zager
that the safest thing for him to do was to utilize the available procedures to have an out-of-state
subpoena prepared for service on Mr. Moore. In the fall of 1999, American was required to take
similar steps to obtain Mr. Daniel Gomez' deposition in Minnesota, despite Mr. Gomez being
related to the plaintiff.
6.

To American's knowledge, the plaintiff took no steps thereafter to get Mr. Moore

to his deposition as noticed. The March 9 date came and went without the deposition taking
place. American is aware of no other effort by plaintiff, nor even mention of the interest in
deposing Mr. Moore before the discovery cut off in this matter.
7.

Similarly, American acknowledges that Mr. O'Callahan again mentioned a

deposition of Mr. Moore after the case did not resolve at mediation, in a letter dated October 9,
2000. However, plaintiff again fails to acknowledge that American promptly and clearly
responded. See Mr. Sutton's letter to Mr. O'Callahan dated October 12, 2000, attached as
Exhibit "C." Mr. Smith reminded Mr. O'Callahan that Mr. Zager had noticed a deposition of Mr.
Moore some time ago but had taken no steps to secure his attendance. Mr. Sutton again pointed
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out that he had no ability to produce Mr. Moore as Mr. Moore was not currently employed by
either defendant in the case. Further, Mr. O'Callahan's request came long after the completion of
discovery in the case, including expert depositions. Again, American is not aware of any effort
thereafter by plaintiff to address their apparent interest in having Mr. Moore deposed.
8.

Mr. Sutton's October 12, 2000 letter further establishes that the plaintiff has

known all along that she would not be able to rely on Mr. Moore's deposition from an earlier
case. Hestates:
Mr. Zager has requested on multiple prior occasions that we
stipulate that deposition transcripts of various individuals taken in
other cases be used in this case with the same force and effect as
though said depositions were taken in this case. We have
repeatedly declined that request. Accordingly, I must again advise
that I am unable to stipulate that you may use prior deposition
transcripts from other cases at the time of trial in this case.
SeeExhibitC.
9.

In sum, there is little doubt that the plaintiff has known all along that formal steps

would be necessary to assure Mr. Moore's attendance at a deposition and also that American
would not stipulate to the use of his deposition or those of other witnesses from prior cases.
ARGUMENT
t

PLAINTIFF WAS FULLY INFORMED OF WHAT WOULD BE NEEDED TO
DEPOSE M R MOORE AND SIMPLY ELECTED NOT TO TAKE THE NEEDED
STEPS. THERE HAS BEEN NO WAIVER BY AMERICAN OF ITS OBJECTION
TO USE OF DEPOSITIONS FROM PRIOR CASES,
As the attached letters indicate, American's counsel has promptly, clearly and consistently

stated that American could not voluntarily produce Mr. Moore's attendance at deposition. As a
former employee, Mr. Moore cannot be ordered to do anything by American. This was made
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quite clear to plaintiffs counsel. Contrary to plaintiffs argument, American never did a thing to
stop her from deposing Mr. Moore.
Although plaintiff claims to have "tried for over a year" to set the deposition, she cannot
point to any meaningful step taken to assure Mr. Moore's attendance. Each time that American
explained its inability to make Mr. Moore attend, plaintiff did nothing. Even when American's
counsel suggested a way to secure his attendance, plaintiff did nothing. This is despite a current
assertion that Mr. Moore's testimony is essential to her case. Now plaintiff seeks to have her
inaction become grounds for charging American with waiver, to have her inaction somehow
suffice as a "good faith effort" to secure Mr. Moore's attendance.
This is plainly not the intent of Rule 804, Utah Rules of Evidence. The case law cited in
American's initial memorandum establishes that a party must do substantially more than simply
write a few letters to the opposition before being able to rely on the "declarant unavailable"
exceptions.
Further, plaintiff has not shown that American had any motive to cross examine Mr.
Moore or the other witnesses during the depositions in the prior case, much less a motive similar
to the one it would have at the trial of this case. Plaintiff flatly ignores this requirement of the
rule.
United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909 (2nd Cir. 1993), demonstrates the meaning of the
"similar motive" requirement. There a criminal defendant tried to use testimony given by two
witnesses at grand jury proceedings involving the same case, i.e., Mafia bid-fixing among concrete
construction companies in New York City. Although the witnesses had testified to the grand jury,

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

by the time of trial they were asserting a privilege against self-incrimination and therefore
"unavailable."
The prosecution successfully argued that the former testimony should be excluded because
it did not have the same motive to cross examine these witnesses in front of the grand jury as it
would have during the trial. The court noted that this is often a fact-intensive inquiry. It
explained: "The test must turn not only on whether the questioner is on the same side of the same
issue at both proceedings, but also whether the questioner had a substantially similar interest in
asserting that side of the issue." Id. at 912. Since the prosecutors during the grand jury
proceeding did not want to develop the testimony of these witness in a manner similar to their
expected questioning of the witnesses at trial, Rule 804(b)(1) could not be used to introduce the
grand jury testimony.
The former testimony proposed by plaintiff has the same unmitigated problem. It cannot
be said that when Mr. Moore and the others were deposed in some prior case, the attorney
attending the deposition for American had a motive similar to the motive American will have at
trial in this case. Indeed, it is a widely-held practice that neither plaintiff nor defense counsel
cross-examine their own witnesses at deposition.
If the rule were otherwise, if a plaintiff were allowed unbridled use of depositions from
one case to present her case-in-chief in another case, then discovery practice would have to be
widely different. Faced with a risk that the company witness' deposition would be used in lieu of
live testimony at trial in not one but many cases, it would become incumbent on defense counsel
to fully establish all relevant aspects of the defense case known to that witness.
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Not unlike the prosecutors in DiNapoli, American's attorneys during discovery
depositions in another case had very different motives to ask questions than will American's
attorneys at the trial of this matter.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, as well as those stated in American's initial memorandum, American
respectfully submits that its motion to preclude plaintiffs proposed wholesale use of depositions
from a prior case should be should be granted.
It should be noted that plaintiffs opposition is silent with respect to plaintiffs use of
transcripts other than Mr. Moore's transcript (i.e., transcripts identified in defendant's Exhibit List
- Ron Carbone, James Barkeley and Deborah Hilton). One can only presume that said omission is
based upon defendant's decision to abandon any attempt to utilize those depositions.
DATED this I f ~ day of April, 2001.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN^QRTINEAU

John R. LuiyK'
KaraL. Pettit
Kenneth L. Reich
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance
Manufacturing and American Water Heater
Company
N:\19944\l\DEPOSIT.REP
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 2001
HONORABLE MICHAEL K. BURTON, JUDGE PRESIDING
**PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS**
THE COURT:

That takes us, I guess, next - unless

somebody has anything else, we're on to hearing about Joseph
Fandey.

The only worry I have on this one, I guess, to start

out with, Mr. Sutton, is how do I know what this fellow's going
to say, when and if he's called as a witness?
MR. SUTTON:

That's something that I've struggled

with, your Honor, and I've struggled with how it is that
Mr. Fandey even gets placed as an expert in this case.
Mr. Fandey, as the briefs indicate, worked with the Consumer
Product Safety Commission for many years, was involved in
governmental investigation and interaction with a host of
different consumer products, to include water heaters.
It appears that Mr. Fandey is being proffered by the
plaintiff on two different theories and to accomplish two
things for the plaintiff at time of trial: one, to suggest that
the water heaters as designed and manufactured were defective;
and secondly, to address the historical purview of what
happened between the water-heater industry, which is comprised
of multiple manufacturers, and the CPSC.
There does not appear to be much from Mr. Fandey that
we can demonstrate from his deposition testimony that deals
with American Appliance Manufacturing Corporation or American
1
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1

Water Heater Company or either of them in particular.

2

of his testimony deals with what happened between his office

3

and the water-heater industry in general.

4

The bulk

He then forms the opinion — and I think it's in this

5

basis that he's offered as an expert by the plaintiff — that he

6

thinks, in his opinion, that the water-heater industry knew

7

that there was a problem with their design.

8

one goes to school or where — or what discipline one is to

9

offer opinions about what one knew or didn't know, and that's

10

I'm not sure where

what we're struggling with by way of this motion.

11

There is a fire, a cause of origin, and a

12

mechanical-engineer expert that the plaintiff has designated

13

that we've deposed by the name of John Hoffman in Warren,

14

Michigan. And I believe, at least the way it's been presented

15

to us, that Dr. Hoffman is primarily going to handle the

16

product-design issue, so if we strip that away from Mr. Fandey,

17

at least preliminary for purposes of discussion, it appears

18

that his only role is that as offering opinion as to his belief

19

as to what the water-heater industry knew, didn't know, or

20

should have known. And so we are very much asking for a

21

preliminary determination by this Court as to the scope of the

22

expert testimony that this witness will be permitted to give at

23

time of trial.

24
25

THE COURT:

So you'd like to break it apart in at

least two areas, his regulatory history and — you don't know

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

how you stand on whether or not he's an expert on whether it
was designed properly or not?
MR. SUTTON:

Well, he did offer some design

opinions —
THE COURT:
MR. SUTTON:
THE COURT:
MR. SUTTON:

Right.
— at the time of his deposition —
Right.
— but my belief is that probably - and

Mr. Zager can correct me if I'm wrong — my belief is that
! probably the bulk of the design criticisms are going to be
proffered by Dr. Hoffman, not by Mr. Fandey.
THE COURT: And so you're not looking for me to tell

:

you right now what I think about Fandey as an expert on design;
you're just worried right now, as we speak, about his expertise
on this history regulating the industry?
MR. SUTTON:

I'm worried about both, because I don't

think Fandey even qualifies as an expert on design —
THE COURT:
MR. SUTTON:
THE COURT:

Okay.

So -

— but my primary concern —
Right now we're just talking about

history?
MR. SUTTON:
THE COURT:

That's fine.
And you want to go to defective now, or

at all today?
MR. SUTTON:

I'd like the Court's rulings on both,
3
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1

preliminarily before trial.

2

THE COURT:

So I think I understand a little bit

3

about the history concept.

4

design and so forth?

5

MR. SUTTON:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. SUTTON:

8

THE COURT:

9

It He is an engineer, I'm told.
He is an engineer.
And he seemed to have been around a long

time, like you say twenty years or whatever?

10

MR. SUTTON:

11

THE COURT:

12

Why is he not capable to talk about

He's also a lawyer.
Well, that says a lot for him, doesn't

it?

13

MR. SUTTON:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. SUTTON:

I'm sorry?
Does that add to his credentials?
In front of most jurors that I see

16

across the country, I think it would probably detract from his

17

credentials.

18
19

THE COURT:

Okay.

So what do you think about him as

an expert on the design?

20

MR. SUTTON:

Well, he's never designed a water

21

heater.

22

designed the component parts into a water heater.

23

has no particular engineering background other than his

24

experience in interaction at CPSC.

25

He's never manufactured a water heater.

THE COURT:

He's never
He really

But he has a degree in engineering.
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MR. SUTTON:
THE COURT:
and/or manufacture?

He does.
Okay.

So you think one has to design

No.

MR. SUTTON: No.
THE COURT:

You're not going that far?

MR. SUTTON:

I'm not going that far.

THE COURT:

So what's his flaw in his credentials?

You'd like — he's probably got enough to at least talk about
design.
MR. SUTTON:

I would agree, your Honor, that the bulk

of the arguments that we're talking about as it relates to
design probably goes to the weight the trier of fact should
afford to his testimony, as opposed to keeping him out of the
room completely.

My main concern as it relates to design is I

don't think plaintiff should be afforded two bites of the apple
and be able to present two different experts that are going to
come in and say the exact same thing; we believe that this
water heater as designed and manufactured is defective.
THE COURT: Well, there's no rule that says they
couldn't do that. Right?
MR. SUTTON:

Well, it would be cumulative, your

Honor, and I think again you have discretion to serve as the
gatekeeper to make sure that the plaintiff is not taking
multiple bites from the same apple and extending the length of
the trial portion.
5
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1

THE COURT:

Fair enough.

2

Well, Mr. Zager, what do you think?

This history

3

thing doesn't seem to impress me a lot, but it strikes me that

4

one could deal with an industry but not know what particular

5

members of the industry knew or didn't know.

6

MR. ZAGER:

Well, your Honor, I think it's important^

7

to first point out that American, the defendant in this case,

8

was represented by Jack Moore, who we'll hear about later in

9

another one of defendant's motions, with the water

10

subcommittee.

They were involved with the — working closely

11

with the CPSC in developing standards. And Mr. Fandey has the

12

unique position of being — as a member for twenty some-odd

13

years with the CPSC, to see that the lack of changes — albeit

14

in the water-heater industry, to see the problems that have

15

been existing for some thirty-plus years with these water

16

heaters.

17

And so he's in an ideal position, which is one of the

18

reasons we retained him as an expert, through his vantage point

19

to talk about what these manufacturers, including American,

20

knew about the defects in these water heaters and their failure

21

to do anything about these water heaters.

22

knowledge of the defendant. And again, like the other motions

23

before the Court, this is another motion that basically goes to

24

the weight of the evidence at the time of trial.

25

THE COURT:

It goes to the

Well, I see this just a little bit
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differently, 'cause this one strikes me as how does Fandey know
what American knew or should have known?

How does - he said,

"Well, we go to meetings together"?
MR. ZAGER:

There were meetings at American and was

represented.
THE COURT:

This Moore guy is there. He's an agent

for American?
MR. ZAGER:

Correct.

THE COURT: And we tell them to do A, B, and C, and
they don't do A, B, and C?
MR. ZAGER:

Or at least that there was discussions

about the — that there was approximately one baby a day in
America for the last fifty years being burned in one of these
water-heater situations, that —
THE COURT:

So did the CPSC create some new

guidelines?
MR. ZAGER:

No, they didn't. Unfortunately, it

appears that a lot of these standards seem to have been
controlled by the manufacturers.

They seem to have been able

to control their own standards as to what was done with these
water heaters, that they have a lot of power, that they were
members of a large group, and that they are effectively able to
control what was done within their own community.

These are

some of the kind of things that Mr. Fandey can address.
THE COURT:

So - and I don't mean to be rude - so
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1

what you want to do is get into a policy debate about why the

2

CPSC did or didn't create regulations?

3

MR. ZAGER:

4

THE COURT: You see that was a function of a trial on

5
6
7

Part of the discussion will be -

a product-defect case?
MR. ZAGER:

Well, you know, even one of the motions

that the Court Ifm sure has reviewed already is the one that

8 I creates, at least according to the defendants, a presumption —
9

THE COURT:

Rebuttable presumption, huh?

10

MR. ZAGER:

- that there is no defect in the water

11

heater because it complied with standards. Now, that makes —

12

so it certainly opens the door for Mr. Fandey to talk about,

13

well, who was really setting these standards and what was

14

really done by these water-heater manufacturers and what was

15

American's role over the course of the history in influencing

16

the standards and in failing to comply with the known dangers.

17

There were letters that were circulated.

Mr. Fandey

18

was on the board involved directly with the water-heater

19

companies, informing them, sending letters, correspondence,

20

attending meetings.

21

left in the dark as to whether this is an oncoming problem,

22

whether this is something that just came about now, whether

23

American had really done what it needed to do over the course

24

of time to improve its water-heater system.

25

So I think without his help a jury may be

And he's in an ideal position to comment on this
8
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because the letters are there.

They are self-authenticated.

He's been at meetings. Hefs been at testing sites alongside
them with manufacturers, including American.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Let me just - so I'm clear.

He's

not going to say that there were standards that the CPSC had
that American didn't comply with.
MR. ZAGER: No.
THE COURT: He's going to talk about what he thinks
standards should have been, why they weren't what they were,
and how American knew of other problems, but since there
weren't standards, didn't live up to this higher level. Is
that kind of how I see it?
MR. ZAGER:

It is, your Honor.

THE COURT: And is that how I understand your
argument?
MR. ZAGER: Yes.
THE COURT: Mr. Sutton, anything else right now?
MR. SUTTON:

Just by way of history, so that the

Court does have some additional input on the inquiry just made.
Mr. Fandey left the CPSC in 1994. One of the last things he
did was write a paper that is referred to as the white paper —
THE COURT:
.-•••'•- MR. SUTTON:

The white paper?
White paper. - that he was critical of

the water-heater design and has suggested to CPSC and his
higher-ups that CPSC should mandate some design changes with
9
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water heaters.

Once Mr. Fandey left the CPSC -

THE COURT:
MR. SUTTON:

That was in '94?
In '94. And from a date standpoint,

itfs interesting to note that that is about the second time,
the second water heater involved at this apartment building was
manufactured and placed into the stream of commerce. After
Mr. Fandey's white paper was considered by his higher-ups at
CPSC, CPSC made the determination that this was not a
water-heater-design problem, that this was a consumer-abuse and
misuse-of-flammable-vapor problem, and elected to take no
action at that time.
Mr. Fandey, since leaving the CPSC and starting his
law practice in New Mexico, has spent approximately 20 percent
of his time, by his estimation, traveling around the country
serving as an expert witness for plaintiffs' attorneys only,
talking about what he thinks CPSC should have done differently,
could have done differently, and continuing, in my estimation,
to do his best to torpedo the water-heater industry, and that's
what I think plaintiff attempts to accomplish by use of
Mr. Fandey in this case at time of trial.
It seems to me that Utah rule of evidence, Rule 602,
which requires a witness to have personal knowledge of what
happened before he can get on the stand and talk about that, is
going to serve as a significant bar to Mr. Fandey here, because
again he wants to talk about the industry in a whole.
10
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THE COURT: Well, when you say personal knowledge, "I
was there, but I didn't deal with a specific defendant," I see
a problem.
MR. SUTTON:

This is what the industry did, and by

implication American was bad. And if you go through the reams
and reams of documents produced by Mr. Fandey at the time of
his deposition, and which find their way into the plaintiff's
exhibit list here, there are — because they're so voluminous, I
don't want to make the representation that there are no
documents, but there are precious few documents, if any, that
exist that talk about the letter exchange between CPSC,
Mr. Fandey, and American Appliance Manufacturing Corporation or
American Water Heater Company directly.

So this is a situation

where plaintiff seeks to, through Mr. Fandey, hold one
manufacturer responsible for Fandey's implication of the entire
industry.
THE COURT: Mr. Zager.
MR. ZAGER:

Yes.

I'm glad Mr. Sutton brought that up

because he reminds that, in fact, Mr. Fandey has qualified as
an expert on these very issues that we're talking about through
courts throughout our nation. He's testified about exactly the
kind of things that we expect him to testify to, that he
testified at deposition to, that he has —
THE COURT: What's the theory on which he makes
that - I mean the court's finding that he ought to be
11
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testifying.

What's the — I mean, how can this be?

MR. ZAGER:

Well, first of all, your Honor, he -

THE COURT:

He's talking about - maybe I

misunderstood, but if you characterize it, it seems to me
what's happened is he's talking about a view he had that is not
consistent with the CPSC.
him an expert.

I mean I don't see why that makes -

That's the part I'm not coming to grips with.

MR. ZAGER:

Well, your Honor, as much as —

THE COURT:

I mean he's saying — let me — he's saying

"I wanted standards.

The CPSC didn't, therefore these guys

should have been held to the standard." And that doesn't sense
to me, but it seems more confusing, prejudicial, all those bad
things.

Why do they let him in?
MR. ZAGER:

Do you have any —

Well, your Honor, first I'd like the

point that the defendant would like us to think that these
water heaters are somehow wholly different from manufacturer to
manufacturer.

One water heater is generically pretty much the

same as all of them, and one of the basic problems is that this
pilot light is only a few inches off the ground and should be
raised to 18 inches off the ground because the fumes are
heavier than air and travel along the floor, which is what
happened in our case.
So when one water heater causes a fire, had it been
an American water heater with the pilot in the same location,
you'd have a fire in that instance too. Mr. Fandey is again in
12
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the unique position-

This is why the courts have let him

testify as he has throughout the country, and he's qualified as
an expert on these very issues before.
learned of him.

In fact, this is how we

Because regardless of what the CPSC ultimately

did because of their pressures — and I don't all the ins and
outs and how they work, and maybe Mr. Fandey will be able to
help us with some of the questions you have at time of trial,
but these manufacturers in our country have a great financial
and other powerful means through their memberships of often
controlling what the government groups do or don't do.
And Mr. Fandey sits in the position of — and his own
frustration when he was with the CPSC of seeing the defect,
seeing the problem, and seeing for years and years nothing
being done to correct the problem.
THE COURT:

Good, all right.
*Second motion*

THE COURT: Now, the third one I have had to do with
former testimony.

I guess this is Mr. Moore.

MR. SUTTON:

Well, the way the motion was originally

drafted, it deals with Mr. Moore, it deals with a fellow by the
name of Ron Carbone, it deals with Debra Hilton, and it deals
with James Berkeley.
Tennessee called Ellis

Those four depositions from a case in
have found their way onto plaintiff's

exhibit list, and I think it would be important for the Court
to know that not a single employee of either defendant was
13
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deposed in connection with this case.
THE COURT: Now, Moore was an old employee.

What's

Carbone?
MR. SUTTON:

Carbone is a financial guy.

He was the

vice president of sales.
THE COURT:

But he's of the American Appliance?

MR. SUTTON:

He was. He's no longer employed.

THE COURT: How about Hilton?
MR. SUTTON:

Hilton is employed by Southcorps USA,

Inc., which is a company that manages human services,
litigation, that type of thing, for many defendants — or many
other companies, American being one of them.

And James

Berkeley, a former employee, was a — I forget his exact title,
but it had to do with installation.
THE COURT: Well, these are all folks that once had
something to do with your defendant. Okay.
MR. SUTTON:

With the exception of Ms. Hilton.

She

has never been employed —
THE COURT:

I believe that - evidently some

management thing.
MR. SUTTON:

Yes.

It appears, from what plaintiff

has suggested in terms of trial presentation, that instead of
taking depositions in this case, plaintiff wants to just come
in and start reading from depositions taken in other cases —
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).
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MR, SUTTON:
THE COURT:
this.

- we're concerned about.
Mr. Zager, why don't you lead off on

This is an unusual - I don't think I've heard the theory

that we'll take depositions from another case and use them in
this case.

That doesn't seem fundamentally fair.

MR. ZAGER:

Well, your Honor, first of all, I think

the Court needs to know that we're not dealing with just
depositions, we're dealing with —
THE COURT:

Trial testimony.

MR. ZAGER:

— trial testimony.

THE COURT:

Let's say that's it, and it doesn't seem

fundamentally fair.
MR. ZAGER:

Well, your Honor, I've made extensive

efforts to contact the defendant and ask him for the
opportunity to produce Mr. Moore.
contact him on our own.

I asked him if we could

He said, "No, we're treating him as

one of our employees, one of our people.

I'd appreciate it if

you didn't make direct contact with him," so we abided by that.
That's all confirmed in the written letters back and forth.
did notice up the deposition.

We

Mr. Moore was not produced for

the deposition.
THE COURT:

What year was that?

Two thousand

something?
MR. SUTTON:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Okay.
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MR. ZAGER:

Also, all of these depositions - Ifm a

little confused with the Debra Hilton one.

I'm not sure I

recall anything with her - but defendant's counsel maybe
correct - I didn't believe I heard her name before.

It may

just be that I forgot.
But James Berkeley, Ron Carbone, and Henry Moore were
all provided to us in the course of discovery.

We did a motion

to produce, and those depositions were provided to us by the
defendant.

To say that they didn't have an opportunity to

fully cross-examine, or redirect, if you will, because these
are, in fact, defendant's own employees, they're friendly
witnesses at their beck and call, is a little misleading,
because certainly at the trial, where punitive damages were
found and awarded against defendant American, one of the
keystones to the award of punitive damages was the testimony of
Mr. Moore.
The testimony of Mr. Moore is not really that
specific in nature but talks about what American knew about the
defect, what the cost would have been to include an 18-inch
stand to be sold with the water heater, for instance, that the
cost was 10 to $12, that American knew they were selling large
numbers of water heaters each year but only a small number of
water-heater stands because they weren't packaged together, and
that basically the bottom line was they didn't take steps to
make their product safer because it would have cost them and
16
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would have cut into their profits.

So they decided that money

was more important than the welfare and the safety of our
people.
He certainly is unavailable for trial. He lives
outside the jurisdiction of the court to subpoena him for
trial.

We did make efforts, as I have mentioned earlier, to

take his deposition —
THE COURT: When you say efforts, when I read it, it
struck me that you asked once, it didn't happen, and somebody
talked about rescheduling and it never happened.

Is that all

the effort that you made?
MR. ZAGER:

Well, we asked, first of all, to have

direct contact with him.

We were instructed that no, he is

an —
THE COURT:

Right. But you got it set up -

MR. ZAGER:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

THE COURT: - and something happened that it didn't
occur, "cause he didn't come that day or something.
MR. ZAGER:

Did not come, right.

THE COURT:

"Cause I guess they - at least the

defendant's position is he wasn't served the proper way?
MR. ZAGER:

Wasn't served at all.

THE COURT:

Oh, okay.

So it doesn't happen - you

realize, I guess, at that point that you're going to have to do
something more specific to get him there, but you never do it.
17
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MR. ZAGER:

Yeah.

He had multiple residences.

were told he was often out of the country.

We

To hunt this man

down and take his deposition for the purpose of simply reading
his prior testimony into another record seemed to be
impractical and fruitless.

What we would have done simply is

say, "Mr. Moore, did you say in your deposition X," and we
would have basically read the old trial transcript or
deposition into the new deposition and received an identical
copy of the same deposition that we already had, and that
doesn't seem to make a whole lot of sense.

It's also — we

can't —
THE COURT:

Your theory was you would depose him and

then, since he wasn't available, you were going to get the
deposition?
MR. ZAGER:

Right.

This deposition and trial

transcript is something that's been relied upon by our experts
in their opinions.

It's not like we're talking about an expert

that the defendant doesn't have hands on with.

They can talk

to him any —
THE COURT:

Well, no, I mean you're talking about

issues that don't seem to me to be a little germane.

I mean we

have to deal with this case as if it is a case separate from
everything else, don't we?

I mean am I mistaken that — are we

just saying that we haven't any other kind of case you'd feel
comfortable doing this approach, using testimony from another
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case here?
MR. ZAGER:

Sure, your Honor.

THE COURT:

You're sure - oh, I'm sorry.

you want to do this.
MR. ZAGER:

First of all You're sure

That was a dumb question.
Your Honor, for us -

THE COURT: What rule allows this?
MR. ZAGER:
all.

Well, it's a party admission, first of

He's a party, an employee of the defendant, who they are

treating as an employee and a party, instructing us not to
contact him.

These were statements made about knowledge he had

acquired —
THE COURT: A party admission usually is a way to get
around admitting something that occurred in the event you're
talking about as against a hearsay objection.
MR. ZAGER:

That's correct.

THE COURT:

Okay.

We're not going to whether or not

this is hearsay; we're going to whether or not you should be
allowed to substitute the whole record for the — you know, the
party, the test of the witness who can present himself in front
of the jury.

I mean we're told often that the fact finder is

to look at the demeanor, and that's a part of everything that
the fact finder determines. What you seem to be saying is it's
okay not to have that as a element, his personal appearance,
just have him read the cold record from a case not even
involving this event.
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MR. ZAGER:

Well, your Honor, it would — it's

impossible for us to bring Mr. Moore to trial.

The defendant

can certainly bring him to trial and has before.
defendant — he is a defendant.

He's a

He's a defendant's employee.

He's unavailable; he's outside our jurisdiction.

If we had

gone around the world to get ahold of Mr. Moore and take his
deposition, we'd still be in the same problem of reading his
deposition into the court because he'd be unavailable for
trial.

We can't force him to be here unless the Court makes

such an order, which we would welcome.
But the defendant isn't prejudiced in any way.
defendant is the one who's holding all the cards.
bring Mr. Moore to trial if they want.

The

They can

It's the plaintiff who

is hand-tied in this case and unable to bring Mr. Moore to
trial because the Court doesn't have the subpoena power over
Mr. Moore, who is an out-of-state witness.
THE COURT:

Right.

MR. ZAGER:

Our efforts to get Mr. Moore to

deposition for the purpose of reading the old deposition into a
new deposition for this case have been thwarted by the
defendant, who has failed to cooperate and produce Mr. Moore
and has also instructed us not to contact Mr. Moore directly.
So to allow them to profit from their refusal to cooperate in
producing Mr. Moore seems to not be an equitable situation.
Mr. Moore, as the defendant knows, is the heart of
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plaintiff's punitive claim.
in the Ellis

case,

He testifies directly, as he did

where again punitive damages were awarded

against the defendant, generically about the knowledge that
American had, similar to what Mr. Fandey's testimony will be,
the knowledge that American had over the years of their defect
in their design and the ways that the design could have been
fixed, and the cost-benefit analysis that it was plausible and
feasible to fix the defect, and that it was solely because of
the moneys and profits that American thought they might suffer
if they made these changes that people like my client continued
to be injured.
Furthermore, it's the defendant who provided us with
these depositions through our request for production of
documents, and these are party admissions.

These are matters

that we discussed in the deposition, which defendants employees
had knowledge during the time that they were employed with the
defendant.
So the only issue that I see really here is whether
the Court is going to allow, first of all, the experts to
testify about matters that they reviewed, which include these
trial transcripts and depositions, that they are certified.

We

went through the trouble of getting those trial transcripts and
depositions stamped and certified as authentic documents, that
they have an indicia of reliability, that they were taken at a
time - and certainly the trial transcript - at a time where
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defendant had every motive and interest, the same as in this
case, to redirect or cross, if you will, their own employee.
So it's not defendant who's been put at — in a
difficult position with respect to the testimony from these
witnesses; it's the plaintiff.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Sutton?
MR. SUTTON:
Honor.

Several comments I choose to make, your

First off, there's been a misstatement by Mr. Zager as

to what happened in Ellis.

The Ellis

case did not result in a

punitive-damage verdict against either American entity.
case resulted in a compensatory verdict.
damages had been bifurcated.
the case settled.

The

The issue of punitive

Before the trial was completed,

There was never a punitive verdict issued in

Tennessee on the Ellis

case.

With respect to Mr. Moore, history is important.
Mr. Moore retired from American Water Heater Company in 1996.
He does maintain residences in two different states.

He

travels a lot in his retirement, fortunately for him.
THE COURT:
MR. SUTTON:

Uh-huh (affirmative).
I told Mr. Zager that I would inquire -

as is communicated in the letters that you have as exhibits to
the moving papers, the opposing papers and the reply papers — I
told Mr. Zager that I would make effort to determine whether or
not Mr. Moore would voluntarily present himself for purposes of
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1

deposition.

2

confidence that Mr. Moore would do that, and that if Mr. Moore

3

was such an important witness that he probably should take the

4

necessary steps to get an out-of-state commission issued so

5

that Mr. Moore could be subpoenaed for deposition in either

6

California or Tennessee.

7

But I also told Mr. Zager that I did not have

That was never done.

Instead, the deposition date

8

comes.

There's been no legal process, no attempt by the

9

plaintiff to get legal process issued by way of an

10

out-of-state-commission motion before this Court and the

11

subpoena issued either in California or Tennessee, and the

12

deposition does not go forward.

13

At that point, the case was still far away from where

14

we are now, and plaintiff had more than an adequate opportunity

15

to attempt to reset that deposition and do so, compelling

16

Mr. Moore to show up for deposition, and that was never done.

17

And I think that's significant because, if there was testimony

18

that was going to be presented to this Court due to the

19

unavailability of a witness, it should be testimony that was

20

taken within the confines of this case, a deposition at this

21

case.

22

To suggest that American had a similar motive when

23

Mr. Moore was being deposed in some other case and then require

24

us to litigate the issues, the factual circumstances, the

25

product that was involved in that some other case, Ellis,

in
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this courtroom in Salt Lake City I believe is very
inappropriate.
For Mr. Zager to suggest that he got the deposition
of Mr. Moore from us is not telling you the complete picture.
The discovery history on this file is as follows. Mr. Zager
sent us requests for admissions, asking us to admit the
accuracy of the deposition transcript that he had from
Mr. Moore, Mr. Carbone, and Mr. Berkeley.

Because of

differences in the deposition transcript that Mr. Zager
supplied vis-a-vis the deposition transcripts that I was able
to obtain from counsel that represented American in the

Ellis

case, we denied the authenticity of the documents supplied by
Mr. Zager by way of those discovery responses.
Once we denied the authenticity of those transcripts
supplied by Mr. Zager, discovery was re-propounded by Mr. Zager
that said, "Send us copies of the deposition transcripts you
have as it relates to Moore, Carbone, and Berkeley."
THE COURT:

Well, when you say deposition, do you

mean, trial?
MR. SUTTON:
THE COURT:

No, I mean deposition.
Deposition.

MR. SUTTON: And at that point, the deposition
transcripts that I had received from counsel representing
American in Ellis

were then forwarded to Mr. Zager pursuant to

his discovery request.

So to suggest that the deposition
24
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transcripts were first given to him by us is not a complete
accounting of what really transpired in discovery in this case.
I would agree that Mr. Moore is unavailable at time of trial
because he is a resident of California and Tennessee, but
again, that harkens back to should plaintiff be permitted to
simply go out and find deposition transcripts from other cases
involving different-model water heaters, involving different
factual circumstances, involving different flammable vapors
involved, and willy-nilly be able to just submit them in this
case in order to prove plaintiff's case in chief?

That's what

sought to do here.
Now, to the extent that we were successful — and I'm
not confident that we would be — to the extent that we were
successful in bringing Mr. Moore in as a witness during
defendant's case in chief, then I suspect that he's on the
stand, then there may be viable grounds for inquiry to be made
of other testimony that Mr. Moore had given upon other
occasions when he's here in court and can explain to the jury
his other testimony, and that may be fodder for
cross-examination.
That's not what we're talking about here. What we're
talking about here is plaintiff proving plaintiff's case in
chief by a cold document from another case. And I would
submit, your Honor, that if Mr. Moore is so important to the
plaintiff's case, should plaintiff be rewarded for plaintiff's
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inaction in not taking the deposition that should have been
taken in this case?

The issues in this case are unique.

The

factual circumstances in this case are unique.
I can represent to the Court that Ellis

did not

involved a carpet adhesive as the flammable vapor, as it does
here.

Ellis

here.

There are many factual disparities between the

did not involve an adult plaintiff, as it does
Ellis

case and this case, and that is important for the Court to
consider, I think, in terms of making the decision that the
Court needs to make.
MR. LUND:

Your Honor, if the Court please, and

Mr. Zager, could I make one additional point on that subject?
THE COURT:
MR. LUND:

Okay.
The thought I have is that, you know,

representing corporate defendants on a fairly regular basis, if
your Honor were to allow this, then I have this situation where
now my corporate representative is getting deposed in a case
tomorrow, and I'm not, I guess, concerned with only that case
anymore.

I have to be concerned that whatever he says in that

deposition, even though it might have some relevance to another
case down the road, is going to be his testimony not only in
that case but in all the cases that follow.
It sort of creates a super deposition, if you will,
that. I don't have any way to know what do I need to follow up
with in the way of questions during that deposition to be sure
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I've got a complete statement from that fellow that's going to
be used throughout, you know, the rest of the cases. And you
expressed some concern for the fundamental kind of unfairness
of going forward in this way, and I think that illustrates it.
THE COURT: Mr. Zager.
MR. ZAGER:

Your Honor, the only thing unfair about

any of this is that the plaintiff has been put through the
arduous task now of having to find and retake a deposition
that's already been taken. We're not just talking about a
deposition, as Mr. Lund points out, but we're talking about a
trial transcript, where they have every motive to present
whatever evidence in their favor at time of trial, or why go to
trial.

I mean that's the purpose of trial is to win your case.
The facts that are different in the Ellis

matter, I'm

not sure that we have to examine those, because the things
we're talking about are numbers in large extent, you know, what
would be the cost for fixing the designs so this type of thing
that didn't happen.

I don't think it matters whether it's

gasoline or carpet adhesive, and that's going to be again
argued in one of the defendant's other motions about similar
incidents.
But what's similar and all that's required, I
believe, is that we're talking about fires caused by flammable
vapors ignited by a pilot light that isn't raised 18 inches off
the ground.

And that's the identical situation we have here.
27
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Common sense dictates, if plaintiff was to hunt down Mr. Moore
and eventually find him and force his deposition in wherever we
were able to locate him at the time, that we would simply read
the old deposition into a new booklet that would now have our
case heading on it but would basically be sum and substance of
the deposition we already had before, or the trial transcript
we already had before.
Now, if the Court thinks that's what we need to do,
we certainly have six weeks between now and the time of trial
that we can go ahead and do that, I imagine.

But it would seem

to be a waste of time and a waste of money and a waste of
everybody's effort, because unless Mr. Moore made new changes
to a deposition and trial transcript, which would be highly
unlikely because he had every opportunity to make those changes
following his first deposition and his trial testimony.

Unless

he lied during a trial, we can all expect that we're going to
have a replica deposition or trial transcript to what we
already have, and it would seem to be nonsense to require the
funds in locating Mr. Moore, the time and effort to fly to a
foreign place to read one deposition into another.

It just

wouldn't make any sense.
I'd be interested to know what discussions Mr. Sutton
had with Mr. Moore.

Of course I'd expect that he'd probably

claim the attorney-client privilege, because that's what
Mr. Moore is; he's a client. And to say that it's unfair
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because they don't have an opportunity to talk to Mr. Moore is
ludicrous.

I mean he's had - Mr. Sutton has had the ability to

call Mr. Moore.

Ifm sure Mr. Moore will follow every direction

Mr. Sutton gives him, and if they want to produce him at time
of trial to explain the document, that's fine.

They have that

opportunity; we don't. We don't have a way of getting him
here.

He's their - he's on their team.
Again, I think, like so many of the other motions,

this also goes to the weight of the testimony, I think, because
these are party admissions and statements against interest and
because our experts have in fact relied upon the sworn
testimony of Mr. Moore that the arguments presented by
defendant that they didn't have a motive to question Mr. Moore
at the time of trial certainly is ludicrous.
THE COURT:

Thank you.
*Ruling*

THE COURT: All right.

Let's go back and - I guess

when we're done here, Mr. Sutton and Mr. Lund, you guys have to
prepare the order, so let's go back and rule on these, and then
we'll talk about this final pretrial and see what we need to do
there.
(This portion not requested to be transcribed)
THE COURT:

The next one we have is Mr. Fandey and

the issue of his - the extent of his testimony.

Because of the

ruling I'm going to make on the one that we just discussed,
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this rebuttable presumption, it's clear to me that Mr. Fandey
cannot be allowed to talk about what the CPSC did or didn't do
and why they did or didn't do that. Number one, it would go
against the clear statutory intent that the - and I can't
remember the code section.
MR. SUTTON:
THE COURT:

78- was it?

15- some odd —

Six.
I don't remember the numbers, but I mean

if you have a rebuttable presumption based on a statutory
enactment, and to have somebody come in here and say, "Well, I
worked at another agency.

We did it another way," that is

confusing, and it seems to me to go against the clear intent of
the way our legislature viewed these things ought to be
handled.
I don't have any problem with Fandey talking about an
expert on what makes a good water heater and why these may or
may not have been good water heaters, defective, whatever, but
I see no room in this trial for his history in dealing with the
whole industry, as opposed to a specific manufacturer.
And it seems to me that if the industry's got some
flaws, then it implies some problem with this defendant, which
it seems to me is way confusing, brings in so much that the
trier of fact would be just unable to separate the industry
from these defendants, what they may or may not have done.
On the other hand, Mr. Zager, it's clear to me that
if Fandey has some direct discussion with these folks about
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some standard they haven't lived up to, that would be
different, but I can't let him talk about what he thinks the
world ought to be, as opposed to what it actually was.
MR. ZAGER:

Can he talk about, your Honor, what took

place in the (inaudible) meetings where American was
represented by Henry Jack Moore?
THE COURT: Well, help me understand how - well,
you'd have the hearsay problems obviously, but how would that
be relevant to whether or not these folks lived up to
guidelines?

See, that's what I'm not getting.

MR. ZAGER:

Just as to their knowledge of the

THE COURT:

Well, I mean that's what we get to, is

problem.

whether or not it's a problem, and I guess what I am loath to
do is have Fandey say, "I am a government employee.

I had a

different view of what things ought to be, but the government
never adopted that."

I think we'll only get "I had a different

view." And so I'm not going to let him talk about this
history, and if American was there and he had a different
version of the world, but nobody else opted to follow that
version, then I don't think that's admissible evidence.
And it harkens back to this idea I have that this
issue of the rebuttable presumption creates, in Utah at least,
some standard by which these things have to be gauged.

And if

they follow what the government has applied as the rule, then I
31
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don't think we can have somebody talking as Fandey - you
intimate he will talk about meetings where "I talked about a
different thing I wanted, and it was never adopted, but I
talked about it, therefore you knew about it."
So that's my ruling there*
Do you want me to be more specific, Mr. Sutton or
Mr. Lund?
MR. LUND:

Your Honor, to just take the wording on

it, could I suggest that we indicate that motion is granted
except to expert opinions regarding design of the product?
THE COURT:

Design and — I guess, yeah, design and

safety of the product as it was on the market, or something
like that, yeah.
MR. ZAGER:

And how about other occurrences and —

THE COURT: Well, I think that's a different motion,
isn't it?
MR. ZAGER:

Will Fandey be allowed to address those

THE COURT:

Well, I don't understand quite what you

MR. ZAGER:

If we bring in other incidents, of a

issues?

mean.

specific incidence, which expert do we bring that in?
bring that through Fandey?
THE COURT:
these things?

Do we

Do we bring it through Hoffman?

Well, did Fandey has direct knowledge of

See, I mean I guess the problem we're going to
32
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have on these, we're going to bring in a bunch of stuff is, how
does it come here, and I don't know that I can anticipate my
ruling on that unless you tell me with precision how it's going
to be presented.

Journal

Do you see what I'm saying?

MR. ZAGER:

I do.

THE COURT:

Does Fandey say, "You know, I read in the

of Water Heater

I guess -

Science

X happened"?

Well, that's

maybe not too good a way to get it in. But if somebody says,
"You know, I was a party to this case and X, Y, Z happened," it
seems to me Fandey can render an opinion.
he gives you an opinion on it.

He hears the facts;

Isn't that what an expert does?

MR. ZAGER:

Yeah.

It seems that we'll have -

THE COURT:

He can be an expert that way, but how you

get the facts in it seems to me isn't before me right now, and
it'd be a little premature for me to guess what it's going to
be like at the time of trial.
Then we have this question of former testimony, which
to me is a pretty troubling one in a lot of ways, but I agree
with Mr. Zager this fellow is outside the arena, outside the
purview of our court to force him to come and testify.

But

it's pretty clear to me as well that the defendant's position
is right.

He could have been deposed in ways such that the

issues of this event could have been preserved and brought to
this forum, rather than using this witness from another case,
this witness or Carbone. And by this witness, Moore seems to
33
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1

be the one most concerned with it, or Hilton or Berkeley.

2

I can't, from the evidence that - if I can say it's

3

evidence, the documentary evidence here — see that the

4

defendants have thwarted the plaintiff's efforts to get this

5

witness.

6

defendants were never going to agree to have the testimony from

7

these other cases allowed in.

8

that Moore had to be deposed.

9

It's clear to me from reading the materials that the

So the plaintiff had to know

Now, if he wasn't being produced in the way that

10

somehow it's intimated "We're going to produce him," and I'm

11

not real clear what that meant, like "We're going to drive him

12

there," whatever, but if that hadn't happened, which evidently,

13

Mr. Zager, you think it didn't, then your remedy is, you know,

14

I can compel his attendance and get the court to issue some

15

process.

16

enforced in California, but you didn't do that.

17

mind, is something that you've just decided not to do.

18

I don't exactly the mechanics of how you get it
I guess, in my

And I guess underlying all of this is my feeling that

19

this is so fundamentally unfair.

I mean what Mr. Moore may

20

have said in one action doesn't mean he'll say it today or

21

tomorrow or the next week.

22

point.

23

going to lead you, any trial is ever going to lead you, if

24

people can later on take transcripts from those events, bring

25

them cold into another event, and say, "You know, he said it

And I think Mr. Lund makes a good

You don't know where exactly any deposition is ever

34
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

this time. We're now going to use this as evidence.'' So I
can't allow that to be done for those reasons.
Mr. Zager, do I need to be more clear for you?
MR. ZAGER:

Yes. Maybe we're asking for some

extraordinary relief here, your Honor, but we certainly do have
six weeks until the date of trial.

I would ask that the Court

allow us then to schedule this one deposition of Mr. Moore and
go through the arduous task of simply reading the old trial
transcript into the new deposition.
THE COURT:

I think we —

Well, let me ask.

You're making kind of

a motion here on the fly?
MR. ZAGER:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

How do the defendants respond to that

request?
I guess to open the discovery for this one witness.
MR. ZAGER:
MR. SUTTON:

Yes, your Honor.
Your Honor, there is I think a massive

problem with that, that being that the way the discovery was
ordered before, the lay discovery had a cutoff date, and then
the expert discovery had a cutoff date.

There have been

multiple expert depositions taken all over the country in this
case at multiple expense to all — or considerable expense to
all parties.

To suggest, now that all the expert discovery

having been completed, that we now should now revisit lay
discovery, I think that it's not just a question of getting
35
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back to the lay discovery and having Mr. Moore's deposition
taken.

The domino then continues to fall, because then the

experts have to be redeposed as well.
minefield.

I think it's a

I mean clearly, with all due respect, if this was

an issue, as I argued before —
THE COURT:

Let me do it this way.

I don't mean to

cut you off, but I think the easier way is I'm not going to
rule on it.

It's not in front of me.

I'm going to let you make a motion, Mr. Zager, and
we'll see where it goes.

I mean that's the only way to do it,

I sometimes think, if the parties will agree, it's fair to go
after it, but if you're not going to agree, then they have to
be able to respond to motions you might make, and we'll see
where that leads us.
Anything else I need to be specific, Mr. Lund or
Mr. Sutton, on that issue?
MR. ZAGER:

Okay.

Your Honor, I'd like to know if

any of the statements made by Mr. Moore can be used by the
experts, having reviewed those documents, and whether these
would be seen as party admissions, which would certainly —
THE COURT:

See, I think clearly I'm not thinking

they are party admissions.

Otherwise, it would be admissible,

Help me understand what your expert — now, if I understood it
right, Moore was to tell us that these folks knew they were
doing bad and should have done differently.
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MR. ZAGER:

That's exactly what he testified to.

THE COURT:

So is there some expert who is going to

opine that this water heater is defective because they knew
they weren't making money on it or something?

I —

MR. ZAGER:

Your Honor, he says in plan language

THE COURT:

Well, Moore said this, but how does the

that -

expert need to piggyback Moore to come to some conclusion?
MR. ZAGER:

Well -

THE COURT:

It seems to me the expert makes his

analysis independent of Moore's statement, "Yeah, we knew about
it, and it cost us more to do it this way."

The expert is not

relying on Moore, is he, to tell us that this is a bad product?
MR. ZAGER:

Well, some of these incidents, it's much

more informative to the jury to know that the defendants —
THE COURT:

I'm not arguing about the -

MR. ZAGER:

Okay.

THE COURT:

- information to the jury, because if

that were true, then I'd want Moore's deposition to come in.
Maybe somebody out of Tennessee who didn't have a good
experience with these guys.

I mean, you know, the path is

never ending if what I want is the jury to hear informative
material.

What I need is fairness.

chance to quiz these folks.

What I need is everybody a

I need the fact finder to be able

to look at the deposition in this case.

So my need is
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different than yours.
What I'm saying to you, though, is that - are these
experts basing their opinion somehow on Moore?
MR. ZAGER:

Sure.

They're -

THE COURT:

I think if they are, if that's going to

be the foundation, they're going to have a problem, because if
these folks object, I'm going to say, "You know, unless you've
talked to Moore in the context of this case, I don't think it's
admissible."

That he said something in another case doesn't —

that's the substance of where I'm coming down on that.
MR. ZAGER:

Okay. And I'm not -

THE COURT:

That doesn't have anything to do with

MR. ZAGER:

I just not sure I understand how Moore's

this case.

testifying that the cost of making a stand is 10 to $12 —
THE COURT:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

MR. ZAGER:

— somehow varies in this case.

THE COURT:

It's not the issue of it's varied,

Mr. Zager.

It's the issue of how is it presented, in what form

did these folks have a chance to talk to him, and more
importantly, I get to this issue of who knows where a ruling
like you ask me to make leads me, or the courts.

If this were

to be the standard rule, if you had, you know, in 19- — I don't
know.

I mean I can't get into examples ^cause I'm not very

inventive on that issue.

But it leads you into a morass of
38
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you'd never have a live witness in any of these cases, it seems
to me.

You'd just say, "Well, he said it three years ago.

Therefore, he'll say it today.
anything."

Therefore, let's not do

I don't think that's the way our system's set up.

MR. ZAGER:

Certainly -

THE COURT:

So what he changed, how you've got to do

it, those are issues you will have to flush out, but I don't
think that that's what our rules contemplate.
MR. ZAGER:

Well, certainly some of his testimony is

so generic that the cost of the stand then is the cost of the
stand at the time of our incident, and —
THE COURT:

You say that; I don't know that.

believe it to be true.

You

That's what the system's about, I

guess, two sides fighting to come to what is true, and unless
you're in the context of this case, it doesn't seem to me it's
a correct, fair, or appropriate fight.
MR. ZAGER:

So I guess we need to file a motion to

allow us to take the deposition of Mr. Moore, since he is the
heart of our punitive claim, and we intend —
THE COURT:

And I don't know what you're going to do.

I'm just saying —
MR. ZAGER:

That's what we'll do.

THE COURT:

Okay.

(End of requested transcript)
(c)
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1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - SEPTEMBER 17, 2001

2

HONORABLE MICHAEL K. BURTON PRESIDING

3

*PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT - MOTION AND RULING ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES*
P R O C E E D I N G S

4
THE COURT:

5

Next was the punitive damages.

Did I

6

read this right, Mr. Sutton?

You say he hasn't alleged enough

7

and therefore he hasn't answered my discovery and he's saying

8 i he'd have to have been in another realm not to know I wanted to
I

9

hit you up for punitive damages.

10

MR. SUTTON:

Well, your Honor, my gripe here is that

11 | we ask by way of specific discovery what is the basis for which j
12 | you think that you're entitled to punitive damages against
13 | either of the manufacturers.

We're told when we preliminarily

14

asked that that discovery is continuing and plaintiff will

15

supplement.

16 |

THE COURT: Right.

17 |

MR. SUTTON:

18 ; separate occasions.

Plaintiff then supplements on two

He files no further response of any kind

19

with respect to either of the - or any of the involved

20

interrogatories, 30 through 33. To this day we don't have a

21

specific indication from plaintiff's counsel as to the basis

22 j upon which, the documents upon which, the witnesses upon which
i

23 | the punitive damage claim is based.

The plaintiff suggests

j

24 j that, well, you guys are big boys and you should be able to
25 ; figure that out and I don't think that is what the discovery
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act in this State contemplates.

I

It appears in reviewing the Rules of Civil Procedure
here as well as the Annotated Code here, that plaintiff has an
obligation to present with clear and convincing evidence the

I

basis upon which punitive damages are alleged and that
obviously that's a very serious charge against a civil
defendant and one that we seek at this stage on the eleventh
hour before the trial is commenced to be stricken from the

j

case.

j
THE COURT:

Okay.

|

Your Honor, we have had numerous

|

Mr. Zager?
MR. ZAGER:

discussions and although they weren't in written form,
basically the defendant is arguing form over substance.

!

Furthermore, the response to that interrogatory was a claim of j
work product privilege where basically the defendant was

|
i
i

attempting to get into the mental impressions of the

;

plaintiff's attorney.

j

MR. SUTTON:

We didn't say that. We said we'll tell

j

you later.
MR. ZAGER:

No, it was also, if the Court looks at

j

the discovery, we also answered a work product privilege and
defendant broadened our motion to compel there in the discovery;
i
i

period but really that kind of leads us astray a bit because
we've had numerous discussions even at the mediation which
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I

1

Judge Daniels handled regarding punitive damages and the basis

2

for our demand to settle this case.

3

that the heart of plaintiff's punitive damage claim is the

4

testimony by Henry Jack Moore which I am looking to see -

Defendant has long known

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. SUTTON:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. SUTTON:

9 ]

THE COURT:

That's always comforting.

MR. ZAGER:

Defendants have known all along what the

10

I knew you were, yes.

You asked me to.

Thank you, Judge.
Is it there?
Yeah, it says what you said it says.

11

basis of our claim is.

It's the stuff that the family has

12

testified to, it's the deposition testimony of our expert,
|

13 j Hoffman, as to the defendant's knowlegge of the ongoing and

i

i

i

14 • widespread nature of the problem and it's at the heart of the

j

15 ! plaintiff's claim and the basis of the plaintiff's claim is the'|
16 i testimony of Henry Jack Moore which defendant so vehemently is
i

17 j trying to keep out of the trial.

It goes to the notice, the

18 j ongoing problem and, pursuant to Rule 26, we supplied all the
19 j witnesses, all of the exhibits we intended to present at trial.
20 | We certainly know it's not going to be Kent Nelson who is going
21 I to be testifying on punitive damages, it's going to be
I
22 j defendant's employees who have made admissions and then
23 j damaging statements, it's going to be our experts who they've
24 i taken their depositions who talk about the wide spread nature
25 I and there is no surprise here and there is no harm there.
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We

j
j
j
j
I
j

are still six weeks before trial and for anybody that was still
guessing as to what the basis of our punitive damage claim is,
there it is.

Those are the ones that we intend to prove the

punitive claim through.

And, again, you know, if the defendant

needed to file a motion to compel which obviously they didn't
need to and they didn't file one, they would have learned what
they've already known long and it's not like this is the first
claim that Mr. Sutton or American has been involved in
defending our claim for punitive damages.

So, just like in the

Ellis case, Henry Jack Moore was the basis for the punitive
damage claim in that case and it's the basis in large part for
our claim here.
THE COURT:
MR. SUTTON:

Anything else on that point, Mr. Sutton?
I would with the Court's permission like

to address a couple of historical things here.

Plaintiff's

complaint in this case was filed on May 28, 1998.

Those

preliminary discovery responses that the Court just referenced
were provided by the plaintiff on December 24, 1998,
approximately seven months after the Court, after the action
was filed.

Indeed, there were objections on legal conclusion

and work product grounds but notwithstanding those objections,
plaintiff then says discovery is continuing and plaintiff will
supplement in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

That never happened as it related to those

particular interrogatories.

For the plaintiff at this point to
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1

simply say Dr. Hoffman and Mr. Fandy tell you why we think

2 | punitive damages are appropriate.

This harkens us back to

3 ! their criticisms as to the industry in general without
!

specification to America Appliance Manufacturing Corporation
4
and American Water Heater Company in particular.

As of right

5
now we have nothing that is evidence in this case that suggests
6
7 | the particular basis upon which punitive damages are sought and
8 I I think your Code here absolutely contemplates that before a

I
9 j serious allegation such as punitive damages be presented to the j
i
i

10 | trier of fact that fundamental fairness dictates that the
11 | defendant have a clean basis upon which those charging
12 | allegations are based.
13 |

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Zager?

14 j

MR. ZAGER:

Just briefly, your Honor.

15 : any error it certainly is harmless error.

If there was

Certainly the

16 , defendant is arguing form over substance and the punitive claim
I
as we've all known through mediation discussions, through
17
discussions and arguments we've had personally over the phone,

18

j
19 j is that our plaintiff's claim is that the defendant has known
20
long and well that their product was dangerous and defective in
21 J not coming up with an alternative design, in not raising the
i
22 | pilot light eighteen inches off the ground and that numerous
i

23 j Americans were badly injured as a result of the defective
24 | design which they knew about, which Henry Moore talked about
25 | generically and that American made a conscious decision not to
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make their product safer because they weren't going to make as
much money.
•

*

•

RULING
THE COURT:
claim.

Let's see we've got the punitive damages j

This one to me is more a fairness issue.

I think

clearly the defendant's are not surprised by the punitive
damages or its basis.

I can't see that there's any harm for

failure of the plaintiff to supplement their discovery requests
here and it's clear to me, as well, the plaintiff still has the j
i

burden of proving all the elements of a punitive request.

So

|

I
for that reason I deny that motion made by the defendants to

j

preclude any evidence on the punitive issue.
Mr. Zager, any more clarification for you?
MR. ZAGER:
MR. SUTTON:
THE COURT:
MR. LUND:

j

No, your Honor.
Your Honor - Mr. Sutton or Mr. Lund?
No, your Honor.

I
j
j
i

THE COURT:

Mr. McConkie?
i

MR. MCCONKIE: On that point, sir, it's clearly my
understanding, and I think Mr. Zager made this representation

j
j
i

in court, that they are not pursuing any type of punitive claim1;
l
against Mr. Kent Nelson or any of the Nelsons.
j
i

THE COURT:

It sounds to me like Nelson and Armstrong j

are gone.

6
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I

II

MR. MCCONKIE: They're gone.

2 I

MR. ZAGER:

And Mr. McConkie states it correctly.

3 |

THE COURT:

Okay.

4 I

(End of requested transcript)

5
6
7

si
!
I
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11 |
12
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14
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18 I
i

19 |
20 ;

21 |

22 I
I

I

23 !
i

24 j
25 |

(C)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript in
the before mentioned hearing held before Judge Michael
K. Burton was transcribed by me from a videotape
and is a full, true and correct transcription of the
requested proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages
to the best of my ability.
Signed this 7th day of March, 2002 in Sandy,
Utah.

Carolyn Etficksoh
Certified^Shorthand Reporter
Certified Court Transcriber
My Commission expires May 4, 2002

'UBLIC
<*CKSON
r i.i.W'WAY
EXPIRES
(2
;TAH

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Tab 9

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MICHAEL S. SUTTON
SUTTON & MURPHY
26056 Acero
Mission Viejo, California 92691
Telephone: (949) 206 0550

FILED DISTRICT C0UR T
Third Judicial District

JOHN R. LUND (A4368)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000

Deputy O e *

Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance Manufacturing
and American Water Heater Co.
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This matter came before the Honorable Michael R. Burton on September 17, 2001 for a
hearing on nine pending motions. Mr. Mitchell A. Zager appeared on behalf of plaintiff. Mr.
Michael S. Sutton, Sutton & Murphy, and Mr. John R. Lund, Snow, Christensen & Martineau,
appeared on behalf of defendants American Appliance Manufacturing, Inc. and American Water
Heater Company.
Having read all memoranda filed concerning the motions, having heard the arguments of
counsel and now being fully advised, it is hereby ORDERED:
1.

American's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Regarding Craftmaster Water

Heater is denied.
2.

American's Motion in Limine Regarding Joseph Fandey is granted as to all

subjects addressed in American's memorandum in support of its motion, except that Mr. Fandey
will be permitted to testify as to any competent opinions he holds regarding the designs of the
water heaters at issue in this case.
3.

American's Motion in Limine Regarding Former Testimony is granted.

4.

American's Motion to Exclude Testimony Regarding Correctional Officer Lost

Earnings and Capacity is granted.
5.

American's Motion in Limine Regarding Plaintiffs Proposed Exhibits is denied

without prejudice. As particular exhibits are proffered at trial, the court will consider American's
objections.
6.

American's Motion in Limine to Disclose Plaintiffs Settlements to the Jury is

granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff is ordered to provide American with all documents
concerning the settlement with Armstrong World Industries and to do so within five days of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
-2-may contain errors.

date of this order. Plaintiff will not be required to disclose the terms of her settlement with
ValueCare. The court will consider proposed instructions to the jury regarding how much
information about the settlements will be given to the jury.
7.

American's Motion in Limine Regarding Preclusion of Other Incidents is denied

without prejudice. There will need to be a showing of substantial similarity and if competent
evidence of other incidents is proffered at trial, the court will consider American's objections.
8.

American's Motion in Limine Regarding Punitive Damages is denied; however,

American is not precludedfromchallenging the sufficiency of plaintiff s proof of punitive
damages if and when that evidence is disclosed.
9.

American's Motion in Limine for a Rebuttable Presumption of Non-Defectiveness

is granted.

^

DATED this

.
of

WC/

\ '

,2001.

BYJHE COURT:

Michael R. Burton
District Court Judge
N:\I9944\1\0RDERLIM.WPD

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

Tab 10

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

*

>flfCHEL ZAGER - 3968
3587 West 4700 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
801-964-6100
GIRARDI | KEESE
Thomas V. Girardi (36603)
James G. O'Callahan (126975)
1126 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90017
213-977-0211
Attorneys for Plaintiff ANNA MARIE ALARID

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ANNA MARIE ALARID
Plaintiff,
vs.
AMERICAN APPLIANCE
MANUFACTURING, INC., et al.
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
;

PLAINTIFF ANNA MARIE
ALARID'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REOPEN DISCOVERY TO TAKE THE
DEPOSITION OF HENRY JACK
MOORE

)

Civil No. 980905332

)

Judge Michael K. Burton

ARMSTRONG WORLD
INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Third Party Plaintiff,
TO.

W. KENT NELSON, et al.,
Third Party Defendants.

)
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INTRODUCTION
The testimony of defendant American Manufacturing's former employee Henry

Jack Moore is critical to this case. Plaintiff calls upon the equitable power of this Court
to re-open discovery for the limited purpose of ordering the deposition of Henry Jack
Moore. Plaintiff has previously attempted to depose Mr. Moore, but defendant American
refused to cooperate and produce this witness. Rather than continuing to waste time and
money tracking Mr. Moore down all over the country, plaintiff decided to rely on Mr.
Moore's former trial and deposition testimony. Plaintiff reasonably relied on the
admissibility of Mr. Moore's former testimony and intended to offer this testimony at
trial.
This Court has now ruled that plaintiff may not use Mr. Moore's former testimony
at trial. Plaintiff must now seek to depose Mr. Moore before trial. Mr. Moore was the
Vice President of Engineering for American from 1981 to 1996 during the years in which
the water heaters at issue in this case were made. Mr. Moore is overly familiar with
American's knowledge of the defect at issue in this case. Since his departure from
American in 1996, Moore has maintained a quasi-employee relationship with American.
Counsel for American, Sutton and Murphy, have cautioned Plaintiff not to contact
Mr. Moore because his testimony involves knowledge gained while employed at
American. See Zager letter attached as Exhibit A. However, when formally presented
with a deposition notice for Mr. Moore, counsel for American claimed they had no ability
to produce a former employee. See Sutton letter 10/12/00 attached as Exhibit B.
Counsel for American seems to decide when or if they will produce Mr. Moore in any
given case. Plaintiff will be extremely prejudiced if not given the opportunity to depose
Mr. Moore and introduce his testimony at trial.
Plaintiffs problems in deposing Henry Jack Moore are hardly unique. Many other
firms throughout the country have experienced the same stall tactic. Mr. Moore
consistently evades service until American decides to produce him. See Affidavit of
Judie Bristo attached as Exhibit C.
\

2
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ARGUMENT

Hurtsw of liberal spirit of Rules, courts should be disposed to grant such discovery
Ihiecomplish full disclosure of facts, eliminate surprise, and promote settlement.

^jagmir^^^^^
9.

&

° - R - C o - n 9 6 L ED Mich) 29 FRD148 * 5 FR Serv 2d 586<

Henry Jack Moore Continues to Maintain an Employee Relationship with
Defendant American Manufacturing.

|f

Since Mr. Moore departed from American in 1996, counsel for American has
consistently maintained a working relationship with Moore. Mr. Moore is the former
Vice President in charge of engineering and design involving the particular gas-fired
water heater at issue in this case. Counsel for American has produced Mr. Moore in more
than 20 water heater burn cases throughout the United States. Moore's own deposition
testimony conclusively demonstrates he maintains and employee relationship with
American.
•

In Fulmer v. Craftsmaster, Mr. Sutton produced Henry Jack Moore in his capacity as
a former employee of American Manufacturing. Moore indicated that he was being
paid by Southcorp USA (American Manufacturing) for his testimony. (41:20-42:6)
See Exhibit D.

•

In Ellis v. American Water Heater. Mr. Moore again sat for deposition upon request
from American. Mr. Moore stated that it was his practice to cooperate with his
former employer when asked to sit for a deposition. Moore testified that he had never
declined American's request to sit for a deposition. See deposition transcript of Henry
Jack Moore, 26:7-19 attached as Exhibit E.
It is blatantly obvious that American, by and through its counsel, produces Mr.

Moore for deposition on an ad hoc basis. Mr. Moore is not a former employee by any
sense. American continues to pay him for his testimony. American continues to provide
him counsel to represent the company's best interest. However, for some inconceivable
reason, American has decided to battle plaintiff in this case over producing Mr. Moore.
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[oore Is Scheduled to be Deposed in October 2001.
reason to believe that Mr. Sutton has not been forthcoming about his
Mr. Moore. Mr. Sutton has recently set-up the deposition of Henry Jack
ie taken on October 11, 2001 in the case Nolan v. Eagle Manufacturing. See
sr dated 7/24/01 attached as Exhibit F. In his July 24, 2001 letter, Mr. Sutton
Jkto produce Mr. Moore without the need for a deposition subpoena. It is
iding that counsel would vigorously oppose the deposition of Moore in the instant
se, claiming Moore to be an unreachable former employee, and simultaneously agree to
produce Moore in the Nolan case. The argument that Moore is an unreachable former
employee is clearly without merit.
Generally, a corporation is not required to produce a former employee because the
company no longer maintains control over the employee. DeLetelier v. Republic of Chile
(2nd Cir. 1984) 748 F.2d 790, 795. The general rule does not apply here. American
maintains substantial control over where, when and in which case, Mr. Moore will testify.
Mr. Moore's designation as a former employee is truly a misnomer considering he is still
being paid by American and represented by American's corporate attorneys.
Moore's Testimony is Extremely Relevant and Plaintiff Will be Prejudiced if
not Allowed to Depose Him.
Moore was the Vice President of engineering for defendant, American
Manufacturing from 1980-1996. Part of Mr. Moore's duties and responsibilities as Vice
President was the safety and design of gas-fired water heaters. Mr. Moore was
responsible for the design of the water heater itself. See Deposition transcript of Moore,
p.7-8, Ellis v. American.
As the chief engineer for American, Moore knew about the problems associated
with gas-fired water heaters igniting flammable vapors. He has testified previously that
his company, American, knew about these problems and consciously chose to disregard
safer alternatives. See Deposition transcript, 135:7-137:6, Ellis v. American Water
Company.
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fy looking for fairness and justice. Plaintiff tried to depose Mr.
Court's intervention. Defendant would not cooperate. Rather than
^wrangle with American over this issue, plaintiff sought to avoid further
ion by offering Mr. Moore's prior testimony in this case. Moore's testimony is
^specifically concerning American's knowledge of a defect in the conventional
water heater. See Moore Deposition Transcript, Fulmer v. Craftmaster, 43:19.
laintiff continues to firmly believe that Mr. Moore's testimony will mirror testimony he
^ a s given in a multitude of other cases, including Ellis and Fulmer.
Lifting the discovery cut-off for the limited purpose of taking Mr. Moore's
deposition will not prejudice American. Mr. Moore's testimony does not effect any of
the other experts in this case. Plaintiffs experts have already relied on Moore's
deposition testimony from prior cases in formulating opinions in this case. Those
opinions will not change. Taking Moore's deposition is simply a formality at this point.
Both plaintiff and American know exactly what Mr. Moore will say. There is no reason
to expect his testimony about American's knowledge of water heater defects to change in
this case.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court re-open
discovery for the limited purpose of ordering the deposition of Henry Jack Moore.
DATED: September 25, 2001

GIRARDI AND KEESE

JAMES G. O'CALLAHAN
Attorney(s) for Plaintiff
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MlTCHBL ZAGER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
3607 WGST 4.700 SOUTH

SALT LAKE C«TYf UTAH 34118
T E L E P H O N E (801 > 064-6100
PAX 9H4-6111

February 14, 2000
Michael Sutton, E6q.
SUTTON & MURPHY
26056 Acero
Mission Viego, CA 92691
Tel:
(949) 206-0550
Fax:
(949) 206-0560
RE:

ALARID V. AMERICAN APPLIANCE MANUFACTURING, INC.

Dear Mr. Sutton:
You have previously informed me not to contact Henry Jack
Moore directly, since hi6 testimony involves his knowledge gained
while an employee for American. Therefore, please arrange to have
Mr. Moore available for deposition at a place of hie convenience.
I have presently set his deposition for March 9, 2000.
I received a message from Marge, Judge Stirba's clerk, in
reply to my request for clarification of the Scheduling Order
regarding the requirement of providing an Expert Report by the 317-00 cut-off date.
It is now my understanding that "designate" means either a
report or availability of an expert ready to be deposed.
As you know, we have provided a report for each expert named
and have, therefore, complied with the Court/s Order. Since you
have not provided expert reports, please have your experts
available for deposition. If any of these dates are inconvenient,
please let me know and we can reschedule those depositions.
Following the taking of your experts' depositions, you may
take the deposition of our experts.
Sinaerely,

Ltchel Zager
Attorney a t La\
MZ/lbz
FAXED 2/14/00 to (949) 206-0560
cc: John R. Lund, Esq.
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TtAKE CITY, UTAH 84118
j * ^ *4-6IOO
AttoraeyW for PLAINTIFF(S)

CASE * 980905332

DECLARATION RE: DILIGENCE
1* the undersigned, declare as follows:
I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action. I have personal knowledge of the facts set
forth in this declaration and I could and would competently testify to these facts if called to do so in a court of law.
On May 3,2001, Our office was hired to serve Henry Jack Moore, Jr., a Deposition Subpoenafora deposition in the
case of: Fox vs. Puglise (Ventura Superior Court Case No. CIV 194309). We have had difficulty in trying to serve
Mr, Moore in the past and have also been hired to serve him m other cases, which werealso very difficult due to die
fact of Mr. Moore's avoiding service. Below is a list of attempts for the above case, Special measures had to be taken
to and effect service on Mr. Moore at his residence of 7573 West 82nd Street. Playa Del Rey, CA
May 5,2001 @ 6:00 p.m No answer at door - again we attempted @ 8:00 p.m. lights on inside, but no answer.
May 6,2001 @ 7:30 a.m No answer at door.
May 7,2001 @ 2:06 p.m Knocked on the door a lady answered stated that Henry Moore, Jr., was not at his
residence but in Tennesse for 2 months and she was house sitting and would not give any other information. We did
not believe her because she asked us why we need Mr. Moore before she told vs he was m Tennesse.
May 8,2001 @ 10:00 a.m No answer at the door, we could hear somebody inside. We knocked louder but no one
would come to the door.
May 10,2001 @ 3:45 p.m No answer at door. Returned again @ 8:00 pjn no answer at door, the lights were on.
Knocked again but still no answer. Our client cancelled the service because we were out of time to effect service
properly.
On August 20,2001 our office was hired to to serve Henry Jack Moore, Jr., a Deposition Subpoena in the case of
Nolan vs. Eagle Manufacturing Case (Merced Superior Court No. 144728).
August 21,2001 @ 6:00 p.m. We knocked on the door, no answer.
August 22,2001 @ 10:15 ajn We knocked on the door, no answer, we went again @ 6:00 p.m no answer.
August 24,2001 @ 2:30 pjn We knocked on the door, no answer we coulkd hear movment inside, knocked louder
but still no answer.
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KELLY FULMER and
CHRISTINA FULMER,
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.CRAFTMASTER WATER HEATER C O . ,
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Defendants.

COPY

DEPOSITION OF HEM[RY JACK MOORE, JR.
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disclosure that purportediy was made by the Fulmers;
is that right?
A

No,

Q

Yes, I am correct?

A

You are correct.

Q

So therefore you did not review a list of

the documents that were presented by the Fu liners to
the defendant in this case; is that right?
A

No, I have not.

Q

When did you first learn about fires

where it was reported that flammable vapors were
ignited by this standard model gas-fired water heater?
A

This particular unit here?

Q

Well, the standard design.

A

You are asking how far back?

MR. SUTTON;

If you don't understand the

question, just tell him that you don't understand it.
TUB WITNESS:

Okay,

I really don't understand

exactly what you are asking.
BY MR. DOWNING:
••' V

Q

I have one ijuestion for you.
Do you have an attorney Bitting here?

A

Yes.

Q

Mr. Sutton is your attorney?

A

yes.
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Q

You have retained Mr. Sutton?

A

Yea:

Q

And are you paying Mr. Sutton?

MR. SUTTON:

Objection.

attorney-client communication.

Call* for an
Instruct him not to

answer.
BY MR, DOWNING:
Q

Is anyone paying Mr. Sutton on your

behalf?
MR. SUTTON;

Objection.

Foundation.

calls for an attorney-client communication.

Also
Instruct

him not to answer,
BY MR. DOWNING:
Q

Have you had conversations with anybody

other than Mr. Sutton about retaining Mr. Sutton7
MR. SUTTON;

Or some other attorney.

MR. DOWNING:

Oh, 1 am not sure that an

attorney that worked for his former corporation would
qualify.

He may be an attorney.

, not an attorney.

I'm not saying he's

I'm just saying I don't thinK that's

i
^ going to get into the attorney-client privilege.
MR, 8UTTQN: Okay.

Your question?

I am sorry.

YcMR, DOWNING:
Q

My question is have you discussed

staining Mr. Sutton with any persons other than
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mr. Sutton?
A

NO.

Q

Has anyone suggested that you retain

Mr. Sutton?
MR. SCJTTOK;

Excluding any conversations that

you have had with me, of course.
MR. DOWNING:

Oh, sure, sure.

THS WITNESS:

No.

BY MR. DOWNING:
Q

when did you retain Mr. Sutton?

A

When I was given notice of the

deposition.
Q

How were you given notice of the

deposition?
MR, SUTTON:

Objection-

BY MR- DOWNING:
Q

Other than conversations with Mr, Sutton,

how were you given notice of the deposition?
MR. SUTTON:

That assume8 facts not in evidence

that there was some method other than conversations
with me.
*

MR. DOWNING:

I guess he could have just

answered and said that there were none other.
THE WITNESS:

None other,

Y KR, DOWNING:
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Q

Who have you spoken to about giving this

deposition other than Mr. Sutton?

Who have you spoken

to about giving this deposition other than Mr. Sutton?
A

Mr. Hackney.

0

when did you speak to Mr. Hackney about

giving a deposition?
A

December.

0

December of '97?

A

Yes.

Q

Did Mr. Hackney provide you with any

documents after December of 199 7?
A

No.

Q

Was Mr. Hackney in the meeting yesterday

that you had with Mr. Sutton?
A

Yes.

Q

Who else was present in the meeting?

A

Steve Murphy.

Q

Who else?

A

That was it.

Q

Are you being compensated in any way for

. coming here to give the deposition?
A

Yes.

Q

How are you being compensated?

A

Being paid.

Q

And who is paying you?

41
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A

Southcorp.

Q

Southcorp USA?

A

Yea.

Q

And what is your agreement with Southcorp

USA with regard to payment?

How much?

A

$150 an hour.

Q

And when does chat start and whan does

that stop?

It's from the time that you left your

home?
A

Yes.

Q

From the time that you left your home in

California or Tennessee?
A

California,

Q

From the time that you leave until the

time that you return; is that right?
A

Yes, portal to portal.

Q

Portal to portalHave you had any other meetings with

regard to this case with anyone other than coming here
and meeting with Mr. Sutton in this deposition?
A

No.

Q

Have you billed anyone for any of your

time in this matter yet?
A

No.

Q

This agreement to pay you the SI50 an
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hour, that would bo *ie« .
w a be also, you add any costs that you
incur?

2
3

A

Any expenses.

Q

Do you have an a c c e n t with Southcorp

4
5

USA that they « r e to pay your 1P 0 ,I A
H y y o u r le
9«l expenses for
Mr, Sutton?

€
7

» • SUTlw,
4

Objection.

va9ue. ^ l g u o u l l ,

irrelavant.

9

5fou can answer.

10

THB WITNESS: No.

11

BY MR. DOWNING:

12
Q
13

How long have you known that this

«oor-nounted standard model

14

ga8-fire<J w a t e r

has a *usceptiMli ty C f i g n i t i n g

flamrnable

n W e r

vapore?

15
MR- SUTTON: objection.
facts not in evidence.

U
"7

Argumentative, assumes

You may answer.
MR. DOWNING:
Q

Let me rephrase it.

Does this standard floor-mounted

gas-fired water heater have the susceptibility to
ignite flammable vapors?
.*

<

MR. SUTTON:

Same objections.

You may answer.
hl

Y

THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. DOWNING;
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MICHAEL S. SUTTON
SUTTON & MURPHY
26056 Acero
Mission Viejo, California 92691
Telephone: (949)206-0550
JOHN R. LUND (A4368)
KARA L. PETTIT (A8659)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTTNEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance Manufacturing
and American Water Heater Co.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ANNA MARIE ALARID,
Plaintiff,
vs.

AMERICAN APPLIANCE
MANUFACTURING, INC., et al.,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REOPEN
DISCOVERY TO TAKE THE
DEPOSITION OF HENRY JACK
MOORE

Defendants.
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES,
INC.,

Civil No. 980905332
Judge Michael K. Burton

Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.

W.KENT NELSON, etal.,
Third
Party Defendants.
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INTRODUCTION
If Plaintiff "wasted time and money tracking Mr. Moore down all over the country," it is
certainly not a matter of record. Other than issuing a Notice of Expert Depositions that included
Mr. Moore's name amongst several expert witnesses, Plaintiff has not made any efforts
whatsoever to depose Mr. Moore. In fact, she has not attempted depose any employee or former
employee of Defendants. During the over three years that this case has been pending, Plaintiff
noticed up Mr. Moore's deposition on only one occasion in March of 2000, right before the
March 17,2000 cutoff. However, she did not follow through with this deposition. After
Plaintiffs counsel learned that Defendants could not compel Mr. Moore's attendance at the
deposition, Plaintiff decided not to depose him. Plaintiff did not issue a subpoena for Mr.
Moore, nor did she try to locate and serve him. Plaintiff simply let the date come and go, without
doing anything at all.
It would be extremely unfair and prejudicial to Defendants to allow Plaintiff to reopen
discovery to depose Mr. Moore on the eve of trial, especially in light of the fact that she
apparently intends to use his testimony as the "heart of her punitive damages case." Punitive
damages are a serious and extraordinary measure. Plaintiff had ample opportunity to depose Mr.
Moore during the almost two year fact discovery period. However, she chose not to depose him.
Instead of developing evidence through depositions, Plaintiff decided to take a gamble that she
could introduce prior deposition or trial testimony from other cases as evidence at the trial in this
case. Ever since Plaintiff first raised the issue of Mr. Moore's deposition via written discovery in
August of 1999, Defendants have informed Plaintiff that they objected to using the previous

-2- J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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testimony as evidence in this case. This notwithstanding, Plaintiff did not ever seek a ruling
from the Court as to whether or not the previous testimony would be admissible in this matter. It
would be fundamentally unfair to place the burden of responding to new evidence on Defendants
at this late hour simply because Plaintiff took a gamble and lost.
Plaintiff apparently intends to have her experts rely on Mr. Moore's testimony.
Consequently, after Mr. Moore's deposition, Mr. Fandey and Mr. Hoffman would have to be
redeposed to learn how their opinions were affected by Mr. Moore's testimony. Defendants still
do not know what punitive damage evidence Plaintiff intends to present at trial, much less what
testimony she will elicit in this regard from Mr. Moore. If Plaintiff is allowed to develop
punitive damage evidence at this late stage, it is only fair that Defendants similarly be allowed to
develop opposing evidence and defenses. It is prejudicial and unfair to put Defendants in the
untenable position to scramble hurriedly to effectively accomplish all of this in the two weeks
before trial simply because Plaintiff failed to avail herself of the opportunity to obtain and
preserve this testimony back in March of 2000. For these reasons, Defendants respectfully
request that this Court deny Plaintiffs motion to reopen discovery to depose Mr. Moore.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On May 28, 1998 the Plaintiff filed the complaint in this case.

2.

After several stipulated extensions, March 17, 2000 was the last day for fact

discovery. See September 13,1999 Scheduling Order, attached as Exhibit A.

-3-
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3.

On February 14,2000, Plaintiff issued a Notice of Expert Depositions which also

indicated that Mr. Moore's deposition would be taken in Playa Del Rey, California on March 9,
2000. See Notice of Deposition, attached as Exhibit B.
4.

On this same day, Mr. Zager wrote to ask Mr. Sutton to arrange for Mr. Moore's

attendance at the deposition. See Exhibit A to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Reopen Discovery.
5.

On February 17,2000, Mr. Sutton promptly and clearly responded: "I do not have

the ability to require [Mr. Moore's] attendance at deposition." As a courtesy, Mr. Sutton offered
to try to reach Mr. Moore and determine if he would agree to appear at the deposition voluntarily.
See Letter dated February 17,2000, attached hereto as Exhibit C.
6.

On February 18,2000, Mr. Sutton and Mr. Zager were together in Salt Lake City

for the deposition of Dr. Morris. Following that deposition, Mr. Sutton and Mr. Zager discussed
the Moore deposition and Mr. Sutton informed Mr. Zager that it was uncertain if Mr. Moore
could be reached because he travels quite a bit in his retirement. Mr. Sutton informed Mr. Zager
that the safest tiling for him to do was to utilize the available procedures to have an out-of-state
subpoena prepared for service on Mr. Moore.
7.

To Defendants' knowledge, Plaintiff took no steps thereafter to get Mr. Moore to

his deposition as noticed. Plaintiff did not issue a subpoena. Plaintiff did not seek an order for
out-of-state service. March 9,2000 simply came and went without the deposition taking place.
Defendants are aware of no other effort by Plaintiff, nor even mention of the interest in deposing
Mr. Moore, before the March 17,2000 fact discovery cut off in this matter.

-4-
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8.

Other than the February 2000 Notice of Expert Depositions that include Mr.

Moore, Plaintiff did not make any effort whatsoever to depose even a single employee or former
employee of Defendants. In fact, Plaintiff only conducted one non-expert deposition in this case,
which was the first half of Kent Nelson's deposition. Plaintiffs apparent strategy was to rely on
evidence developed by plaintiffs in other water heater cases in other jurisdictions.
9.

During the months of May and June of 2000, the parties conducted numerous

expert witness depositions. The last expert deposition took place on July 6,2000.
10.

Since the discovery cutoff expired, this trial has been scheduled to go on three

occasions: June 20,2000, August 8, 2000, and May 7,2001. The trial is currently set to begin
October 29, 2001.
11.

Plaintiff first raised the issue of Mr. Moore's previous testimony via written

discovery in August of 1999. At this time, Defendants objected to the authenticity of the
deposition transcripts. Moreover, throughout this case, Defendants repeatedly have stated their
position to Plaintiff that she could not use prior deposition or trial transcripts as evidence for her
case in chief. See October 12, 2000 letter from Mr. Sutton which states:
Mr. Zager has requested on multiple prior occasions that we
stipulate that deposition transcripts of various individuals taken in
other cases be used in this case with the same force and effect as
though said depositions were taken in this case. We have
repeatedly declined that request. Accordingly, I must again advise
that I am unable to stipulate that you may use prior deposition
transcripts from other cases at the time of trial in this case.
See Exhibit B to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reopen Discovery.

-5-
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9. At the September 17,2001 pretrial and motion hearing, Mr. Zager alleged that Mr.
Moore's testimony was the heart of Plaintiffs punitive damages case. Mr. Zager also indicated
that Plaintiffs experts relied upon Mr. Moore's previous deposition testimony in reaching their
opinions in this case. However, the Court ruled that Plaintiffs experts could not rely upon Mr.
Moore's testimony, unless it was given in the context of this case.
10. At the September 17, 2000 hearing, the Court also stated that it did not see that
Defendants had thwarted any efforts by Plaintiff to secure Mr. Moore's attendance at a
deposition. Additionally, the Court remarked that Plaintiff could have compelled Mr. Moore's
attendance, but it was just something Plaintiff decided not to do.
ARGUMENT
IT WOULD BE FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR AND PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANTS
TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO DEVELOP NEW PUNITIVE DAMAGE EVIDENCE ON
THE EVE OF TRIAL WHEN SHE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESERVE MR,
MOORE'S TESTIMONY DURING THE ALMOST TWO YEAR FACT DISCOVERY
PERIOD WHICH EXPIRED IN MARCH OF 2000.
The discovery rules promulgated in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to
eliminate last minute surprises and ensure that parties are aware in advance of the evidence their
opponents will be producing at trial. For instance, Rule 26(a)(4) requires parties to provide their
opponents with final witness and exhibit lists at least thirty (30) days before trial. Moreover,
although scheduling orders should never be so inflexible as to not accommodate exigencies that
may occur, they are necessary to expedite the flow of cases through the court system and should
not be lightly disregarded. See Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1993). The Arnold Court
upheld a trial court's refusal to consider an expert affidavit attached to a summary judgment

-6-
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memorandum on the ground that it was filed in derogation of the scheduling order entered eight
months earlier, and in view of the fact that the party had not at any time asked to be relieved of
the time requirement of the order. Id
With only two weeks left before trial, Plaintiff asks this Court to reopen fact discovery
although the cutoff expired one and one-half years ago.. Thereafter, numerous expert depositions
took place. The last expert deposition of Ed Karnes, third-party defendant's expert, occurred on
July 6, 2000. Both fact and expert discovery have been closed for well over a year. Plaintiff
cannot credibly claim that this is an exigent circumstance. This is not a situation where Plaintiff
did not know of the existence of the witness and therefore, could not have taken his deposition
during the discovery period. Here, Plaintiff simply chose not to follow through on the deposition
of Mr. Moore after learning that Defendants could not compel his attendance at a deposition
because he was a former employee. Plaintiff made no efforts whatsoever to secure his attendance
at the deposition and no subpoenas were ever issued in this case for Mr. Moore.
The Tenth Circuit has outlined the relevant factors used by courts in deciding whether to
extend or reopen discovery: Ml) whether trial is imminent, 2) whether the request is opposed, 3)
whether the non-moving party would be prejudiced, 4) whether the moving party was diligent in
obtaining discovery within the guidelines established by the court, 5) the foreseeability of the
need for additional discovery in light of the time allowed for discovery by the district court, and
6) the likelihood that the discovery will lead to relevant evidence." Smith v. United States, 834
F.2d 166, 169 (10th Cir. 1987). In Smith, the Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's denial of the
plaintiff taxpayer's request to reopen discovery to conduct depositions. The trial court denied the

-7-
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request because the taxpayer had eight months during discovery in which to take the depositions,
the request was made approximately three weeks before trial, and the discovery was not relevant
to the narrow issue to be tried. Id The Tenth Circuit held that the trial judge acted well within
the range of allowable discretion in denying the taxpayer's motion. Id at 170.
THE FACTORS SET FORTH BY THE TENTH CIRCUIT CLEARLY SHOW THAT
REOPENING DISCOVERY AT THIS LATE DATE IS NOT IN THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS IN THIS CASE.
In analyzing these six factors with respect to the case at hand, it is clear that these
considerations weigh totally against Plaintiffs request to reopen discovery to depose Mr. Moore.
The Trial Would Likely Begin Less than One Week after Mr. Moore's Deposition.
First, the trial is imminent and is scheduled to begin on October 29, 2001. By the time
the deposition could perhaps even be scheduled and occur, it mostly likely would take place with
less than one week before trial. Moreover, this is not a one-day trial for which Defendants could
quickly prepare. It is anticipated that the trial in this matter will take four weeks. This is a
products liability case involving numerous expert witnesses, and both compensatory as well as
punitive claims.
In October of 2000. Defendants Informed Plaintiff that They Objected to Reopening
Discovery to Depose Mr. Moore.
Second, Defendants oppose this request, and Plaintiff was on notice of their position back
in October of 2000, approximately one year ago. Mr. Sutton relayed in his October 12, 2000
letter to Plaintiffs counsel, that Defendants would oppose the reopening of discovery to depose
Mr. Moore because it was well past the March of 2000 discovery cutoff, and additional expert
discovery would be required thereafter. This notwithstanding, Plaintiff took no action and did
-8-
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not ask the Court to reopen discovery to depose Mr. Moore at that time. Instead, Plaintiff
decided to rely on her assumption that she would be able to introduce the prior transcripts as
evidence in her case in chief.
Defendants Will be Prejudiced if Plaintiff is Allowed to Develop New Evidence on the
Evepf Trial.
Third, Defendants will be unfairly prejudiced if discovery is reopened at this late
juncture. Until now, Plaintiff has made no real effort to develop testimony from any employee or
former employee of Defendants. In fact, the only fact witness the Plaintiff deposed was Kent
Nelson. Defendants have prepared their case to respond to the evidence that Plaintiff has
developed in this matter. Defendants have not prepared their case to respond to evidence that
plaintiffs in other cases may have presented.
Plaintiff seeks to depose Mr. Moore to develop evidence for her punitive damages claims.
Defendants still do not know what punitive damage evidence Plaintiff intends to present at trial,
much less what testimony she will elicit in this regard from Mr. Moore. Consequently, it is
unknown how Defendants will need to respond to new testimony developed by Plaintiff.
Defendant may need to designate additional former employees as witnesses or additional
documents in response to evidence developed by Plaintiff in Mr. Moore's deposition.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs counsel has previously stated they intend to have their experts
rely on Mr. Moore's testimony. Consequently, after Mr. Moore's deposition, Mr. Fandey and
Mr. Hoffman would have to be redeposed to learn how their opinions were affected by Mr.
Moore's testimony. It is prejudicial and unfair to put Defendants in the untenable position to
scramble hurriedly to effectively accomplish all of this in the two weeks before trial simply

-9-
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because Plaintiff failed to avail herself of the opportunity to obtain and preserve this testimony
during the almost two year discovery period.
Plaintiff Made No Effort to Secure Mr. Moore's Attendance at a Deposition in this Case.
The fourth and most egregious factor is that Plaintiff did not exercise diligence in
obtaining this discovery within the guidelines established by the Court's scheduling order. The
complaint in this matter was filed on May 28,1998 and the discovery cutoff was extended on
several occasions. Pursuant to the last revised scheduling order, fact discovery ended on March
17,2000. During this entire time, the only effort Plaintiff made to depose Mr. Moore was to
notice up his deposition on one occasion for March 9,2000, one week prior to the cutoff.
As this Court noted on September 17,2001, although Plaintiff knew she had to do
something to secure Mr. Moore's attendance at this deposition, she did not do anything to try to
get him there. Plaintiff did not issue a subpoena. Plaintiff did not seek an order for out-of-state
service. Nevertheless, Plaintiff tries to blame Defendants for not "producing" Mr. Moore,
instead of acknowledging her own lack of diligence. Plaintiffs memorandum is completely void
of any reference to any effort made on Plaintiffs behalf to secure Mr. Moore's attendance at a
deposition. Instead, the memorandum discusses some other individual's efforts to serve Mr.
Moore with a subpoena in an unrelated case, in another jurisdiction, over a year after the
discovery cutoff in this case.
In lieu of developing testimony in this case, Plaintiffs counsel made a strategic decision
to rely upon prior testimony of Mr. Moore and other former employees of Defendants that other
plaintiffs obtained in other unrelated water heater cases. Plaintiff did not attempt to depose any

-10-
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of Defendants' employees or former employees. It would be unfair to penalize and prejudice
Defendants because Plaintiffs counsel now believes their decision was unwise.
From the Very Outset of this Case. Plaintiff Knew She Wanted to Have Testimony from
Mr. Moore and Knew that Defendants Would Object to Her Using Mr. Moore's Prior
Testimony from Other Cases.
Fifth, Plaintiffs counsel obviously foresaw their alleged need for Mr. Moore's testimony
during the time allowed for discovery by the court. Plaintiffs counsel stated that Mr. Moore's
testimony is the "heart of Plaintiff s punitive claims." Furthermore, Plaintiffs counsel has been
aware all along that Defendants would object to the admission of Mr. Moore's prior deposition or
trial testimony from other cases. Nevertheless, Plaintiff made essentially no efforts to depose
Mr. Moore. Nor did Plaintiff seek a ruling from this Court as to whether or not the prior
testimony would be admissible. Defendants should not be the ones to bear the burden of
Plaintiff s case strategy decisions.
Although Mr. Moore's Testimony May be Relevant, the Plaintiff Had Ample Opportunity
to Preserve this Evidence, and By Choosing to Not Depose Mr. Moore. She Created the
Alleged Prejudice She Now Claims Would Occur if Her Motion to Reopen is Denied.
Last, although Mr. Moore's testimony may ultimately be relevant to the punitive portions
of Plaintiff s claims, it is not relevant to her compensatory claims. Moreover, the prejudice and
fundamental unfairness evident in the preceding five factors far outweigh any relevance it may
have considering the totality of the circumstances. If Mr. Moore's testimony is so crucial to
Plaintiffs claims, why did she fail to avail herself of the opportunity to depose him during
discovery? Because she cannot identify any efforts that she took to secure Mr. Moore's
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

attendance at a deposition, Plaintiff makes an unwarranted attack on Defendants' counsel,
blaming him for failing to voluntarily "produce" Mr. Moore at the deposition in March of 2000.
However, the record shows that Plaintiff made absolutely no efforts to follow through on
a deposition of Mr. Moore. In fact, Plaintiff made no efforts to preserve the testimony of any fact
witnesses other than Kent Nelson. Plaintiff's strategy in this case has been to rely upon evidence
that other plaintiffs have obtained in other, unrelated water heater cases. Defendants have
prepared their case accordingly. It is unfairly prejudicial to Defendants to force them to reopen
discovery to not only to depose Mr. Moore, but to develop defenses to this new testimony, as
well as to redepose the experts in this case who will rely upon Mr. Moore's testimony, on the eve
of trial, especially regarding claims as serious as punitive damages.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this Court deny Plaintiff's motion.
DATED this

of October, 2001.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

N:\I9944\I\MOOREOPP.WPD

JohnR. Lund
KaraL. Pettit
Attorneys for Defendants American
Appliance Manufacturing and American
Water Heater Co.
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I must say that I was offended by the allegations made in your July 19,2001, coirespondence. It
seems that you and I have always been able to work amicably on cases, despite our
disagreements as to the factual basis and histrionics presented by various claims, I am aware of
no efforts made by Mr. Moore, at any time, in any case, to evade service of any subpena. As you
know, Mr. Moore is retired, maintains residences in more than one (1) stale, and frequently
travels as part of his retirement In the event you have bad difficulty in the past effectuating
service of a Deposition Subpena upon Mr. Moore, I am confident that that difficulty was based
upon Mr. Moore's retirement status andfrequenttravel, as opposed to any volitional attempt by
hin to evade service. Notwithstanding your mis-characterizations to the contrary, which seem to
take on a personal vent against Mr. Moore, we are willing to afford you the courtesy and
cooperation previously described in this correspondence. It seems that personal accusations
and/or vendettas will serve no useful purpose in terms of cooperative handling of this litigation.
In terms of your accusations thai my legal assistant did not respond to you as expeditiously as
you would have preferred, please be advised that bonafldc efforts to contact Mr. Moore were
being made, as we had promised you we would do, following your telephonic request and prior
to your July 19,2001, correspondence. Unfortunately, given Mr. Moore's retirement and travel
status, we were unsuccessful in discussing your request with him such that we could obtain his
authority to provide you the assurances that have been given in this correspondence. I apologize
that we did not move as quickly as you would have liked.
I am hopeful that we can remove the persona] chargesfromthis litigation as we move forward.
Thank you for your anticipated courtesy and cooperation in this regard.

MSS:kjc
cc:
Henry Jack Moore, Jr.
Scott R. Phillips, Esq/SOUTHCORP USA, INC.
Dean M. Robinson, EsqVLOW, BALL & LYNCH
Steven P. Burke, Esq,/SEDGWICK, DETERT, MORAN & ARNOLD
Christopher W. Larapc, Esq./TENENB AUM, LAMPE & FROMSON
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SUTTON & MURPHY
Attorntyi aft U w
26056 Accro
KCiuion Vicjo, CA 92691-276*
Takphonr (949) 206-0550
Facsimile: (949) 206-0560
E-Mail: wtton*murphy@picbtl).net
Intern*: www lawyenxom/iuitw>4tm\irp|.y

^chacl S. Sutton
Thomai M. Murphy
JoatphA. Haodnx
Pittioki.Wehaie
PttarT.CoUrosn

JUL 2 7 2001
T5U U L b ^
Erin R . T O t a a t W t r - — * • • • • • • • • • •
MaicJ.D EJlti
S. Moniquc Jama

July 24, 2001

V^Maq^4/4?H^
Edward F. Downing, ill, Esq.
GAUTHIER, DOWNING, LABARRE,
BEISER&DEAN
3500N.HuiIcn Street
Mctaire, LA 70002

RE:

NOLAN VS EAGLE MANUFACTURING

Dear Ed:
This correspondence will acknowledge receipt of your facsimile transmittal dated July 19,2001.
Preliminarily, please be advised that it will not be necessary for you to effectuate service of a
Deposition Subpona upon Mr. Moore with respect to the October 11,2001, deposition date
heroin. I have discussed your desire to proceed with the deposition of Mr. Moore with respect to
this case with him and I have now received his authority to voluntarily produce him for
deposition in this case without necessity of service of a Deposition Subpena. At this juncture,
October U , 2001, is a good date on both Mr. Moore's calendar and my own. However, given
the fact that the deposition date is approximately three (3) months away, something may develop
on either Mr. Moore's calendar, or my own, that will render that date inconvenient. If such a
development occurs, you will promptly be notified. If it becomes necessary to change the
deposition, you will not be required to serve Mr. Moore with a Deposition Subpena, so long as
you will be cooperative with us in terms of a revised date and time for the deposition. Both Mr.
Moore and I do desire that the deposition take placo in my office, whether it proceeds on October
11,2001, or some other date. By virtue of these agreements made by me on behalf of Mi.
Moore, please confirm that your office and Mr. Lamped office will take no steps to effectuate
service of a Deposition Subpena upon Mr. Moore. I am particularly interested in your assurance
that process servers will not interact with Mr. Moore's wife, son, or any other family members.
It would seem that given the assurances that I have provided in this correspondence, than any
attempt to interact with Mr. Moore or any of his family members would be harassive.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ANNA MARIE ALARID,

Case No. 980905332

Plaintiff,

™«'DISTRICT COURT
JAN 3 0 2Q02

AMERICAN APPLIANCE
MANUFACTURING, INC., et al.,

By

^ A L £££ K E COUNTY
OeputTcISriT

Defendants.

ORAL ARGUMENT OCTOBER 12, 2001
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL K. BURTON

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 East Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186

FILED
APR

1 5 2002
s ^
PaiA&ttB
del* of the Court

JQbXLW

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

APPEARANCES
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MITCHEL ZAGER
Attorney at Law

For the Defendants:

MICHAEL S. SUTTON
Sutton & Murphy
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH; OCTOBER 12, 2001
HONORABLE MICHAEL K. BURTON PRESIDING
P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

Let's see, Mr. Zager, you get to lead

MR. ZAGER:

Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT:

Is that right?

MR. SUTTON:

I believe so.

off,

MR. ZAGER:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Has the Court had

the opportunity to review the motions and the attachments to
plaintiff's motion?
THE COURT:

Yes. Uh-huh (affirmative).

MR. ZAGER:

Plaintiff believes there are several

reasons that the Court should use its broad discretion in
exercising its equitable powers in the interest of justice to
accomplish a just and fair result and plaintiff requests the
Court to permit in it's motion the taking of the deposition of
defendant's employee, Mr. Moore, or essentially to reconsider
its earlier ruling excluding Mr. Moore's prior trial transcript
testimony for some of the reasons that I'll present here today.
First of all, plaintiff reasonably relies and had
relied, she believed that the prior sworn testimony of Mr.
Moore would be admissible.

Plaintiff will demonstrate that

there will be no surprise nor prejudice to the defendant by
permitting the deposition to proceed at this time and that the
1
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evidence contained or anticipated to be received, will be
highly relevant and in fact, critical to plaintiff's case and
that there'll be no unfairness to the defendant.
By way of background, plaintiff believed that the
prior deposition and trial transcript of Mr. Moore would be
admissible in this case for several reasons, those found in the
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 8012 an admission by a party,
opponent where Mr. Moore unlike what was represented that Mr.
Moore is no longer employed by the defendant.

It's true that

Mr. Moore is retired from his previous position as the Vice
President and Safety Engineer, but I will present evidence
today to the Court that Mr. Moore is in fact still on the
payroll and still receives a salary from the defendant for
giving depositions related to information he obtained while
being an employee of the defendant. As a party opponent, no
subpoena was ever necessary, simply the Notice of Deposition
would have been sufficient for the defendant to produce Mr.
Moore.

Plaintiff also relies in Rule 803-24.

I'm sure the

Court is familiar where transcripts in this case are
trustworthy.

They're offered to prove materials facts.

They're probative and the defendant has known of the contents
of Mr. Moore's testimony for over three years. Utah Rule of
Evidence 804, although requiring unavailability and, in fact,
Mr. Moore is outside the subpoena power and jurisdiction of
this Court, 804-1, former testimony of a witness where the
2
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defendant had a motive at trial. Here certainly defendant did
have a motive to rehabilitate Mr. Moore at time of trial*
We're not talking about simply a deposition here, but an actual
trial proceeding.

804-3, a statement against interest and

804-5, again, where the information is trustworthy and
probative.
In fact, the Court should aware that plaintiff's
experts in their prior depositions, have already relied upon
the prior testimony of Mr. Moore. Again, plaintiff believes
that her reliance on the admissibility was reasonable and it
was not until this Court's recent ruling in response to
Defendant's Motion in Limine that plaintiff realized that she
would then be required to take Mr. Moore's deposition and
plaintiff acted promptly, notifying, in fact, defendant at that
hearing of her intentions to open discovery to take the
deposition of Mr. Moore.
I also contacted Mr. Sutton and let him know of our
intentions and asked him if he would cooperate to try and get
Mr. Moore's deposition and dates set up in the event that the
Court allowed

the deposition to go forward, in fact, Mr. Moore

testified yesterday, voluntarily at Mr. Sutton's office, again,
referring back in his deposition and ratifying his testimony in
the Ellis matter.
It's critical for the Court to know the relationship
that exists between the defendant and Mr. Moore.

The last time
3
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we were in Court, Mr. Sutton, I believe was less than candid
with the Court when he presented the image that Mr. Moore was
someone that the defendant had no control over and that he
could not require Mr. Moore to voluntarily attend.

In a letter

from Mr. Sutton to me, it was made clear that if we were to
proceed forward on Mr. Moore's deposition that Mr. Sutton would
need two days, not one day, to block out his calendar because
one of the days would be used to prepare Mr. Moore for the
deposition the next day, clearly showing that Mr. Moore would
do more than simply attend pursuant to a subpoena, that he
would voluntarily present himself at Mr. Sutton's office the
day before or at whatever date he and his attorney agreed on to
prepare Mr. Moore for deposition and, in fact, it's also clear
that Mr. Sutton is Mr. Moore's attorney, has been his attorney
in other deposition against the defendant, American, and that's
presented in the attachments which I'm sure the Court has
reviewed.

In fact, the defendant in every case where Mr. Moore

testifies where American is a Defendant, Mr. Moore is
represented by the same attorney who is the attorney in the
case in chief and that defendant not only pays Mr. Moore $150
to testify from portal to portal as an expert, not a lay
witness, but also provides Mr. Moore and pays for his
representation by the attorney on the case.
In Mr. Moore's deposition at Page 26 in the Ellis
matter, Mr. Moore has testified that he always is agreeable to
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1

presenting himself voluntarily for depositions in the twenty

2

odd cases that he has testified for. He has never refused to

3

testify and again, I think the Court and myself, for some

4

period of time, were misled in believing that Mr. Moore was the

5

problem in not showing for the deposition.

6

testifies that he is always agreeable to voluntarily present

7

himself at depositions.

In fact, Mr. Moore

8

Further evidence of the control the defendant has

9

over Mr. Moore again was related in the fact that Mr. Moore

10

would show up early, as I've mentioned.

11

deposition taken yesterday, it's odd that Mr. Sutton sent a

12

letter to Mr. Downey who is the attorney for the plaintiff in

13

the Nolan matter where Mr. Moore testified yesterday at Mr.

14

Sutton's office voluntarily and that letter cautioned the

15

attorney, Mr. Downey, not to subpoena Mr. Moore and in fact,

16

told Mr. Downey in that letter if he was to subpoena Mr. Moore,

17

Mr. Sutton would deem that to be harassment.

18

stance was taken cautioning not to subpoena Mr. Moore, that

19

that would be harassment.

20

In connection with the

So the opposite

We intended to use, if we were required, if the

21

Court, you know, simply couldn't order Mr. Moore to appear as a

22

party in the event that we cannot use the prior trial

23

transcript, we intend to use this same process server as the

24

one used in Nolan, the one that Mr. Moore had a problem with,

25

some question of whether he evaded service, which prompted Mr.
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Sutton's letter cautioning, please do not subpoena Mr. Moore
because this particular process server would somehow be deemed
harassment.

We intend to use the same process server.

that to Mr. Sutton.

I told

Still, Mr. Sutton refused to voluntarily

present Mr. Moore for a deposition.
The bottom line I think that we're looking at here
and I know the Court had some concern with introducing
deposition or trial testimony in this case because the jury
would not have the benefit of being able to observe the
demeanor and candor of Mr. Moore at trial. We're no further
along if we were to take Mr. Moore's deposition anew because we
cannot require Mr. Moore to show up at trial, so we would just
be introducing a new deposition versus the previous trial
transcript into evidence.

The jury is not going to be any

further benefitted because Mr. Moore still will not be
compelled to appear.

It is only the defendant who controls

their own party to have him appear in the court.
that.

We cannot do

I imagine that if the testimony is permitted by the

Court to be used, you can probably anticipate that Mr. Moore
will be brought here as a witness by the defendant who
exercises control over Mr. Moore as their client.
Furthermore, the testimony given by Mr. Moore which
the Court has now had an opportunity to see, is generic, is not
case specific.

His testimony is about what he knew and what

the defendant knew about their product for years and years,
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about the inherent dangers and about the cost issues involving
what profit they would loose if they made their product safer,
for instance, by including water heater sands.

It's clear that

the testimony given three years ago by Mr. Moore is going to be
a lot fresher in Mr. Moore's mind that it is now, that the
testimony is going to be a lot more probative and more reliable
taken three years ago and the Court should be aware that
plaintiff does not seek to discover any new evidence or
anything that has not been contained in that deposition.

We

will not go outside the parameters of that deposition or trial
testimony.

We will not seek to discover any new evidence. We

will only seek to have Mr. Moore basically ratify, as he did
yesterday, the testimony that he gave in the Ellis matter,
generic, non-specific case testimony which was fresher in his
mind several years ago than it probably will be now.

We simply

intend to read the old testimony, the admissions, the
declarations against interest or however you want to define it,
his testimony into a new booklet.
Under these circumstances, we would ask the Court to
reconsider allowing us to use the prior trial transcript
testimony that Mr. Moore has previously given, but if the Court
feels that we need to re-read that testimony, that generic
testimony into a new deposition booklet, then we would ask the
Court to order the defendant to produce his client without the
necessity of subpoena at his office at a time prior to trial.
7
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Obviously, the last leg that we would propose, is
that if the Court required us to again hunt Mr. Moore down at
this time and track him down, it's pretty clear now that Mr.
Sutton knows his whereabouts, knows where Mr. Moore can be
served, has been in constant contact with him, just saw him
yesterday and probably the day before for preparation of this
deposition and that they cooperate in having Mr. Moore served
and not evading service.
Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT:

Before you sit down, give me a little

insight on why you think 801, 803 and 4, apply.

Maybe I

misunderstand but I thought those were rules that apply to
define or create exceptions for what we call, hearsay.

I'm not

real clear how they apply to this little discussion we're
having today.
MR. ZAGER:

Well, Your Honor, if in fact, Mr. Moore,

because he still is paid $150 by the defendant to testify in
matters from portal to portal—
THE COURT:

Let's assume that's true.

MR. ZAGER:

Let's assume he's a party?

THE COURT:

Let's assume all that's true, what does

that have to do with you wanting either to depose him at this
late date or - I guess my question really is, why did you
recently rely on the idea that testimony he'd given in another
case, in another jurisdiction, other parties, would suddenly be
8
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admissible here?

What precedent is there for that?

I'm not

arguing that those rules you described don't exist. I
understand they do. Where has it ever been done?

Yeah, we're

going to take the testimony from a case out of Tennessee and
say, here, we'll read it to you, ladies and gentlemen of the
jury?

I thought - maybe, this is more editorial, but I thought

maybe the reason the jury was here was to measure the reliable
of the witness and you seem to be saying to me, you know, I
just thought we didn't have to go through that.

Is there a

case where this kind of process is used?
MR. ZAGER:

First Your Honor, there's nothing we can

do to require Mr. Moore —
THE COURT:

Let's set aside that part. Where in

anybody's history, guide me - I guess I'm trying to ask you to
help me.

Tell me where this is sanctioned.

You take, you

know, trial testimony where they're essentially not the same
case, not the same jurisdiction, and say, Well, we'll use that
in our trial?

Where is this done?

Where is this upheld?

there like case authority for this proposition?
to be the way the world works?

Is

We'd like this

I mean, I guess, I confess to

you, it was such an astonishing thought to me, that I never
noticed it before. Where is this done before?
MR. ZAGER:

Your Honor, I guess I'd like to just

point simply to the rule and say that Rule, for instance, 801
and 2, talks about admissions by party opponent when the
9
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document containing the admission is one that's genuine,
trustworthy, and has guarantees of reliability and one that was
taken at a time when the defendant had a similar motive to
cross examine or rehabilitate the witness and our position is
what greater moment would a defendant have to rehabilitate
their own witness from damaging testimony than at trial and so*
if in fact, Mr. Moore is a party to the lawsuit and has made
declarations against interests or admissions in a sworn
document during the time of trial, dealing with non-specific
case information but basically just what he knew about what the
defendant knew about their product, that it just seems so clear
that that kind of sworn testimony at a time when the defendant
had every opportunity and motive to cross examine and
rehabilitate that witness, that there would be no question that
that kind of evidence is exactly what is intended by the rule,
that it's not hearsay and that it is admissible because the
written document, albeit the trial transcript, what greater
guarantee of trustworthiness can you have than a party making a
damaging statement under oath at time of trial?
THE COURT:

Well, I can answer that.

that every trial is a different event.

It seems to me

One could argue, I

think, quite readily that, and I don't know anything about the
Ellis case, but one could say, Well, in Ellis we thought we had
a lock on xx' or we thought we were losing on yy'.

It just

seems to me that each of these things is a beast unto itself
10
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and your argument seems to say, Well, anytime I go to trial, I
ought to be ready for every contingency and my point is, every
trial is a different event and I'm sorry, I guess, I now see
what you're saying but I think we have such a different view,
it's just - my answer to your question, is they are just such
different animals that maybe you have no motive. Maybe you've
conceded some points. Maybe you just, for trial strategy in
that trial, want to do nothing.

I don't know why it is Mr.

Zager, but it seems to me without much effort, somebody can
think up a lot of reasons why you don't do, in that particular
instance, what you might want to do here.
MR. ZAGER:

In 20 depositions given by Mr. Moore in

cases involving the Defendant American, Mr. Moore testified the
same, that American knew the product was dangerous and they
didn't fix it for these reasons.

In fact, on Page 135 of the

Ellis - "And your company knew, let's talk about in 1990, that
if the water heaters had been installed on stands, that would
reduce the likelihood that someone would get burned." And the
answer given on the following page was, "It could reduce some
of the instances, yes." "And you made a conscious decision not
to include the safety device with your products?"

The answer

is yes. And that is not going to change if we take his
deposition tomorrow and it didn't change yesterday when his
deposition was taken in the Nolan case and it didn't change in
the 20 other cases, but if the Court is troubled that we need
11
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to take that testimony for a 21st time again.

There's no

unfairness to the defendant to allow us now to take that
deposition.

The defendant has long known that the testimony -

we do not intend to go outside the parameters of the questions
that were already asked and if the Court finds that, in fact,
because Mr. Moore is being paid by the defendant for these
depositions and is in fact controlled by the defendant and is
in fact a party even though he now longer has his position as
Vice President of Safety, then he should have been produced
when we noticed up the deposition without the need for a
subpoena and it was only because of Mr. Sutton's misleading
statements and he comes before the Court, I believe with
unclean hands, that Mr. Moore wasn't presented voluntarily as
Mr. Moore has testified he always presents himself voluntarily.
So one must wonder why in one case, the attorney for the
defendant will not present Mr. Moore and in another case, not
only will he present Mr. Moore but caution the other attorney
not to subpoena him.
It seems to be Your Honor, that it's not Mr. Moore
that is the problem nor Mr. Moore that is making a decision as
to why he is voluntary or not, it seems to me that it is the
attorney for the defendant who is deciding whether or not to
produce Mr. Moore at his own whim and for his own reasons.
THE COURT: As you now speak, I guess I suddenly see
where - I started from really a different premise, Mr. Zager.
12
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My premise was you were going to call Mr. Moore as a witness.
I guess you never intended to.
MR. ZAGER:

Well, you can't, he's outside the

subpoena power of the Court.
THE COURT:

I didn't ask you -

MR. ZAGER:

We would love to.

THE COURT:

You're not going to have any witness but

a person that's within the subpoena power of this Court for
your case in chief?
MR. ZAGER:
hostile witnesses.

Well, we have our own experts but not
I don't see —

THE COURT:

Okay.

But I guess what I never heard

from you, you asked Moore to come and he said nah, never on a
bet.
MR. ZAGER:

Defendant instructed us that we were not

to contact Mr. Moore. We were to make no contact with Mr.
Moore.

We abided —
THE COURT:

you.

Okay.

Let me think this through with

I guess the way I suppose you prepared for trial - and

this is my fault because I made a supposition - you'd get a
list of folks.

These will all come, this one won't. We tried

to get this one, he said this and then if you can't get them,
you might come to the Court and say, well, hey, Judge, we can't
get them so can we do 'a' or *b'. But I guess you just leaped
over that spot and (inaudible) you said, Well, he's not going
13
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1

to come; therefore, we're going to use this and that's how we

2

proceed.

3

thought that what you do is ask the guy to come so that we

4

could see - that's really what I was hoping was the premise of

5

this whole exercise.

6

MR. ZAGER:

Have I kind of seen inside your mind because I always

Actually Your Honor, I was hoping that we

7

would have had the opportunity to call Mr. Moore directly and

8

ask him if he'd come to trial. Unfortunately, we could not do

9

that -

10

THE COURT: Now, when you were told not to, is there

11

a reason you didn't approach the Court and say, you know, we

12

need this guy, we want this guy, they aren't letting us talk to

13

him, what's our solution?

14

I'm just thinking out loud with you because here we are, you

15

know, two weeks before this is to kick off and what I now

16

understand you want to do is take the deposition for purposes

17

to use here in trial because you don't think this guy wants to

18

come. Although you have no evidence, is that fair to say?

19

You've not asked him and you haven't asked for permission to

20

ask him, other than talking with Mr. Sutton?

21

that.

22

MR. ZAGER:

Is there a reason that wasn't done?

I'm not arguing

I guess I have to say, Your Honor, that

23

as attorneys we're well aware of the ethical obligations and

24

the legal ramifications of practicing law.

25

THE COURT:

Let's say then, okay, I think I know
14
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where you're going.
feathers.

You didn't want to ruffle Mr. Sutton's

If you can't get through him what you want, is there

a reason you didn't come to me and say, here's my problem?

I

say me, but I mean some are here long before me. Here's my
problem.

I need to this guy, what's the plan?

could be here and he could tell us A, B and C.

And Sutton
Why not? That's

where it's getting past me.
MR. ZAGER:

Why not, because we are aware that when

witnesses are beyond the subpoena power of this Court they
cannot be brought to trial and if we came to the judge,
yourself or whoever was on the bench at that time, and said
Your Honor, we want Mr. Moore to be here at trial, which we
would welcome now.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ZAGER:

We didn't believe, knowing the law as we

do, that the Court had the power THE COURT:

I'm not arguing that I could force it.

That's not my argument. My argument is, there are other ways
to do it, just as you described.

There are, let's suppose in

this case, or I guess, this new method that you say others well, you haven't ever said that. You haven't said anybody
else has ever done it, what you're proposing, but there's
another method I guess. Why aren't these things brought to our
attention before two weeks before a calendar?

That's what's

disturbing to me, it's the shortness of the time.

It seems to
15

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

me that there should have been notice before, sorry,
MR. ZAGER:

And Your Honor, I imagine it's because

we've relied on our understanding that party admissions are
always, they would be brought in if it's contained in a
document as I've described earlier and when the defendant is
the one who blocks out attempts to contact the defendant, then .
it also bears some blame in the situation that we're in right
now and when the witness lives outside the subpoena power of
the Court —
THE COURT:

I'm not arguing I can compel him.

MR. ZAGER:

So, I mean, there were reasons for our

actions in each instance. Maybe we knew too much about the law
and should have just come in here and asked the judge, what can
you do for us?

But we thought we had something that was solid,

apparently the Court has taken a different view on that.

Six

weeks ago, six weeks prior to trial, the last time we were in
Court, we let the Court know that in response to your ruling,
that we'd be back here again asking the Court for the
permission.

Sure, it's now two weeks before trial because of

having to file a motion or response time, the Court's calendar,
but nonetheless, Your Honor, we're not talking about redeposing anybody else other than Mr. Moore. We think he should
have been presented at a time when he was a party without the
need for a subpoena.

He wasn't.

I don't think we're alone in

this situation that we're here right now.

I think a lot of
16
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1

this has been caused because Mr. Sutton has been less than

2

candid about his relationship and control and character of Mr.

3

Moore as someone whose on the salary, still receiving a salary

4

as a party affiliate of the defendant, and right now we're

5

asking the Court to use its broad discretion in terms of

6

fairness with the discretion the Court has because we're going

7

to get the same statement of what the guy knew, what Mr. Moore

8

knew when he was working for the defendant.

9

it about 20 times. Did you know that your product was unsafe

He's testified to

10

if it wasn't on an 18 inch stand?

11

regardless of - that's a non-case specific, it's generic. We

12

promise the Court that we will not go outside the testimony

13

that's already been received and basically we'll go through the

14

task, if the Court deems it appropriate to simply, read the old

15

deposition into a new deposition or hopefully walk in and

16

hopefully Mr. Moore will have reviewed, during his preparation

17

with Mr. Sutton the prior deposition and we'll say, is

18

everything you said in Ellis still the same?

19

That's not going to change

And we're done.

THE COURT: Well, we approached it a little

20

differently, but that's fair.

21

understand your points.

I see what you're saying. I

22

MR. ZAGER:

Thank you, Judge.

23

THE COURT: Mr. Sutton?

24

MR. SUTTON:

25

With respect to Mr. Zager's comments that deal with

Thank you, Your Honor.
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the use of the transcript and the various rules of evidence, I
would simply point out to the Court that it appears that that
attempts to rehash or revisit a prior motion with a prior
ruling by this Court.

There is no such relief that is

requested as part of the moving papers with respect to this
hearing and I would respectfully submit that that relief is not
something —
THE COURT:

Caught you by surprise, huh?

You didn't

every think he'd raise that again.
MR. SUTTON:

Well, I thought that if was going to

raise it, that he would fairly put us on notice of that so that
we could brief it again, if need be.
Secondly, I'd like to state that if Mr. Zager is
sincere in his position that Mr. Moore should have been
produced following the failed March 9, 2000 deposition because
he was a party affiliate and that no deposition subpoena was
required, there are certainly procedures that could have been
filed subsequent to March 9, 2000 to bring that to the Court's
attention and to seek an order in that regard.

That was never

done.
Mr. Zager has attempted to make me the bad guy in
terms of this history and suggests that I have —
THE COURT:
California?

It's easy isn't it. Haven't you lived in

Haven't we been over this before?

MR. SUTTON:

We were Your Honor and18
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. SUTTON:

3

You're causing me some concern that you

keep bringing that up but —
THE COURT:

4
5

That issue is easy.

Do you drive around here very much when

you come?

6

MR. SUTTON:

It seems like I've been here a lot.

7

THE COURT: Have you driven much, like on the

8

freeway, they've got a few billboards.

9

California cheese.

10

It's says, it's the

;

It says something like, it's not weird,

it's just from California.

11

MR. SUTTON:

12

THE COURT:

I've seen it.
I mean, you know, so you know I guess

13

people outside your fair state think - although I think it is

14

jealousy.

I think you're right.

I think everybody thinks —

15

MR. SUTTON:

16

THE COURT: No, I mean there is a lot to be said for

Not everyone, Your Honor.

17

you and some against you I guess but no one can argue that it

18

isn't quite a place.

19

bothers you.

20
21
22

MR. SUTTON:

So, I'll leave it behind maybe.

If it

Well, with respect to the issue of me

being the bad guy —
THE COURT: Well, you know, we expect Mr. Zager to

23

say that and we expect you to say I'm not the bad guy, but go

24

ahead though.

25

MR. SUTTON:

It concerns me that accusations and
19
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charges are being made to my trial judge that I don't have a
history of appearing before and I don't have a relationship
with, and I take those charges quite seriously.

I want to

assure you that there are indeed times when I have been able to
produce Mr. Moore without necessity of subpoena and the Nolan
deposition that went yesterday, is a perfect example of that.
There was one very significant difference in the Nolan case.
If you look at my confirming letter to Mr. Downey, the
plaintiff's attorney in that case, those arrangements for Mr.
Moore's deposition were made approximately 90 days ago, in July
of this year. Mr. Moore's history in terms of deposition has
been to cooperate as he indicated at deposition.

His history

has been to make himself available without necessity of
subpoena if indeed if comports with his retired lifestyle, with
residences in two different states and very frequent travel
which all of us I think, should hope to have a retirement like
he does.
THE COURT: You bet.
MR. SUTTON:

In this case, despite the accusations

that were being made, I did attempt, as I promised Mr. Zager I
would, to reach Mr. Moore to find out if, notwithstanding his
history, if Mr. Moore would make himself available for
deposition on very short notice at this time.
THE COURT:

He lives mainly where?

California

somewhere?
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MR. SUTTON:

His testimony yesterday, was that he is

a resident of the State of Tennessee, legally; that he
maintains residences in both California and Tennessee.
THE COURT:

So hefs a little - those are the two

spots he's mostly in, okay.
MR. COLE:

Those are the two spots he's mostly in. I

will tell you that Mr. Moore was given the opportunity to make
himself voluntarily available.

I enquired as to whether I

could represent to this Court and to Mr. Zager that I could
produce him for purposes of deposition in this case. Mr. Moore
wanted to know what the time window was and when I told him
that the motion was to be heard today and I told him that the
trial was slated to start on October 29th, his response to me
was I have vacation planned during that time period.

It has

long standing been set and I don't want to mess that up. Had
there been diligent efforts and followup by plaintiff following
March, 2000, my prediction, although I can't be sure, is that
Mr. Moore would have cooperated and agreed to a date that
worked on his calendar either in Tennessee or in California,
but that followup from plaintiff didn't happen. And I think
the focus for purposes of this motion, is not what Mike Sutton
did or didn't do, but what the plaintiff did or didn't do and
that record is very, very clear about what the plaintiff didn't
do.

The plaintiff had adequate opportunity to compel proper

legal process to take Mr. Moore's deposition in this case and
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preserve his testimony, particularly if it was testimony that
the plaintiff thought was so very important, and as Mr. Zager
has described at our last hearing, was the heart of plaintiff's
case.

I don't understand how we can be here two weeks before

trial suggesting that this is the most critical witness to
plaintiff's case, but yet, two and a half years of discovery
past without any effort by plaintiff to schedule that
deposition other than to send me a notice and two letters
saying will you set it up.

That's the extent of the effort

that was made contrasting with what lawyers have done in other
cases in terms of long standing scheduling in advance that
comports with Mr. Moore's schedule, that comports with
everybody's schedule so that it can be something that is done
on a relaxed schedule that comports with his retirement plans
as opposed to somebody's delay becomes Mr. Moore's crisis.
As it relates to the issue of prejudice which is the
last thing I want to talk about, Mr. Zager would suggest that
there is no prejudice if you order the deposition to go at this
late hour because of several reasons, one, there is an
expectation that we know exactly what Mr. Moore is going to say
and that his testimony is not case specific but generic in
nature.

I would submit to you that if you look at the

manufacturing date of the water heaters involved in this case,
we have one that was manufactured in 1991, we have one that was
manufactured in 1994.

I was not the defense lawyer in the
22
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Ellis case so I cannot and will not make a representation to
you as to the exact date of manufacture of that water heater,
but I have been informed that that is a water heater that was
built before 1991. I don't know how long before but to the
extent we are talking about corporate knowledge, corporate
decisions, things that happened as it relates to when water
heaters are manufactured, there are indeed case specific issues
that deal with when the water heaters are manufactured in this
case vis-a-vie when the water heaters were manufactured in
Ellis or any other case.
Secondly, I will represent to the Court that although
there's no transcript available yet, there was some re-visiting
of Mr. Moore's testimony in the Ellis deposition and in the
Ellis trial during his deposition yesterday and there were some
occasions when Mr. Moore indicated that the testimony that he
had previously provided was not correct, that he had either
made a mistake or the court reporter had made a mistake and for
that reason, I don't think there is any absolute guarantee that
the testimony will be on all four corners now, with what it was
in Ellis and I think the very concern that the Court has about
what party's, litigant's, motives are for examination and cross
examination at a time in another case, comes back to be
pronounced significance in another case, in another venue, are
things that should be controlling here.
The bottom line is the time for discovery in this
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case expired a year and a half ago.

The prejudice that we have

at this time is we're two weeks before trial, Mr. Lund and I
should be engaged in all kinds of trial preparation, not lay
witness depositions.

If this deposition goes forward there

will be a domino effect.

It will be our request that we be

given leave to take the depositions of Mr. Hoffman and Mr.
Fandy, the two experts and I think a ruling granting the
ability of the plaintiff to depose Mr. Moore at this point,
will definitely put the October 29th trial date at risk.
That's the fifth trial setting.
position, posed to try our case.

We should be, at this
Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Zager?
MR. ZAGER:

Your Honor, some of these trial settings

bring up the last point were requested continuances by the
defendant when the matter was set for jury trial, the defendant
was the one who asked for additional time. And I'd also point
out that it's a red herring to say that there'll be a domino
effect because these plaintiff's witnesses Hoffman and Fandy
have already relied when they gave their depositions on the
testimony of Mr. Moore and if the defendant seeks to re-take
their deposition for whatever reason, we will produce those
witnesses without the need for subpoena and we'll have them
available at the time and place that the defendant chooses, so
I don't see that as a big issue.
It's interesting to see that Mr. Sutton now stands
24
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

before the Court and complains that we didn't give them enough
time to produce Mr. Moore for what I anticipate will be the
Court's order allowing us to take his deposition, that he
doesn't have enough lead time, that had we given him more
notice he would certainly have voluntarily appeared because on
March 9, 2000, that was the very request. We noticed his
deposition.

We sent out notice of deposition.

We asked Mr.

Sutton to voluntarily produce Mr. Moore and March 9, 2000 was
certainly more than three months from the time that we stand
here now, to produce him if they were going to do so.

So, for

Mr. Sutton to say that, if we only had more notice, we would
produce Mr. Moore when he didn't do so back on March 9, 2000,
said Mr. Moore would not voluntarily appear. Again, this is
the kind of legal jargon that troubles me throughout this case.
Is the Court following my argument that on March 9 —
THE COURT: Well, I am now, I'm just trying to get a
little - I mean I was just looking at these.

I'm now kind

of curious of the phraseology of the "can't produce him on the
9th".

Is that one of these exhibits?
MR. ZAGER:

Yes, it is. That would be, Exhibit A is

my letter asking them, confirming that you previously informed
me not to contact Mr. Moore directly since his testimony
involves knowledge gained while employed with American,
therefore, please make Mr. Moore available for a deposition at
his convenience.

I set his depo for March 9.

Actually that
25
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was back on February 14th of 2000 and then Mr. Sutton replies,
as you know - this is Exhibit B.

I'm sorry Your Honor, second

paragraph.
THE COURT:

Is that the October 12th letter?

MR. ZAGER:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Second paragraph.
MR. ZAGER:

Second paragraph, last sentence, "As you

knowr Mr. Moore is no longer employed by any defendant in this
case and therefore, I do not have any ability to produce him
pursuant to the notice." Now, that's exactly opposite what Mr.
Sutton is saying now. Mr. Sutton is saying now, sure, we would
produce him.
salary.
evidence.

He's our client.

We control him.

I assume that's what he's saying.

He's on

That's in the

But Mr. Zager didn't give us enough notice.
THE COURT:

Well, maybe we don't have him here but

there must have been something that took place around March,
2000.
MR. ZAGER:

We went forward with other depositions.

THE COURT:

No, no, no.

MR. ZAGER:

Okay.

THE COURT:

I want to know about him rejecting.

Sorry.

of those exhibits here, do you know?

Any

I'm just curious how he

responded to your request.
MR. SUTTON:

Your Honor, it's our Exhibit C to the

memorandum.
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THE COURT:
MR. SUTTON:

Your what?
Our Exhibit C to the memorandum opposing

the THE COURT: C?
MR. SUTTON:

There was a letter from me, Your Honor,

to Mr. Zager three days after his February 14th letter.
THE COURT:

February 17?

MR. SUTTON: Yes.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I just want to look at that.

MR. ZAGER:

That would be Paragraph 2, Your Honor,

second sentence, "according I cannot have any ability to
require his attendance at deposition.

I am in the process of

attempting to serve Mr. Moore, whether or not he will
voluntarily present himself for deposition at a date, time and
place mutually agreed" and of course, then the October 12
letter, "I don't have the ability to produce him."
THE COURT: Mr. Sutton, your response?
Didn't they ever followup, Mr. Zager, here on this "I
am in the process of attempting whether he will or will not
voluntarily present himself. As soon as I've discerned it, I
will advise you."
MR. ZAGER:

I'm not sure whether there were letters

back and forth in between or discussions.

I know there was a

deposition of one of the doctors where I —
THE COURT:

See, I'm not into that. Anybody followup
27
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on that?
MR. ZAGER: Yes.
THE COURT:

Tell me about it.

MR. ZAGER:

We asked Mr. Moore - I mean Mr. Sutton

again if, you know, when and where and when and will he produce
him and we were finally met with the response on October 12
that he's not going to do it.
THE COURT:

Okay. And what did you do in response to

their October 12 letter to you, well, it's not going to happen
the way you thought?
MR. ZAGER:

At that time -

THE COURT:

That's when you concluded on using the

MR. ZAGER:

— at that time we opened up the evidence

old stuff?

code and determined that pursuant to the rules which we have
already discussed before the Court, which not until six weeks
ago, or four weeks ago, or mid-September, the Court advised us
we had misplaced reliance upon the rules of party admissions
and declarations against interests and documents which were
sworn to where the defendant had an opportunity to rehabilitate
and cross examine. We relied on those evidence code
provisions.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. ZAGER:

And now, you know, we understand that the

Court doesn't accept our reasoning in those cases so, you know,
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1

we're before the Court asking the Court to use its broad

2

discretion to at least accomplish what is fair which is to

3

allow plaintiff to take the deposition of Mr. Moore at this

4

time to satisfy the requirements of this Court. We still can't

5

bring him here as a witness, in fact, the Court's probably not

6

going to see Mr. Moore unless the Court allows us to take that

7

deposition at which point in time, I'm sure, the defendant will

8

exercise it's control over their client and employee, Mr.

9

Moore, to have him attend here at the trial.

10

But, I also think, and you know, this is just one

11

statement.

12

your company make a conscious decision" - I'm reading from the

13

Ellis deposition on Page 135, Line 7, "Did your company make a

14

conscious decision not to enclose stands with the standard gas

15

fired water heater?" Yes, was the answer.

16

decision was made certainly before 1990, wasn't it?" Yes.

17

Now, our water heaters are after 1990, so there isn't a problem

18

there with the dates.

19

water heaters were built, not to enclose these stands with the

20

water heater, not to have people be aware that through the

21

enclosure of these stands to raise these water heaters —

22

Did your company make a - and this is again - "Did

THE COURT:

"And that conscious

They've made this decision before our

Haven't you made huge assumption that

23

that was the end of their ever visiting the issue?

I mean, I

24

don't mean to be advocating one way or the other, but isn't it

25

possible that they could have revisited the issue?
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MR. ZAGER:

They don't.

THE COURT: Maybe the week after?
MR. ZAGER:

They don't do that.

You can buy their

stands and our experts can testify - I mean our experts can
testify THE COURT:

You know they've never done that.

MR. ZAGER:

Our experts can testify now that when

they go into a Home Depot, the stands are sold separately from
the water heater at the time in 1991, '94 and throughout this
case.

Our experts can testify to that. We just wanted to know

what the defendant knew prior to our water heater being built
and prior to this accident and that testimony is not going to
change yesterday when he testified in the Nolan matter.

It was

his testimony when he testified 20 times and if we take his
deposition, his testimony will be the same unless he says,
"Well, you know, I was paid by the plaintiff's lawyer to say
this, but the high likelihood, Your Honor, is that he said
under oath 20 other times and 20 other depositions, is what
he's going to tell us. And I know that the Court is somewhat
troubled by the time constraint now and I don't know what the
remedy for that is short of continuing the trial date or
allowing plaintiff to take this deposition, but Your Honor,
this is a critical deposition.

If we've made a fatal error

here, we ask the Court to relieve us of that error in the
interest of justice. Anna Marie Alarid is the plaintiff in
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this case.

She's been burnt almost 40 percent of her body.

She is permanently scarred for life.

I have many other cases.

Mr. Sutton has more cases than myself, I'm sure. Anna has one
shot at this, Your Honor.

If we've made an error in this case,

we ask the case, in the interest of justice, to relieve us of
that error by allowing us to take Mr. Moore's deposition.
THE COURT:

Thanks, Mr. Zager.

MR. ZAGER:

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Sutton do you want a last word?
Fatal request of the lawyer inviting the last word.
MR. SUTTON:
Honor, is this.

The only comment I would make, Your

The moving papers are void of any type of

relief to set aside any error that the plaintiff's attorneys
may have made.

For the suggestion to be made that this came as

a complete surprise is misplaced.

The letters from myself to

Mr. Zager and to Mr. 0'Callahan, his associate counsel, made
clear that it was always our position that what they were
proposing in terms of use of that testimony, was inappropriate
and something that we were not prepared to stipulate to, so I
don't think that your ruling could have taken them completely
by surprise because that is the position that we had been
articulating all along.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor.

I'd have to agree with Mr. Zager that

clearly, I think I have the broad discretion and fairness, I
guess, unlies all that we try to do in the court and I'd agree
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with you entirely that, at least from what I've heard from your
prospective Mr. Moore's testimony is very relevant to all that
you hope to present at trial.

I don't think I can quite agree

with you that there wouldn't be any prejudice because I don't
know that I agree totally with Mr. Sutton that he's got to redepose everyone, but when we're to open up discovery again, it
seems to me there is some argument here that prejudice could
evolve.

I don't dismiss it outright.

It seems to me that

maybe could be enumerated, but, I guess where I'm really stuck
is kind of two things that maybe even before fairness, kind of
rule where I think I have to go on this one is that the system
that we operate in, for good or for ill, is the system that we
have.

It's pretty clear that in this case, there was an order

restricting time frames for discovery and that: as we all know,
is long past being done.

One could argue he had to reasonably

rely upon these transcripts being admissible.

Without being

able to tell me today wherever, where in any place has this
ever happened?

I mean I understand the consequences, well,

I'll go over it.

I understand the admission by party opponent

but these are not opponent parties when these admissions were
made.

I mean, these rules, it seems to me talk about in the

context of the ones you referred to, the 800s, when the two
parties are facing off.

They weren't facing off in any of

those instances you described, therefore, I don't see how
anybody could have thought, well, you know, gee, that's just
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going to be admissible.

If you had worried about that as an

issue, it would have been easy to come and make a motion to
allow production or presentation of that material in the trial.
So, I honestly can't side with you on the idea that you ever
reasonably relied.

I know you relied, but I don't think it was

reasonable that they'd be admissible and as I look at the
history, the exhibits, it seems to be clear, that there should
have been, could have been more followup on this issue of what
Mr. Moore, when he was going to available and what we had to do
to dispose him in this case.
So because the trial is two weeks away, because it's
been continued so often, because we, on this end, the Court,
made quite an effort to set aside four weeks that you folks
want.

Because of all that and because I don't think there's

reasonable reliance because we operate in a system where you
know, we set up parameters, discovery deadlines. We try and
follow them.

Those things are a year and a half old.

It's

just not the right time, it's not the right situation for this
request to be granted so I'm denying the motion.
MR. ZAGER:

Your Honor?

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

MR. ZAGER:

Defendant's have asked for a continuance

prior to this.

Plaintiff's never have asked for a continuance

of the trial date.

If we ask for a continuance of the trial

date to accomplish the taking of this deposition for it's
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monumental value and in the interest of fairness and justice,
it seems that if defendant's were permitted to receive a
continuance of the trial date, that plaintiff should also be
afforded the same courtesy and I would be allowed to at least
continue the trial date on - this is the first time the
plaintiff's have ever asked that the trial date be continued. .
THE COURT: Now, we're going to go back to where we
were at the end of our last hearing and I appreciate, Mr.
Zager, that it is fair for you to ask that right now, and I am
just anticipating maybe rightly or wrongly, the Sutton response
which would be, it's not before you judge. Here's my problem.
I appreciate that that's what you may have in mind, but it's
not in front of me right now and I've got into trouble before
doing things and what I get most in trouble for is trying to
accommodate everybody, do the things that seem to me to be
right and easily done, when not everybody at the table is
reading from the same menu and if you're asking for a
continuance, I'm just going to answer, it's not in front of me
right now.
MR. ZAGER:

Your Honor, when the defendant asked for

a continuance at the close of the motion involving whether this
matter was going to be set for a bench or a jury trial, which
was before Judge Medley, there was no continuance on the table
or motion for continuance at that time either and defendant's
request for a continuance was granted at that time even though
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it was not before the court at this time so it seems to me and
I understand Your Honor —
THE COURT:

Here's the problem, I'm not Medley and

maybe he hasn't had the fun experiences I have doing things
when each party wasn't prepared.

That's my bottom line, is

that the notice provisions of our rules are there to give
parties notice.

If you don't have notice, I think a fair

argument can be made, we're not ready to address it.
MR. ZAGER: May I ask the Court because of the need
to prepare for trial at this time, the Court would now know the
basis that we would be asking for a continuance, that we'd
asking for a continuance for the opportunity to give us more
time in fairness to the parties, so that Mr. Moore's deposition
could be taken. Would the Court believe—
THE COURT:

Here's one problem we have, even if I

gave you a continuance, let's say I did, don't I have to bust
down the deadline for discovery that's past, what was it?
March, 2000?
MR. ZAGER:

For this one purpose of taking this one

deposition.
THE COURT:

Right.

I mean, what would have changed

between your request to continue and you're still going to have
to get permission to depose him.
next time you ask me?

What am I going to say then

You're going to say it's relevant and

I'm going to agree. You're going to say fairness says and I'm
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going to say, well yeah, it sound like it would be fair. We're
going to run up against why you didn't during the deadline and
we're going to run up against I guess the prejudice would be
done away but we're going to run up against why you didn't
during the year and a half or two years that you had to do
discover and I think I'm still going to come out in the same
place.

So I don't know that continuing the trial gives us a

chance for you to depose Mr. Moore.
MR. ZAGER:

It would get rid of any question that the

Court had regarding prejudice.

It would certainly be within

the Court's discretion then regardless of the reason that
plaintiff didn't move forward, it would still be completely
fair to all the parties because we'd have extra time,
additional time, and so the only remaining issue would be the
one that the Court just described with why the plaintiff didn't
move earlier and it would seem that that would not outweigh the
need for fairness and justice.

I could also purport to the

Court that I believe that plaintiff might be able to present
her case in less time and that the month is probably a very
conservative estimate in terms of the length of the trial and
that if plaintiff could in some way could shorten the time that
she would need to prepare, maybe we could keep the Court still
on schedule and begin the trial, you know, a week after it's
already scheduled for.
THE COURT: All right.

I guess I'm not going to make
36
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the decision today.

I'm inclined not to continue.

any reason to given the rulings.
adverse to you, Mr. Zager.

I don't see

I mean, I agree that they're

I'm not so obtuse that I don't see

that, but on the other hand, I don't know how I could make the
rulings because in the back of my mind, I know where they're
leading. I've got to make the rulings and then I think
eventually you're going to get to the point where you want this
continuance and having gone down the path that I have, I think
I'm not going to have to continue this.

We're just going to go

ahead.

We've turned away a

This has been sitting too long.

lot of other folks who wanted to go to trial sooner on the
theory that during this month of November to be with you folks.
I think if you make the Motion to Continue, I think it highly
unlikely that I'm going to grant that.
MR. ZAGER:

And do you think the Court would have the

power to order Mr. Moore to attend trial?
THE COURT:

I don't.

I don't see how I could.

Like

you say, that was the building block upon which you built the
house that I eventually said, Well, I don't see how you built
it like that, but that's the first building block, he can't
come.

He won't come.

So it then seems to me you have to do

some other things that you should have done but you didn't do
them and they have objected to certain ways you want to handle
it after not doing it.

I agree with them and that you didn't

do it, you know, I guess you have to live with the strategies
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you've chosen.

I guess that's the —

MR. ZAGER:

The Court has also reviewed the

attachments that we talked about where on several occasions Mr.
Moore was alleged by process servers to be evading service and
the amounts expended?

That's all been reviewed before the

Court?
THE COURT:
to be another case.

No.

I mean, I saw that.

That appeared

See, I'm looking at the facts in this

case, Mr. Zager, which I take to be essentially some time in
March, 2000, you folks wanted to depose him, he wasn't
produced.

It seems to me then, March, 2000, plaintiff had a

duty to come to the Court and say, give us more time, expand
the discovery period, allow us to do this, allow us to do that.
You chose a path in this that I don't see justified by anything
that is normally done in the practice of preparing for and
presenting a trial and you know, I could totally wrong.

I

mean, I'm not arguing I'm right, but I am for good or for ill,
the judge in this case and so having made those decisions, you
now are stuck with a set of facts that I have to deal with and
they leave me - I mean, it seems to me I don't: have any other
choices right now.
Any other questions right now?
MR. ZAGER:

No Your Honor, we just, you know, I

thought this was a way to avoid any possible prejudice or
whatever.
38
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

THE COURT:

You've got a good point.

MR. ZAGER:

With all due respect -

THE COURT:

No, no.

I don't know if there are errors

and let me just say, if I've made errors, they're clearly
prejudicial to you.

I mean, I would concede that in a

heartbeat. At least on one aspect of your case, I don't know
about compensatory damages, I don't know about that.

I guess

on this argument that there ought to be some kind of punitives,
it seems to me, yeah, they had a knowledge and they were at
fault and you followup that line of reasoning, yeah.

I mean,

it seems to me that if I've made an error it's clearly
prejudicial so you know, no, I'm not - I mean, you wouldn't
offend me at all if you appeal to whoever there is to appeal
to.

I don't know who you appeal to anymore.

I guess you just

start one place and they toss it off to other places. No, I
wouldn't mind at all.
(inaudible).

I'd welcome the review.

I'd welcome

Thanks both of you.

MR. SUTTON:

Thank you Your Honor.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

(c)
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RE: Alarid v. American Manufacturing et al.
Dear Judge Burton:
The Court has recently ruled in favor of defendant's motion in limine to exclude the
former testimony of Henry Jack Moore. Plaintiff anticipated offering the deposition
and/or trial transcript of Henry Jack Moore, a former employee of defendant, from a
similar water heater defect case styled Ellis v. American Water Heater Company. Utah
Rule of Evidence §804 provides an exception to the hearsay rule for former testimony of
an unavailable witness. Plaintiff intended to offer Moore's trial transcript given under
oath in a similar water heater defect case.
The Washington Court of Appeal considered the admissibility of former testimony of an
unavailable witness in Foster v. Fibreboard Corporation (1989) 779 P.2d. 272, 55
Wn.App.545. The issue in Foster was whether or not the plaintiff was exposed to certain
asbestos products at a Seattle shipyard in 1945. The defendant Owens-Illinois contended
that it did not distribute the asbestos product in question until 1947. The trial court
allowed Owens to admit the deposition testimony of a line worker who had manufactured
the product in question in the early 40's. This worker had given a deposition in a
coordinated asbestos proceeding but had not given a deposition in the Foster case. The
deposition transcript was admitted because the declarant was unavailable, the deposition
had been taken in compliance with the law, and the prior proceeding was similar in
nature. Id. at 276. The Washington Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's ruling,
focusing mainly on the similarity requirement. The court held that even though the
deposition was given in a different matter, the circumstances were similar enough to
satisfy the rule. Essentially, the court determined that had the deposition been given in
the Foster case, the testimony would have been the same. See id. at 277.
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The unavailability requirement has been interpreted, in part, to mean that the witness is
absent from the state at the time the deposition is being offered. Rule 32(a), Utah Rules
of Evidence. See also F.R.C.P. 32(a) In Brown v. Prior (1998) 954 P.2d 1349, the
Supreme Court of Wyoming ruled that the plain meaning of rule 32(a)(3)(b) allows for
the admission of deposition when the witness is absent from the state. "We hold that
absence of the deponent at the time the deposition is offered is sufficient to allow the
deposition into evidence, and the party offering the deposition need not proffer an excuse
for the failure of the deponent to appear." Id. at 1352.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that Henry Jack Moore's residence outside the state of Utah
satisfies the unavailability requirement of rule 32(a). Furthermore, plaintiff submits that
Moore's prior trial testimony was given under substantially similar circumstances to the
instant case and therefore meets the section 804 exception to the hearsay rule.
Respectfully,

KEITH GRIFFIN
Cc:
Michael Sutton via facsimile
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1 ;

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2001

2 i

HONORABLE MICHAEL K. BURTON, JUDGE PRESIDING

3

j

**PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS - FIRST FOUR MINUTES

(

4 j

RELATING TO HENRY JACK MOORE**

j

I

!

5 !
THE COURT: How would you like to do this, Mr. Zager? j
6
Do you have any preference? I don't have a clue, so...
7 j

MR. ZAGER:

A couple of outstanding issues. I don't

8

know if the Court, I'm sure the Court has received our letter

9

to the Court regarding yet that trial transcript of Henry Jack

j

10 : Moore. I remember last we were here the Court 11 .

THE COURT:

A never ending question, huh?

12 '

MR. ZAGER:

- inquired whether there was a case

13 ' where-

:
!

14 j

THE COURT:

You guys have gone to 1940-

MR. ZAGER:

I don't believe so, no.

Was that the

15 • year?
16

'
i

17

'

THE COURT: 1947, (inaudible)

18

i

M R.

,

ZAGER: Much more recent than that. Yeah. There

19 ; was a reference 20 '

THE COURT:

More recent?

',

MR. ZAGER:

Oh yeah. That case was actually won in

21

22 ' 1989, a rather recent case. Just one case that we happened to
i

23 '; come across where, in fact, a prior deposition was, in a very
24 ' similar case to the one that we have here, a product liability

i

i
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1

case, where generic testimony that was non-case specific, an

2

asbestos case was used in a subsequent trial where the parties

3 : had an opportunity and motive to develop the earlier testimony j
4

in a former trial, I remember the Court had asked, Mr. Zager,

5 ' if you could just show me one case and so 6 |
7

THE COURT:

:

!

10 |
11

:

;

I don't know that I said, in fact,

i

MR. ZAGER:

And so we stopped at one.

THE COURT:

We had a (inaudible).

MR. ZAGER:

Didn't want to burden the Court.

THE COURT:

Well, here's the only problem I have with!

12 j what you say.
13

•

(inaudible)•

8 i
9

.

I think it clear that he would be one who would

be described as being unavailable, but the problem I have is

14 ' that the last line on page 1, "Essentially the court determinedi
!

15 j that had the deposition been given in the posture case,
16 ! testimony would have been the same." And I don't think I've
17 I ever come to that conclusion. I don't think 1 have a way to get
18
19

there. I don't know how a judge did that, but though we've
:

argued that it has this condition, reliability and the fact

20 ; that it would have been this way and they had a reason to pose
21 ! it. I think there's still on the other side questions that
22 ! could be raised about why they did what they did or didn't do,
23 ; therefore, because it's not in this case I don't think I come
i
24 •' to the conclusion that it would have been the same.
25 1

MR. ZAGER:

But Your Honor -
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i
!

,

THE COURT:

That's where we part our company.

MR. ZAGER:

And in the trial transcript that we

attached as an exhibit, the excerpts from the actual trial

i

where Mr. Moore testified, there was certain evidence where he
had testified to again and again and again, including just the j
day before that hearing on October 11 th where the testimony was
essentially the same as to what American knew about the number ;
i

of injuries that were caused in these flammable vapor fires
involving water heaters. Generic information about what

j

American knew about not making conscious decisions not to put
the water heater on an 18 inch stand, the cost of the water
heater, certain information again that American knew that would :
not change and hadn't changed in the 20 depositions he did

;

before this case and which was non-specific and generic

;

information.

So to the extent that the testimony was non-case ,

specific as in the Foster case, we thought the case would very
well parallel the case that we have here.
THE COURT:
that.

I think I understand that you believe

I have no doubt you do.
Then what else Mr. Zager? Anything else right now?

!

(End of requested transcript)

I

(C) '
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INTRODUCTION
Joseph Fandey should not be permitted to offer unqualified opinions. Moreover, even to
the extent Mr. Fandey may have adequate qualifications, he should not be permitted to offer
opinions that are unreliable, as that term is applied in the Utah law of expert opinions. In
addition, as a former employee of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, certain portions of
Mr. Fandey's expected testimony are factual rather than expert. That testimony should be limited
to matters about which Mr. Fandey has personal knowledge. He should not be permitted to
testify as a general historian.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Mr. Fandey is licensed as an attorney in Maryland and New Mexico. He first

became licensed in Maryland in 1984 or 1985. He does specialize as an attorney but his practice
is limited to primarily business law. Depo. of Joseph Fandey, pp 5-7.
2.

In 1973 he received a bachelors degree in mechanical engineering; but, he has

never been licensed as a professional engineer, nor as a plumber or a gas fitter. Id. p. 17. He does
not belong to any organizations or societies that relate to mechanical engineering. Id. p. 17. He
has never published in any trade journals. Id. p. 19.
3.

Mr. Fandey has never designed a water heater, or even a component part for a

water heater. Id. p. 40. Similarly he has never been involved in the manufacture of a water heater
or a component part for a water heater. Id. With regard to consumer products, Mr. Fandey has
never been the designer of a consumer product of any kind. Id. p. 38.

-2-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4.

He does not hold himself out as a fire cause and origin expert, a human factors

expert or a biomechanics expert. Id. pp. 32-33.
5.

For some portion of his working life, Mr. Fandey was an employee of the

Consumer Product Safety Commission. Id_. pp 55-59. In that employment, Mr. Fandey was
involved in considering safety concerns with a wide variety of consumer products, including both
contact adhesives and water heaters. Id. pp. 61-64.
6.

With regard to product liability litigation involving water heaters, Mr. Fandey has

only ever testified on behalf of persons claiming design defects. However, he anticipates that
defendants will want to retain him as to some of the new water heater designs, as a former
"opponent" and "critic" of the older designs. Id. pp. 84-86.
7.

In his deposition and expert report, Mr. Fandey opines that American "maintained

a conscious and knowing disregard of the safety of others;" yet, he does not explain any method
or procedure he used, nor any expertise, to come to that conclusion.
8.

Similarly, Mr. Fandey opines that American could have come up with design fix

they now have developed back in 1976, referencing ignition resistant design. Id. p. 82. He offers
no basis for this opinion. He has no expertise to conclude when and how a water heater
manufacture could have developed an alternative design. Indeed, he had not even examined
American's ignition resistant design so as to begin to understand what it entails.
9.

Essentially, the plaintiff will try to use Mr. Fandey as an opinionated historian to

recount the history of interaction between the water heater industry in general and the CPSC.

-3-
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ARGUMENT
L

RULE 702 AND APPLICABLE CASE LAW LIMIT M R FANDEY'S
OPINIONS TO THOSE SUBJECTS ON WHICH HE IS COMPETENT
AND ON WHICH HE HAS RELIABLY APPLIED SCIENTIFIC OR
TECHNICAL EXPERTISE TO DRAW A CONCLUSION.
The trial judge acts as a gatekeeper, and thus, has the responsibility of carefully

scrutinizing proffered expert evidence. Franklin v. Stevenson, 987 P.2d 22 (Utah 1999). If
permitted, Mr. Fandey will become nothing more than a second advocate for the plaintiff,
speaking from the witness stand rather than from counsel's lectern.
The pertinent inquiry for the court is this matter is whether American manufactured and
sold a water heater that was unreasonably dangerous and defective. Persons trained in
engineering design and manufacturing are the ones who can evaluate that. Instead, plaintiff
proffers a former government official who has no actual experience in designing or making
anything.
The right to offer expert opinions is proscribed by Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence,
which provides that "[i]f scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise." Thus, an expert must possess specialized knowledge about the subject on which
he is testifying through skill, experience, training, or education, before he can be called a qualified
witness.
Courts generally limit expert testimony to those topics within the expert's specific area of
expertise:
-4~
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The capacity is in every case a relative one, i.e., relative to the topic
about which the person is asked to make his statement. The object
is to be sure that the question to the witness will be answered by a
person who is fitted to answer it. His fitness, then, is afitnessto
answer on that point. He may befittedto answer about countless
other matters, but that does not justify accepting his views in the
matter at hand.
Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 516 F.2d 33, 37 (10th Or. 1975)
(upholding trial court's decision excluding metallurgist's testimony concerning metal pipe
manufacturing standards when he had no manufacturing experience). A physician trained in one
specialty cannot testify regarding treatment in a different specialty. Butterfield v. Okubo, 790
P.2d 94, 97 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985).
Moreover, an individual does not become an expert in an area simply because he has read and
studied documents about the subject area on which he is to testify. Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d
943 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Applying these concepts to Mr. Fandey, one mustfirstconsider if there are any relevant
questions in this case that he isfitto answer. He is certainly not fit to answer questions about
water heater design, simply because of his general involvement in monitoring the safety of various
consumer products.
As far as his opinion about whether American "consciously and knowing disregarded the
safety of others," where does one go to become an expert in diagnosing a corporation'sframeof
mind? Certainly Mr. Fandey has no such training. Indeed, it is doubtful that any expert could
contribute more on this than the objective trier of fact who hears the facts about American's water
heater designs.

-5-
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Rule 702 requires that the proffered opinion must be an application of scientific, technical
or other specialized knowledge possessed by the expert. American respectfully submits that Mr.
Fandey is not applying his training and education, rather he is expressing his personal views and
opinions. This should not be permitted.
EL

RULE 602 LIMITS ANY FACTUAL TESTIMONY BY MR. FANDEY TO
RELEVANT MATTERS ABOUT WHICH HE HAS PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE.
To the extent Mr. Fandey is not offering qualified, competent expert testimony, plaintiff

may argue that he can provide factual background about how water heater designs have
developed over the years and what the water heater industry in general has done, or not done, to
address the flammable vapor hazard.
To begin with, such testimony should not be allowed from any witness unless it can be
connected to the defendant in this case. Depending on how plaintiff presents her case, it may not
be relevant what another manufacturer did or knew.
Further, as to Mr. Fandey, it is expected that plaintiff will try to have him provide a
general history of interactions between the water heater industry and the CPSC. In this respect,
his testimony must be limited to those matters about which Mr. Fandey has personal knowledge.
This is the clear constraint of Rule 602, Utah Rules of Evidence, which states: "A witness may
not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness
has personal knowledge of the matter."
If Mr. Fandey actually sat in a meeting with a person established to be an employee of
American and can therefore testify based on personal knowledge about something that occurred in

-6-
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the meeting, then his testimony would meet the personal knowledge requirement of Rule 602. If
however, he attempts to testify about such a meeting which he did not attend, his testimony
should not be admitted.
DATED this 3 ~ day of April, 2001.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

John R. Lund
KaraL. Pettit
Kenneth L. Reich
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance
Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co.
N:\19944\1\FANDEY.MEM
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INTRODUCTION
American attempts to challenge the reliability of the opinions offered by plaintiffs
expert, Joseph Fandey. American has no basis to characterize Mr. Fandey's opinions as
unreliable. Mr. Fandey worked for the Consumer Product Safety Commission for
approximately nineteen years. He managed the engineering programs associated with gas
fired appliances for over ten years. Mr. Fandey was originally hired by the CPSC as a
mechanical engineer in 1975 and continued to use his engineering skills throughout his
tenure with the CPSC.
Fandey has a wide base of knowledge concerning the water heater industry and the
design of the conventional gas-fired water heater. Aside from being a mechanical
engineer, Fandey has designed a wide-variety of products for various governmental
agencies. Fandey has received numerous honors and awards for mechanical engineering
during his employment with the CPSC.
Fandey is intimately familiar with the governmental standards, regulations,
evaluations and reports concerning the conventional gas-fired water at issue in this case.
Fandey's testimony concerning the water heater industry is important to explain the
goings-on of the water heater industry, a field largely dominated by the water heater
manufacturers. Fandey will testify about American's knowledge of water heater defects
and conscious disregard for the safety of consumers, an essential element of plaintiff s
claim for punitive damages.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiffs expert, Joseph Fandey is a mechanical engineer and served as a

mechanical engineer in various positions with the Consumer Products Safety
Commission for approximately nineteen years.
2.

From 1975 through 1978, Fandey was a program manager for the

development of standards and processing of petitions under the CPSA and other acts
administered by the CPSC. (Exhibit A)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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3.

Fandey worked as the Engineering Branch Chief for the CPSC from April

1980 to September 1988. In this position, Fandey managed the research activities
supporting regulation and enforcement of consumer safety. This work was primarily in
the area of architectural safety, including gas-fired appliances. (Exhibit A)
4.

Fandey became a senior engineer and project manager at the CPSC in 1988.

He served as the project manager for Fire and Burn related activities from 1989 to 1994.
5.

Fandey is a qualified mechanical engineer with specialized knowledge

concerning the evolution of the conventional gas-fired water heater and the developments
in the water heater industry over the last twenty-five years.
ARGUMENT
I.

FANDEY IS COMPETENT TO OFFER EXPERT TESTIMONY ON BOTH

WATER HEATER DESIGN ISSUES AND ISSUES CONCERNING THE WATER
HEATER INDUSTY
Rule 702, Utah Rule of Evidence, provides that expert testimony may be offered
to the trier of fact if the expert's technical, scientific or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact in determining a fact in issue. The rule is broadly phrased. The
fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon are not limited merely to the "scientific"
and "technical" but extend to all specialized knowledge. Federal Advisory Committee on
Rules, F.R.E 702.
The proper situation for expert testimony is to be determined on the basis of
assisting the trier. "There is no more certain test for determining when experts may be
used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained laymen would be qualified to
determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without
enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in

3
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the dispute." Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand.L.Rev. 414, 418 (1952). When opinions
are excluded, it is because they are unhelpful and therefore superfluous and a waste of
time. 7 Wigmore § 1918. Fandey's testimony is relevant and helpful to explain
American's knowledge of the defect in the conventional gas-fired water heater.
American claims that because Fandey has never designed a water heater, he is not
qualified to testify as to the defects in the water heater design. In Rogers v. IngersollRand Co., (1997, DC Dist Col) 971 F.Supp 4, the court held that plaintiffs expert's
opinions on alternative safety features for a milling machine were admissible even though
the expert had not worked on milling machines. The expert had drawn his opinions on the
safety features of the milling machine from his experience working with a company that
performed safety analyses on the machine.
Joseph Fandey gained an extensive base of knowledge concerning water heater
design during his nineteen-year tenure with the CPSC. The CPSC has commissioned
various studies and tests regarding the conventional water heater. As detailed in
Fandey's report, attached as Exhibit B, the CPSC conducted numerous tests to determine
the effect of elevating the air-intake in the conventional water hater. (Fandey Report,
page 2). Fandey was privy to this testing as the Project Manager for Gas-Fired
Appliances from 1989 to 1994.
Jospeh Fandey provides a specialized degree of knowledge on the water heater
industry that is essential to understanding this case. Despite defendant's characterization,
this case is not a simple product defect case. The water heater industry has long known
that floor-mounted water heaters are inherently dangerous. Plaintiff intends to show at
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
4 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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trial that American, a leading manufacturer in the industry, disregarded safer alternative
designs despite knowledge of serious safety concerns.
American's Position in the Water Heater Industry
American insinuates that it was not an active participant in industry meetings
concerning water heater standards and testing. This suggestion is plainly false.
American, through its representative Henry Jack Moore, was a member of the ANSI Z21
water heater subcommittee. American, in conjunction with other water heater
manufacturers, effectively controlled the industry standards concerning water heaters.
The manufacturers had the power to block any change to the conventional water heater
design by virtue of its presence in the ANSI committee. (Moore Deposition, 151:5-12)
Fandey's testimony is important to reveal what the water heater industry knew about
combustion fires and when they became aware of this problem.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff reserves the right to augment her opposition with any oral argument
permitted by the Court at time of hearing on this matter. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff
Anna Marie Alarid respectfully requests that the Court deny American's motion in limine
in its entirety.
DATED: April 9, 2001

GIRARDI AND KEESE

JAMES G. O'CALLAHAN
Attorney(s) for Plaintiff
5
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Joseph Zaid Fandey, Esq.
P.O. Drawer 32
112 East 1st Street
Truth or Consequences, New Mexico 87901
Office 505-894-4436
Facsimile: 505-894-7213
E-mail: joczaid@zianet.com

CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ASSOCIATES, LLc June 1994 through present
Safety Consultant/Member
Provide litigation support services including expert witness services. Areas of particular
expertise include gas appliances (especially gas water heaters), stairs - ramps - landings, ladders,
athletic equipment (including football helmets., baseball bats, baseball chest protectors and other
padding), snowmobiles, architectural and structural safety (including urea-formaldehyde foam
insulation), in-door air quality, swimming pool drowning and diving accidents and spa safety.
U.S, CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION Aug. 1975 through June 1994
Senior Engineer/Attorney September 1988 through June 1994
Served as senior agency advisor in the area of indoor air quality and other environmental matters
as well as Project Manager for Fire and Burn related activities. Coordinated technical efforts of
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and
Department of Energy (DOE) with those of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC).
Reviewed both planned and on-going regulatory research to ensure that the work produced by
the various research efforts would be unlikely to conflict and would be legally sufficient to
withstand judicial scrutiny. Had occasional assignments with additional duties as a staff attorney
in the Office of General Counsel or as a trial attorney in the Directorate for Compliance.
Engineering Branch Chief, April 1980 through September 1988
Working under the procedures and requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)
and Consumer Products Safety Act (CPSA) managed the research activities supporting
regulation and enforcement of consumer safety. This work was primarily in the area of
Architectural Safety including gas fired appliances. Negotiated and managed contract
requirements supporting the needed research. Served as an expert witness and trained others to
be expert witnesses. Briefed senior staff of the Commission, Commissioners, officials of other
agencies and industrial representatives on the progress and status of research.
Standards Coordinator August 1975 through May 1978
Was a program manger for the development of standards and processing of petitions under the
CPSA and other acts administered by the CPSC. Coordinated with the various bureaus and
offices within CPSC to assure that the work needed to meet legal and technical requirements was
provided. Established and maintained constructive relationships with key members of industry
and other government agencies. Participated in select committees and made public addresses.
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Consumer Product Safety Associates
P.O. Diawcr 32
Truth or Consequences, NM 87901
505-894-4436

Fax:505-f94.721?
November 12,1999
Mitch Zager
Attorney at Law
3587 West 4700 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
He:

Preliminary Report - Aana Marie Alarid v. American Water Heater Co.

Dear Mr. Zager:
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with disclosure information, including my opinions in
ihe referenced case. As the case develops, I may supplement the report.
Background information,
I am a mechanical engineer. My relevant background includes serving as a safety engineer/manager
within the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission for a period of about nineteen years. That
experience included managing the engineering programs associated with gas fired appliances for
over ten years. Other than official documents for the CPSC, and reports in litigation, I have not
authored any publications during the last ten years. My time is compensated at the rate of $ 150 per
hour. The data and information forming the basis of my opinion include all related documents
reviewed during the time of my tenure at CPSC including, but not limited to. all briefing packages
authored by myself or my successors, the information developed at CPSC regarding water heaters,
the studies conducted on behalf of the water heater industry by A D . Little, the National Fire
Protection Association Handbooks (NFPA) on the National Fuel Gas Code and Liquified Petroleum
Gases. 1 have reviewed and considered case materials, depositions, etc. for this and other cases. For
historical confirmation I have also considered telephone interviews 1 have had with Donald McKay,
former Voluntary Standards Manager for CPSC, Carl Bledchmidt, fomier director of Product Defect
Investigation and Correction for CPSC and with Jack Langmead, former technical director for the
Gas Appliance Manufacturers Association (GAMA). I would refer to official documents from the
CPSC file, which 1 understand have been produced by American Water Heater Co. or have been
supplied in response to FOI A requests directed to the CPSC. A partial listing of these materials is
included as an attachment.
WATER HEATERS
Background
The Gas Water Heater Manufacturers, and its member manufacturers, including American Water
Heater Co.. through their industry organization, GAMA, have known about the hazard of ignition of
flammable vapors by gas water heaters since before the beginning of the CPSC [in October. 1972].
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Mitch Zager
Page 2
November 12, 1999
Administration) had studied the epidemiology of fires and explosions associated with water heaters
and held discourse on the possible elimination of these hazards with GAMA. At that time, and for
many years thereafter, the industry took the position that the fires were not the fault of the
equipment but instead were a function of inappropriate human behavior in using or storing
flammable liquids and vapors around water heaters. This argument held off serious examination of
the equipment itself, by the CPSC staff, through several project managers and the beginning of my
own term as such, until staff was given a presentation of experimental work done in preparation for
plaintiffs product liability litigation in which elevated water heater ignition was compared with
heaters placed on the floor. Shortly thereafter CPSC staff sent a "White Paper' to the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI) sub-committee on water heater standards. In that white paper,
staff recommended that the sub-Committee develop a product safety standard ro reduce or eliminate
the risk of injury presented by these water heaters due to their defective design. The design defect
identified was that conventional water heaters take their intake (combustion) air directly off the
floor. Staff suggested that such intake (and flame height) should be at least eighteen inches off the
floor. The sub-committee formed a special working group whose purported charter was to examine
the problem and suggested solutions and to make recommendations to the sub-committee.
The approach taken by the working group was to attempt to disprove the efficacy of the corrective
methods which had been brought to their attention. In addition GAMA proceeded to develop some
consumer information pieces. At the urging of Jack Moore, now retired from American Wa.er
heater Company. A.D. Little was contracted by GAMA to do a series of tests which examined
elevation, quantity of gasoline spilled and proximity of gasoline spills to the water heater. Even
though the experiment was modified during the course of the tests with no real justification |to
create multiple spills, to spill larger quantities of gasoline, and to use grossly elevated floor and
room temperatures] the tests basically showed that the raising of water heater flame and air intake
would reduce the number of fires and explosions associated with these products and thereby reduce
Ibe number of deaths and injuries caused by gas water heaters. The A.D. Little tests also showed
that elevation alone would not prevent all of the fires if a lot of gasoline was spilled close erough to
a water heater of conventional design. The most important result of the test was a demonstration
that when a water heater was not elevated it would almost always ignite spilled gasoline but when it
was elevated the risk of fire was greatly reduced.
At the same time the GAMA tests were going on, CPSC was also conducting tests to determ ne the
effect of elevating the air-intake. In order to do this and examine a potential retrofit possibility,
placed a piece of fourteen-inch "roof-dashing" around the water heater and sealed it at the floor. A
fan was used to produce the same "draw" as a normally burning water heater and gasoline vapor
concentrations were measured at the "flame front." These tests showed that even this barrier greatly
reduced the risk of fire by not allowing the vapor concentrations to reach the "lower explosive limit''
(LEL) at the flame-front in most cases. It is interesting that Rheem's patent #5.085,205. filed 5/9'91
was essentially the same idea as that tested by CPSC. It is even more interesting that in spite of the
existence of the CPSC testing which demonstrated the effectiveness of the idea/Rheem withheld
this important safety device from the public and finally ''dedicated" it.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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On the morning of one of my briefings to the Commission, the President of GAMA called to tell me
that thev (GAMA) had also run barrier tests (two mns) and that they quickly got fires. I immediately
called the American Gas Association (AGA) Laboratories in Cleveland, where the tests had been
run. and learned that in both cases the barriers had not been sealed to the floor and that measurable
or observable amounts of gasoline had run under the barriers. Under such conditions, there was
effectively no hairier and it was not surprising that fire conditions were reached. I found it
.nteresting that GAMA had not disclosed this defect in the tests and that they continued to u;.e the
misleading reports to try to disprove the barrier theory in their presentations to the Commiss.on after
my retirement. On the other hand, it was totally consistent with the rest of their effort: At the time
that the problem was first pressed on them, they responded with poor labeling. When the problem
was again pressed, they responded with improved labeling. Upon the third and much more vigorous
pressing (and this time for product standards) they responded with decent information and
educations materials but no real efforts to improve the safety performance of the equipment. At
each turn, they seemed to respond with the minimum effort which they calculated might take the
pressure off of their industry. The hundreds of people who were being burned-up were apparently
insufficient to motivate them to improve their standard products or installation practices.
Even after the industry was routinely selling so-called "sealed combustion" or "direct vent" systems
(these would have eliminated the vast majority, perhaps all, of the fires and explosions) they
persisted in their attempts to maintain the status quo as to conventional water heaters. It was the
insensitivity of the water heater manufacturers to the plight of the victims which caused suc-.i a
negative reaction from the CPSC staff, particularly when demonstrated methods to reduce or
eliminate the hazard were in existence. The staff was haunted by photos of the victims showing the
degree of injury and obvious pain of these victims, yet the industry was unmoved to correct the
design of the water heaters. They were, however, moved to change the rules of the ANSI 7.-21
whereby a similar presentation could not be made again without the specific approval, in advance, of
the sub-committee chairman. The industry also went to some expense to demonstrate that the
"fixes" which had been suggested would not prevent all of the accidents and then professed no
further interest in pursuing them. Their approach seemed to be that if an suggested method could be
shown to be unsuccessful in preventing even one fire, then the method was to be rejected.
Discussion
As discussed above, it is my opinion that the gas industry, including American Water Heater Co. has
long known that by installing a conventional water heater directly on the floor, a useful product is
turned into a defective one. The defect is that, by design, the air (which the flame must have in
order to bum the fuel) is drawn from directly off of the floor. At first glance, where the air is taken
from doesn't seem to present much of a problem, unless and until you think about the environment
into which a water heater is installed. They are installed into homes where many chemicals
including flammable and poisonous chemicals are stored and used. They are installed into garages.
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inio utility rooms, into kitchens and other rooms and areas of the house. Many flammable vapors
are known, by the industry and others involved in science, to be heavier than air; however, many
consumers do not know or think about those facts. They also do not typically interact with their
water heaters except when the water heaters are not working. Therefore, the water heater is not on
the mind of most consumers during any activity that does not directly involve the water heater.
When people wash cloths they may think about the washer but they will not likely think about the
water heater or the hazards it can present unless they regularly run out of hot water.
For several years, "sealed combustion'* or "direct-vent" gas water heaters have been offered wherein
combustion air was drawn in from outside the residence. These were considered by the industry to
be 'high end" products and when CPSC staff recommended to GAMA that these could be used as
the ''standard product*' to eliminate or greatly reduce the risk of the fires that were injuring so many
people each year, they answered with the general statement that many consumers could not afford
them. There did not appear to have been any examination of the economics of scale and its effect on
pricing , When this analysis is made, a product which previously appeared too expensive can
suddenly be competitive when it is produced in large numbers.
The industry largely relics on its labeling and information campaign for safety coverage. However,
in February 1976 GAMA admitted that xi ... the only time most people find out what type of furnace
or water heater they have is when for some reason the unit fails to provide the desired service." That
obsen ation is as true today as it was in 1976 and before. Labeling on water heaters will not be
effective in eliminating most fires, injuries and deaths associated with water heaters igniting
flammable vapors. Water Heaters are unique among the major appliances found in the home — it is
not a product with which a consumer interacts on any reasonably consistent basis — similar to an
electrical supply (wiring) system. It, however, presents a continuous hazardous condition of likely
ignition of any flammable vapor with which it might come into contact.
There are a number of ways to keep gasoline from getting under the water heater including a Rhecm
patented barrier mechanism similar in concept to the one tested by CPSC labs. In addition, my
review of reports of testing done with Firexx and the Bowen burner, both had successful tests where
gasoline was spilled under the water heater yet no ignition occurred.
The economic analysis done by CPSC indicated that the installer's charges of $35 to install the
water heater on a stand would have been a cost-effective safety remedy.
The concept of that manufacturers would rely on the homeowner to follow safety guidelines as well
by reading the manual, is, of course false on its face. Consider that the instructions make reference
to standards which are not included in the owners manual. Such reference is of little or no value

'What this means is that, where only a few of a particular model arc manufactured, the eosts of
development, tooling and construction have to be recovered over only the few units; however, where many
are ni8de, these same costs can be recouped over the entire production, thereby lowering the "per-unit" costs.
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because most consumers and many installers will not have them. This lack of access is an item
which has been discussed by the industry such that while they know of its ineffectiveness they feci
lhai ihey need to be "covered" and therefore included reference to other standards so that they can
claim that they have covered the subject.
The training that installers receive is generally "on-the-job" training. The process of installing a
water heater is not complicated. It is not reasonable to expect that installation instructions will be
examined by installers unless there is something which they have not seen before associated with a
particular piece of equipment. Basically, three pipes and a vent are disconnected and reconnected.
Only if something unexpected were introduced would it be reasonable to expect any inquiry. In my
own experience in having water heaters installed in property I owned, water heater installers, even in
areas like Washington, D.C. [home of the AGA and GAMA headquarters], did not know (much less
.n small towns or communities) that Water Heaters need to be installed on stands in garages or other
places where flammable vapors are likely to be encountered. Installers are always in a better
position to know of the requirements than is the consumer because they furnish it and arc in actual
interaction with the unit whereas the typical consumer only looks at the Water Heater when it
doesn't work.
Only after the staff of the Consumer Product Safety Commission recommended that mandatory
standards be developed did the Water Heater Industry seriously attempt to examine how to nake a
safer water heater. The American Water Heater Co. recently announced that they have developed
such a water heater and were honored for being the first to do so. However, we have been unable to
find any of the units available on the market. It is interesting to note that it took only five years after
the industry agreed to develop such a product. Had they done so in the early 1970s, thousands of
people would not have been killed, disfigured or injured by the ignition of flammable vapors,
including Anna Marie Alarid.
Conclusion
The water heater industry in general and American Water Heater Co, in particular has maintained a
consistent, conscious and knowing disregard for the safety and welfare of their customers in the face
of repeated urging by the government agency charged with the responsibility for consumer product
safety (CPSC). They had the ability to greatly reduce or eliminate the risk of injury from ignition of
flammable vapors by using other existing products (closed combustion or stands) or any other
design which would elevate the flame source or eliminate the need for floor level intake air for
combustion. They refused to do so.
Very truly yours,

Joseph Z. Fandey
Consumer Product Safety Associates, L L C .
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
MR, FANDEY IS NOT QUALIFIED TO OPINE ABOUT
THE DESIGN OF WATER HEATERS SIMPLY BECAUSE
HE HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN INTERACTIONS BETWEEN
THE INDUSTRY AND THE CPSC.
Is a crossing guard qualified to opine on the proper design of a roadway? This is the role
attorney Fandey has played with regard to water heaters. Plaintiff offers no indication that Mr.
Fandey has training, expertise or specialized knowledge about any aspect of water heaters other
than a historical study of the interface between the CPSC and the Gas Appliance Manufacturers
Association (GAMA). He should not be permitted to give opinions about design alternatives
based solely on this single facet of expertise.
The design of a water heater, or any other product, involves many factors and only one of
those factors is its historical development. Design includes consideration of the proper and
reliable function of the product. It includes consideration of the various environments in which
the machine may operate. It includes a consideration of the useful life of the product and its
economic feasibility. The concern for consistent and efficient manufacture of the product must
also be addressed.
Without any actual knowledge or experience concerning these many factors, Mr. Fandey
seeks to offer myopic opinions from the standpoint of regulatory history alone. This is all he can
do because his life's work has been in various roles "supporting regulation and enforcement of
consumer safety."
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That Mr. Fandey may be familiar with other design considerations from having read about
them does not suffice. This is the plain holding of Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P. 2d 943 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994), where an emergency room doctor sought to give opinions about the standard of care
for cardiologists based on his readings. The court disallowed those opinions, based in part on the
following:
To allow a doctor in one specialty, retained as an expert witness, to
become an "expert" on the standard of care in a different medical
specialty by merely reading and studying the documents in a given
case invites confusion, error, and a trial fraught with unreliable
testimony.
Id. at 947.
Mr. Fandey could no more design a water heater than could any number of the lawyers
involved in this case. Like them, his knowledge of water heater design is book knowledge, not
personal knowledge. Moreover, there is no indication that his involvement with water heaters has
touched on any aspect other than historical considerations. Just as a crossing guard may think
there is a way to change an intersection, Mr. Fandey's review of accidents involving water heaters
may give him an idea about how to change them, however, it does not qualify him to give an
opinion about improper design.
POINT H
PLAINTIFF SEEMS TO CONCEDE THAT MR. FANDEY
CANNOT BE AN EXPERT ON WHO "KNOWINGLY AND
RECKLESSLY DISREGARDED."
Although it is not said explicitly, plaintiff seems to agree that Mr. Fandey does not qualify
as an expert on whether American should be liable for punitive damages. In criminal cases,

-3-
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certain experts with training in psychology or psychiatry are permitted to testify about an
accused's state of mind. However, nothing in Mr. Fandey's background or preparation of this
case would supply him with that type of basis for a similar
It is conceivable that Mr. Fandey could offer an admissible piece of factual testimony
about American's involvement in some meeting to which he was also a party. Perhaps he even
recalls some admission against interest made by an American employee. To this extent, Mr.
Fandey may be an appropriate percipient witness.
However, that does not make his opinion admissible. Plainly, it is up to the finder of fact
to conclude if the proof shows that American knowingly and recklessly disregarded the safety of
others. That is the ultimate question as to American's liability for punitive damages. An expert is
not permitted to simply tell the jury what result to reach. See Steffensen v. Smith's Management
Corp., 820 P. 2d 482 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). This issue is properly within the province of the
finder of fact to decide by application of common knowledge and experience to the facts adduced.
POINT in
MR. FANDEY'S TESTIMONY BASED ON PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE OF AMERICAN, THE DEFENDANT IN
THE CASE.
A brief review of Mr. Fandey's report and plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to this
motion suggests that plaintiff seeks to have Mr. Fandey attack the entire water heater industry.
His report would apply with minor edits regardless of what water heater maker was named as
defendant.
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Plaintiff has made no attempt to limit Mr. Fandey's testimony to his personal knowledge
of American's conduct. Yet it is the conduct of American's upper management, and that alone,
which will be material to an assessment of punitive liability against the company.
Plaintiff seems to concede that Mr. Fandey must have personal knowledge in order to
testify as a percipient witness. However, she suggests that Mr. Fandey's general historical
knowledge is relevant. Unless Mr. Fandey is testifying to matters that are established to have
involved American, his factual testimony should be precluded. Particularly when the plaintiff is
seeking to punish a defendant, not just obtain compensation, careful application of Rule 602 is
warranted so that the defendant is not punished for the wrongs of others.
DATED this

//7*
/ day of April, 2001.
SNOW, CHRISTENSElSWhMARTINEAU

JohnR.
Kara Ly
Kenneth L. Reich
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance
Manufacturing and American Water Heater
Company
N:\19944\l\Fandey.rep
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American moves the Court for an order excluding numerous exhibits identified by plaintiff
which are inadmissible hearsay for which the plaintiff has developed no foundation. This motion
is supported by the accompanying memorandum and Rules 803 and 703, Utah Rules of Evidence.
To the extent this motion is granted, American requests that counsel be admonished to refrain
from mentioning any inadmissible evidence in opening statement or otherwise, and that counsel be
ordered to instruct all witnesses to refrain from mentioning the evidence while testifying.
DATED this $ ~~ day of April, 2001.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

John!
KaraL. Pettit
Kenneth L. Reich
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance
Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co.
N:\19944\1\RULE803.MOT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached AMERICAN'S MOTION IN
LIMINE REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED EXHIBITS was served by mailing, postage
prepaid, on the £

day of April, 2001, on the following:

Mitchel A. Zager
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and
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
Thomas V. Girardi
James G. O'Callahan
GIRARDI KEESE
1126 Wilshire Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA 90017
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Royal I. Hansen
MOYLE & DRAPER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Armstrong World Industries,
Inc.

Robert G. Gilchrist
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main #700
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Attorneys for Eagle Hardware & Garden, Inc.
Daniel McConkie
KIRTON & MCCONKIE
60 East South Temple #1800
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Attorney for Kent Nelson
John Mangum
NIELSEN & SENIOR
60 East South Temple #1100
P.O. Box 11808
Salt Lake City, UT 84147
Attorney for Kent Nelson
Gary E. Atkin
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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff proposes a total of 131 exhibits in this matter. Several of the proposed exhibits
have multiple subparts. Proposed exhibits 24 through 127 include a plethora of letters, minutes,
reports, studies and other documents dating back to 1967. American objects to the introduction
of such materials unless and until plaintiff has laid an adequate foundation and overcome the
obvious hearsay problems with these materials. As will be argued, those objections are not
overcome simply by having plaintiffs expert rely on these materials as a basis for their opinions.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiffs list of proposed exhibits is attached as Exhibit A. This list was first

produced to American's counsel on March 1, 2001 when counsel met in accordance with the
court's scheduling order.
2.

The list includes various reports, letters, meeting minutes and other documentation

that generally recount the history of efforts by the water heater industry, certain government
committees and the CPSC to address safety issues related to flammable vapors around gas
appliances. The documents do not specifically identify the involvement of American in such
events. The documents do not address the particulars of the design of the water heaters involved
in this matter.
3.

There has been absolutely no effort in this case to connect any of these materials to

American or to the water heaters involved in this case. In point of fact, plaintiff has not
conducted a single fact deposition in this matter, specifically she has not deposed any engineer or
employee of American.
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4.

Moreover, plaintiff does not list any employee of American as a witness at trial.

5.

Apparently the only witnesses who will be called to testify about American's

liability will be plaintiffs two retained experts, Mr. Fandey and Mr. Hoffman. Both of these
gentlemen purport to rely on these various memoranda and reports as the basis for their opinions.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS PROPOSED EXHIBITS ARE HEARSAY DOCUMENTS THAT
DO NOT FALL WITHIN ANY HEARSAY EXCEPTION,
Plaintiffs proposed exhibits are hearsay documents. They contain multiple out of court
statements which plaintiff intends to use to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See Rule 801,
Utah Rules of Evidence. For example, plaintiff may offer a memorandum discussing the hazards
of flammable vapors around gas appliances and showing that it was sent to someone at American.
She will be hoping to use this to convince the jury that American knew of those hazards. She is
offering the memorandum both to prove the existence of a hazard and to prove that American
knew of that hazard. Hence, she is offering the memorandum to prove the truth of that matter
asserted.
If plaintiff had elected to depose American in this matter, she might have asked whether

(

American was aware of a certain hazard by a certain day, or whether American actually received a
certain memorandum. No such evidence is in the record. Unless these exhibits fall within an
exception to the hearsay rule, they should be excluded.
Rule 803, Utah Rules of Evidence, lists exceptions to the hearsay rule, at least a few of
which have applicability to the documents proposed by plaintiff. Rule 803(6) permits the
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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admission of records of regularly conducted activity. However, to use this "business records"
exception, the plaintiff must provide foundational testimony from a custodian or other qualified
witness. That person must be able to testify that the record was kept in the course of regularly
conducted activities as a matter of routine practice and that it was made at or near the time by a
person with knowledge of those activities. American is unaware of any witness to be called by
plaintiff who can provide such foundation for the documents. Similarly, Rule 803(8) permits the
admission of certain public records reflecting the activities of that office or agency; however,
American is unaware of any witness to be called by the plaintiff who can lay such a foundation for
the proposed exhibits.
Rule 803(18) permits the admission of certain learned treatises. If any of the studies and
reports on plaintiffs exhibit list are found in "published treatises, periodicals or pamphlets" which
are considered to be reliable authorities, then this exception to the hearsay rule might be
employed. However, the exhibit list proposed by plaintiff does not indicate that any of the reports
or studies were published in the type of publication anticipated by this exception.
POINT H
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE DOES NOT BECOME ADMISSIBLE
SIMPLY BECAUSE AN EXPERT RELIES ON IT.
Plaintiffs liability case against American will apparently be the testimony of two retained
experts, Mr. Joseph Fandey and Mr. John Hoffman. She has not designated any employee of
American as a trial witness. These experts cannot be used to prove plaintiffs case with
inadmissible evidence.
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DATED this 3 - d a y of April, 2001.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

JohnRj^nd
Karaf^Pettit
Kenneth L. Reich
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance
Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co.
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ARGUMENT
Plaintiff concedes that exhibits containing out of court statements must fall within an
exception to the hearsay rule in order to be admitted at trial. However, she downplays the scope
of the problem. It is indeed difficult to separately address each document on the exhibit list
because there are 131 different numbered descriptions of exhibits, many of which contain several
subparts.
By way of further illustration, consider the 22 items listed as Exhibit 26 on the plaintiffs
list. Exhibit 26 is described only as: "Joseph Fandey, 1970-1976 Flammable Vapors Materials."
It includes four items described only as "Letter" with a date. It appears to contain articles and
reports from a variety of sources other than the CPSC where Mr. Fandey worked. All of these
documents are out of court statements falling within the definition of hearsay found in Rule 801.
There are undoubtedly incidents of hearsay within hearsay to the extent the articles and reports
are gathering information from elsewhere.
The admission of any of these materials depends upon the plaintiff showing how each
proffered document has some materiality to the issues being tried in this case. The defendant in
this case is American, not every water heater company that ever corresponded with the CPSC.
Further, the water heater in question was manufactured in 1991, which may make materials
published thereafter irrelevant. Mr. Fandey's files up through 1998 are included in the list.
Plaintiff seems to concede that these files and records are not admissible simply because
Mr. Fandey says that he relied on them. She claims that she is not trying to use her experts as a
front for hearsay documents. American contends that the central purpose of Mr. Fandey's
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testimony will be to introduce the historical facts contained in his files. In point of fact, Mr.
Fandey has done little else to form his opinions in this matter.
The real test of this comes in application of Rule 703's proscription on what can be used as
the basis for an expert opinion. That Rule only allows an expert to base his opinion on the type of
materials that are "reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." Obviously an expert
in the design of water heaters should not be relying on what he reads in the newspaper to support
his opinion. See, generally, Barson v. KR. Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, American stands on its general objection to the plaintiffs exhibit
designation and will make more specific objections to the exhibits as they are offered at trial.
DATED this

*

f

day of April, 2001.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

John R. L u n J ^
Kara:LL. P6ttit
Kenneth L. Reich
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance
Manufacturing and American Water Heater
Company
N:\19944\1\RULE803.REP
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1
2

OCDCEER 31, 2001

3

9:35 A.M.

4

PROCEEDINGS
•

5

•

*

•

•

6
7

THE COURT:

8

MR. SUTTON:

9

Well, here we are.

We did, Your Honor, there were a couple

of issues.

10

THE COURT:

11

somebody will go for that, huh?

12

guys haven't ]picked up on this.

13

MR. SUTTON:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. SUTTON:

Uh-huh.

16

THE COURT:

All right.

17

Did you —

huh?

Wearing that US flag again.

Thin)ting

I'm surprised the rest of you

Since September 13th, Your I-ionor
Is that right?

So it's really how you feel,

I' 11 go for that.

MR. SUTTON:

18

There are a couple of issues we'd like

19

to bring to your attention outside the presence of the jury,

20

please.

21

J

It* s my understanding that the plaintiff intends to

22

call as their first witness this morning a gentleman by the

23

name of Jeff :Long.

24

affiliated wi-th eithesr the city or the county fire department

25

and that he may even be proffered this morning to cof fer some

It's my understanding that Mr. Long is
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J

expert opinions.
My client would object to him being called as a
witness for the following reasons:

He was never identified in

discovery responses served by the plaintiff in this case that
would have specifically sought out his identity.

In December

of 1998, plaintiff served discovery responses that did not list
Mr. Long in response to inquiry about witnesses to be used at
the time of trial, expert witnesses to be used at the time of
trial or persons who arrived at the scene after the incident.
Those discovery responses were supplemented by the plaintiff in
May of 1998 and there was still no reference to Mr. Long.
In November of 1999, pursuant to prior scheduling
order, plaintiff was ordered to produce all expert witness
reports.

There was nothing from Mr. Long in the expert witness

reports.

And as recently as April 26, 2001, when the final

pretrial order was signed by this court, Mr. Long did not
appear on plaintiff's witness list nor, for that matter, did
anybody from the Salt Lake City Fire Department.
For those reasons, because Mr. Long has not been
identified —
THE COURT:

Anything general like a firefighter maybe

or anything like that?
MR. SUTTON:

No, Your Honor.

For those reasons, it

would be our motion that Mr. Long be precluded from testifying
this morning and particularly precluded from offering expert
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

opinions.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. SUTTON:

4

THE COURT:

If he werenft allowed to testify —
I recognize that, Your Honor.
I guess that would be a —

so you're

5

saying on the chance that I let him do it, you don't want him

6

to talk about expert stuff?

7

MR. SUTTON:

That's correct.

8

THE COURT: Okay.

9

MR. O1CALLAHAN:

Your Honor, Mr. Long at the time was

10

a member of the Salt Lake City Fire Department.

11

involved and in charge of the investigation pertaining to this

12

fire.

13

his name doesn't appear in the incident report itself but he

14

was the one responsible for it, and that's according to the

15

person who signed off on it and who we did identify.

16

Mr. McKone who we made reference to previously, so this is —

17

in other words, if we brought in, I guess he's Commander

18

McKone, Commander McKone would have to say, Well, the person

19

who actually oversaw this was Mr. Long.

20

some extent foundational for what Mr. McKone would say with

21

respect to the fire incident report.

22

He was

One of the reasons that we have to call him is that —

That is

So this is really to

The fire incident report is something that their

23

experts have relied on and have reviewed for purposes of their

24

testimony.

25

there has been some challenges or concerns with respect to the

So this is foundational and, to the extent that
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investigation that was undertaken, we want to play that out for
the jury.

But he is a
THE COURT:

—

How about going to the issue —

the issue

raised is we have rules of discovery, the rules of discovery,
as I understand them, say essentially, if you donft tell me who
you1re going to call, then you canft call them.
to be the problem.

So that seems

It's not who is he, what's he doing.

Isn't

that the problem?
MR. O'CALLAHAN:
THE COURT:
motion?

Your Honor, I would

—

Isn't that the problem raised by the

I've heard your words, but they don't go to the

motion.
MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Your Honor, the fact is that we were

not aware that Mr. Long was the preparer of this report and we
did not anticipate that he would be a witness.
THE COURT:

So you were going with McKone and McKone

at some point tells you it's really Mr. Long?
MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Mr. McKone told us that on Monday

morning when we had subpoenaed him.
that actually did the
THE COURT:

And he said the person

—
That really knows about this is Mr. Long?

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Right.

And on that basis, obviously

if we were to bring Mr. McKone in here
THE COURT:

—

All he'd say is --

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

See Mr. Long.
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1

THE COURT:

How about the promptu of Mr. Sutton's

2

concern Long is suddenly going to be some sort of expert

3

fellow?

4

Not that he couldn't be, but that he now will be?
MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Well, Your Honor, I would merely

5

bring him in to establish what investigation that he undertook.^

6

The conclusions or the summaries that are contained in his

7 J report, I think that to the extent that he's a public official
8

who's created a public document under Evidence Code 803-8, the

9

document itself would be entitled to be introduced into

10

evidence because it in fact would not be barred by the hearsay

11

rule.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. SUTTON:

14

Okay.

Mr. Sutton, anything more?

The comment I would make, Your Honor, to

my knowledge, the only document that has been prepared is an

15 J approximately one and one-half page typewritten narrative that
16

I believe Mr. McKone was the author of.

17

document sets forth any opinions and conclusions with respect

18

to the fire.

19
20
21
22

THE COURT:

I do not believe that

Well, let's get to that.

What is the

document you are going to have Long submit?
MR. O'CALLAHAN:

It's the Fire Incident Report that's

part of the state reporting system that the City of Salt Lake

23 I and every other —
24

THE COURT:

Does Sutton know about this report?

25

MR. OfCALLAHAN:

Yes, his experts have it in their
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1

files.

2

THE COURT:

So I'm confused, Mr. Sutton, when you say

3

it's some kind of narrative.

4

thing?

McKone evidently signed it, but —

5
6

MR. SUTTON:

THE COURT:

Okay.

So why would you say there's only

one thing?

9
10

No, we're not talking about the same

thing.

7
8

Are we talking about the same

MR. SUTTON:

There is a one and one-half page

narrative report.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. SUTTON:

That McKone signed?
Nobody signed it, but it's my belief

13 I that it was authored by Mr. McKone.
14

THE COURT:

So let's set that aside.

He wants

15 J something else in which he calls the Fire Incident Report.
16 I
17

MR. SUTTON:

Okay.

Then there was some statistical

Utah Fire Incident Reporting System documents that were filed

18 I that basically indicated —
19

THE COURT:

Is that the thing we're talking about?

20

MR. OfCALLAHAN:

Yes, Your Honor, that's the thing

21

that their experts have in their files, which I think everybody

22

has seen.

23

THE COURT:

You saw that, right, Mr. Sutton?

24

MR. SUTTON:

I have seen these documents.

25

THE COURT:

Does it say who authored that?
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1

MR. LUND:

Your Honor, may I hand it to you?

2

MR. SUTTON:

It says at the bottom, "Officer in

3

charge of incident:

4

completing, submitting or reviewing report:

5

Battalion Assistant."

6
7

B. Gene Warr."

THE COURT:

All right.

And then it says, "Member
D.M. McKone,

McKone will tell us that Long

created the report, that's your proffer?

8

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

9

THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.

All right.

So you would object to this

10 I report.

You knew it existed though; right?

11

MR. SUTTON:

I did know that it existed, yes.

I need

12

to look I guess at the exhibit list as to whether they

13

proffered it as an exhibit there.

14

does reflect opinions on it germane to this inquiry,

15

Your Honor, I will represent to the Court that it says, "Form

16

of heat of ignition:

17

"Type of material:

18

Multiple forms."

Pilot light," singular.
Carpet adhesive.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. SUTTON:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. SUTTON:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

And to the extent that it

Then it says,

Form of material ignited:

Meaning that's what got burned?
I don't know.
A lot of things got burned, is that

—

Right.
Okay.

Mr. O1Callahan, he is just going

to tell us he prepared the report and did the investigation?
MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Correct.
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THE COURT:

Are you going to ask him to opine to what

caused the fire?
MR. OfCALLAHAN:

No, Your Honor, I!ll ask him what he

undertook to prepare this particular document and ask him what
he put in there based on his investigation.
THE COURT:

All right. Any other problems,

Mr. Sutton?
MR. SUTTON:
THE COURT:
MR. LUND:

No, Your Honor.
Mr. Lund has arisen.
Your Honor, because of 803-8, the public

records exception, we had some discussion about that yesterday,
I actually have prepared a brief little summary of some law on
803-8.

And one of the things about 803-8 is in subsection (c)

about public records it says that in civil actions you may
include, despite the hearsay rule, factual findings resulting
from and investigation made pursuant to authority granted by
law unless the source of information indicates lack of
trustworthiness.
So our position would be that with regard to the
UFIRS document itself, leave aside whether this witness
testifies —
THE COURT:
MR. LUND:

With regard to what, now?
It's the Utah Fire Incident Reporting

System, UFIRS, that the factual observations recorded on that
are indeed appropriate under this hearsay exception, but that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1 I the conclusions reached by the government in that report are
2

excluded by this.

3

THE COURT:

4

to excise portions?

5

MR. LUND:

So you'd have the report but somehow have

The standard thing on a police officer's

6 J report is that he recorded the —
7 I

THE COURT:

I mean if we're talking criminal cases

8 I nobody lets reports in.
9

MR. LUND:

But —

No, I'm talking —

we let in the fact that

10 I he knew what the weather was that day because he observed it
11 I that day, but don't let in the fact that he determined —
12

THE COURT:

13 I

MR. LUND:

14

Who was at fault, huh?
Yeah.

So here I think the observations he

makes are fine, but the conclusions he reaches would be

15 I excluded.
16 J

THE COURT:

17 J

MR. LUND:

18

THE COURT:

Because it would be hearsay?
Because it would be hearsay and —
And the problem we have is that nobody

19 I told you that he was going to testify so you're unprepared to
20 I question him.
21

All right.

Well, it seems to me the only way I can

22

rule is to allow him to testify about what he did, what he saw,

23

but not to tell us what he thinks happened, why it happened, I

24

guess, conclusions.

25 I

Does that make sense, Mr. O'Callahan?
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MR. O'CALLAHAN:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor, although --

Do you understand it, not —

do you

understand it?
MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Your Honor, I understand what the

Court has said.
THE COURT:

Because I think the fact that he isn't

divulged to the other side as he's going to be the witness and
we're going to rely on him to tell us A, B and C puts him at a
disadvantage to prejudice their position because they weren't
able to inquire of him before today what he might be saying so
they can't meet the evidence.

But I think these —

I get the

sense we're all agreeing that it could come in another way, you
know, what he did in the way of investigation, what he found
and what he saw, but the conclusions he draws from that we'd
have to keep out because those are the kinds of things that
they'd be able to challenge if they'd been prepared, which they
couldn't be because they didn't know about it. Okay?
Mr. Zager has a thought.

Mr. Zager, since I upset

you yesterday by not listening to you, please stand.
MR. ZAGER:

If we could just have a moment, Your

Honor, I'd like to confer with counsel.
THE COURT:

Sure. Make the record.

(A side-bar conference was held off the record.)
MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Your Honor, I just want to put

Mr. Long on, go through his testimony and —
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1

THE COURT:

2

Find out what he 'saw, what he did, but

not what he thinks happened?
MR. OfCALLAHAN:

3

And, Your Honor, the fact that there

4

was a report that was prepared pursuant to his investigation, I

5

think that is a fact, the report was prepared, although I

6

understand that —

7

THE COURT:

I mean you can see why the conclusions

8

can't come in?

9

going to have to probably excise it. And that could be an

10

If you want to admit it, that's fine, but we're

exercise we could engage in at some point if you want.

11

If he makes conclusions and if they get in without

12

being tested by the other side, which they aren't prepared to

13

do, that's the problem.
MR. OfCALLAHAN:

14

That's what cross-examination is all

15 I about.
16 I
17

THE COURT:

It is, but that's why you have discovery,

so you can prepare for that.

18

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

19

THE COURT:

Right?

You know, obviously

—

Well, I'm not saying you've got the upper

20

hand other than he's reached some conclusions that you may or

21

may not like and now it seems to me we have to approach it that

22

way.

23

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. SUTTON:

Okay.

Anything more right now?
There is.

I don't know how long —
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1 A

1

deputy, United States Marshal, and along with that we had to

2

carry a minimum of 48 hours a year of training.

3

locally but we also had to do it nationally, so I attended the

4 I National Fire Academy.

Not only

I attended the ATS training on fire

5 J investigations.
6 J

Q

What's the National Fire Academy?

7

A

The National Fire Academy is in Emmitsburg, Maryland,

8

it's part of the US Fire Administration.

And that's where

9

firefighters travel to attend the different various topics on

10

fire investigation, fire inspections, code enforcements,

11

incident command structures, interpersonal dynamics and so

12

forth.

13

Q

During the course of your years as a fire

14

investigator and the training that you received, did you come

15

to learn certain principles of fire investigation?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

Could you outline in layman's terms what those

18
19
20
21

principles were?
MR. LUND:

Your Honor, calls for a narrative.

I'm a

little concerned about the scope of the testimony.
THE COURT:

It's the easiest way to get at it. And I

22

guess if it becomes too rambling, I'll allow Mr. Lund to call a

23

halt to it.

24
25

THE WITNESS:

Well, again, in fire investigation, it

deals with the dynamics of what fire does in a building or what
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

fire does in a vehicle or wherever you?re investigating the

2

fire.

3

oxygen to combust, to keep it going.

4

fire crew comes in and they put the fire out by extinguishing

5

it.

6

the fire started.

7

teach you is to go to the point of most destruction,

Fire has a simple process where it uses heat, fuel and
So what happens is the

So we go in as fire investigators and try to determine how
By doing that, the first thing that they

8

MR. LUND:

9

THE COURT:

10 I

This is my problem, Your Honor.

MR. LUND:

Okay.

Go question by question.

And, Your Honor, we would be happy to

11

stipulate that Mr. Long is qualified as a fire scene

12

investigator, since this is just foundational as to what he did

13 I and saw there.
MR. 0!CALLAHAN:

14

Your Honor, I think for the benefit

15 J of the jury in terms of the testimony —
16

THE COURT:

I think you're entitled to overlook the

17 I stipulation and move to credibility of the witness, sure,
MR. OfCALLAHAN:

18
19
20

Thank you.

(BY MR. OfCALLAHAN)

Q

Mr. Long, you indicated that the

first thing that you do in the process of investigating a fire

21 I is to go to the point of greatest destruction?
22

A

That's where it ends up leading you to, the point of

23 J most destruction.

What you do is you go to the point of least

24

destruction to the point of most destruction.

25

around —

So you go

let!s say for example it's a structure, a building.
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1

You go around the outside and you look at all the different

2

indicators to show where the possibility or where the fire came

3

from and eliminate all those, and then you go inside. And then

4 I after you go inside you go to the point of most destruction,
5

and that pretty much indicates where —

6

happen where the fire started, or there might be a fuel load,

7

like a couch or something that could have burnt that made it

8

look like where the fire started.

9
10

Q

there's two things that

So going from the point of least destruction to the

point of greatest destruction, do you undertake certain types

11 I of inspection along the way, measuring char depth or things of
12

that nature?

13

A

Yes, it's been done, yeah.

14

Q

After you get to the point of greatest destruction,

15

what does that point enable you to do, to determine the point

16

of origin?

17

A

Well, the fire's an oxidizer, so when it oxidizes, it

18

burns. When it burns the wood it's like looking at a fireplace

19

or a camp stove.

Once you burn that wood it's going to turn

20 J into what's called pyrolysis and it's going to turn into
21

pyrolysized wood or burnt wood.

So the more it burns the more

22

you're going to go to the depth of char or the deepest of char.

23

So that's why we go to the depth of char or the point of most

24

destruction.

25

Q

And what do you do when you get to the point of most
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overhauling and had left the scene before you started going
through and doing your routine investigation?
A
crew —

That's usually what I do.

I think they leave a

they leave a crew on all the scenes to make sure I —

if I find any fires or smoldering, then they help me with the
investigation.

Not help me with the investigation, but help me

put out some of the fires.
Q

In case it hasn't really been completely put out?

A

Yeah.

Q

Was there any particular order to the photographs

that were taken?

I guess if we —

if you looked at the

negatives, would that give you a clue as to —
A

The outside photographs —

the outside were taken

first.
Q

Maybe you could separate out the photographs that

were taken on the outside first and then maybe organize them in
the way that you actually took those.
A

Now, if you want, we could copy them with the

negatives, if you want.
Q

Okay.

Do you want to do that to confirm that you —

and I note one thing is that all the photographs have a date in
the bottom right-hand corner.

Is that correct?

A

Yes.

Q

And they all reflect July 8th, 1996?

A

Are you —

you're not going to —
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official business that you were undertaking on behalf of the
City of Salt Lake?
A

Yes.

Q

I take it back, there are 24 photographs.

And for

the record, I've marked them as 131-1 through 131-24.
Now, in your investigation, if you'd take us through
those photographs maybe you could describe starting with 131-1
and going through them what the photograph depicts and why you
thought that it was significant for you to get a picture of
that.
A

Do you mind if I get up and show the jury what I'm

showing them so they can have a better understanding?
THE COURT: Any objection to —
MR. LUND:
to the admissibility.

Your Honor, I think there's no objection
With regard to the question posed, if

the witness could simply be clearly understanding that he's not
to state a conclusion or determination he made, he's simply to
use the photos to explain what he saw, then that's probably
going to be the quickest way to proceed.
THE COURT:

Any objection to that, Mr. 0'Callahan?

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Your Honor, I think that the jury is

also entitled to know why he took that particular photograph,
what he thought was significant in the photograph.
THE COURT:

Well, that gets us to the problem that we

discussed for a half an hour before.

Yeah, you may believe
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1

that.

We had a discussion off the record but let's just, since

2

we can't get around it without anybody bringing it up, as to

3 J whether or not you should be allowed to state some
4 J conclusions —
5

and it's not that you're not qualified, it's for

wholly different procedural reasons that I'm not allowing you -

6 J to state conclusions.
7 J
8

So for purposes of what you're describing there, it
would be fine to go over and show it to the jury, but just

9 I describe what you saw, and if it results in a conclusion, I
10

don't want to know why you took the picture.

11

THE WITNESS:

12

THE COURT: Okay.

13

THE WITNESS:

14

Right.

I will do that.

There was a five-gallon adhesive can

that was left at the fire scene, and this is the top from

15 J underneath.
16
17
18

This is the lid of —

the same lid, the five-gallon

with a label on it.
This is just part of the firefighting activity

19

showing that the firefighter — building, the attic for

20

extension of the fire.

21

This is the doorway with the firefighter in it, I

22

shouldn't have done that, but of where the fire was fought.

23

This is a four-plex and there's two levels on the

24

upstairs and two levels downstairs. And these are the two

25

doors that go into the water heaters.
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MR. LUND:

May we know which water heater?

THE COURT:

I think you can cross-examine him on

that.
MR. LUND:

Thank you.

THE WITNESS:

And 24 is just the, "Do not occupy,

unsafe for occupancy."
Q

(BY MR. OfCALLAHAN)

Now, No. 20 that you referred

to, Mr. Long, which water heater does that depict, the one on
the left or the one on the right?
A

The one on the right.

quick like.
Q

Hold on, just let me look real

This would be the one on the right.

Okay.

What did you do to make the determination that

the water heater on the right had suffered more damage than the
water heater on the other side?
MR. SUTTON:
THE COURT:

Objection, Your Honor.
Mr. OfCallahan, if that is not a question

that calls for a conclusion, help me with what it is.
MR. OfCALLAHAN:

I want to understand in the process

of investigation what he used to make the determination that —
THE COURT:
conclusion.

The determination is, in other words, a

Is that fair to say?

And I thought the purpose of

our discussion earlier today was that, for the reasons at least
I thought were important in the process of all of this, that
former —

what were you, Chief Long?
THE WITNESS: No.
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THE COURT:

Former High Honcho Long.

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Fire investigator,

Not that he's not capable, but I have

ruled that he can't today give us his conclusions.
that's —

I believe

I mean it seems to me that's what you are asking him

to do, so I'm going to have to sustain the objection.
MR. O'CALLAHAN:
Q

Okay.

(BY MR. O'CALLAHAN)

Well, in this particular case

did you as part of your investigation seek to understand the
spread of the fire that occurred?

In other words, did you try

to, as part of your investigation, analyze where the area of
least damage occurred and where the area of greatest damage
occurred?
A

The area of greatest damage was in —
MR. SUTTON:
THE COURT:

Objection, Your Honor.
So the answer is, yes, you did, or, no,

you didn't.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q

(BY MR. O'CALLAHAN)

Okay.

And this is something,

again, that you undertake in every fire investigation?
A

Yes.

Q

And were the photographs that you took intended to

document that investigation?
A
Q

Yes.
And besides taking photographs, what other things did
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THE COURT:

Where was that?

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

It was on the second landing.

And where physically on the landing?

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

It was around the floor area.

The floor of the landing?

THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT:

And did you determine if it had been

started or set intentionally, yes or no?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: And was it intentional?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT:

Beyond that, I mean I've tried to think

about what conclusions he can come out with that I think are
kind of led to by the facts, but beyond that, Mr. 0fCallahan,
if we're going to get into conclusions, every time he jumps up
I'm going to sustain them.

And I've made the reasons clear, I

hope.
Q

(BY MR. O'CALLAHAN)

When you say "the landing area,"

would that include the utility closet that's on that —
A

That would be the area —

that whole area would be

the area of origin.
Q

Okay.

Were you able to identify the area of greatest

damage on the landing?
MR. SUTTON:
MR. LUND:

Same objection, Your Honor.
Same objection.
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1

THE COURT:

2

Q

Sustained.

(BY MR. 0!CALLAHAN)

Now, following your

3

investigation there at the scene, what did you do next with

4

respect to your activity on this particular matter?

5

A

There again, I took the photographs of it, I checked

6

with Mountain Fuel or Questar, I spoke to the technician to see

7

if everything was working —

8

business to see if there were any natural gas leaks, any

9

electrical problems, and none had occurred.

10

functioning properly in the

So once we got

done with that we pretty much stopped and turned it back over

11 J to the owner.

There again, we were worried about the

12

spoliation issue more than anything else because we want to

13

leave that in a —

14

Q

pristine, or as good as we can.

Do you remember when you were doing your

15 I investigation that Mr. Peterson came back to the scene?
16

A

I believe he did, yeah.

17 J

Q

Was he with you when you were taking the photographs?

18 I

A

No, he was up at the hospital at the time.

19 J

Q

The record in the investigation report narrative that

20 J you have there indicates that he returned at about 1330 hours.
21 I Is that consistent with your recollection?
22

A

Yeah.

23

Q

And at the time when he returned, did you discuss

24
25

with him your findings?
A

We both went over what we saw, yes.
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about so far is what Mr. Fandey knows about these are the
Americans1 knowledge of what was going on.
thing to say?

Is that a fair

We don't need to know everything hefs going to

tell us.
MR. SUTTON:
THE COURT:

No, I think we just need to know —
How he knows what he knows if he knows

it?
MR. SUTTON:

Exactly.

THE COURT: Any question on what we're trying to
inquire into right now?
MR. OfCALLAHAN:

Yes, Your Honor.

gave a report in this case, and I am not —
is ground that's already been tilled.

He was deposed, he
it seems to me this

He either knows or he

doesn't know.
THE COURT:

Right.

Well, I guess what I'm worried

about is if he says he knows, you get into it, and when he's
examined on cross-examination it turns out he knows because Bob
and Carol told him about it.

That's what I'm worried about, in

all candor.

about?

MR. ZAGER:

Just admonish him that he's —

THE COURT:

That he's got to know what I'm worried

I'm not trying to be flippant, but —
MR. ZAGER:

Well, I'm

THE COURT:

So I'm saying, let's call him, let's do

the voir dire.

—

That's my decision.

If you don't like it,
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1

And, you know, I don't know what else you want, if I know

2

about.

3

I've got quite a bit of knowledge about them.

4

Q

5

I mean I participated in the meetings with them, so

Your knowledge is attending meetings that a

representative of American Appliance was also in attendance?

6

A

In part, yes. Also, the meeting minutes of that are

7

close to the government and others of the GAMA water heater

8

division meetings.

9 J
10

Q

Let's separate those first.

The GAMA meeting

minutes, were those meetings that you personally attended?

11 I

A

No. As I said, they were closed to us.

12 I

Q

So what happened at those meetings you would have- no

13 J personal knowledge, other than your review of whatever the
14 I minutes said?
15

A

Right.

16 I

Q

Okay.

What meetings did you personally attend that a

17 J representative of either American Appliance or American Water
18 I Heater was personally present?
19 I

A

A number of meetings with Henry Jack Moore.

20 I Sometimes he would sign in as American, sometimes he would sign
21 I in as Mor-Flo.

These were ANSI committee meetings, ANSI

22

Z21.10.1 subcommittee.

23

subcommittees of GAMA Z21.

24

Q

I also ran into him in other

Are you able to differentiate with your memory as to

25 I the meetings that Mr. Moore was there as the representative of
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1 I American Appliance separate and apart from the meetings he was
2

there as the representative of American Water Heater?

3

A

He —

no, I don't know that,

I know that I would

4

look at the meeting members and I could tell you who he signed

5

in for, but he was representing American and Southcorp and the

6

whole —

7

when I was working with him.

8

Q

9
10

Mor-Flo, the whole nine yards.

He was the main guy

Did you ever have any personal conversations with

Mr. Moore wherein he discussed with you his unique or
particular knowledge regarding flammable vapor ignition

11 I hazards?
12
13

A

I had conversations with him at the meetings, they

were not separate meetings, separate occasions during the

14 I meeting period, but just as we're having a conversation now in
15

a I guess quasi meeting scenario, we had discussions like that

16

then, yes.

17

Q

Is it your intention to testify today with respect to

18

any particular statements that you heard Mr. Moore make at any

19

time?

20 I

A

More perhaps conduct, I don't —

discussions of the

21 I occurrences at the meetings and the knowledge that they had
22 I because of their participation.
23
24
25

I don't believe I'm going to

be talking about particular quotes or anything like that.
Q

Is Mr. Moore the only person from either American

Appliance or American Water Heater Company that ever was in a
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allows me to infer a lot of stuff, like the memo that was a
record of the telephone conversation between Henry Jack Moore
and a Mr. McFarland telling them what they thought they needed
in terms of a study, and then the AD Little After Action report
where they said, well, we did the things —

it didn't say it in

these terms, but it basically said, we proved what Jack Morris
said we needed to have.
Q

Were you or were you not a participant in the

McFarland/Moore telephone conversation?
A

Oh, I was not, all I had was the memo, but it

reflects pretty much what their state of mind was.
Q

At least that is your impression?

A

For sure.

Q

As you testify today is it your intention to recount

any direct conversations you had personally with Mr. Moore?
A

I think we already answered that and the answer was

no.
MR. SUTTON:

Okay.

I think that's all I have on voir

dire, Your Honor.
MR. LUND:

Your Honor, I have one isolated subject.
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION

BY MR. LUND:
Q

You mentioned, Mr. Fandey, the name Mor-Flo.

A

Right.

Q

And you've mentioned Mr. Moore as the main person,
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1

MR. LUND: Okay.

2 I

THE COURT:

3

MR. OfCALLAHAN:

4

THE COURT:

5

Do you want to ask any questions of him?
Your Honor, do I need to?

I don't know.

I don't have a clue.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. OfCALLAHAN:

6
7

Q

8

Mr. Fandey, your contacts with Mr. Moore came in the

context of your work with the CPSC; correct?

9

A

Yes, sir.

10

Q

And you remember various committees that Mr. Moore

11

was a member of; correct?

12

A

Yes, sir.

13

Q

And Mr. Moore, during the course of your association

14 I with him on those committees, represented himself to be there
15

on behalf of a number of entities; correct?

16

A

That's correct.

17

Q

And those entities included American Appliance and

18 I American Water Heater Company; correct?
19 I

A

20
21

Often he was only signed in as American, but yes.
MR. O'CALLAHAN:

All right.

Thanks.

That's all I

have.

22

THE COURT:

Should we excuse Mr. Fandey for a minute

23

and we'll do our oral argument?

24

Mr. Sutton?

25

MR. SUTTON:

Your Honor, I would submit to the Court
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1

that based upon the voir dire, it is very clear that Mr. Fandey

2 J does not have personal knowledge with respect to what was done
3

or not done, what was known or not known by either of the

4 J defendants.

The attempted testimony that is going to be

5 I proffered to the jury is, this is my conclusion as what they
. 6 I should have known, and I think that that is inappropriate.
7

THE COURT:

You don't think itfs fair for him to say

8 J X from that company was there and Y was discussed, why not
9

that?

10 J

MR. SUTTON:

Well, we have no foundational showing —

11 J for example, how do we know that Mr. Moore was in the room, how
12

do —

13

THE COURT:

If he can!t get that far, that's fine,

14 I but he seems to think he can.

He said Moore was there and this

15 I is what we talked about. Why isn't that appropriate?
16 J

MR. SUTTON:

There's no foundational showing that

17 J even if Moore was in the room that he understood it, that he
18 I knew it, that he took it back to the company, that it was
19

discussed with upper management.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. SUTTON:

22

Fair.

So?

I'm just asking you, so what?

The particular discussions in the

meeting, Your Honor, I would submit to you are hearsay.

23

THE COURT: Okay.

24

MR. SUTTON:

How does Mr. Fandey recount what went on

25 I at those meetings without there being a hearsay problem?
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1

hearsay rule?

2 I one.
3
4

I'm not aware of this one.

Guide me on that

The notice exception to hearsay.
MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Your Honor, again, it's not being

offered for the truth of the matter but notice of the facts.

5

THE COURT:

Okay.

I'm sorry.

If it isn't a fact, is

6

it untrue?

7

saying it's the truth, I just want to tell you it's the fact.

8

I mean those are kind of synonymous, aren't they?

9
10

What I'm getting at is, you're saying, I'm not

MR. O'CALLAHAN:
purpose of the hearsay —

Well, I think that that's the
the exception to the rule when it's

11 I being offered for purposes —
12

THE COURT:

I mean I think there are exceptions to

13

hearsay as you say when they aren't offered for the truth, when

14

they're like foundational, when they're getting us to a point.

15

But in all candor, aren't you offering it for the truth of the

16

matter that Moore knew this is what the status of the world

17

was?

18
19

I mean I guess this is one of Mr. Lund's fine
distinctions, the truth of the matter you're trying to

20 J establish is that Moore knew this, and I guess you're not
21

offering it for the truth of what Fandey says.

22

they're so intertwined you can't get around it by saying it's

23

not offered for the truth.

24

somewhere —

25

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

It seems to me

I'm sorry, but you're —

I think it's —

Rule 803

yeah, 803-24 has the
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1 I general exception.
2

MR. LUND:

3

Well, let's get away from 803-24, that's

the one that requires notice of use of the noticeable

4 I exception, we've got to get —
5 1

MR. ZAGER:

Your Honor, these are meetings talking

6 J about what are the problems with these water heaters.

There's

7 I no other motive at these meetings other than to try to solve a
8 I problem dealing with water heater dangers.

They're attended by

9 I manufacturers, the statements made at these meetings, what
10 I defendant calls hearsay statements, are statements made to make
11 I our society a safer place by dealing with problems related to
12 I water heaters. Now, section 24 clearly is exactly those kind
13 I of statements covered under 803-24.

The statements are made

14 I with a guarantee, the statements are made for a purpose other
15 J than lawsuits and for no other motive other than to surround it
16 I by a guarantee of trustworthiness to deal with fundamental
17 I problems dealing with water heater dangers.
18

THE COURT:

19 I this:

How about sub (b), Mr. Zager, which says

"The statement is more probative on the point for which

20 I it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
21 J procure through reasonable efforts."

What if I concluded that

22 J a reasonable thing to do would have been to interview the
23 I recipients of this information and reject Moore, for one,
24

somebody like that?

And I could have concluded that that would

25 I have been a reasonable thing to do in reparation for this
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1

trial.

That not being done, you failed if I concluded that

2

way, in sub (b) which is one of the elements that would have to

3

be established for Rule 24 to take effect.

4

MR. ZAGER:

Well, Your Honor, I'm not sure —

I see

5

where the Court's going with that and that would bring us a

6

full circle back to —

7
8

THE COURT:

I guess I'm going back full circle

MR. ZAGER:

In response to that, I don't think (b)

because —

9
10

really qualifies the time at which the reasonable efforts are

11

made.

12

reasonable efforts are those that need to be made at the time

I think it could easily be interpreted that the

13 I of trial, and I think this court has already held that
14 J Mr. Moore is unavailable at trial, certainly he's within the
15 J sole control and disposal of the defendant.
16

THE COURT:

I didn't conclude that, sir.

I concluded

17 J that he's unavailable for trial because this court has no
18 J jurisdiction to force his appearance.
19

MR. ZAGER:

That's correct.

That's my conclusion.
So at this point in time

20

as we argue the applicability of 803, Section 24, then at this

21

particular time the most reasonable efforts that can be made to

22

bring in this type of testimony is to allow Mr. Fandey to talk

23

about those trustworthy statements made at these meetings where

24

Mr. Moore attended.

25

THE COURT:

So if your argument is that 803-24 is how
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1

it gets in, I'd have to conclude I don't agree with that

2

interpretation of it.

3

the hearsay rule, it seems to me I'm —

4

the route in then I'm not going to allow it in.

So unless there's another exception to
if I'm saying 24 is not

5

Any other argument on it from the plaintiffs?

6

MR. OrCALLAHAN:

Your Honor, yeah, I'd also say that

7

it's a —

Mr. Fandey could testify that he had a present sense

8

impression that Mr. Moore was present, that he was

9 I participating in the meeting, that he was listening to the
10

discussions that occurred, and that there is —

that he

11

believed that Mr. Moore was having impressed upon him the

12 J information being communicated.
13

THE COURT:

I don't mean to be rude, but isn't it

14

fair to say, then, that Fandey could also say, I also have the

15

present sense impression that Mr. Moore disregarded it and

16 I Mr. Moore is a cheating liar?
17

let you do what you're saying there is no limit to what

18 J Mr. Fandey can say?

Is there a limit to what a guy —

19 J the way the rule is —
20

I mean isn't it true that if I

that's

what a guy can say, this is my present

sense impression?

21

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

22

THE COURT:

Your Honor, I think —

I mean is there any limit?

Where would I

23 I draw the line?
24

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Your Honor, I think that the line,

25 J first of all, would be drawn by virtue of the objections that
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1

A

Bachelor of Science and mechanical engineering.

2

Q

After you completed your education there, did you go

3

into the work force?

4 I

A

I did.

5

Q

And could you tell us what you did following your

6

graduation?

7

mechanical engineering?

By the way, what year did you take your degree in

8

A

'73.

9 I

Q

Could you give us some idea as to what you did over

10
11

the next couple of years?
A

Well, I was working for Atlantic Research, I believe,

12 I at the time I got my degree —

no, I'd moved on by then, I was

13

at Washington Technological Associates and I was designing

14

equipment for government agencies. And I did some design work

15

in some consumer products, like we did a hair dryer design that

16

I participated in.

17

a very complicated mixture for using solid propellants and for

18

pharmaceuticals —

19

to be real resistant to exposure.

20

cranes for use of the Polaris Poseidon Program, designed other

21

equipment for training sailors. And then I worked for a time

22

at a place called Data Design Labs where I was responsible for

23

developing the logistic support programs for the new Trident

24

submarines out of Vanguard, Washington.

25

Q

I helped to design a mixture of blades for

not pharmaceuticals, but cosmetics that had
I designed some bridge

In 1975, did you go to work for an agency of the
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federal government?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

What agency was that?

A

The Consumer Product Safety Commission.

Q

And that's a federal agency; correct?

A

It is.

Q

Did the CPSC have a particular goal or mission?

A

Our charter was to reduce or eliminate unreasonable

risks of injury from consumer products.
Q

And when you initially went to work there, what

position did you take?
A

For personnel purposes I was a mechanical engineer;

in terms of a job function, I was a project manager.

I was

actually called a standards coordinator, but the function was
project manager.
Q

And at the outset, what project were you responsible

for managing?
A

Well, at the outset we were mainly doing petitions.

And I had petitions in sports and recreation, I had petitions
in poisons, flammability, I even had a petition to ban on
Anthrax at the time, some fabrics that were coming in from
overseas that had Anthrax in them.
Q

And how long did you remain a standards coordinator?

A

Until the agency was reorganized in —

I believe it

was f78.
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Q

And in 1978, you undertook a new position?

A

Yes, I was transferred into the engineering

department where most of the standards coordinators went.
Q

And in the engineering department were you given

particular responsibilities?
A

Yes.

Initially, I was the person in charge of sports

and recreation equipment and had ancillary assignments in the
area of home appliances, and we called it household structures
organization.

That's what it was called, but it was primarily

home stuff, from insulation to appliances.
Q

What title did you have in the engineering

department?
A

Initially it was engineer, then it was senior

engineer, then I was a branch chief.
Q

Somewhere along the way during your career at the

CPSC, did you go to law school?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

And when did you start law school?

A

I believe it was in f79.

Q

And when did you receive your degree?

A

I believe that was f83.

Q

And that was from the University of Baltimore?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

Okay.

How long did you remain a senior engineer in

the engineering department?
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1

A

2

Until I became a branch chief, and that was about —

gosh, about two years after the reorganization.

3

Q

That would have been 1980, '81?

4

A

Something on that order, yeah.

5 I

Q

And how long were you a branch chief?

6

A

I was a branch chief for about ten years.

7 I

Q

And what branch were you in charge of?

8

A

Household structures branch.

9 I

Q

Could you give us some idea of what products were

10

under the domain of the household structures?

11

A

Yes. We were responsible for a lot of products,

12 I stairs, ramps and landings, architectural blazing, gas
13

appliances, insulations —

14 J

Q

Did you say insulation?

15 I

A

Yeah, like formaldehyde foam insulation band was done

16 j in our group,
Q

17
18

Within the area of gas appliances, could you tell us

what particular household products fell under your purview?
A

19

Well, stoves, furnaces, water heaters, gas logs.

20

Anything that was gas powered was in our group.

The electrical

21

stuff was in a different group, in the electrical engineering

22 J group.

23

Q

And why was that?

24 I

A

Because the hazards associated with those are

25

primarily electrical.
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Q

Right, every one has a specific number that may run

into three or four digits; correct?
A

Yes.

Q

But they're all ANSI Z21 —

A

Subcommittees, right.

Q

Okay.

Well, if you could tell us the products, that

would be fine.
A

Control valves and controls was one of the

subcommittees; furnaces was another subcommittee; water heaters
was another; pool heaters; a little bit of involvement with the
stove folks. And I was involved with people working on the
labeling subcommittee.

ANSI came out with some labeling rules

and I was involved in that work too.
Q

Was that a Z21 committee or was that under a

different ANSI?
A

That was a more global committee, yeah.

Q

Now, focusing in particular on the ANSI subcommittee

that dealt with water heaters, when did you initially become
involved with that?
A

The first time would have been around the time that I

became a branch chief, late f70, early !80s.
Q

And what was the nature of the contact that you

initially had with that particular subcommittee?
A

The first contact had to do with explosions of water

heaters, having to do with pressure and temperature sensing.
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Q?

1

to guide standards or influence them to do other things was not

2 J intense until the early eighties.
3 J

Q

Okay.

And would you personally attend meetings of

4 J the subcommittee whenever you were able?
5

A

6

after f90.

7 J

I attended a great number of them, yes, especially

Q

And as a result of your attendance at the committees,

8 I did you become acquainted with other members?
9 J

A

10

Yes, I did, to one degree or another, yeah.
MR. LUND:

May have some effect on evidence which was

11 I that he was a member.

I think the statement today has been

12 J he's involved —
13

THE COURT:

14 J

MR. LUND:

Excuse me?
I move to strike to the extent he's

15 J referring to himself as a member until that's established that
16 I he's actually a member of one of these committees.
17
18 I

THE COURT:
Q

Overruled.

(BY MR. O'CALLAHAN)

Go ahead.

Go ahead.

During the years when

19 I you were attending meetings of the ANSI subcommittee on water
20 I heaters, did you become acquainted with individuals from
21 J various water heater manufacturing companies?
22

A

I did.

23

Q

Did you become familiar with somebody who was a

24
25

representative of American Appliances Company?
A

I became familiar with Henry Jack Moore, who —
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1

Q

Hold it.

Did you also become acquainted with someone

2

who was represented to be the representative of the American

3

Water Heater Company?

4

A

Henry Jack Moore.

5

Q

Is it correct to say that the same person who

6 I represented American Appliances was also the representative for
7 J American Water Heater Company?
8

MR. LUND:

9 I

THE COURT:

10

Q

It's leading, Your Honor.
Sustained.

(BY MR. OfCALLAHAN)

Did the American Water Heater

11 I Company have a representative, at least during the years that
12 I you were involved, who was a person other than the
13
14

representative of the American Water Heater Company?
A

He would —

Jack Moore would sign in as American a

15

lot of times, sometimes he would sign in as Mor-Flo, and

16

sometimes he would sign in as American Appliance.

17

only member that I knew of that was associated with them.

18

time to time they may have had one of his assistants or

19

something, somebody else from the company there, but they

20

weren't the official representative.

21

Q

He was the
From

But when Henry Jack Moore was at a water heater

22

subcommittee meeting, you saw him as a representative of both

23

American Appliances and of the American Water Heater Company?

24
25

A

Yeah, at that time we didn't distinguish him and we

took him at —

as all of those.
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J

1 I just volunteered, needs to be stricken.
2

(BY MR. OfCALLAHAN)

Q

Now, the Gas Appliance

3 J Manufacturers Association was a group that you had contact with
4

as a result of your position at the CPSC; correct?

5

A

That's correct.

6

Q

And in particular you had contact with the

7

organization called GAMA with respect to issues that dealt with

8 I water heaters; correct?
9

A

Yes.

10 I

Q

And, again, that was just part of something that fell

11 J within your responsibilities as the chief of the branch dealing
12

with household structures?

13

A

That's correct.

14 J

Q

Now, with respect to GAMA, were you invited to their

15 I meetings?
16

A

Oh, no, not to GAMA, no.

17 J

Q

Now, would you have meetings with representatives

18 I from GAMA on occasion?
19 I

A

Frequently, yes.

20 I

Q

Would you also receive material from GAMA that they

21

wished you to review?

22

A

That's correct.

23

Q

And, again, the material that we're talking about had

24
25 J

to do with water heaters; right?
A

Well, many things, but also water heaters, yes.
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Q

At least when you dealt with the group that focused

on water heater issues, that was the nature of the material
that was being provided to you?
A

Correct.

Q

And to your knowledge, did the American Water Heater

Company have a representative in GAMA?
A

Yes, they did.

Q

And who was that?

A

Generally it was Henry Jack Moore.

Q

How about American Appliances, did they have a

representative to GAMA?
A

Not that I could distinguish from Henry Jack Moore.

Q

So, again, it was the same situation where Henry Jack

Moore was wearing more than one hat?
A

That's what it appears to be, yes.

Q

Now, I want to ask you about a subcommittee meeting

that took place in November of 1991, a meeting of the water
heater subcommittee group of ANSI.

Do you recall a meeting

that took place at that time?
A

Yes, I do.

Q

And do you recall at the meeting in November of 1991

a presentation was made to the group?
A

Yes, I do.

Q

And who made that presentation?

A

An attorney out of New Orleans by the name of Ed
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1
2
3

Downing.
Was Henry Jack Moore in attendance at that particular

Q
meeting?

4

A

He was.

5

Q

Let me place in front of you what we'll mark —

6

I!m

going to mark it as 135, if that's okay with Marci.

7

THE CLERK:

That's fine.

8

THE COURT:

Marci's lost control of the process, so

9
10

she's letting you —

J

(BY MR. OfCALLAHAN)

Q

Mr. Fandey, let me place in

11

front of you what's been marked as Exhibit 135.

12

recognize this particular document?

Do you

I

13

A

Yes, I do.

14

Q

All right. And this is titled, "Presentation of

15

Edward F. Downy before the ANSI Z21.10.1 Subcommittee on

16

Standards for Gas Fired Water Heaters," and then it has the

17

date of November 13th, 1991 and the location, Cleveland, Ohio?

18

A

Thatf s correct.

19

Q

Okay.

20

A

Right.

21

Q

And then it —

|

1

Now, it has a table of contents; correct?

MR. LUND:

22

1

1

Your Honor, I object to the content of the

It's a hearsay document, it has not been received

23

document.

24

into evidence and the witness is now being asked about the

25

content o f it.
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1
2

he provided distributed to all the attendees?
A

There were 40 copies of the materials and those were

3

all distributed.

4

got copies and guests and others were allowed to get what was

5

left.

6

Q

The meeting —

the subcommittee members all

And what was the material that Mr. Downing provided

7 I to those in attendance, including Mr. Moore?
8

A

Well —

9

MR. LUND:

10
11

THE COURT:

Hearsay.
Sustained.

I mean the question assumes a

fact that is in evidence that Mr. Moore was there and another

12 J fact not in evidence that Mr. Moore received a copy of the
13 J report, so the objection is sustained.
14
15

You are not to answer the question.
(BY MR. OfCALLAHAN)

Q

To your knowledge, was Mr. Moore

16 I provided with a copy of this material that is placed in front
17

of you?

18

A

Yes, as were all the members.

19

Q

So could you tell us what material was in the packet

20

that Mr. Downing presented to all those in attendance?

21

MR. LUND:

22

THE COURT:

23

Hearsay.
And Ifm going to sustain that, unless you

can give me a reason why not, Mr. 0fCallahan.

24

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

25

THE COURT:

Sure, Your Honor.

Mr. Downing —

An exception to the rule, perhaps?
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A

No, anybody could go —

can even now go to the

committee meetings, but we were guests.

They wanted to be

working with us and we worked with them, but it wasn't per se
invitational.
Q

At the time of Mr. Downing's presentation, he

provided material to the committee members; correct?
A

Right.

Q

And were there minutes of the committee meetings

kept?
A

There were.

Q

And were you provided with copies of the minutes of

the subcommittee meetings on water heaters?
A

On a regular basis, yes.

Q

And as you received them, would you look at them to

verify that what had transpired had transpired?
A

Almost always.

There were a couple —

a few times

Ifm sure where I didn't get to in time.
Q

Now, with respect to the presentation made by

Mr. Downing, do you have a copy of the minutes that were
generated from that meeting?
A

I don't know if it's in here or not.

I have a copy

in my own files and I have the transcript of the presentation
that was produced.
Q

And I think that may be in here.

Hold on one second.
The materials that were provided by Mr. Downing, did
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there and sees a binder, sees

he's drinking out of a white

cup —
MR- LUND:
THE COURT:

Understood.
I appreciate that might be —

preference is a white cup.

yeah, my

I think that is not hearsay in the .

sense that it!s not a statement of anybody offered for the
truth.

It's not a statement.
Go ahead, Mr. 0'Callahan.

Q

(BY MR. OfCALLAHAN)

Did Mr. Downing provide studies

that had been done by the National Fire Protection Association?
A

He did.

Q

And what did the particular NFPA study that he

provided to the committee deal with?
MR. LUND:
THE COURT:

Objection, Your Honor —
I'll sustain that now.

Now we're getting

him reciting something prepared by somebody else, an
out-of-court statement, so that's sustained.
Q

(BY MR. O'CALLAHAN)

Did the material that

Mr. Downing provided to the members of the subcommittee become
the subject matter of discussion at subsequent subcommittee
meetings that you were in attendance at?
A

It did indeed.

Q

And what aspects or what was it from Mr. Downing's

presentation that was subsequently the subject matter of
discussion?
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1

MR. LUND:

Hearsay.

2

MR. SUTTON:

3

THE COURT:

Objection.
If we're going to talk about the

specifics, therefore, itfs hearsay.

4

Sustained as to the

5 J objection.
6

(BY MR. OfCALLAHAN)

Q

When the subsequent matters were

7

discussed, when the subject matter of Mr. Downing1s

8

presentation was discussed at later meetings, were there

9

minutes of those discussions maintained?

10

A

There were, at least at the ANSI level.

11 I

Q

And minutes of those meetings, would they reflect

12

your attendance as well as the attendance of other members?

13

A

Yes, they would.

14

Q

And would those minutes reflect the nature of the

15 J discussions that were had at the meetings?
16

A

They would.

17 I

Q

And if we were to look at the minutes regarding

18 I various meetings that took place of the ANSI subcommittee
19 I meetings from about 1980 on, would they reflect various
20 J materials that were provided to those in attendance at the
21 J meetings?
22 I

A

They would usually be attached to the minutes.

23 I

Q

And would they be attached in their complete form or

24 I would they be attached in a summarized form?
25 I

A

The attachments would generally be complete, at least
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as to things that were pertinent to that particular meeting.
But things like videotapes and other graphic kinds of things
might not be attached in their entirety.
Q

With respect to the presentation that Mr. Downing

made, did he also include videotapes as part of his
presentation?
A

He did.

Q

And in terms of the material that Mr. Downing

provided to the committee, did some of that then become
attached to the minutes of the meeting that occurred?
A

My recollection is that most of it did, yes.

Q

And do you have a specific recollection as to any

materials that Mr. Downing presented to the committee that then
became attached to the minutes and sent on to those who were in
attendance at the meeting?
A

The people that were in attendance at the meeting,

the members, all received copies of his presentation.
Subsequently, the transcript of his presentation was included
in a bound folio that included the videotapes and all the
attachments also and that went out to all the members, everyone
present.
Q

And when you say it went out to all the committee

members, what do you mean?
A

I mean all the members of the ANSI subcommittee and

many of the other people that were there received copies. I
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believe all the people there, but I can't swear that they got
it because I didn't check with them.
MR. LUND:

Your Honor, on that subject, could I voir

dire and make a foundational objection?
THE COURT:

Sure.

Go ahead.

VOIR DIRE EX3MENATI0N
BY MR. LUND:
Q

Mr. Fandey, you're saying now that certain materials

were sent to all members of the ANSI Committee; right?
A

That's correct.

Q

Do you have some personal knowledge, Mr. Fandey, that

Mr. Moore received a set of those documents?
A

I have personal knowledge that he received the

documents that were presented at the meeting.
Q

But you have no personal knowledge as to what he may

have received thereafter about Mr. Downing's presentation?
A

Yes, that's correct.
MR. LUND:

I'll move to strike his testimony about

those materials as irrelevant unless it's connected to
Mr. Moore.
THE COURT:

I don't think it's irrelevant.

He's

talking about a meeting, we've not had about two words from
Mr. Moore.

Mr. Moore does not strike me as the focus of what's

been presented so far, so I mean either everything we've been
talking about the last hour is irrelevant or this is relevant,
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1

so overruled.

2

Go ahead, Mr. OfCallahan.

3

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

4

Q

Thank you, Your Honor.

(BY MR. OfCALLAHAN)

Mr. Moore was in attendance at

5 I the November 13th, 1991 meeting, you have personal knowledge
6

that he received the material that's there in the binder before

7

you; correct?

8

A

With the exception of the transcript of the meeting,

Q

And you're saying "the transcript," that contains

9 I yes.

10
11

actually the text of what Mr. Downing said when he was there?

12

A

That's correct.

13

Q

Other than that, all the materials that are in there

14

you have personal knowledge that Mr. Moore received them?

15

A

That's correct.

16

Q

Did you see him with that particular document in

17
18
19
20

front of him?
A

I did, and I saw him with individual parts of it that

were passed around separately.
Q

Now, this particular document, which was then

21

provided to the members of the subcommittee and in greater

22

length later on, would you be able to identify which documents

23

were given to Mr. Moore at the meeting based upon what you have

24

in front of you?

25

A

I believe so.
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Q

All right.

Could you tell us, identify the documents

that Mr. Downing provided to Mr. Moore among others at the
meeting?
A

The first was —

the first set of documents were

photographs of burn victims, children that had been burned up
by these things.
MR. SUTTON:
THE COURT:

Your Honor, objection, motion to strike.
Sounds like we're going back to the same

ground we covered and an objection was made and we got into the
specifics of what's in the presentation, it sounds like that's
now at least how he's interpreted your question.

So either

he's not responding to the question or he's now giving us some
hearsay information.

So I think I have to sustain the

objection.
MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Well, Your Honor, I believe this

would qualify under 803-6 because it's a record of a regularly
conducted meeting.
THE COURT:

I don't have any evidence before me that

this is a record of a meeting.

It's got to be a memo or report

made during the meeting shown by a custodian or qualified
witness that would keep a memo of the report.
report.

This is some stuff somebody hands out, it's not a memo

or minutes created.
minutes.

There isn't a

There's no evidence that these are the

All it is is something somebody created.
MR. O'CALLAHAN:

It was created but it provides

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

119

Q

What was it about the Downing presentation that

enabled you to conclude that there was a technologically
feasible fix available?
MR. SUTTON:

Objection, Your Honor, calls for

hearsay.
THE COURT:

I think you're asking him to tell us what

Mr. Downing told him, that's hearsay.
Q

(BY MR. O'CALLAHAN)

Sustained.

What were the factors that led

you to conclude sometime in 1991 that there was a technically
feasible fix available?
A

There was a video demonstration that we were shown

which indicated that that was a possibility.
Q

And could you tell us what it was about the video

demonstration that led you to conclude that was a possibility?
MR. SUTTON:
THE COURT:

Objection, Your Honor, hearsay.
Well, I think our problem,

Mr. 0'Callahan, is what you're asking Mr. Fandey to do is relay
for us to the jurors here today information that can be
processed through him, it seems really clearly a case of
hearsay.
MR. O'CALLAHAN:
describe what he saw.

Your Honor, I'm merely asking him to

The witness's perception would not be

hearsay, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
why we have the rule.

Well, that's the problem.

I think that's

It's not that Fandey won't tell us
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truthfully what he saw, but itfs filtered by his experience so
the poor jurors here get it second or third hand.

That seems

to me to be the purpose of the rule, so that this filtering
doesn't occur.

So I can't see that it's not hearsay.

If it's

not hearsay, why isn't it?
MR. O'CALLAHAN:

By your logic nobody could ever

testify to anything that they saw because it's all filtered by
the individual.
THE COURT:
direct witness.
presentation.
about.

Okay, very good point, unless he was the

But all he saw was somebody else's

Now we get to hear what that presentation is

It sounds like you've interpreted my standard to be

something you can't overcome, so sustained.
MR. SUTTON:
THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor.
I'll quit talking.

I tried to do that

earlier, but I'll be better.
Q

(BY MR. OfCALLAHAN)

During your years at the

Consumer Product Safety Commission, did you become aware of
tests that had been undertaken with respect to the ignition of
flammable vapors as to water heaters?
A

Yes.

Q

And how did you become familiar with tests that had

been undertaken of that type?
A

We participated in the design of certain tests and we

conducted others of our own.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

125

1

Henry Jack Moore on that subject.

He was very vocal in the

2

meetings about the Downing presentation, but not specifically

3 I to me.
4

Q

5

You overheard Mr. Moore as a member of the

subcommittee discuss the Downing material?

6

A

It was more of a policy level discussion than the

7 J specifics of the presentation.
8

Q

What do you mean it was more of a policy level

9 I discussion?
10

A

As a result of that presentation, the committee

11

changed its rules so that no presentation could be made by a

12

nonmember unless the presentation had been previously approved

13 J by the chairman of the subcommittee.
14

Q

And was that a change in rules that Mr. Moore

15 J supported?
16

A

Yes.

17 I

Q

And did he indicate why he supported that change in

18

the rules?

19

MR. LUND:

That would be hearsay.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. OfCALLAHAN:

Any reason why that wouldn't be hearsay?
Yes, Your Honor.

He's the corporate

22 I representative and could be an admission against interest.
23

MR. LUND:

I'm not sure how his statement about the

24 J rules against interest whoever he represents —
25

THE COURT:

I'm not worried about admission —
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is he

a party opponent?

Therefore, it's not hearsay, neither

representative of one of these agencies?
evidence we have, so overruled.

At least that's the

Go ahead and answer the

question.
THE WITNESS:

I'm sorry.

Will you repeat the

question?
THE COURT:
Q

The question was what did he say?

(BY MR. O'CALLAHAN)

What did you hear Mr. Moore

saying?
A

Well, Mr. Moore expressed the opinion that this

presentation was made to set up the industry for punitive
damages and not really to solve the problem, and he didn't want
to have anymore of those kind of presentations.
Q

Did Mr. Moore indicate at any of these meetings

whether or not he believed that elevating the pilot light and
burner on water heaters would be a good idea?
A

I don't recall him ever saying he thought it would be

a good idea.
Q

Do you ever recall him saying it would be a bad idea?

A

Well, the comments, and I can't —
THE COURT:

I think this is a yes or no question.

It

would be good if he answered yes or no and you might ask him,
if it's appropriate, what the next question is.

I think that

allows the other side to make appropriate objections.
So, yes, you heard him say something about it or, no,
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1

information —

2

THE COURT:

3

THE WITNESS:

4 I

THE COURT:

5

have any objection?

6

MR. LUND:

Well, I mean whatever form you picked.
Yes, Your Honor.
I think the foundation is there.

Yes.

Do you

Just that subsection (b) is really

7

by analogy the firefighter that sees things at the scene and

8

reports them pursuant to duty as matters observed.

The content

9 I of this document is not matters observed by some employee of
10

CPSC, it is rather some data they've collected and reported.

11

It is not an observation of the public entity.

12
13

THE COURT:

Okay.

Fair enough.

Any other thoughts,

Mr. O'Callahan?
MR. OfCALLAHAN:

14

Yes, Your Honor.

Obviously the data

15 I had to be compiled and reviewed by a member of a government
16 I agency and then it was then published by the government agency.
17
18

THE COURT:

contemplates, so it's admitted, No. 47.
(Plaintifffs Exhibit No. 47

19
20 I
21

And I think this is what 803-8

was received into evidence.)
Q

(BY MR. OfCALLAHAN)

The other document that you have

22

there, which is the Calspan Report, which has been marked as

23

Exhibit 4 9, that was something that Mr. Downing presented to

24

the members of the subcommittee in November of 1991/ true?

25

A

That's correct.

The abbreviated form, right.
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1

think it's clearly offered for the truth of the matter

2

asserted.
MR. O'CALLAHAN:

3
4

All right.

That is not the

intention for which I offered it, but further —
THE COURT:

5

I know, you don't believe that but I

6

found that that's what it was for.

7

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Further, Your Honor, this particular

8

document was done pursuant to a request of the Consumer Product

9

Safety Commission and is a report that they had requested be

10

generated and then was subsequently published with their —
THE COURT:

11
12

that one.

13

say happened.

14

Q

I don't recall the foundation who laid

I mean I don't remember somebody saying what you now

(BY MR. O'CALLAHAN)

Okay.

Mr. Fandey, if you'd take

15

a look at that document, it's called the Calspan Report;

16

correct?

17

A

Well, it's done by Calspan.

18

Q

What is Calspan?

19

A

It's a research organization out of Boston, I

20
21
22
23
24
25

We refer to it --

believe.
Q

Does it indicate on the front page of that document

who commissioned the report?
A

Well, the Consumer Product Safety did it under

contract.
Q

And subsequent to this, was the document published
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and disseminated?
A

Yes, by CPSC.

Q

My next question:

Was it diseminated and published

by CPSC?
A

Yes.
MR. O1CALLAHAN:

Your Honor, on that basis, I'd move

that particular Exhibit 4 9 into evidence.
THE COURT:

And the exception is?

MR. O'CALLAHAN:
as —

As a government publication, as well

well, you told me I couldn't do it as providing notice,

so —
THE COURT:

Right, you wanted it not to be —

Mr. Lund or Mr. Sutton?
MR. LUND:

I think —

I guess we're talking —

cited to Your Honor the state in (b) —

I have

exceptions for things

prepared by the person employed by the agency, cases
regarding —
THE COURT:

Must be a public official who made the

report in the open scope of his or her duty, but our supreme
court says about 803-8 —

any response to that, Mr. OfCallahan,

because this would not appear to have been prepared by a public
official in the scope of their duty.
MR. OfCALLAHAN:

Your Honor, I believe Preparation

Broadest Terms who published and who disseminated it, and if it
was published and disseminated by the CPSC, I believe that that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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would satisfy the criteria under the evidence code.
THE COURT:

All right.

I think following the

reasoning in the case that the defendants have cited which
appears to be captioned State against JS, the state of the
interest of WS and the pursuing —
case, 939, P 2d, 196.

it's a Court of Appeals

I think it's pretty clear that this does

not fit within that exception, at least as defined by what I
understand our Court of Appeals to be saying in that case. So
the objection to its admission is sustained based on my reading
of that case.
MR. O1CALLAHAN:

Your Honor, the next document I'm

going to provide to Mr. Fandey I've marked as Exhibit 138.
Q

(BY MR. OfCALLAHAN)

Let me ask you, Mr. Fandey, is

that a publication from the US Consumer Product —
A

Yes, sir, it is.

* <

Q

And what's the subject matter of that document?

A

Fire Hazards Associated with Gas Water Heaters.

Q

And what's the publication date?

A

November of 1982.

Q

And is that a document which was generated during the

time of your tenure?
A

Yes, it was.
MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Your Honor, I'd like to move that

particular document into evidence at this point.

It's a

government publication.
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THE COURT:
MR. LUND:

Any objection there?
Your Honor, may I look at the document?

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. LUND:

Your Honor, I'd object to it until it's

established that this is a record of the regular activities of
CPSC as opposed to some specialized report or summary of
somebody else's activity.

If it's established this is indeed a

record of the regular activities of the government agency, I'd
have no objection, but I don't think that foundation is here.
Q

(BY MR. O'CALLAHAN)

Mr. Fandey, did you testify

earlier that one of the concerns of the Consumer Product Safety
Commission was household appliances?
A

Yes, household products, right.

Q

And water heaters would fall under that particular

category?
A

That's correct.

Q

And the CPSC was charged with evaluating the safety

of that particular product, among others?
A

Yeah. Yes.

Q

And from time to time, did CPSC undertake studies and

publish those studies regarding particular safety issues
regarding particular appliances?
A

That's correct.

Q

And is that what that document is?

A

This is a publication of the Department of
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. LUND:

3

Mr. Lund will want to look at it.
May I ask a question of voir dire on this

subject?

4

THE COURT:

5

Without even looking at the paper?

Sure.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION

6

BY MR. LUND:

7 I

Q

You don't have any direct specific personal knowledge

8 I that this document or the one before it were ever received by
9 J American Appliance Manufacturing, do you?
10 J

I donft know what they received.

A

It was available to

11 I them.
12

MR. LUND:

It's got the same kind of content

13

information I had a problem with on the last exhibit, so if we

14

could defer on that.

15

THE COURT:

16

hearsay that you think ought not be allowed in?

17
18

The objection is that it contains some

MR. LUND:
Q

Plus I'll add the relevance objection.

(BY MR. O' CALLAHAN)

Mr. Fandey, let me place in

19

front of you a document that we'll mark as Exhibit 142. And

20

this is a United States government memoranda; correct?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

And from the Consumer Product Safety Commission?

23 I

A

It's to the Consumer Product Safety Commission from

24

the staff.

25

Q

And what's the subject matter of that document?
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A

Gas Heating Systems Year-End Report 1982.

Q

And was that again published by the commission?

A

It was.
MR. O1CALLAHAN:

Your Honor, I!d move that document

into evidence as well.
MR. LUND:

I object to that on relevance.

Your Honor

previously ruled that this witness should not function as a
CPSC historian and there's been no attempt to connect these
documents, in particular this one, to anything that has to do
with this case.
Mr. 0fCallahan, how does it get to this

THE COURT:
case?

MR. OfCALLAHAN:

Your Honor, it goes to the case

because these are documents generated, published by the United
States government regarding the products that are at issue in
this lawsuit.

And as has been testified to, this information

was generally published and disseminated and available to
anyone in the public, which would include manufacturers.
THE COURT:

Can I see

THE WITNESS:

THE WITNESS:

leave it with you?

Sure.
Does it have a date, is it f82?

THE COURT:

THE COURT:

—

Yes, sir.

And No. 140, where did it get to?
Do you have the No. 14 0?

Did he

Thanks.

I think given the dates of these Exhibits 139 and
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140, 142, I think to be consistent with the pretrial ruling
No. 139 that was previously admitted, along with 140 and 142
have to be excluded for the very reason that I talked about
initially almost three weeks ago.
(BY MR. OfCALLAHAN)

Q

Mr. Fandey, you have testified

that as of 1980 you became involved with the water heater
industry in your capacity as a senior engineer and branch
manager of the Consumer Product Safety Commission; correct?
A

Right.

Q

And is it correct that during the years that you were

involved with the industry or involved with the CPSC in the
particular area dealing with water heaters that you had — or
that rather the commission had various documents published that
pertained to the safety of water heaters?
A

That's correct.

Q

And in addition, there were various concerns that the

CPSC had with respect to fires that were initiated or ignited
by water heaters of flammable vapors; correct?
A

That's correct.
MR. SUTTON:

Objection, Your Honor.

I believe this

is violative of the Court's prior ruling.
THE COURT:
something.

Well, I guess he's laying a foundation or

I don't know where it's going so I think it may be

getting there but I don't know that it has, so overruled right
now.
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MR. SUTTON:
THE COURT:

Actually, it was me.
I mean I've just got to take my hat off.

I mean I am, in terms of the foresight and thought —
MR. O1CALLAHAN:

So in other words, we don't need to

keep Mr. Fandey here, but —
THE COURT:

Exactly.

MR. 0'CALLAHAN:
THE COURT:

—

there are various items —

And had I allowed you to do it, you would

have had Mr. Fandey go through, as he did very ably, and isay
generated by this agency.
these things tfere
i

And had I allowed

De admitted, you would have had them in.
them to 1
MR. 0'CALLAHAN:

And there are other items as well

which were items relating to either subcommittee meetings or to
GAMA mee*tings or GAMA publications that we would offer under
the same basis, but we'll —
THE COURT:

Subcommittee meetings of the ANSI?

MR. 0'CALLAHAN:

The ANSI subcommittee meetings and

material gene rated by the Gas Appliance Manufacturers
Associat.ion.
THE COURT:

The whole historical development of these

fixes on the itfater heater?
MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Correct, just so we could have a

record o f that.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Thank you very much.

Then Mr. Zager
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INTRODUCTION
Although American has specifically asked plaintiff, via written interrogatories, to identify
the facts, witnesses and documents that support her punitive damages claim, plaintiff has failed to
identify a single witness or piece of evidence to support this claim. Plaintiffs discovery responses
simply indicated that she would supplement her answers with a list of her punitive damage
evidence. However, plaintiff has never supplemented these responses, and thus, has not disclosed
any evidence to support her punitive damages claim.
Moreover, even if plaintiff had disclosed evidence to support her punitive damage theory,
the allegations as set forth in her Complaint do not rise to the level of conduct necessary for
imposition of punitive damages. Prior to allowing the punitive claim to proceed at trial, this Court
should require plaintiff to demonstrate that she has sufficient, admissible evidence to establish a
prima facie basis for American's punitive liability under a clear and convincing standard. A
separate hearing regarding the legitimacy and sufficiency of plaintiff s punitive damage evidence is
especially warranted in light of Utah law which mandates that punitive damages should be
awarded infrequently, and only in exceptional cases.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The first cause of action of plaintiff s complaint alleges that American acted "in wilful,
reckless and conscious disregard of the safety" of plaintiff by "fail[ing] to utilize the state-oftechnology that was available at the time of manufacture for a pilot lighter raised to a safe
distance above the floor." Complaint,ffif23 and 24.

-2-
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2. On or about October 26, 1998, American served discovery requests upon plaintiff.
These requests contained several interrogatories which specifically asked plaintiff what evidence
she knew of or possessed that supported her punitive damages claim against American. See
American's First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff, Nos. 30-33, attached as Exhibit "A."
3. On December 24, 1998, plaintiff provided answers to American's interrogatories.
plaintiff responded in an identical manner to Interrogatories 30-33, as follows:
Plaintiff objects to said Interrogatory on the grounds that it calls for a legal
conclusion and work product. Plaintiff claims that discovery is continuing and
Plaintiff will supplement in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Plaintiffs Answers to Defendants' (American Appliance Manufacturing and American Water
Heater Co.) First Set of Interrogatories, attached as Exhibit "B."
4. Although plaintiff did supplement her responses to American's interrogatories in June
of 1999 and via a letter in August of 2000, she did not provide any additional responses to
Interrogatories Nos. 30-33. Consequently, she has completely failed to identify any evidence in
support of her punitive damage claim against American. See Plaintiffs Supplemental Responses
to American's First Set of Interrogatories and August 24, 2000 Letter from Plaintiffs Counsel,
attached as Exhibits "C" and "D."
ARGUMENT
L

BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S DISCOVERY RESPONSES FAILED TO
IDENTIFY ANY EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HER PUNITIVE DAMAGE
CLAIM, PLAINTIFF IS NOT PERMITTED TO PRESENT SUCH
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL.
Pursuant to Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:

-3-
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If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as required by
Rule 26(a) or Rules 26(e)(1), that party shall not be permitted to use the witness,
document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless
or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose.
U.R.C.P. Rule 37 (emphasis added).
Rule 26(e)(1) establishes that plaintiff was under a duty to supplement her responses.
According to Rules 37 and 26, plaintiff shall not be permitted to present any evidence in support
of her punitive damage claim because she failed to disclose any such evidence in response to
American's interrogatories specifically asking for the same. See also, Stevenett v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 977 P.2d 508 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (upholding trial court's exclusion of expert

i

testimony for failure to give complete discovery answer and supplemental response pursuant to
Rules 26 and 37).
<

In October of 1998, American asked plaintiff, via Interrogatories Nos. 30-33, to identify
the specific facts, witnesses and documents she knew of or possessed that supported her claim for
punitive damages. Plaintiffs initial responses failed to identify any facts, witnesses or documents
in answer to these interrogatories. However, plaintiffs answers indicated that she would
supplement her responses in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Nevertheless,
plaintiff has completely failed to supplement her responses to these interrogatories and has never
identified the evidence or witnesses which allegedly support her punitive damage claim.
Consequently, American asks this Court to exclude all of plaintiff s punitive damage
i

evidence pursuant to Rules 26 and 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which prohibit plaintiff
from introducing any punitive damage evidence because she failed to identify such evidence in
response to American's specific requests.

'
-4-
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H.

THIS COURT SHOULD REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO MAKE A PRIMA
FACIE SHOWING THAT SHE HAS SUFFICIENT ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH BY A CLEAR AND CONVINCING
STANDARD THAT AMERICAN ACTED MALICIOUSLY OR WITH
RECKLESS DISREGARD TO THE SAFETY OF OTHERS. WHICH
PROXIMATELY CAUSED PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES.
Under Utah law, "punitive damages may be awarded only in exceptional cases" Gleave

v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 749 P.2d 660, 671 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Behrens
v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983)) (emphasis in original). The Utah legislature
established a high standard for imposition of punitive damages:
[P]unitive damages may be awarded only if compensatory or general damages are
awarded and it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or
omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference
toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1 (l)(a).
Therefore, Utah courts have recognized that punitive damages should be awarded
infrequently and cannot be imposed for mere errors of judgment or negligence. See Gleave, 749
P.2d at 670. "Notice or knowledge of a dangerous condition and failure to act absent more, do
not support a claim of punitive damages." Orr v. Brigham Young University, 960 F. Supp. 522,
531 (D.Utah 1994).
Under these standards, plaintiff cannot prove that punitive damages are warranted against
American in this case. In order to prevail on her punitive damage claim, plaintiff must show by
clear and convincing evidence that American knew that the water heater design was unreasonably
dangerous to the safety of others, and knowingly and recklessly disregarded this danger, which
proximately caused plaintiffs injuries. Plaintiff has identified absolutely no evidence, clear and
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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convincing or otherwise, to support these claims. As discussed above, pursuant to written
discovery, American specifically asked for, but plaintiff failed to reveal, any evidence that
supported her punitive damage claim.
i

Moreover, even if plaintiff had disclosed evidence to support her punitive damage theory,
the allegations as set forth in her Complaint do not rise to the level of conduct necessary for
imposition of punitive damages. Plaintiff asserts that punitive damages should be imposed due to

<

American's "failfure] to utilize the state-of-technology that was available at the time of
manufacture," Complaintfflf23-24. However, a manufacturer does not have a duty to a
i

consumer to refrain from marketing a product because of, nor even a duty to inform the consumer
of, a safer alternative. See Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317, 320 (Utah 1999). The Slisze
court recognized that "[s]uch a burden might well act as a disincentive for manufacturers in the

<

development of safer products...." Id. at 321.
In light of plaintiffs failure to identify any punitive damage evidence in her discovery
responses, coupled with the dubious basis she alleges for punitive liability, prior to allowing the
punitive claim to proceed at trial, this Court should require plaintiff to demonstrate that she has at
least prima facie evidence to support her punitive damage claim under a clear and convincing
standard. A separate hearing regarding the legitimacy and sufficiency of plaintiffs punitive
damage evidence is especially warranted considering that Utah law mandates that punitive
damages should be awarded infrequently, and only in exceptional cases.

-6-
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<

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, American respectfully requests this Court to exclude all
punitive damage evidence because plaintiff failed to disclose the same in her discovery responses.
Additionally, American asks this Court to order plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of
sufficient, admissible evidence to support liability for punitive damages under a clear and
convincing standard prior to allowing the punitive damage claim to proceed at trial.
DATED this 3 ^ d a y of April, 2001.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

JohnR^^tffia
Michael S. Sutton
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance
Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co.
N:\19944\l\KLP\punilim.mem
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On July 8, 1996, Rudolph Gomez, the manager and maintenance person of

eight apartment units in Salt Lake City, located at 936 and 940 South Lincoln Street, was
removing and installing new outdoor carpet at both locations. While working at the 940
South Lincoln apartment landing, Mr. Gomez was assisted by his daughter Anna Marie
Alarid. Anna was picking up old pieces of carpeting after her father had removed it from
the floor.
2.

As Mr. Gomez had just finished laying all of the carpet on the landing , he
i

saw a fire originate from underneath the doors of the utility closet on the second story
landing. Two gas-fired water heaters manufactured by American Appliance were located
inside the utility closet. The fire quickly spread from the door of the utility closet to the
rest of the landing. Anna Marie was still on the landing when the fire broke out. Mr.
Gomez grabbed his daughter and tried to run down the stairs. Before they could escape
down the stairs, an explosion blasted Anna Marie and her father to the bottom of the
(

stairs and into the front yard.
3.

While Mr. Gomez suffered burns on his hands, arms and legs were from the

fire, Anna Marie sustained third and fourth degree burns to virtually every part of her
body, including her legs, forearms, hands, face, neck and upper chest. She was in the

<

hospital for 31 days after the accident and doctors performed full skin grafts over the
course of three separate operations to both of her arms, hands, fingers, upper chest, both
legs, both feet, the left side of her face and her left eye.
4.

Plaintiff has determined through definitive engineering analysis, that the

cause of the fire on July 8, 1996 was the ignition of extremely flammable vapors by a
gas-fired water heater located in the utility closet on the upper landing at the 940 South
Lincoln apartment building. American Appliance manufactured both water heaters

i

located in said utility closet. The source of the flammable vapor was the outdoor carpet
adhesive, Henry 263, manufactured by Armstrong World Industries. The extremely
(
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flammable vapors emitted by the Henry 263 carpet adhesive ignited the pilot light and/or
burner in the water heater and caused the fire.

ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE PRECLUDED FROM PRESENTING
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HER PUNITIVE DAMAGES CLAIM
BECAUSE DEFENDANTS HAVE BEEN FULLY APPRISED OF
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPORTING EVIDENCE FROM THE DEPOSITION
TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF'S EXPERTS
Defendants contend that because Plaintiff did not supply detailed responses to

Defendants' interrogatories, the Court should resort to the draconian measure of
precluding her from presenting any evidence of punitive damages. This position is
specious at best because Defendants are fully aware of the evidence that Plaintiff intends
to present in support of her punitive damages claim.
Rule 37(f), upon which Defendants rely, states in its entirety:
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as required
by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), that party shall not be permitted to use the
witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to
disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to
disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court may order any
other sanction, including payment of reasonable costs and attorney fees,
any order permitted under subpart (b)(2)(A), (B) or (C) and informing the
jury of the failure to disclose, (emphasis added)
Here, even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff has violated Rule 26(e)(1) as
Defendants contend, such a failure to disclose would be entirely harmless because
Defendants have been fully apprised of the evidence that supports Plaintiffs punitive
damages claim by virtue of their extensive deposition discovery of Plaintiff s experts, Joe
Fandy and John Hoffman. These two experts have testified inter alia that Defendants
have known that the ignition of vapors from flammable liquids by the pilot light or burner
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of gas-fired water heaters has been a recognized hazard since the 1950 's. (See Part II
below for a summary of this evidence)
In addition, one must not lose sight of the purpose behind interrogatories—they
are intended to apprise a party of the information and evidence that will be used against
them at trial. Defendants have been so apprised. Simply because this information was
not detailed for them in a supplementary discovery response does not entitle Defendants
to escape from punitive liability for their fraudulent conduct.
If the Defendants were truly concerned that they were not adequately informed
about Plaintiffs punitive damages claim, then they should have made efforts to meet and
confer or could have brought a motion to compel pursuant to Rule 37(a)(2)(B).1 Yet they
chose not to, and have instead attempted to submarine Plaintiffs punitive damages claim
on a mere technicality. This mere technicality is not sufficient reason to eliminate a
viable claim for punitive damages. (See Part II below)
However, should the Court be inclined to grant Defendants' instant motion,
Plaintiff requests that the Court award a less harsh sanction, such as those provided in
Rule 37(f), "including payment of reasonable costs and attorney fees, any order permitted
under subpart (b)(2)(A), (B) or (C) and informing the jury of the failure to disclose."

II.

THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S PUNITIVE
DAMAGES CLAIM
In order to recover punitive damages, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the acts

or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference
toward, and a disregard of the rights of others. Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(1) [Emphasis
Added].
1

Rule 37(a)(2)(B) provides: "If... a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted
under Rule 33 . . . , the discovering party may move for an order compelling an answer ..
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As Plaintiffs experts will testify, the ignition of vapors from flammable liquids by
the pilot light or burner of gas-fired water heaters has been a recognized hazard since the
1950 's. The water heater manufacturing industry awareness of this problem is traceable
to the 1960's or earlier when a law suit similar to this was filed in Arizona. In addition,
the activities summarized below provided the gas fired water heater manufacturers with
ample notice of the extent and severity of the problem.
Using data from hospital emergency rooms, the National Electronic Injury
Surveillance System (NEISS, August 1974) of the Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC) reported 38,000 water heater associated injuries during the 1973 calendar year.
A significant number of the cases involved ignition of flammable vapors from gasoline
and other flammable liquids by the water heater flame of gas and oil fired water heaters.
In 1975, the CPSC published Fact Sheet No. 65 reporting that in one year over
1200 persons were treated for burn injuries received in fire accidents involving gas fired
water heaters. The data revealed that flammable solvents and flammable cleaning agents,
which have vapors heavier than air, were ignited by the gas water heater pilot light or
burner. The most serious accidents involved gasoline which was either used intentionally
as a cleaning agent or was unintentionally spilled in the vicinity of a flame-fired water
heater. The vapors of gasoline, which remain close to the floor, traveled from the source
and were ignited by the water heater. Two factors were identified that led to an increased
occurrence of accidents involving the ignition of flammable vapors and gas fired water
heaters: (1) the location of the gas fired water heater, and (2) a lack of conscious
awareness by the consumer of the standing pilot light at the base of the water heater.
In 1974, the CPSC commissioned Calspan Corporation to research hazards
associated with gas-fired appliances. Calspan published two reports: Identification and
Classification of Potential Hazards Associated with the Use of Residential Flame-Fired
Furnaces, Hot Water Heaters, Clothes Dryers, and Ranges and Investigation of Safety
Standards for Flame Fired Furnaces, Hot Water Heaters, Clothes Dryers and Ranges.

5
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In the first Calspan report, the flammable liquid/vapor problem and gas fired
appliances was emphasized. Unlike problems associated with the operation of
appliances, this hazard was neither attributed to appliance misuse or defect, but the
location (garage, utility room, basement) and the higher potential for use or storage of
flammable liquids in those locations. Further, the location of the pilot light/burner
and combustion air intake near the floor and the tendency of flammable vapors to remain
and flow close to the floor, increased the potential for ignition. The report states that
flammable vapors accounted for the majority of the injury producing accidents involving
flame fired water heaters.
After investigating the potential hazard associated with gas fired appliances,
Calspan reviewed the related NFPA and the National Fuel Gas Codes. The existing
standards, cautions and warnings were criticized as being inadequate in addressing the
hazard associated with the storage or use of gasoline near gas fired appliance. The
requirement by the National Fuel Gas code (ANSIZ223.11.31.6) to install gas
fired water heaters eighteen inches from the floor in residential garages was not sufficient

{

to eliminate accidental ignition. To reduce the hazard associated with ignition of
flammable vapors by gas heaters, the Calspan report suggested: (1) increase consumer
awareness through education and bold labels , (2) prohibit installation of on-direct vent
water heaters in high risk locations such as garages, and (3) make additional efforts to
reduce the possibility of flammable vapors from reaching the pilot light such as a
flammable vapors sensor. Subsequent analysis of data through 1994 by CPSC has shown
that the labeling effort has not been effective.
The results of the Calspan research was presented to the Gas Appliance
Manufacturers Association (GAM A) in June 1975. GAM A distributed the Calspan
reports to the member manufacturers and related task forces and working groups to

i

address all issues, including the flammable vapors problem.
2

In November 1975, the American National Standards Committee on Performance and Installation of Gas-Burning
Appliances and Related Accessories (Z21) and the National Fuel Gas Code (Z223) addressed the flammable vapors
problem and suggested a clear warning on the appliance manual to be attached to the water heater.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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GAMA, in February 1976, acknowledged that the NEISS data showed that the
major hazard associated with gas fired water heaters is the ignition of flammable vapors.
GAMA also pointed out the Calspan critique of existing standards and noted the interest
of the CPSC. The GAMA water heater division incorporated improved warnings
regarding flammable liquids in the required installation and maintenance instructions
with each water heater. GAMA focused on consumer education as the critical item and
ignored engineering solutions to eliminate and/or mitigate the hazard.
In 1987, the NFPA published a Special Report on Residential Structure Fires
Involving Flammable/Combustible Liquids (1980-1984 Fire Experience). In this report,
water heaters, classified under Areas of Origin, wee responsible for 5.5% of the fires.
Water heaters, under the general classification of heating equipment led to 15.4%
of the fires (13,560 fires per year) causing 26.0% if the injuries (1390 total civilian
injuries), 11.8% of the deaths (182 total civilian deaths) and 13.5% of the dollar loss.
In 1992, Rheem Corporation received a patent (filed in 1991) for a water heater
design, specifically addressing the flammable vapors problem. In the patent, the water
heater modification includes a floor supported horizontally enlarged drain pan with a
height of 18" such that all combustion air delivered to the burner (still at floor level) is
taken from a height at least 18 " above the floor. This design is often referred to as the
"Rheem Bucket" or "bucket" design.
The American Gas Association performed gasoline spill tests with electric water
heaters, floor mounted gas fired water heaters, elevated water heaters and the 18" bucket
design. The results of the AGA tests showed that flammable vapors were not ignited
when water heaters were elevated or contained in the "bucket."
The GAMA Flammable Vapor Hazards Ignition Study commissioned the Arthur
D. Little Laboratory (ADL) to (1) investigate the hazards associated with ignition of
flammable vapors and (2) to compile a comprehensive database of incidents from which
trends could be established. In addition, the analysis considered the activities and

3

Direct vent in this context was synonymous with sealed combustion chamber.
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awareness of gas water heater installers and the consumer. A.D. Little identified seven
scenarios which they estimated represented 80-90% of the gas water ignition of
flammable vapor incidents. The results of the A.D. Little study show that elevation is an
effective means for mitigating the hazard of ignition of flammable liquid vapors by gas
fired water heaters.
i

The elevation of "conventional" water heaters to a position that places the
combustion air inlet and burner and pilot light at least 18 inches above the floor has
been used as a means to reduce the potential for the ignition of flammable vapors. The
requirement for elevation has been a provision in the National Fuel Gas Code (NFPA-54)

(

for more than forty years. The requirement for elevation specifies locations where
flammable liquid vapors may be present. Safety Engineering Laboratories has conducted
tests with water heaters in several different configurations simulating installations in

(

garages, utility rooms and similarly enclosed spaces. In each of these tests, elevation of
the water heater was sown to be effective in preventing the ignition of moderate spills of
flammable liquids under a variety of circumstances.
Another means of reducing the potential for the ignition of flammable vapors is by
sealing the combustion chamber at floor level and drawing the combustion air from an
elevated source or from outside of the room. A commercially available residential direct
vent water heater has been available or more than ten years . A United States Patent was
issued in 1972 for an elevated air intake gas fired water heater. This adoption of the
existing water heater designs permits combustion air to be drawn from and exhausted to a
location outside of the home or garage. When properly installed, direct vent water

^

heaters eliminate the potential for the ignition of flammable vapors from spills of
flammable liquids in the room or area where the water heater is located.
A modification of the direct vent design has also been shown to be effective in
preventing the ignition of flammable vapors from spills near and under a water heater.
This modification permits air to be take from the room in which the heater is installed but
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at a level of four feet or higher. Combustion air taken from this level would not contain
flammable vapors within the flammable range when flammable liquids are spilled. While
this method, in theory, would not eliminate the potential for ignition of a flammable
vapor air mixture it reduces the potential for an ignition to occur to a vanishingly small
likelihood.
Elevated, direct vent and modified direct vent water heaters have been tested and
the results recorded and videotaped. In summary, the tests show that elevation of the
water heater using an 18 inch stand (and the equivalent using an 18 inch tub or bucket) is
an effective means for preventing the ignition of vapors from spills or flammable liquids.
The tests also demonstrated that direct vent and modified direct vent water heaters are
effective in preventing ignition of vapors from flammable liquids. The water heaters
used in the testing and the water heater in the utility closet that caused this accident are
essentially the same. Both have the pilot light/burner located close to the floor. Both
have access doors for lighting the pilot which are not air tight. Both draw their primary
combustion air through holes located on the bottom of the heater not more than two
inches above the floor. The technology of taking combustion air from elevated sources
or sources outside of the room in which the water heater is located has been known for
more than 27 years.
In addition to the testing conducted by Safety Engineering Labs, tests conducted
by Arthur D. Little for the Gas Appliance Manufacturers Association (GAMA)
demonstrated the effectiveness of elevation. In the A.D. Little testing, no ignitions
occurred when spills of up to (1) 2 gallons wee initiated at distances of 30 inches or more
from the elevated water heater in their large test room and (2) 1 gallon were initiated at
distances of 28 inches or ore from the elevated water heater in their small test room.
While some aspects of the A. D. Little tests were flawed with respect to realistic
conditions the testing of and results from elevated water heater installations were
consistent with results obtained by SEL and with results predictable based on engineering
Sealed combustion chamber water heater for installation in "hazardous" locations have been available for more

9
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and scientific principles.
At the time the water heaters in the 940 Lincoln Street utility closet were
manufactured (1991 and 1994), the technology and engineering applications were
available to provide water heaters which either eliminated the potential for ignition of
flammable liquid vapors or mitigated the likelihood of such ignitions. American
Appliance Manufacturing Inc. and the gas fired water heater industry were well
aware of magnitude of the problem from at least the mid-1970's yet did not
attempt to eliminate or reduce the hazards through engineering design. It further
became clear that the labeling to warn about the hazards was ineffective5.
American
Appliance Manufacturing Inc. and the gas fired water heater industry in general,
became aware of the ineffectiveness of the warning approach to solve this problem as
early as 1989. American Appliance Manufacturing should have and could have initiated
retrofit activities to provide elevation for water heaters already installed and should have
and could have pursued engineering solutions to this problem for new water heaters.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Anna Marie Alarid respectfully requests that the
Court deny American's motion in limine in its entirety.

DATED: JULY 14, 2000

GIRARDI AND KEESE

By: X ^ ^ f ^ g
JAMES G. O'CALLAHAN
Attomey(s) for Plaintiff

than twenty-five years.
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PLAINTIFFS CONTINUED FAILURE TO DISCLOSE PUNITIVE DAMAGE
EVIDENCE IS PARTICULARLY EGREGIOUS AND HARMFUL DUE TO THE
QUASI-CRIMINAL NATURE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLAIMS,
Plaintiff asserts that her complete lack of response to defendants' discovery requests is

harmless because defendants "have been fully apprised" of the punitive damage evidence she
intends to present at trial. Plaintiff points to the depositions of her purported experts Joe Fandey
and John Hoffinann to support this assertion. However, contrary to plaintiffs argument, neither
of these witnesses testified as to any acts or omissions by either defendant. Mr. Fandey merely
gave a history lesson on the CPSC's involvement with the water heater industry in general. Mr.
Hoffinann's opinions appeared to primarily pertain to cause-and-origin, although he also
discussed in general terms the history of the water heater industry and CPSC. Neither of these
individuals had any knowledge of whether or what role either defendant played in history.
Consequently, their deposition testimony does little to apprise defendants of plaintiffs punitive
damage evidence.
It is now almost the eve of trial and approximately two and one-half years have passed
since defendants formally requested that plaintiff provide a detailed list of the evidence which
supported her punitive damages claims, but to date, she has failed to do so. This motion could
not even compel her to identify with any specificity her intended punitive damage evidence.
Consequently, defendants continue to be in the dark about the evidence plaintiff hopes to present
at trial to show that certain actions of defendants were willful and malicious or intentionally
fraudulent, or done with a knowing and reckless disregard to the safety of others. It further
remains unclear which theory of conduct plaintiff even intends to pursue-she refers to both
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"fraudulent conduct" and "reckless conduct" in her opposition memorandum. Plaintiffs failure to
disclose this information has robbed defendants of their ability to develop a meaningful defense to
her punitive damage claims.
Plaintiff asks this Court to impose a sanction less harsh than exclusion of evidence.
However, the plain language of Rule 37(f), coupled with the advisory committee notes to the
1999 amendment which added this provision, make it clear that courts are required to exclude
undisclosed evidence unless the sanctionable party can show substantial justification for nondisclosure. The advisory committee notes explain:
If a party fails to comply with the disclosure rule, Rule 37(f) requires the court to
prohibit the use of the witness or evidence at trial unless the failure was harmless
or there is good cause for the failure. The court may order any other sanction it
determines to be appropriate and Rule 37(f) provides some examples.
1999 Advisory Committee notes to Rule 26 (emphasis added). These advisory notes emphasize
that although the presumption is to exclude the evidence, a court may impose additional sanctions
as well. Significantly, the notes do not mention that a court may order other sanctions in lieu of
exclusion.
Moreover, plaintiff has not put forth any reason for the Court to deviate from the required
sanction of exclusion in Rule 37. Plaintiff has not made any attempt to assert that good cause
exists for her failure to disclose. Punitive damages claims are the most serious claims a party can
raise in a civil case-they are akin to criminal charges. In light of this, plaintiffs complete failure
to disclose any punitive damage evidence is particularly egregious and further justifies exclusion
of such evidence. Plaintiff not only failed to provide any information whatsoever in response to
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the interrogatories regarding her punitive damage claims, she lead defendants to believe she would
provide the information in the future, but failed to do so.
If plaintiff intended to seriously pursue her punitive damage claims, she should have
ensured she complied with this basic discovery rule. Her failure to disclose is particularly harmful
because it pertains to the most serious penalty that can be imposed in a civil case. Consequently,
defendants respectfully request this Court to exclude all of plaintiffs punitive damage evidence
pursuant to Rules 26 and 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
IL

PLAINTIFF HAS STILL NOT IDENTIFIED ANY EVIDENCE THAT SUPPORTS
HER CLAIM THAT AMERICAN ENGAGED IN CONDUCT THAT WAS
WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS OR INTENTIONALLY FRAUDULENT. OR WITH
A KNOWING AND RECKLESS DISREGARD TO THE SAFETY OF OTHERS.
In her opposition memorandum, plaintiff alleges that there is "ample evidence" to support

her punitive damages claim. However, the five and one-half pages that purportedly support this
assertion, do not contain an iota of information regarding either defendant, or any actions by
them. Instead, plaintiff reiterates a general history of CPSC's involvement with water heaters but
fails to make any mention of American Appliance Manufacturing or American Water Heater Co.
Plaintiff has identified absolutely no evidence, much less any that would rise to the required "clear
and convincing" threshold, to support a punitive claim against either Defendant.
Under Utah law, "punitive damages may be awarded only in exceptional cases'' Gleave
v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 749 P.2d 660, 671 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Behrens
v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983)) (emphasis in original). In order to prevail on
her punitive damage claim, plaintiff must show by clear and convincing evidence that defendants
knew: (1) that a high degree of probability exists that the conduct would result in substantial

-4-
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harm; (2) that the conduct is "highly unreasonable or an extreme departure from ordinary care";
and (3) that a "high degree of danger is apparent." Gleave, 749 P.2d at 670 (quoting Behrens,
675 P.2d at 1186-8). "It is not enough that a decision be wrong. It must result from a conscious
indifference to the decision's foreseeable effect." Boyette v. L. W. Looney & Son, 932 F. SUPP.
1344 (D. Utah 1996) (citations omitted).
Punitive damages are not awarded for mere inadvertence, mistake, errors of judgment and
the like, which constitute negligence. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186
(Utah 1983), quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 908 Comment B, at 465 (1979).
Punitive damages may not be based solely on a finding of gross negligence or even recklessness.
In addition, notice or knowledge of a dangerous condition and failure to act absent more does not
support a claim for punitive damages. Orr v. Brigham Young Univ., 960 F. Supp. 522, 531 (D.
Utah 1994). Furthermore, Utah appellate courts have repeatedly cautioned that "punitive damage
may be awarded only if they serve society's interest in 'punishing and determining outrageous and
malicious conduct which is not likely to be deterred by other means.'"
In Boyette, supra, the court interpreted and applied Utah punitive damages law to support
dismissal of punitive claims against a foam manufacturer because the manufacturer had complied
with the governing OSHA regulations. See Boyette v. L. W. Looney & Sonf Inc., 932 F. SUPP.
1344 (D. Utah 1996). The plaintiff in Boyette was a Thiokol plant employee injured in an
explosion caused by polyethylene foam which leaked gasses while enclosed in the container
without ventilation. The injured employee alleged punitive damages against the foam
manufacturer and general contractor for failing to warn about the explosive nature of the foam.

-5-
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The Boyette court determined that since the foam manufacturer met its duties under the applicable
standards, its conduct could not constitute knowing and reckless indifference to the rights of
others. Id at 1349.
Similar to the manufacturer in Boyette, American met its duties under the applicable
standards, and therefore, their conduct could not constitute knowing and reckless indifference to
the rights of others. In light of this standard, coupled with plaintiffs complete failure to identify
any evidence whatsoever in support of her punitive claims, prior to allowing the punitive claim to
proceed at trial, this Court should require plaintiff to demonstrate that she has at least prima facie
evidence to support her punitive damage claims under a clear and convincing standard.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, American respectfully requests this Court to exclude all
punitive damage evidence because plaintiff failed to disclose or identify such evidence.
Additionally, American asks this Court to order plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of
sufficient, admissible evidence to support liability for punitive damages under a clear and
convincing standard prior to allowing the punitive damage claim to proceed at trial.
DATED this J__

day of April, 2001.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Michael S. Sutton
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance
Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co.
N:\19944\l\KLP\rplypuni. wpd
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3

PROCEEDINGS
4
* * * * *

5
6
7

THE COURT:

defendant's motion regarding punitive damages.

8
9
10

I think we're here to consider the

MR. LUND:

Your Honor, I know the time is short, I'll

be brief.
A starting place to me would be the instruction that

11

we've all agreed on regarding the standard of proof that is

12

clear and convincing, and that is that for evidence to be clear

13

and convincing it must at least have reached the point where

14

there remains no substantial doubt as to the truth of the

15

conclusion.

16

some basis upon which a reasonable mind could say the evidence

So for this matter to go to jury, we need to have

17 I is at least to the point where there's no substantial doubt
18 I that one or the other of these defendants acted willfully,
19 I recklessly and with conscious disregard.

And we've briefed I

20

think the law that's pertinent in Utah on that subject.

21

There's really two elements to this.

First, leave

22

aside the standard for a minute, let's just talk about the

23

evidence of conduct.

24

meetings, we know some people from the CPSC thought that —

25

well, we know Mr. Downing came and told those folks he thought

We know Jack Moore sat in a couple of
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elevation would be a good idea.

We know this Mr- Fandey from

the CPSC thought elevation should be looked atthink one of my cases cites the fact that —

We also — I

the Jarvis case,

these manufacturers are participating in addressing the
complaint that's raised.

They are in the meetings, they are

listening to the proposals, they are involved in reading — at
least they hear that there's studies.

They put warnings on

their product, they upgrade those warnings when the CPSC and
GAMA developed a better warning.

They ultimately come up with

the flame guard solution in 1999.
this problem.

They are not disregarding

More to the point, we don't really know what

they're doing except that they've been in a couple of meetings,
because the evidence doesn't allow us to determine what they've
done past that.
The second feature is that we've cited the Boyette
case from Federal District Court of Utah as well as three other
cases from other jurisdictions where the fact that the
manufacturer is —

the product does comply with the applicable

government codes defeats a claim that it could be knowing and
reckless, those are all summary judgments. And here the facts
are unrefuted that these two products did comply with all
applicable standards, there's nothing that the government
expected be done that was not done by these manufacturers.
I know time is short.

Unless you have some

questions, that's essentially our position, both lack of
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1

evidence of any sufficient actions to support reckless

2

disregard and, in any event, nothing that would overcome, at

3

least under the clear and convincing standard, the fact that

4

they have complied with the applicable government regs.

5 I

MR. ZAGER:

Good morning, Your Honor.

6

THE COURT:

Howdy.

7

MR. ZAGER:

As the Court is probably well aware, the

8

standard of review in a directed verdict is much the same as

9

that in a summary judgment, all the facts in dispute need to be

10

assumed in favor of the plaintiff.

And the evidence is here to

11

support that this was in fact a dangerous and defective design,

12

that it caused the injuries. And this court has, as I pointed

13

out yesterday, briefly previously held in its ruling on

14

Armstrong's motion, despite the fact that Armstrong's product

15

met the standards was a case where punitive damages should go

16

to the jury.

And there are cases on point contrary to what the

17 I defendant represents where compliance with the federal
18 J regulations does not preclude a finding of recklessness or an
19

award of punitive damages.

That was held in the 10th Circuit

20

in the Silkwood v. Kara-McKee Corporation case, which I'd be

21

happy to present to the court.

22

stated in the restatement second of torts, Section 288(c),

23

where the court in Salmon v. —

24

Martin-Marietta Corporation out of the 10th Circuit stated,

25

Generally speaking, compliance with regulatory standards may be

That proposition has also been

I'm sorry, in Bruce v.
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admissible on the issue of care but does not require a jury to
find a defendant's conduct was reasonable.

And in the Honda

case referred to in Salmon v. Park, Davis and Company and also
referred to in Raymond v. Regal Textile Corporation, Honda
offered no persuasive reason why compliance will as a matter of
law be merely admissible on the issue of whether the
defendant's conduct is reasonable but an absolute defense on
the issue of whether its conduct is willful, reckless or
outrageous, again citing over to the Silkwood v. Kara-McKee
case.
The testimony from —

I should also mention that in

the Armstrong ruling by this court denying the summary judgment
and allowing the issue of punitive damages to go to the jury
there was clearly less evidence in that case, in that instance,
than there is here.

In this case we have testimony from

experts Fandey and Dr. Hoffman to support a clear and
convincing finding that the acts or omissions of Defendant
American Appliance and Water Heater Company were a result of
willful and malicious conduct or conduct that manifested a
knowing and a reckless indifference and disregard of the right
of others.
Specifically, Dr. Hoffman testified that it has been
common knowledge since at least the early or mid-seventies that
raising water heater pilots at least 18 inches off the ground
will most likely reduce flammable vapor fires in most
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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n

1

instances.

Expert Joseph Fandey testified similarly and

2

further testified that defendants, both of them, were

3

represented at meetings prior to 1991 by Henry Jack Moore where

4

American, by and through Henry Jack Moore, defendants gained

5

knowledge that raising water heater pilots 18 inches off the

6

ground was, if not a complete safeguard against flammable vapor

7

fires, was certainly a significant safeguard in reducing

8

flammable vapor fires. Notwithstanding the information, the

9

defendants, over the many years, knowingly and willfully

10

continued to manufacture and sell to the general public water

11

heaters without an 18-inch stand with pilot lights only a few

12

inches off the ground in reckless disregard for the safety of

13

others.

14 I

Defendants, through the testimony of Hoffman and

15

Fandey again, also knew well that 300 people a year were being

16

burned and injured in flammable vapor fires ignited by water

17 I heaters and intentionally continued to market their water
18 J heaters, dangerous and defective water heaters, to the public,
19

knowing that raising the water heaters 18 inches off the ground

20 J would have prevented many of these tragedies.
21 J

It was clear that 18-inch stands had been available

22 I and manufactured by manufacturers since 1977, according to
23 J Dr. Hoffman.

If elevated 18 inches off the ground, I believe

24 lit was Dr. Hoffman's testimony that either there would have
25

been no fire in this case or that it was more likely than not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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thar;

;v. incident would have been avoided.
. r- +!ie Neiss Report v:act.

the •-. .-^ .j.,i:. i--i-

: : = I"-

;

:n :-':>\.

also 7 h-elie-e in
:;

•:.:•• : - i . r . :

^-ma:

was

liable for its failure to use elevation safety devices r.ird tha4"
these elevatioi 1 saieLv devices wen 1 disousseH .md - •>::: L U Lue
manufacturina aroup at Jarqe anl the defendant where they
di-j - . -•••' :

-

|iie,r^nt fi res,

• on H:, M TTit"-.-a11. t

Henry Jack Moore, tl.- v. :e president: or safety
en.:ii leer ..

*j? :--^en* '

•

*

• •

"T

. *-v

was a

member o: ^AKA, attended most of t-.r.e Z21 meetings, according to
Mr. E "ai id-

:"•

. •

.*

* •-

*-- ussea n a m m a b l e

vapor issues related tc tires i g n n e o ; , .-at^r heaters.
kn*-w '"i
vapors.

;

E'aiid-\

T

•. .

*

.t,,v-,

Tr<

He

-L 1 1 y i l a m m a b l e

1 : Morris specii ; :5.,y at meetings to raise
.' ^r.

Defendant American knew through Moore tha4- ^h*
44

:: «

>•-•

f

•*

y w±Lii i l a m m a b l e v a p o r

f i r e s , t h e r e w e r e s t u d i e s aii'i r e p c i t s p r o v i d e d t o A m e r i c a n
:hi: < :>i i :;1 „ Moore that there was no decline xn : r ^ 3ri~s after
labeling.
wou^cl

So the industry has known sin^° rn*-: n^ <- . -

r

hn

.-.'..

include Defendant American, that raisinq wa*~: :.eater

pilots 18 inches off the ground was effective in reaucit-;; * ri?-j-iKenhood of flammable vapor fires.

And certainly again in

1991 pursuant to the Downing presentation Moore thought that
the defendants were being set up for punitive damage cJ aims
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1
2

where this information was again presented to American.
The Gas Code has required since before 1970 elevation

3 I of pilots 18 inches off the ground where flammable vapors were
4

likely to be kept as a means for reducing the tragedies

5 I suffered by Americans and flammable vapor fires.

Despite the

6

knowledge, defendants continued to knowingly manufacture and

7

sell water heaters to the public without 18-inch stands. If

8

water heaters in this case —

9

presumption of evidence should be in favor of the plaintiff,

and I believe in this motion the

10

water heaters then would be found to be unreasonably dangerous

11

and defective in their design, that the defendant knew of the

12

defect and did nothing to guard against the dangers in the

13

hierarchy of engineering as has been discussed throughout this

14

case to either eliminate or guard against, and then they of

15 J course then willfully and intentionally showed a reckless
16 I disregard to the rights of others.
17 J

Dr. Karnes also testified that in 1990 water heater

18 I label evidence, defendant's knowledge of the flammable vapor
19

danger, the pictorial on the label shows flammable vapors

20

igniting and burning people.

21

And, finally, in the case of Gryc versus Dayton

22

Hudson Corporation, the court held that manufacturers have a

23

powerful hold over the means for discovering and correcting

24

product hazards.

25

inspection and collection of data on product safety performance

Through the process of design, testing,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in the field, the manufacturer has virtually exclusive access
to much of the information necessary for effective control of
da:.j-

lacing gtodurt

i-nnsunm] s.

I. believe that there is
sLct:rn. i n| i

""mm a directed verdict

ind •' MI^T t - ns oi facts in favor of i;.e

plaintiff, that there is ample evidence of a clear and
iv un i nq n.v

'

.* the defendant manufacturer

• •

produced a defective product, ' ha"- ^ h ^ - knew for "ear? prior *
in ;

'; * ,

••

*-

dangers involved, •" 4 *:
aii'l i

.

to market t h e n

. i ^ 4 water heater- ..: the

m m e r o u s Americans suite: iro
' •

tragedv

ii defective product «-*•: • ntinued

dangerous ami defective product to m e

.r. e:

puhl i c :i i 1 a reckless ai id knowing di sregard to the rights of
ottiers .
THE COURT:
is

Let m e understand, M r . Zayei, wh_ . f this

the problem you describe, i*her^ ^° n o legislation *

'/i n 1 1

i MI i \ i t

i

n

n

•

'

MR. ZAGER:

•

.•

' .

'•

"

••••'

' '

•

•...:,, j I;
" :•

Well, the
re certaii

v ~ 5' • ^ •?

support our position that tho reason mpr^- K ; a*: absent of
legislation and standards it because
1 , m m .. j
industry, the powerful group t m t m e y are, defective.*
controls the standard-making pro-.' .- .
standards which certainly d o n T t ~m^e t

-,

in 1.

m e mvel

:' standard

required to make their products : -groups where 80 percent of t h-: industry

- is Joe tandey
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1

pointed out, the rule-making group is the industry and they can

2

effectively block any changes. And in the case of Moore, in

3 I the case of the Downing presentation, now exclude any other
4

input from other outside sources to come in and recommend

5 J changes.
6 J

If you recall —
THE COURT:

I didn't understand.

When I said

7 I "legislation," I typically meant why a municipality, county, a
8 I state, a national law-making body.

But your assertion is that

9 I these people are controlled by what you describe as the
10 I powerful manufacturing industry, is that what Ifm hearing you
11
12

say?
MR. ZAGER:

And that's a good point, Your Honor, and

13

a problem we have in our country and probably one that was

14

recognized in the Silkwood case, where they held that just the

15

fact that a product meets the federal standards does not

16

preclude an issue of punitive damages.

17

attorneys when the federal legislation fails to protect our

18

citizens to let juries and fact finders send a message to these

19

manufacturers that the federal government has failed them and

20

the manufacturers themselves have failed to provide the

21

safeguards for the American people.

22

THE COURT:

It's up to courts and

Now, if I were to follow what you're

23

saying, then, I'd have to be guided I guess by law in this

24

state, and the defendants have cited this Behrens case.

25

think we have evidence that there was a high degree of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Do you

1

probability that havina a water heater as designed would result

2

in substantial narm tc ;omecne?

;

ZAGEP

" :/ ur -••••, yes.

THE COURT:
ZAGER:
injured \:

on--

....;: aegree cf probabii -i.t\ .
'* •

iour Honor, almost a person a day is

r tries*- tires.

rntiRT:

( •• i,y. And how many -- I mean how many

water heaters :are there?
EAGER:
10

h e n , I think there was testimony from

our expert t.ia* tnere wis between 4 n and *
•:• y

1

out tneie.

. -..

.,: \nese

But it a person a day i: t>ein^

12 I . r urea in these for over the last 50 years, tnar :..- a
1

, • -1* * :

jitujer uf Americans injured, and maybe mote that

14

were injureu in these water heater fires than were injured

15

I •':• ^ into cases.

16

THE COURT:

Okay.

1

MR. ZAGER:

Ktrd p-: r\ r..

18

THE COURT:

Auo descriD*-. :or me what

19

gtes- the second element of that test is that: :i 1: has tc: be

20

hi-Ui y unreasonable zonduct or ai I extreme depar 1:I ire froi i: t

21

ordinary

22

you on that one.

23
24
25

care.

Help me understand where your evidence supports

._,. ZAGER:

I'm not sur-

~. follow that questioi I.

I'm

sorry, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

r

Ihe Behrens case is no: you looked
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1*

1

at it, and you have three kind of standards, I mean three

2

criteria, three elements of a punitive kind of case.

3

there had to be a high degree of probability that what they did

4

would result in substantial harm.

5

year out of 50 million homes is a high degree of probability,

6

in your view.

7 J

One was

You've described 300 every

Secondly, then, the second element is that it has to

8 I be highly unreasonable conduct or an extreme departure from
9

ordinary care.

What's the evidence that this is highly

10

unreasonable and/or an extreme departure from what one would

11

describe —

12

MR. ZAGER:

Well, ordinary care would expect, I

13

believe, a manufacturer to put out a product that was safe and

14

that wouldn't cause injury.

Thatfs the idea, that's the whole

15 J basis for the hierarchy of engineering.

And that it is

16

unreasonable I think follows that if you have a product that

17

you know is likely to cause harm to at least one person or

18

almost a person a day, then it would seem unreasonable conduct

19

to continue to put that product out when all that would be

20

required for the fix or at least the guard against as required

21

by that hierarchy of engineering would be to sell this water

22

heater with an 18-inch stand.

23

conduct to continue selling the product as it is knowing that

24

people are going to be injured by it, when all it took was to

25

add an 18-inch stand with the product so that people would

It would seem unreasonable
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install it so that the pilot light was 18 inches off tht
ground,
, COURT:

And the last element I guess :;as 11 be a

situation where a high degree of danger is apparent.

And n

..,. yWhere?
MR. ZAGER: to--]1.,
Dr

•

person i^

T

^ M r ^ w<=> have testimony from

tne iiumbei 01 natalities chat: occ^i wh«-- i

r^um^i about ""heir body, depend^ncr on th^ir atnei lactoib.

aa\

v%r.-r

r,

iey':>

JTULKI

involved : ~ +"Kir

. -- we!ie not taxkino abcjf
t~ get a little cu+

gen
a .';'

ZPJ:

:: :: re or this

. :

- product where someone's

' neir :inqer i: \ne\

• n

* ;: we'ie talking about seri^u- injuries oir~n :^5uiring

in fatalities herp.
you

V

^learh* aimo~L a person

MIUW,

tnese are you:, ; • ..i:>

And a number a

oabies and Smalx children wr:u ai c rlay:n:: w.. * •

gasoline or some other volatile product neai
So the injuries we're talking about in large part are occurring
to children, innocent victims.
THE COURT:

Fair enough,

Anything else you'd like to

MR. ZAGER:

No, Your Honor.

THE

I I M I i J-

add?

i "I NIK'I

Anything mcr-,
Ill1

l.'.'NI

MR. ZAGER:

/ .11.

.una?
•

:*

_ . y .

• ••

uaht approach the bench, Your
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1

Honor, the Court may want our copies of these cases for its

2

review,

3

THE COURT:

No, we can be instructed in 30 minutes.

4

I don't have time to review it.

5

night I made it pretty clear that I had something at quarter to

6

9:00 and at 9:00.

7

reading stuff.

8

today wasn't clear, it wasn't a meditative day for me,

9

I appreciate it, but last

I can listen, but I don't think I can be

If my explanation of what we were going to do

MR. ZAGER:

Right, it was my understanding we were

10

going to present argument at 8:30, and I'm here with the cases

11

in hand and I just wanted to offer them to the Court if —

12

MR. LUND:

It's about context.

There's probably more

13

than one car wreck a day, but Ford —

14

you've got to look at how many cars are out there.

15

say there's 400 accidents and let's say there's only 40 million

16

water heaters out there.

17

those water heaters a year that's involved in some kind of a

18

flammable vapor ignition.

19

high degree of probability that there is going to be

20

substantial harm, we have the exact opposite.

21

vast, vast majority of these heaters functioning without

22

presenting a risk of harm.

23

to have that make sense,
So let's

I think that's about 1 in 100,000 of

So when we turn to the element of a

We have the

In context I think, you know, Mr. Fandey is really

24

their guide to present there's any evidence of this and he did

25

perceive a couple of minutes of meetings.

I want you to know

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1 I +-hat those meeting minutes in our view put this in context.
2

l

In September .-: ' v?_ , .;:.,

3 I pit -

^

: ;

. - the latest specific
wa^ the last meeting ~ L

4

which this Mr. Moore was present, Mr. Fandey himself, their

5

exper t, :i s recorded as 1 sis si i ig i i,oted that something needs to be

6

done tn reduce these accidents out stating that it f <= not- known
i nvo] ,;; ;' es a d<

" I"

J

sanae ui noc.

Wei.] , ssers

r

ery

8 I expert even as a ,i.ast p<:im we have any specific information
r

•

*

:esign is appropriate, the codes

remairi what; tney ar^.
'':••-•
12
13

i

-smstrong, Armstrong, the evidence ner-

. s tha1- is a banned product, s~ T ^ r
'-.

14 I labe,

*•

.: s4\s anywhere.

know how 1-he c o m p a n y

Dr. Karnes said this u

i *. s :; ^ positive force.

1

, f

o good

Ultimate!; ;s terms nf there

uo we even know who ±i ij

witr: some

16

standard of clear and convincing evidence vita; it is Mi

1

sas, unpls-yed by:'

I -loois

We don't even barely know that to a point

18 j where we could reduce it to a burden.
3

I'll submit it, Your Honor,

20

THE COURT i

1 t:hink t ol 1.owirig Behi ens, wh i ch, li ha* s.

21

to do, I don't think there is a high degree of probability that

22

the water heaters as designed wilJ result

23

to someone.

24

extreme departure from, ordinary caie because they follm Mi*.1

25

statutes.

in subs l" ant Id I harm

I don't think it's an unreasonable conduct or: an

And, though, Mr. Zager, 1 agree with the fact, that
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%n

if you're burned that is a very serious harm, I don't think
that these products are used in a situation where a high degree
of danger is apparent.
For those reasons, since I don't think it follows the
Behrens, I don't think that I can allow the jury to consider
based on the evidence we have here an award of punitive
damages.
So we will recess until 9:30 and we'll reconvene.
(A recess was taken.)
(The jury entered the room.)
(End of portion of transcript requested.)
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1

NCMEMEER 0 5 , 2001

2
3

PROCEEDINGS
4
5
6
7

THE COURT:

went away, Mr. Lund needs to talk to the court.

8
9

Teena, tell the record that the jury has

MR. LUND:

Thank you for waiting a moment.

hoping this would be —

I was

I believe, and we 1 11 have to tell them,

10

I believe that may be the last witness that the plaintiffs are

11

intending to call.

12

like to hand Your Honor briefs we have in support of our what

13

will be two motions for directed verdict at the end of the

14

case.

And with that anticipation in mind, I'd

That's the only reason I wanted to

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. LUND:

17
18
19
20

—

You wanted to get a jump on my

—

Well, you can certainly do whatever you'd

like with your lunch hour, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
the motion to

I can?

Then how will I be prepared for

—

MR. LUND:

I guess we could wait and have argument on

21

those at another point, but those are motions that must be made

22

at the close of their case.

23

I wanted you to know that that's coming up.

24
25

THE COURT:

So anticipating that's coming up,

Great.

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Is he right in his guess?

Your Honor, I would say yes, with
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j

r

xception that —

and my belief is that the motion ^s oased

,;

:.ne tact that the -THE COURT

:m- .

^ I ' S ask one question at a

T:: ;* trie ena cr your case?
:':-. :-r* ior cross-examination.
MR. ZAGER:

^t me daa something.

THE COURT:

/our cast; in cniei is over?
-ni there are 3.1sc some —

MR. O'CALLAHAN
. ..

1 lat Mr

' ii iias agreea we can introduce into

10 (evidence, but. :\ \exn\t

of liability, apart from.

u ui

THE COURT:

12

MR. LUND:

case is done.
Okay,

Long answer to a short question

If you want these now, I'M I hand tnem t.>

• - if you'd rather have them after lunc^

THE COURTx/

VA

^'^

:. -,:.z. +"hem to

ncind ^hem whenever yon :.;- ; t-hpm,

(A recess was taken.)
THE COURT:
M v

T n

I guess we're off, Mr. Suttoi i and

inr^

Now, y n n ' v p r e s t e d ,
MR.
23

..

TnaiiK yuu,

-« p

on

there's a

ALLAHAr

THE COURT:

r i g h t . , Mr. 0 ' C ' a l l a h a i I?

! : € s , : :' : I 11: 1 1 o i i : r ,

And you've admitted, I guess, what other

:s you were worried about: ?
25

MR. OfCALLAHAN:

Yes, with the exception of a
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1

photograph that Mr. Sutton stipulated that we would

2

subsequently be able to admit.

3

THE COURT:

4

about all the exhibits being —

5

You've checked with Marci to be sure

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

6

I haven't done that, Your Honor, but

I would expect we'd do that at the.end of the day.

7

THE COURT:

8

So I guess on to your motion, right,

Mr. Lund?

9

MR. LUND:

Yes, Your Honor.

There's two motions for

10

directed verdict.

The first one has to do with causation, and

11

I don't know if you have had a chance to look at those memos.

12

THE COURT:

13 J

MR. LUND:

I did.
Well, thank you.

I apologize for those

14 I not being available, but —
15 J

THE COURT:

Lot a adieu about nothing, so it's not

16 J your fault.
17

MR. LUND:

Even as of this morning, I guess who had

18

the burden of proof of causation apparently seemed to be a

19

moving target.

20

go back to the beginning.

21

I'm speaking of Ms. Alarid's testimony.

Let me

As a rule, as a fairly well-set subtle rule in most

22

jurisdictions, including ours, it's the person making the claim

23

that has the burden.

24

cause as well as the other elements of their case. And we've

25

cited, for example, the case involving the Hilton Hotel where

And they have the burden on proximate

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

somebody gets killed in their hotel room and somebody sues the
hotel because they've got inadequate security.

The only

problem is that nobody knows who committed the murder. And
since there's no way to know if the inadequate security — this
is Mitchell versus Pearson.

There's no way to know that the

inadequate security has really made a difference.

For all they

know, it was a friend that walked in and killed this person, so
there's a lack of an ability to prove proximate cause. And
that is, we believe, where the plaintiffs are in this case.
A directed verdict motion at this juncture is
essentially a summary judgement motion in terms of the standard
you need to apply.

Is there either such evidence that's so

clear that reasonable minds couldn't differ or an insufficiency
of the evidence such that the jury is left to speculate or
guess about a critical element of the case. And that's our
position with regard to proximate cause here.
Most notably in the words of Dr. Hoffman on the first
day, it's a matter of pure speculation which of those two water
heaters ignited the fire.

He does think it's one of them, but

he cannot determine between them.

And there's been no other

evidence upon which a jury would be able to differentiate which
of the two water heaters ignited.
Now, I guess that's why three days into this trial on
November 1 the plaintiffs decided that, no, this should be our
burden to prove —

disprove proximate cause.
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If you'll recall,
•7

1

you had an interchange with Mr. 0'Callahan Friday morning, or

2

Thursday morning, about Summers versus Tice, and now that's

3

come full bloom.

4
5

We argue in our memo, and I'll just briefly assert
here again that, first of all, even if that were a valid point -

6 I of Utah law, and I'll get back to that, it's unfair to have the
7

burden shift on. that issue midway through trial.

8

Mr. 0'Callahan took on that burden in opening statement, he

9

takes on that burden in his jury instructions that he has the

10

burden of proof, and it isn't until his expert fails him on

11

that that he decides it must be our burden because he can't

12

prove it.

13
14

So procedurally it seems that this would be something
that we'd be entitled to know before we started the case. And

15 I I mentioned a few things in the memo that I would have done
16

different on behalf of American Water Heater if I'd known I had

17

the burden.

18

Most notably, Mr. 0'Callahan said in opening

19

statement that not only was Dr. Hoffman going to pick the left

20

water heater, but that that would be consistent with what

21

government officials would say.

22

here, that was Mr. Long.

23

objection, not permitted to give opinions.

24
25

THE COURT:
MR. LUND:

We had one government official

Mr. Long was not —

over my

Due to your objection.
Due to my objection.

I would not have
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made that objection, because I think Mr. O'Callahan was correct
that that —

Mr. Long's opinion was the left side, just like

his own expert.

So instead of trying to keep that evidence

out, I guess if I'd had that burden I would have approached the
case very differently in terms of proving this critical
question of which water heater ignited.
Probably more to the point and I think the most
straightforward reason to reject their proposal to shift the
burden is because that's not the Utah law.
in Utah that follows Summers versus Tice.

There is not a case
There is three or

four that have discussed Summers versus Tice under certain fact
patterns, none of them have decided that case is an appropriate
one to apply, Summers versus Tice.
We cite the Clark case, which is a five-vehicle
accident case where the plaintiff's expert says, well, all
these drivers were careless, but I can't figure out which one
actually caused the collision, even though they're all somehow
involved.

And that is a failure of the plaintiff's proof

that's fatal to their case.
The burden-shifting rule in Summers versus Tice is
for a very tightly defined situation.

The facts are, two guys

are shooting a gun both at the same time, aiming the same
direction.

The bullet of one of them hits a person in the eye.

They know it's either hunter A's bullet or hunter B's bullet.
THE COURT:

But it's no other bullet.
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a

1 I

MR. LUND:

Itfs no other bullet.

And it's not partly

2 J hunter A and partly hunter B, it's one or the other, alternate
3 I liability, and under those facts they shift the burden.
4 J

I cited you to the Rutherford case out of California

5 J where they define the elements of Summers versus Tice a little
6 I more cleanly.

And the thing they said that helped me a lot is,

7 I we know that these two people that are in the case —
8 [there's three, fine, there's three shooters —

or if

we know these

9 I people who are in the case are the ones responsible and they're
10

the only ones responsible, and it's either A or it's B.

11
12

Now, the facts here simply don't fit that because
there has been some assessment of proximate cause in this case,

13 I it's implicit in the settlements that have been reached, in the
14 I opinions that have been rendered about the glue having to be
15 J part of the cause of this accident and proximate cause
16 J language.
17

The causes of this accident include Mr. Nelson's

conduct, Mr. Gomez's conduct, the glue company's conduct, as

18 I well as potentially the ignition of this vapor by one of the
19

heaters.

20

versus Tice should be applied, even if that were something you

21

were inclined to do just by Utah law to that effect.

22

in a nutshell on that issue.

23 J
24
25

But it's simply not the fact pattern where Summers

That's it

Do you want me to go to punitives or do you want me
to answer questions or —
THE COURT:

Well, I guess we can't punish you if
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1

you're not negligent, right, so we ought to solve one at a

2

time.

3

MR. LUND: Yeah.

4

THE COURT:

5

Refresh my mind about a statute. Wasn't

there a statute that said in essence if you had lived up to the

6 I code you had some protection —
7

MR. LUND: Yeah.

8 I

THE COURT:

9

So besides not wanting the burden

shifted, is there any other basis?

I mean I'm trying to think

10

absent them shifting it to the two of you, you would also, I

11

guess, assert there's no negligence been shown?

12 I

MR. LUND:

13 J that.

Well, I think there are two aspects of

First of all, we're not arguing they have failed to come

14 I forth with evidence of a defect in the design of the water
15 J heater.

They have Dr. Hoffman saying, I think it's defective

16 I because it's not 18 inches off the ground.

I assume question

17 J one on the verdict form —
18 J

Leave out there's two water heaters for a minute. I

19 I think question one on the water heater form is going to be, Was
20

the water heater defective?

21

on that despite the fact that there is a rebuttable

22

presumption —

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. LUND:

25

And I think they've got evidence

An instruction —
Going to have to deal with that, although

it does raise a subject.

This Summers versus Tice ruling is an
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1

ultimately equitable ruling without shifting the burden, and

2

the reason for it is, it isn't fair to the plaintiff that we

3

know one or the other of these did this wrongful act and they

4

shouldn't be able to both get off scott free and have the

5

plaintiff be without any remedy.

6

have the plaintiff already having a remedy against other

7

parties and we have the remaining defendants being people that

8

did comply with the code in terms of there being some equitable

9

reason to overlook the need to prove proximate cause.

10

THE COURT:

All right.

11

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

And I'd submit to you here we

From the plaintiff?

Sure, Your Honor.

The first thing

12 I I'd like to point out is that in this case, just like in every
13 J fire case, there is a fire triangle.

There is a fuel source,

14 I there is an oxygen source and there is an ignition source.
15 J this case, the issue is the ignition source.

In

And our evidence

16 I is that the ignition source came from the water heaters, either
17

the one on the left or the one on the right.

18

circumstances, it's perfectly appropriate to apply the Summers

19

versus Tice ruling.

20

design defect.

21

defect, which makes it different from the Rutherford case.

22

Under those

And by that what we are talking about is a

It's not a manufacturing defect, it's a design

In our case, we presented evidence that was based on

23

reasonable scientific and technical probability that the

24

ignition source was from, first of all, one of the water

25

heaters.

In addition to that, Your Honor, there was also
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1

evidence that the particular flames that were initially seen

2

came from the doors that were on the left-hand side of the

3

landing.

4

And this is of significance because, first of all,

5

there was testimony from Mrs. Alarid that the flames were from

6

the left-hand side of the door; and, secondly, it was

7 I Mr. Long's testimony that the most severely damaged water
8 I heater was the one on the left-hand side.
9

That provided

evidence from which a jury could infer that that was the source

10

of the fire, although certainly Dr. Hoffman's testimony left

11

the issue as one that the jury could make such a determination

12

at the close of evidence.

13
14

Now, one of the things that the Court may recall is
that there was originally a motion in limine that was intended

15 I to bar any evidence with respect to the water heater on the
16 J right side and the Court denied that on the basis that there
17 I was testimony that it was not clear or our expert did not
18

conclude that it was from the left or the right, and the Court

19

said, well, you know, we'll let the evidence come in and then

20

we'll let the jury decide that issue. And the reason I think

21

that —

22

Dr. Hoffman testified in May of the year 2000, a year and a

23

half ago, and gave the testimony, which is consistent with the

24

testimony that he gave here during the course of trial.

25

or I suspect that the Court did that is that

As the defendants point out that this is basically a
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1 J motion for summary judgment, and I think that the Court should
2

consider about why there was a delay on the part —

or not a

3 I delay but there was a failure to file a motion for summary
4 I judgment during that year and a half when they had possession
5

of Dr. Hoffmanfs testimony.

And I think that the reason is

6 J that even under circumstances such as the Webber case which
7 I counsel cited, the court in Utah didn't say, we don't believe
8 J that the case of Summers versus Tice was incorrectly decided,
9 J what it said is that it is not appropriate under these
10

circumstances.

And in this case, with respect to the ignition

11 J source, the only evidence regarding the ignition source will be
12 I that it came from the water heaters.
13
14

THE COURT:

I don't mean to be rude, but the damage

is not caused just by ignition.

I mean what am I missing here?

15 I You seem to be saying, if I understand you right, that we're
16

going to somehow separate one element of the triangle and put

17

you on trial for that, whereas if the other two elements of the

18 I triangle aren't there ever, then you have no fire.
19 I
20

I mean it's like in my house today there's a water
heater with a fire but there's no explosion and/or fire and we

21 J aren't going to sue somebody for fire in my house.

Do you

22

follow my drift?

23

ignition source, but without these other things, nothing

24 I happens.
25

I mean, yeah, there is a fire source,

And you seem to be saying to me, Well, we're just

going to focus on this one little triangle thing and
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everythingfs cool.
MR. O'CALLAHAN:
THE COURT:

Well, I think —

I guess I!m just not seeing conceptually

how you are seeing it.

I'm not understanding, that's what I'm

trying to say.
MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Well, I think that one of the things

that we have here in this case that didn't exist at the time
the Summers versus Tice was decided is that in the days of
Summer versus Tice, 1948, contrib was a complete bar to
recovery, and that is why Summers versus Tice was framed as it
was.
Since that time in California and Utah and in most
states there has been a change in that showing that if there is
any negligence on the part of the defendant —

on the part of

the plaintiff, it was a complete bar to recovery.

In this day

and age and in this case, the jury has already been told that
there have been other tortfeasors who were involved in the case
and that they have resolved their differences.

So we're not in

the same legal framework that existed at the time of Summer
versus Tice.
THE COURT:

Sure, okay.

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

So what happens through the

apportionment process is that the jury is able to go through
and make the determination with respect to those other parties
or actors in the set.
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1 C

1

But with respect to the issue of ignition, and I

2

think that Dr. Hoffman covered this, he said, if you don't have

3

an ignition source, the warnings are not relevant.

4

don't have the ignition source, the conduct of the others

5

doesn't come into play.

6

case is leaving the pilot light and the burner at such a low

7

level to the ground to provide the ignition source. And that's

8

why I think that in the analysis of this case, given the

9

Summers versus Tice analysis or given a causation analysis,

10

If you

And certainly that's the focus of this

it's appropriate to focus on the issue of ignition.

11

THE COURT:

Well, I mean —

I'm sorry.

I guess what

12

I'm saying, he cites the Webber and these Clark cases which

13

seem to say you just can't guess at who it is, you have to have

14

evidence.

15

right, is I saw it come out under one door and somebody else

16

said one of these was burnt more than the other.

And your only evidence will be, if I understand you

17

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

18

THE COURT: And from that, the jury will be asked to

19
20

And —

say it's the left-hand side or the right-hand side or whatever?
MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Certainly causation can be inferred

21

by the jury based upon the evidence before it.

22

evidence —

If that

if they base that upon that evidence knowing what

23 I they now know about the likeliest source of ignition of the —
24
25

THE COURT: And can I just ask you, how can a jury
come to a conclusion an expert couldn't come to based on
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exactly the same facts?

I mean the expert says, I know what

the jury knows, right, I mean he knew those things, didnft he?
MR. OfCALLAHAN:

Your Honor, I —

although I think

that —
THE COURT:

He knew that somebody saw fire from the

left side and one of them was burnt more, and I think that was
specifically asked.
MR. O'CALLAHAN:
THE COURT:

~

Is that fair to say?

MR. 0!CALLAHAN:
specifically asked.

I don!t

I don't think that that was

As I think the Court is aware, the

identity of the fire investigators and the photographs and so
on were not part of what Mr. Hoffman had available to him.
THE COURT:

Somebody did ask him about one of these

is burnt more than the other, I think Hoffman had that in front
of him.

He can't come to a conclusion, but a jury should be

allowed to infer —

see, thatfs what I'm not following.

MR. O1CALLAHAN:

Well, Your Honor, I wouldn't leave

it at Dr. Hoffman's testimony.

I'd also point out that

Mr. Long was eminently qualified to investigate fires and
describe what he did and described what conclusion he reached
with respect to which particular water heater had suffered the
most damage. And in the context of his testimony on that
subject, there's no reason that the jury couldn't infer,
notwithstanding whether or not they accept Dr. Hoffman's
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1

analysis that he couldn't reach that conclusion, but there was

2

substantial evidence provided by the plaintiff by way of

3

Mr. Long that would allow the inference to be made that it was

4

in fact the one on the left side rather than the right side.

5
6

THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

Anything else you want

to add?

7

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Your Honor, the only thing that I

8

would add is that I think that I'd like to brief the legal

9

standard with respect to the application of Summers versus

10

Tice.

I had an opportunity to do some research during the

11

break, and based on the limited research that I was able to do,

12

I think that there is case law which would support its

13

application under these circumstances.

14

THE COURT:

Where do you find such a case?

The

15 I reason I ask is, I have some help here in the building and they
16 I looked, they can't find one.
MR. OfCALLAHAN:

17

But —

Your Honor, I would refer the Court

18 I to a case called Abel versus Eli Lilly, which is a 1984 case of
19

Michigan.

It involved the application of Summers versus Tice

20

in the product liability context.

21

a drug.

22

THE COURT:

Okay.

23

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Your Honor, I believe it was

What kind of drug, do you know?
I don't know that offhand.

24

just —

I read a brief summary, but if I can —

25

cite, if thatfs of any interest to the Court.
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I

I111 give the

THE COURT:

So what you'd like me to do is just

reserve my ruling on this?
MR. OfCALLAHAN:

Your Honor, I think that we could

brief the matter and provide you with some persuasive
information on the subject.

In any event, I think that

certainly the testimony regarding the location from which the
flame came, the testimony regarding the damage to the heaters
should be sufficient to give the jury the opportunity to make a
determination with respect to causation.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ZAGER:

Your Honor, if I might add something, Ifd

like to also point out that there was a motion in limine filed
by the defendant on this very point trying to have the
determination that it was the water heater on the left that in
fact caused the ignition.

And the Court heard that motion,

denied that motion, and basically let the case go to trial that
either of the two water heaters could have been the cause and
both defendants were involved in the case.
I think it1s interesting that —

it was Mr. Lund, I

believe, who made the objection to Mr. Long!s conclusions that
the fact it was the water heater on the left, when that would
have benefited his client.

I think that only goes to show

again the nongenuine interest, the gamesmanship played by the
defendants in separating the two defendants, because obviously
that would benefit, quote, unquote, his client to have it be
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1

the water heater on the left that was the cause rather than the

2

one on the right.

3

If I hear Mr. Lund correctly, he says he wouldn't

4

have made that objection to Mr. Long testifying had he known

5

that it was the plaintiff's position that it could have been

6

either of the two water heaters that caused the ignition. And

7

that is, as I read the landmark case of Summers v. Tice, the

8

very issue.

9

the two defendant manufacturers of the water heaters. Without

10

the ignition, there would have been no injury, so basically it

11

is a causation problem, or issue, I should say, which the

12

application of Summers v. Tice is exactly on point as to a case

The only two remaining defendants in the case are

13 I where there are two sole defendants involved in the lawsuit at
14

this point in time and the evidence is such that the inference

15 J can be made that either of the two are, as Mr. Hoffman stated,
16 I potentially simultaneously both of the two water heaters
17 I combined to cause the ignition.
18

THE COURT:

19

MR. LUND:

Okay.

Thank you.

Your Honor, just very briefly, what

20

Mr. Zager just said about Dr. Hoffman is absolutely backwards.

21

He said itfs not possible that both of them ignited at the same

22

time.

23

both started at the same time.

24
25

That was Dr. Hoffman's statement about could they have

And I guess the thing —

I hope —

I really do want

us to do this right and I'm concerned that we think clearly
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through this.

And I heard Mr. 0'Callahan kind of move back and

forth between two things.
The threshold question is, is there enough evidence
that one could determine proximate cause here on the basis of
evidence or is it simply speculation?

Because if there is

enough evidence to kind of point at one of the heaters versus
the other in a way that you think is not guessing for the jury,
then Summers versus Tice has no application because it only
comes into play if there's no way to prove the difference.
So it seems to me the first question is, is it
possible, and I respect your questions to Mr. 0'Callahan about
how a jury could decide it if the expert can't. And I guess
that's our position, it's probably not possible on the basis of
the evidence in front of them, but there may have been other
evidence that could have been elicited on that subject.
I guess the second point is, again, there is not
going to be a case, at least we could not find any, where you
would take the Summers versus Tice concept and apply it to two
remaining defendants in a situation where globally there has
already been some sorting out. And ultimately either the jury
is going to be guessing here or the plaintiffs are going to
convince you to have the burden shift to us and then I guess
we're going to have deal with the fact that there's no proof to
disassociate one or the other. And I respect Mr. O'Callahan's
interest in briefing it, the problem is, we've got to go
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1

forward with our case and know if we have a burden or not.

2

THE COURT:

When you say you've got to go forward,

3

I'm thinking one solution for the moment is to get the input

4

from everybody a little more clearly.

5

waiting in the wings that feel the need to go ahead today or

Do you have people

6 I could you go tomorrow morning if we decide?
7

MR. LUND:

8

that's Your Honor's feeling.

9

THE COURT:

We could start it in the morning, if

I was just thinking maybe if I

10

got Teena to run me a copy of her handywork

11

here from the last half hour and have a minute to think about

12

it —

13

morning, that it might be better.

14

on your side there's no use going ahead and —

a minute, I mean think about it and afternoon and the
I mean it seems to me that
what do you

15 I folks think about that, giving me a chance to get the
16 I information you think exists?
17

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Sure, Your Honor.

You know, the

18

fact of the matter is I think it will probably take us a couple

19

of hours to do that. We could submit that tomorrow morning.

20

That would be fine.

21

I know Mr. Sutton had mentioned earlier that he has

22

an expert that he would dearly love to complete and send home.

23

I don't know whether or not that's operative at this point in

24 J time, but I'll defer to whatever the Court and counsel want to
25

do.
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MR. ZAGER:

I would add one thing before we adjourn.

Two things, actually.
One, this doesn!t change much, both defendant still
have every motive to prove that it wasnft their water heater
that was the cause of the ignition, so I donft see how that
would change with some other evidence that would have been
brought up.

Both defendants still have the same motive.

Further, there is absolutely no evidence or any credible
evidence that there was any other source of the ignition than
one or both of the two water heaters.
it was the air furnaces.
THE COURT:

There's no evidence that

The evidence —

I agree, Mr. Zager, but I don't recall

anything that you could get to both of them.

If one wanted to

do that, how would one say, This is the peg upon which I placed
my hat, both of you did it because...
Give me any scenario you want from the evidence that
we1ve had.

it's —
al.

MR. ZAGER:

Well, in Summers v. Tice —

THE COURT:

Set aside Summers v. Tice.

Pretend

what's it called, Alarid versus American Appliance, et

You just give me any facts together that get them both in.

I'm just curious what that —
MR. ZAGER:

Well, Your Honor, if I just might for a

moment refer for a moment back —
THE COURT:

I'd rather not. Answer my question
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because I want to see where you think it's leading me because
that's the whole process.
clearly.

I have to think this through

So you tell me what facts support your idea that both

of them are responsible.
MR. ZAGER:

Well, the evidence is, Your Honor, that

the water heaters, one or the other, or in the case of
Mr. Hoffman the potentiality that it could have been a
simultaneous ignition, although he said that would be
unlikely —
THE COURT:

Hoffman said no to that.

MR. ZAGER:

Hoffman said that would be unlikely, it

could have happened, but it is unlikely, is what he said.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. ZAGER:

We certainly know it was one of the water

THE COURT:

Let's assume you've —

heaters.

(Reporter had to interrupt.)
THE COURT:

Oh, just keep going.

MR. ZAGER:

Okay, just like the one bullet.

There

was one of the two defendants, one of the two water heaters
that was the cause of the incident.
THE COURT:

All right.

If that's your answer, that's

MR. ZAGER:

I'm not sure if the Court —

THE COURT:

My question wasn't was it one of the two.

fair.
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You said itfs both, and I said to you, tell me how you prove
that.

And all I want to know is what it is and you never

answered the question.
MR. ZAGER:

I'll defer to Mr. 0!Callahan.

THE COURT:

Mr. 0fCallahan didn't say what you said.

MR. ZAGER:

I111 let him address that, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right.

best plan is —

Fair enough.

where did Mick go —

tell them Ifve got to meditate.
what's going on.

So I think the

is to get them in here and

It's better for them to know

So I can either address them in there or

bring them in, whichever you like.
MR. OfCALLAHAN:
THE COURT:

Your Honor, what do you think?

Mick says bring them in.

(The jury entered the courtroom.)
(End of requested portion of transcript.)
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C E R T I F I C A T E
2 I

STATE OF UTAH

3

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

4

)

I, TEENA GREEN, RPR, CSR, do certify that I am a

5 I nationally certified reporter and a Certified Shorthand
6 I Reporter in and for the State of Utah,
7 1

That at the time and place of the proceedings in the

8 I foregoing matter, I appeared as the official court reporter in
9

the Third Judicial District Court for the Honorable MICHAEL

10

BURTON, and thereat reported in stenotype all of the

11

proceedings had therein.

That thereafter, my said shorthand

12 I notes of the Trial Proceedings were transcribed by computer
13

into the foregoing pages; and that this constitutes a full,

14

true and correct transcript of the same,

15

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL in Salt Lake City, Utah on

16 I this, the 5th day of November 2001.
17

Teena Green, RPR,'CSR
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21
22
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24
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NCWE*CER 0 6 , 2001
8:50 A.M.

PROCEEDINGS
* * * * *

THE COURT:
MR. LUND:

Mr, Lund, anymore from you today?
Your Honor, we've had an opportunity to

review the plaintifffs memorandum,

I have several remarks

about it, but —
THE COURT:
MR. LUND:
probably realized.

Go ahead.
—

we have not filed our own, as you've

Ifm going to take the four points they've

got in order, and I think probably take a minute to deal with
the facts that he's asserted and be sure that we know what —
It's true Anna Marie testified she saw them out of
the left door.

Whatever Mr. Gomez is going to testify about

isn't in evidence at this point, so I don't think that would be
material.

Mr. Long did make a statement when he had one of the

photographs in his hand about which water heater had the most
damage.

He had photo 20 in his hand.

If Your Honor please,

I'll hand you photo 20 and also hand you photos 17 and 23.
Although he said that was the water heater on the
west, that's a misstatement.

This is the photo that shows —

photo 17 shows the water heater on the west and then you can
see the blanket of the one on the east. And this is another
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

photo of the one with the blanket on it.

Photo 20, which was

2 I the one he had in his hand when he said it was the one with the
3 I most damage is actually a photo of the water heater on the
4

east.

5

THE COURT:

To the extent that you testified, yeah,

6 J itfs probably not material.
7

MR. LUND:

I'm just pointing out that that is Exhibit

8 I 20 that he had in his hand at the time.
9
10

Mr. Long was expressly not permitted to disclose
whatever determinations he made, so I don't know how that would

11 I be much for the jury to use to go on.
12 J

Kent Nelson testified that he had no way of

13 I remembering, he could not be certain as he sat there that the
14 J flames came out of one door versus the other.

I think those

15 J are the pertinent facts that are suggested.
16 I

Regarding the points that are raised, I don't think

17 J we have much disagreement with the plaintiffs about what the
18 J standard review is on directed verdict and we discussed that
19 J yesterday.
20

I!m a little confused by the plaintiff's memo in

the sense that on the one hand they're suggesting there's

21 J enough evidence, I guess, for the jury to make a determination
22

of which water heater ignited the fire.

If that were so, then

23

why would we be talking about Summers versus Tice?

24

concept only comes into play when it is not possible to make

25

that determination, so their point that —

That

I think that's the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

fundamental question.

First of all, is there enough evidence

that the jury could make a determination.

Our position on that

has been stated.
In the face of a cause of fire origin expert
testifying, he cannot, in that it is speculation.

Our

submission remains that it is simply a matter of having the
jury guess about something that the expert is not inclined to
do.

That expert did have the depositions, he did have the

photos, and he's not inclined to make that evaluation.
There is a case in Utah called K-Mart versus Beard
where a plaintiff seeks to have a jury guess about whether
certain medical injury was caused by a certain accident. And
the case holds that that must be the subject of medical
testimony.

A doctor has to say in most cases —

I can give you

the case, if you want.
There is another case and Mr. Sutton read it in the
half hour we had, so if I could turn to him for a minute,
there's another case called Walker versus Parish Chemical that
sheds a little light on whether juries should decide things
that seem to be in the realm of expert testimony.
MR. SUTTON:

Your Honor, the Walker case was a fire

case that the proffered jury instruction was seeking a res ipsa
loquitur instruction, and as part of the appellate court
analysis there was a consideration as to whether expert
testimony was needed with respect to something like fire cause
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1 land origin.

And it was indeed the Court's conclusion that

2

expert testimony was necessary in that regard because fire

3

cause and origin is not something within the realm of the

4

common experience of lay jurors. That, frankly, is also a

5

point that the plaintiffs make in their brief.

They say that

6 I the plaintiff may prove the causal nexus between the events
7 I sued upon and the injuries suffered by lay testimony alone in
8 J those cases in which general experience and common sense will
9 I enable a layman to determine with reasonable probability the
10 I causal relationship between the event and the condition.
11

I would submit, Your Honor, that fire cause and

12 I origin is not one of those subject matters that is within the
13 J general experience and common sense of a layman to determine
14

because Dr. Hoffman testified that he was unable to

15

differentiate between the water heater on the left or the water

16 I heater on the right as to the cause of the fire.
17 I

The plaintiffs are asking you to, not withstanding

18 I that testimony, say, well, even though the expert couldn't
19

determine it, there are some facts that the jury could hang

20

their hat on, so let's submit it to the jury.

21

that is a subject matter that you are charged to grant a

22

directed verdict if you make the determination that this is

23

indeed not one of those subject matters that is within general

24

experience and common sense.

25

THE COURT:

And I think that

What do you call the case again?
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1

MR. SUTTON:

2

The name of the case is Walker versus

Parish Chemical, and the cite is 914, P2d, 1157.

3 I

THE COURT:

Thank you.

4

MR. SUTTON:

5

MR. LUND:

April 4, 1996.

The only other subject probably to talk

6 J about then is the question of burden shifting in Summers versus
7 I Tice, and I think we can largely stand on our memo there that
8 J the plaintiffs have not supplied a Utah case that has, as we
9 J stated, adopts or applies Summers versus Tice.
10 J
11

In the area of aggravation of preexisting conditions,
we have a couple cases, Tingey versus Christensen and the

12 I Robinson case that hold that the burden shifts on establishing
13 I the harm or the cause of the harm, and that's 433(a) of the
14 I restatement.
15 I

There's nothing that adopts 433(b).

The only case that theyfve now cited in addition that

16 I itfs not a Utah case is the Hood case about the two dogs and
17 I the dog bite. And I guess the core —

even thought that it was

18 I appropriate that the Utah case, the Utah appellate court would
19 I adopt Summers versus Tice.

The remaining problem is, it isn't

20

a set of facts that warrant the burden being shifted.

And the

21

reason for that is that where there's two dogs and nobody else

22 (that's at fault and you've got to sort through it, that's like
23

two hunters, both have shot a gun.

Here it's as though we've

24

got two dogs and a guy that let the dogs out and another one

25

that aggravated the dogs, because we have not only these two
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1

water heaters but we have the proximate cause analysis that

2

incorporates Mr. Nelson's conduct, Mr. Gomez's conduct, the

3

glue company's conduct.

4

in California the rationale for Summers versus Tice is that you

Ultimately under the Rutherford case

5 I have two people and the complete and entire responsibility for
6

the injury or the accident is with both of them, with one or

7 J the other and not with people outside of that universe. And
8 J that's just simply not the facts we have here.
9 1

We'll submit it, Your Honor.

10

THE COURT:

Mr. 0'Callahan?

11

MR. O1CALLAHAN:

Your Honor, I think that what the

12 J Court needs to focus on are the theories as to defect that we
13

have against these defendants. And when I say "these

14 J defendants," I use the term advisably.

We are here, we have a

15 I jury empaneled, they've heard evidence and evidence that would
16 J allow them to make a determination as to which of these
17

defendants' water heaters was responsible on the basis of the

18 I fact that there is testimony that the one on —

flames were

19

seen coming from the left door, flames were seen coming from

20

the right door.

21

But I think beyond that, you know, the court has to

22

look through this and see here we have a situation in which the

23

defendants here were not separate defendants until the first

24

day of trial. Throughout the course of this case, they're

25

represented by the same lawyers, they retain the same experts,
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there has been testimony that they have held themselves out to
be the same entity.

The products that are involved are the

identical products with the same design, the same components,
the same materials and the same defect.
I think that in this case if the court looks at what
the theory of defect is and the fact that in terms of the
parties that are before the court at the present time, the
theory against them is discrete.

It's the same defect.

Dr. Hoffman in his testimony said that he laid this
problem at the feet of these defendants because if the flame
were not —

the flames from these pilot lights were not

two inches from the ground that you never would have had
ignition of this vapor, notwithstanding
THE COURT:

He never went that far, did he?

MR. OfCALLAHAN:
THE COURT:

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

it

—

More likely than not, which is

—

He said that it reduces the causes but it

doesnft eliminate them.

THE COURT:

Your Honor

He never used the word "never"?

MR. O'CALLAHAN:
THE COURT:

—

Didn't he say that?
Your Honor, I think

—

So your argument that he said never had

—
MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Your Honor, I believe he said that

it was more likely than not at a minimum.
THE COURT:

He says they caused, I'm not arguing that
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1 J you seem to say that he said, but for that, nothing like this
2 J would have ever happened.

If you raise it all is well.

And he

3

didn't ever say that. And maybe I just misunderstand what

4

you1re saying.

5

MR. O'CALLAHAN:

Well, I think the point is that here

6 I we have the same product with the same defect, they happen to
7 I be next to each other. And these products are the cause of
8

ignition. And that's a very discrete theory.

There is nobody

9

else that was ever involved in this case either as a party or

10 J as a nonparty in whom there was an allegation that they were
11

responsible for igniting this fire.

So I think that if we look

12 I and use the example in our papers of a —

in Summers versus

13 I Tice, a landowner who let the hunters come on their land in
14

violation of the statute and then had settled out, that is a

15 J different type of negligence than that which is alleged against
16

the hunters in Summers versus Tice. And that makes it a very

17

different situation in terms of the concerns that have been

18

expressed historically.

19

Again, the jury is going to be in a position where

20

they will apportion fault amongst all the parties. That is

21

different from the situation that existed in Summers versus

22

Tice because at that time the law didn't permit that, not in

23

California or anywhere else, as I understand it.

24

jury is going to be in a position to apportion fault

25

appropriately.
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1

And the other thing is that, you know, the defendants

2

have not yet begun to put on their case.

There is more

3

evidence that is going to be before the jury.

4

position where it can permit this matter to go to the jury and

5

in the event that it finds after the jury returns a verdict

6

that it is troubled by the result then it can always do

7

something about it at that point.

The Court's in a

But it seems terribly unfair

8 J when we do have evidence from which a jury could reasonably
9

conclude that the fire was ignited by the water heater on the

10

left and there's also evidence from which it could infer that

11

it was ignited by the water heater on the right, that to throw

12

us out of court completely would be massively unfair.

13
14

By the same token, if the Court doesn't think that
that is an appropriate —

doesn't feel comfortable with that,

15 I to deny us a Summers versus Tice instruction given the unique
16

factual circumstances of this case would do an injustice.

17

Because I think what the courts have focused on is the fact

18 I that it is unfair to prevent a plaintiff from being fully
19

compensated for its injuries because of a failure of proof

20

when, as the court said in its footnote in the King versus

21

Searle case, that it was clear in Tice that both defendants

22

acted negligently in precisely the same manner and that one of

23

the two defendants had to have been responsible for the

24

plaintiff's injury.

25

So what we have here is that one of the two — both
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defendants are negligent, one of them was responsible for
igniting the fire. And on that basis, it would be appropriate
to shift the burden. And this is not a surprise to them,
they've been aware of the evidence in the case and the
testimony of the experts for quite some time.
I think that certainly in the King versus Searle case
and in the other cases that the court has had indicate that
Summers versus Tice is a theory which has been accepted by the
Utah courts, although not necessarily —

apparently from the

cases that we've read, it has never been requested to be
applied in a particular case, at least at the trial level. At
the trial level.
THE COURT: What do you mean by the phrase it has
been accepted but never applied?
MR. OfCALLAHAN:

I'm not understanding.

All right.

Your Honor, as I went

through, for example, in the Clark case, there is a discussion
in there about what evidence there was as to the cause of the
particular plaintiff's injuries. And in its footnotes the
court said in the Clark case that no one had asked for the
application of the Summers versus Tice theory; therefore, we're
not going to address that issue.

It seems to me that the court

was voluntarily raising that issue on its own, which would
indicate that they were not foreclosing the use of that theory
in Utah.
By the same token, in the King versus Searle case in
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1

footnote 3, there again is a discussion of Summers versus Tice

2

which indicates that it would not be applicable under the

3

circumstances presented in the facts of that case.

4

One of the things that I think in all the cases that

5

discuss Summers versus Tice is they say that it is factually

6

specific to a particular set of facts that are presented.

7

in the case that was —

And

the Webber case, there was no request

8 I that Summers versus Tice be applied, at least as I read the
9 lease, until it got to the appellate court level.

I don't think

10 J that there was any request at the trial court level that the
11

theory be applied.

And again, that was a case in which

12 J different defendants against whom the same theory was being
13

alleged had been let out of the case or it had judgments

14

entered as to them and were not before the court on appeal.

15 J

So nowhere in any of the opinions is there an

16 J indication that the Utah courts would not approve of Summers
17 I versus Tice under a particular factually specific set of
18 J circumstances such as what we have here.

Rather, the

19

discussions have centered around the fact that it wasn't raised

20

at the trial court level during trial or during the course of a

21 J motion for summary judgment. And I think in this case we have
22

a different set of circumstances because the issue has been

23

brought before the court at this level and it seems appropriate

24

under the circumstances to apply it, particularly given the

25

fact that there is a public policy interest, first of all, in
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trial on the merits of the case and, secondly, on the fact that
a plaintiff who is entitled to compensation be fully
compensated.
And you know, Ifm not sure if the Court has already
reached a determination that this was a defective product and
now it's concerned about, you know, the causation issue. This
is the —

the jury has to overcome those hurdles before it gets

to the issue of causation.

I!m sure the defendants are going

to have some testimony on that particular point themselves. So
I don't think therefs any reason that the Court should not
permit the case to go forward from this point, given the
standard that exists with respect to motions for directed
verdict and given the state of the evidence.
Obviously with respect to the testimony of Mr. Gomez,
thatfs testimony that we expect will be proffered during his
case, but we understand from his prior deposition testimony and
by way of an offer of proof, we can certainly indicate that.
So I think the court looks at what is the
applicability of Summers versus Tice to the issue of ignition
here.

I think that we are clearly within the bounds of the

theory of Summers versus Tice and I think that that has been
accepted.

And I also think that, you know, itfs —

the only

reason that we're at this juncture is that just before trial
there was a decision by the defendants to kind of split their
previously unified defense.

That was a decision that they made
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1

and that was a decision which I believe they thought would

2 I procedurally be to their advantage and they've pursued it. But
3

there are consequences that have to result or should result

4 I from their selecting that particular defense.

If they want to

5 I present themselves as two different defendants at time of
6

trial, then they have to accept the consequences which that

7 I entails, and one of the consequences is the imposition of the
8 I Summers versus Tice burden shifted.

And what I see here are

9 I defendants who want all the benefits but none of the
10

obligations that are imposed under the law.

11

it would be terribly unfair to allow them to have the shell and

12

pea game that they've played thus far to benefit them in a way

13

that would so unfairly hurt the plaintiff.

14

THE COURT:

Thank you.

And I think that

It seems to me that Summers

15 I versus Tice doesn't belong in this case at all. The theory
16 J that somehow there's an ignition portion of a case and maybe
17

a —

I don't know, a fuel portion of the case and a negligence

18 I by another party portion of the case, is an unusual approach to
19 I a case. There are several little distinct portions and these
20

defendants have to defend on a portion of the case.

21

look at the whole case, it's clear that there are others to

22

whom the burden of fault might be apportioned; that being true,

23 J Summers versus Tice does not apply.

If you

Because in Summers versus

24

Tice there are only a couple of folks who it ever could have

25

been and we can't postulate as Mr. O'Callahan has about, well,
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1

what if somebody had been negligent about letting them on the

2

land or maybe a negligent manufacturer of a bullet-proof vest.

3

I mean you could postulate a lot of nice scenarios; Summers

4

versus Tice dealt with some specific case.

Itfs clear to me it

5 J doesn't apply.
6

I'm making a ruling right now.

7 I notice you'd stood.

I'm sorry, I didn't

Please don't let me interrupt you, go

8 J ahead, Mr. Zager.
9

MR. ZAGER:

Thank you, Your Honor.

I think it's

10 I important for the Court to also realize one other question of
11 I fact that the jury would be in a position to determine on the
12 I factual issue that we expect would go to the jury.

And that is

13 J I think that there is sufficient facts for the jury to find
14 I that both water heaters were at fault in causing the ignition
15 I because Dr. Hoffman testified that the pilot light by virtue of
16

combustion would tend to draw flammable vapors toward the pilot

17 I light. And we have to remember now that we have two water
18 J heaters acting in conjunction, which would enhance the flow of
19

vapors to both water heaters, and the jury could find that the

20

dual combination of both water heaters acting in conjunction

21

aided the ignition of the fire by drawing the flammable vapors

22

twice the draw that it would have had had there just been the

23

one water heater.

24
25

THE COURT:

It's a nice —

I'm going to take a

minute, read Walker versus Parish Chemical.
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You folks haven't
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addressed that, you folks being the plaintiffs, and I guess I
am struck by the idea that, as I said yesterday, how does a
jury decide a question that a expert knowing what the jury
knows won't decide. And I think the defendants have said there
may be an issue there.

So I want to look at that case for a

few seconds and then Ifm going to be back.

And if we're

continuing on, we'll start; if we're not, we'll go from there.
But now that is the only question for me.
doesn't apply.

Summers versus Tice

I give you the fact that there is an issue

about where this fire started, you know.

I guess if an expert

can be overlooked on this kind of matter and plaintiffs will go
forward, but I want to see what Walker and Parish have to say
about that.
MR. SUTTON:

Your Honor, here's a copy, if you'd like

me to hand it up.
THE COURT:

No, I've got —

(A recess was taken.)
THE COURT:

I've had a chance to look at Walker

versus Parish Chemical, that seems to me to go to a little
different question; was there negligence.

And in this case,

clearly, the plaintiff has asserted by their evidence that
there was negligence.

I think that problem's been answered.

don't know that we have any —

I

certainly Walker I don't think

stands for the proposition that you have to have an expert tell
us the causal connection, which is what the plaintiff, at least
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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in my view has at least asserted some evidence left door, right
door, left water heater, right water heater, somebodyfs going
to I guess make a reasonable inference.

So I'm going to deny

the motion for directed verdict, and as I said before, there
will be no Summers versus Tice instruction because it's not
applicable.

We'll get Mick to bring in the jury, unless

there's something else right now.
MR. LUND:

I don't know how you want to deal with it,

we did submit that other memo on punitives.
THE COURT:

Right. And one day that might be what

we'll talk about; not today, though.
MR. LUND: All right.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Understood.

But, yeah, I won't forget that. Anyone

else?
MR. O'CALLAHAN:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

I guess it's you, Mr. Atkin.

MR. ATKIN:

That's correct, Your Honor.

(The jury entered the courtroom.)
THE COURT:

Thank you.

The jury has returned.

Plaintiff has rested their case and Mr. Atkin is going to
present some evidence for the third party.

Right?

(End of requested portion of transcript.)
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C E R T I F I C A T E
2

STATE OF UTAH

3

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

4

)

I, TEENA GREEN, RPR, CSR, do certify that I am a

5

nationally certified reporter and a Certified Shorthand

6

Reporter in and for the State of Utah.

7

That at the time and place of the proceedings in the

8

foregoing matter, I appeared as the official court reporter in

9

the Third Judicial District Court for the Honorable MICHAEL

10

BURTON, and thereat reported in stenotype all of the

11

proceedings had therein.

12

notes of the Trial Proceedings were transcribed by computer

13

into the foregoing pages; and that this constitutes a full,

14

true and correct transcript of the same.

15
16

That thereafter, my said shorthand

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL in Salt Lake City, Utah on
this, the 6th day of November 2001.

17
18

<
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Teena G r e e n , RPR/' CSR
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MICHAEL S. SUTTON
SUTTON & MURPHY
26056 Acero
Mission Viejo, California 92691
Telephone: (949)206 0550

"LED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JOHN R. LUND (A4368)
KARA L. PETTIT (A8659)
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTTNEAU
10 Exchange Place. Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000

Deputy CteA

Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance Manufacturing
and American Water Heater Co.

fN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ANNA MARIE ALARID,
Plaintiff,
vs.

JUDGMENT

Civil No. 980905332

AMERICAN APPLIANCE
MANUFACTURING. INC., etc.. et al.,

Judge Michael K. Burton

Defendants.

This matter came on regularly for jury trial before the Honorable Michael K. Burton on
October 29. 2001. Plaintiff was represented through trial by James G. OTallahan of Girardi
Keese and Mitchel Zager. Defendant American Appliance Manufacturing was represented
through trial by Michael S. Sutton of Sutton & Murphy and defendant American Water Heater
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Company was represented through trial by John R. Lund of Snow, Christensen & Martineau.
Third-party defendant Rudy Gomez was represented at trial by Gary E. Atkin of Atkin &
Associates. The trial continued through October 30 and 31, 2001 as well as November 1. 5, 6
and 7, 2001, and the matter was submitted to the jury on November 7, 2001.
On November 7, 2001, the jury returned the Special Verdict with the following answer to
Question No. 1: Was the 1991 American Appliance water heater in a defective condition as
defined in the instructions? Answer: Yes

No

X . The jury also supplied the following

answer to Question No. 3: Was the 1994 American Water Heater Company water heater in a
defective condition as defined in these instructions? Answer: Yes

No

X . No other

questions on the Special Verdict were answered. The Special Verdict was signed by foreperson
John Hancock and dated November 7, 2001.
Based on these findings by the jury and good cause appearing therefore, judgment is hereby entered in favor of defendant American Appliance Manufacturing, Inc. and in favor of
American Water Heater Company and against plaintiff as to all claims asserted. Costs are
awarded in favor defendants and against plaintiff in the amount of $<AS ^ ^ f t o be filled in by
the Clerk of the Court in accordance with Rule 54(e)).
DATED this ^ 7

dav of November. 2001.
BY THE COURT:

N I^44

or

^strict Court Judge

I JUDGMHNf WPUN-U C ^ C U M ^ v r E N ^
,
THIRD
0'~ -i:Cl
&IT-UKfc COUNTY. STATE
OF UTAH.
DATE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
i HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

of November. 2001.1 caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing [proposed] Judgment to be sent, by mail and facsimile, to:
Mitchel A. Zager, Esq.
3587 West 4700 South
Salt Lake City. UT 84118
and
5580 La Jolla Blvd. #83
LaJolla,CA 92037
facsimile no. (858) 456-9471
Thomas V. Girardi. Esq.
James G. O'Callahan, Esq.
1126 Wilshire Blvd.
Los Angeles. CA 90017
facsimile no. (213) 481-1554
Gary E. Atkin, Esq.
311 S State #380
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
facsimile no. 521-3731
and to be hand delivered to:
Mitchel A. Zager. Esq.
3587 West 4700 South
Salt Lake City. UT 84118

N IW44 I'JlllXiMI-XI'.Wm

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Tab 29

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MF^ ^-'

\l OF I IENRY - 3 ACK MOORE
J a n u a i y 8,

3 R.

1999

I IE CIR rUIT COURT FC I I I IOU DON COUN I ! ! , TEN N E S S E E
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1

Q

Did you have dinner last night

2

with anyone?

3

A

No.

4

Q

Have you had any other meetings

5

with perBona with regard to this case other than the

6

five or six-hour meeting you had yesterday with Mr.

7

Murphy and Mr. Ellis?

B

A

No, I have not.

9

Q

Were you aware that a subpoena

10

was going to be served upon you before the first

11

subpoena came to you in this case?

12

A

Before the first?

13

Q

Yes, sir; that is did someone

14

call you and tell you that you would be receiving a

IS

subpoena to give a deposition in this case?

16

A

I believe so.

17

Q

And who was that that called you

18

and alerted you to the fact that you were going to be

19

receiving a subpoena to give testimony in this case?

20

A

Ed Hackney.

21

Q

Did you at any time try to ellude

22

or evade service of process in this case?

23

A

Absolutely not.

24

Q

Did Mr. Hackney at any time

25

suggest to you that you try to evade service of

GIBSON COURT REPORTING
423-546-7477
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please sit for a deposition?11

Did anyone ask you to

do that?
A
case.

I don't know if it was for this

Mr. Hackney told me back in the middle of the

year, said that I was wanted for a deposition.

And I

don't know what the name of the case was.
Q

Let me ask you this, sir.

Is it

your practice to cooperate with your former employer
when they ask you to give a deposition, that you will
sit for a deposition?
A

Yes.

Q

Have you ever told your former

employer that you refuse to sit for a deposition?
A
time.

If I am not available at that

If the time doesn't work out.
Q

Other than scheduling, have you

ever told them that, "No, I don't feel like giving a
deposition anymore in these cases."
A

No.

Q

Did you ever consider yourself

being "difficult" in agreeing to sit for a deposition
before getting a notice and before getting a
subpoena?
A

Not that I know of.

Q

Now, it is fair to say that you,

GIBSON COURT REPORTING
423-546-7477
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MR. MURPHY:
THE WITNESS:

Objection, leading.
Mathematically,

yes.
BY MR. DOWNING:
Q

So if the manufacturers, the

water heater manufacturers had decided they did not
want a change to get through this committee, they, by
voting together, could block any change; is that
right?
MR. MURPHY:
THE WITNESS:

Objection, leading.
That is

conceivable.
BY MR. DOWNING:
Q

Now, it was your company's

opinion that in 1990 the best way to address the
hazard of the ignition of flammable vapors by these
floor-mounted, gas-fired water heaters was to place
this label on the water heater; is that right?
MR. MURPHY:

Objection, leading.

BY MR. DOWNING:
Q

What was the best your company

could do to address the flammable vapors hazard in
1990 with regard to design of your water heater?
MR. MURPHY:

Objection

argumentative as to best.

GIBSON COURT REPORTING
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DEPOSITION OF HENRY JACK MOORE, JR.
1
January 8, 1999
2
3
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR LOUDON COUNTY, TENNESSEE
4
5
6
7
8

10

SHAY ELLIS and MICHAEL ELLIS,
Parents and Next Friends of
REILEY ANNETTE ELLIS,
a minor, deceased,

11

and

12

DAVID MITCHELL and BETH MITCHELL,
Individually and as Parents and
Next Friends of
MARGARET ELIZABETH MITCHELL,
a minor,
Plaintiffs,

9

13
14
15

No.

16

vs.
AMERICAN WATER COMPANY,
d/b/a MOR-FLO Industries, Inc.

17
18

and
19

Blitz USA, Roy Lintner,
Jack Lee and
Lenoir City Utility Board
Defendants

20
21
22
23

s.^* 'v^ r

24

$

25

II
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135

A

Yes.

Q

Now, your company made a

conscious decision not to enclose stands with its
water heaters; isn't that right.
MR. MURPHY:

Objection, leading.

BY MR. DOWNING:
Q

Did your company make a conscious

decision not to enclose stands with the standard
gas-fired water heater?
A

Yes.

Q

And that conscious decision was

made certainly before 1990, wasn't it?
A

Yes.

Q

And that conscious decision was

in part made on the basis of the added cost of the
stand, isn't that right?
A

That was one of the reasons.

Q

And your company knew -- let's

talk about in 1990 that if the water heaters had been
installed on stands that would reduce the likelihood
that somebody gets burned, right?
MR. MURPHY:

Objection, leading;

mischaracterizes the prior testimony.
BY MR. DOWNING:
Q

You can answer.
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2
3

A

It could reduce some of the

instances, yes.
Q

And you all made a conscious

4

decision not to included that safety device with your

5

products, right?

6

MR. MURPHY:

7

THE WITNESS:

8
9

Objection, leading.
Yes.

BY MR. DOWNING:
Q

And when you made that conscious

10

decision, did you all know that persons would

11

continue to be burned as a result of ignition of

12

flammable vapors as long as this standard model

13

design of water heater was being sold?

14

A

Yes.

15

MR. MURPHY:

Could you read that

16

last one back, please, ma1am?

17

(The court reporter read back the previous

18

question.)

19
20

BY MR. DOWNING:
Q

And had you all made that

21

decision to include the stand with your product, the

22

safety device, then that would have effected the

23

profits of your company; would it not?

24

MR. MURPHY:

25

THE WITNESS:

Objection, leading?
It would have

GIBSON COURT REPORTING
423-546-7477
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effected the sale of the product, yes.
BY MR. DOWNING:
Q

And ultimately effected the

profits of your company, isn't that right?
MR. MURPHY:

Objection, leading.

THE WITNESS:

Yes.

MR. DOWNING:

Let's take a break

for lunch.
(A lunch recess was taken.)
BY MR. DOWNING:
Q

Mr. Moore, would you describe for

the jury the direct vent designed water heater?
A

A direct vent water heater pulls

the combustion air from outside the structure and
also exhausts the combustion products to the outside.
Q

And does a direct vent water

heater, as designed, take air for combustion from the
room in which it sits?
A

No.

Q

Is that direct vent design one

that was around in the 1970s?
MR. MURPHY:

Objection as to

"around".
BY MR. DOWNING:
Q

Was that direct vent design in
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claims per year were you averaging where someone
claimed that they were involved in a flammable vapor
fire with one of your company's water heaters?
A

I did not keep those records, so

I wouldn't have any numbers.
Q

I thought you told us before that

you were aware of the hazards of a flammable vapor
fire in this type of water heater as far back as the
1950s.
A

Yes.

Q

And in the 1970s these reports, I

believe, the NEISS report came out, the government
report, setting forth that there were some hazards
with flammable vapors and water heaters; is that
right?
A

Calspan report, hazards

associated with water heaters.
Q

And were you aware in the 1970s

of actual instances of people being involved in fires
with floor-mounted, gas-fired water heaters?
A

Our company?

Q

Yes.

A

I believe it was the 80s before I

knew of any.
Q

And from the time that you became

GIBSON COURT REPORTING
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aware in the 1980s, would that have been the early
80s?
A

Yes.

Q

And from the time that you became

aware of actual instances involving gas-fired,
floor-mounted water heaters up until the production
of this particular unit involved in this case in
1990, did your company produce any water heaters
other those that drew air from the bottom of the
unit?
A

We made some other products, yes.

Q

I am talking about water heaters

that drew air from other areas other than the bottom
of the unit?
A

Yes.

Q

So your company had the

technology, and, in fact, was actually making water
heaters that drew air from other regions or other
sources?
A

Direct vent water heaters, yes.

Q

You replaced or came up with new

labeling for your water heater in what year?
A

1988.

Q

And was that placed on the water

heaters in '88?
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR LOUDON COUNTY. TENNESSEE
AT LOUDON, TENNESSEE

SHAY ELLIS and MICHAEL ELLIS, Parents
and Next Friends of REILEY A. ELLIS,
A Minor, Deceased; and
DAVID MITCHELL and BETH MITCHELL,
Individually and as Parents and Next
Friends of MARGARET ELIZABETH MITCHELL,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

No. 5998

AMERICAN WATER HEATER COMPANY, d/b/a
MOR-FLO INDUSTRIES, INC., et al,
Defendants.

TRIAL TESTIMONY
HENRY -I MOORE
MARCH 2ND, 1999

BARBARA

\PLES, COURT REPORTER

BROWN & »::;.. COURT REPORTING, INC.
cr
south Gay Street, Suite 704
P.O. Box 2347
hi^xviile. Tennessee 37901
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1
2

82nd Street, Helendale (phonetic).
Q.

Did you ever work with Mor-Flo

3 J Industries, sir?

5 1

A.

Yes# I did.

Q.

When did you work with Mor-Flo

6

Industries?

7

A.

I started in 1959. The company was

8

called American Appliance Manufacturing Corporation at

9

that time.

10

Q.

Where was that, sir?

11

A.

Santa Monica, California.

12

Q.

And you started in what year?

13

A.

1959.

14

Q.

And when did you leave Mor-Flo

15

Industries?

16

A.

In 1996.

17

Q.

And Mor-Flo, at that time in '96, was

18

known by another name?

19

A.

American Water Heater Company.

20

Q.

And when you left American Water

21

Heater, or Mor-Flo, in '96, what was your position?

22

A.

Vice-president of engineering.

23

Q.

And how long were you vice-president

24 I of engineering?
25

What was the period of time that you

held that position with Mor-Flo Industries?
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A.

Chief engineer,

Q.

And how long did you hold the position

: f chief engineer?

A.
Q.
responsible

As chief engineer, were you
des igning produc t:is 1 •
ICO f

JL

nuM •

So, is It fair to say for twenty years
Industries that was
esponsible I

iesign

he residential gas-fired

/aterheater.; ill. I I m I m i g l i l ,'
A.

Yes

Q.

S i r, were

design 'of this Mor-Flo product that we have here in
^urtroom marked Exhibit 1?
Y P F!

Q.

Now, were

the person responsible

ae safety
twenty years?
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1

A,

Yes, sir.

2 1

Q.

Was it your responsibility to approve

3

any design changes in this product that dealt with safety

4

for that twenty-year period?

5

A.

6 I

Q.

Yes.
In the past, sir, have you been

7

designated in litigation such as this to testify on

8

behalf of your corporation, Mor-Flo?

9
10

MR. MURPHY:

Objection, Your Honor.

Relevance.

11

MR. DOWNING:

12

THE COURT:

13

A.

14

Q.

Goes to bias.

Overruled.

Yes.
On how many occasions were you the

15

person that was the corporate representative sitting in

16

trials similar to this on behalf of your company?

17

MR. MURPHY:

18

I'd like a side bar.

19

THE COURT: All right, come up.

20

(WHEREUPON, a bench conference

21
22
23 I
24
25

Objection, Your Honor.

was had out of hearing.)
MR. DOWNING CONTINUES:
Q.

Have you been called upon in the past

to testify on behalf of your corporation?
Yes.

A.
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Is that alsc an instance where it was
reported
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gasoline

vapors, were ignited by a waterheatei of the same design
as this one?
Yes.
Are you familiar with a matter
company?
Yes.
ft-

Il

reported «-^ your company that gasoline vapors were
ignited by a waterheater with the design ]ust

s

Yes.
I IN

( i iii mi i» ni in mi i mini mi i n n
i

mi

HI in

1 (

t h e n a m e u i .

Franko?
• ..-;. - *

Yes.
Was that also an instance where ml,

reported :. •.. your company that gasoline vapors were
::i g in ::i te< ::i lb

i „ g' EI s £:i x: ed waterheater designed just like

this one?
s.
«.

Are you familiar with one called

Jedediah Franklin?
YesWas that instance where a young *•>
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Rpnww K WTOGO COITRT REPORTING,

INC

*

11

2 I

A.

Yes.

Q.

And how much time did you spend

3

preparing for your testimony with the lawyers from the

4

waterheater company?

5

A.

We met for a couple of hours.

6 1

Q.

Couple of hours?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

In fact, aren't you represented by the

9

lawyers for the waterheater company personally?

10
11

A.

for depositions or trial. The answer is yes.

12
13

That's standard practice whenever I go

Q.

So whose standard practice is that, is

that yours or the waterheater company?

14

A.

Mine.

15

Q.

So, when you go to give testimony

16

where you're sworn to tell the truth in something like

17

this, or depositions involving these things, you retain

18

your company's lawyer; right?

19

A.

Yes.

In the past when I was working

20

for the company I was represented by counsel, so I

21

figured I should have counsel if I'm no longer with the

22

company.

23
24
25

Q.

And you're also represented by the

company's inhouse lawyer, aren't you?
A.

Yes, I am.
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A.

I don't know if the doors are there, I

haven't looked at the heater today.
Q.

See the doors?

A.

Yes.

Q.

The doors are there?

A.

The doors are there.

Q.

So that's the way it was when it left

the factory except pristine clean; right?
A.

Yes.

Plus the draft hood was packed

with the waterheater in the carton.
Q.

The what?

A.

The draft hood.

Q.

This thing that goes here. (Indicating

top of waterheater.)
A.

Yes.

Q*

Okay.

Now, you're the person in

charge of safety, you're the person in charge of design,
let's talk about your educational background.

Tell the

Jury which college of engineering you went to.
A.
engineering.

I do not have a formal degree in
I have thirty-seven years in the

waterheater industry; I worked for four years, four or
five years in the manufacturing, I learned all the
processes for manufacturing the product.

I worked from

1963 to '74 I worked in the technical service group.
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1

was the first full-time service person American and

2

Mor-Flo had.

3

technicians we brought on board.

I trained all the additional service

4

In 1974 I went into the engineering

5

department as a product designer.

6

years and then I became chief engineer.

7

went to vice-president in 1981, held that title until I

8

left the company.

9

patents that I was applied and granted during that period

10

Q.

15
16
17
18
19
20

And during that time I've got twenty

My question was, which college of

engineering did you go to?

13
14

And from that I

of time.

11 I
12

I worked there for two

A.

I told you I didn't have a formal

Q.

Thank you.

degree.
Did anyone suggest when

that was question asked to go on with your history?
A.

I figured I should put it in there

since you're applying I don't have a formal degree.
Q.

Now, did you ever take any courses in

thermal dynamics?

21

A.

No, I did not.

22

Q.

Now, let's talk about the standard

23

gas-fired waterheater.

24

gas-fired waterheater we see in the country, isn't it?

25

A.

This is the most predominant

Yes.
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Q.

And would you tell the Jury where the

air for combustion comes from on this, please?
A.

The air is drawn in from about two

inches off the floor through the bottom of the product.
Q.

Down here?

A.

Yes. There's openings in the bottom

panel of the waterheater, and there's also an opening in
the front of the heater where the doors are.
Q.

Now, don't essentially all the other

manufacturers have a waterheater just like this one that
takes its air for combustion from this low level?
A.

There are similar designs, yes.

Q.

Are they similar at least with

respective to the location where they take their air for
combustion?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Mow, tell the Jury, please, where the

air for combustion was taken in the standard model
gas-fired waterheater in the 1950's.
A*

Dm, 1950fs?

Q.

Yes, sir.

A.

Well, I started in 1959.

The

waterheater had probably a four-inch leg on it at that
time, or maybe taller.
Q.

Where did the air get sucked in the
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waterheater from?
2 I

A.

Again, at the bottom of the heater.

3

Q.

So it's the same basic design as where

4

it sucks its air for the last forty years; would you

5

agree with that?

6

A.

Yes,

7

Q.

Would you agree also that there's no

8

real design requirement that you take the air for

9

combustion for this waterheater from the floor; is that

10

right?

11

A.

No,

12

Q.

That's not right?

13

A.

I'm agreeing with you.

14

Q.

You agree with me that there's no

15

design reason why you had to take your air for combustion

16

from the floor to operate this heater; correct?

17
18

A.

Yes.

It's the most economical

designed.

19

Q.

It's the most economical.

But you

20

would agree with me that you could take that air from a

21

higher level and channel it into that combustion chamber,

22

can't you?

23

A.

We do on other models.

24

Q.

On other models you do that, you said;

25

right?
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A.

Yes,

Q.

This waterheater, when it leaves your

factory do you expect that it's going to get constant
attention by the owner?
A,

Constant attention?

I don't

understand what you mean by —
Q.

Is this a passive appliance?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So, it's basically you hope that once

it's installed the customer can basically rest assured
they'll get hot water; right?
MR. MURPHY:
MR. DOWNING:

Objection to leading.
Bias.

THE COURT: Overruled.
A.

Yes.

Q.

So you would expect they would forget

about your heater once it's installed, wouldn't you?
A.

Unless it gives them a problem, yes.

Q.

Now, before you even got in the

waterheater industry you understood that flammable vapors
were heavier than air, didn't you?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And you also understood that this

waterheater sucked air from floor level, didn't you?
A.

Yes.
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1 I
2

Q.

And once you entered the waterheater

industry you learned even more about flammable vapors and

3 J waterheaters, didn't you?

5 I

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you knew when you entered the

6

waterheater industry that this model waterheater could

7

ignite floor-exposed flammable vapors; true?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

And then, in the 1970' s you started

10

learning about specific instances of these fires, didn't

11

you?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Tell the Jury how you first learned

14

about specific instances where people were burned as a

15

result of the ignition of flammable vapors from this

16

model waterheater.

17

A.

In our subcommittee meetings we had

18

reports from CPSC on fires caused by waterheaters,

19

ignition of flammable vapors.

20

Q.

21

talking about, sir?

22

A.

The Z21 Water Heater Subcommittee.

23

Q«

So you were serving on this committee

24
25

Which subcommittee meetings are we

that writes the standards, is that it?
A.

Yes.
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Q.

The standards for the design of this

2 I product; right?
A.

For the performance and safety

requirements of waterheaters, yes,
Q.

So the rules that this waterheater has

to meet are written by a committee on which you served;
right?
A.

Yes, Ifm one of many.

Q.

You and other representatives of other

waterheater manufacturers; right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, did you also learn other ways,

did you learn another means besides these meetings that
you all had, about persons being injured as a result of
the ignition of flammable vapors by this standard model
gas-fired waterheater?
A.

We were informed through our reports,

our lawsuits that were filed.
Q.

You received information through your

company of persons that were hurt and claiming it was
because of the design of your product; right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And in those reports, you would learn

about the testimony of other people who professed to have
expertise in design of waterheaters; right?
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A.

I don't understand.

Q.

Would you have an opportunity in your

work to read the testimony of other engineers who were
criticizing your product?
A.

I have seen some, yes.

Q.

Isn't it true that you were advised

they were criticizing your product because it sucks its
air from the floor level, and that flammable vapors are
heavier than air and they're at floor level, too?
A,

Yes.

Q.

And these people were recommending to

you and your company that you elevate the air intake;
correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

They were also recommending something

called direct-vent we'll talk about in a little bit, but
weren't they recommending something called a direct-vent?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And that was a way that, instead of

taking air from the floor they would take the air from
outside the room into your heater, and the bottom would
be sealed; right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, tell the Jury how many models of

waterheaters did your company make in 1990?
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1
2

A.

I don't understand what you mean by

how many models.

3 J

Q.

How many different model waterheaters

did you all make?

-

A.

Different types?

Q.

Yes, sir.

Let me rephrase that, let

me withdraw that one.
How many different models of gas
waterheaters did your company make in 1990?
A.

The standard type, you're talking

about how many models of that we made?
Q.

How many models of waterheaters; did

you all have tall, did you have short, did you have
under-counter, how many different models of waterheaters?
Did you have 30-gallon, 40-gallon, 50-gallon, how many
different models of gas-fired waterheaters did you all
make?
A.

In the standard product line like

this, there's 20-gallon through 75-gallon capacity, for
tall models like this.

There are short models of which

are 30- or 40-gallon, I believe.

And then we have

direct-vent waterheaters; two different models of that, a
40 and a 50. We also have a Polaris product line;
there's two sizes of that, a 34-gallon and 5-gallon.

And

then there's a commercial line of product which covers
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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about fifteen models of those.
Q.

Would it be fair to say, sir, that you

all made in 1990 at least thirty different models of
gas-fired waterheaters?
A.

At least.

Q.

At least thirty different models.

Now, it was common knowledge in the 1970"s that persons
were being injured as a result of ignition of flammable
vapors by gas-fired waterheaters in your industry; right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

So did you all consider that to be a

hazard associated with your product?
A,

Yes.

Q.

So, your company was aware of this

hazard in the 1970's; correct?
A.

Yes, we were.

Q.

And did you also discuss with other

manufacturers their experiences?
A.

At times, yes.

Q.

Did you get the general impression

that the other manufacturers with the same model heaters
were having the same experience as you guys were having?
A.

Yes.

Q.

So this hazard of ignition of

flammable vapors by this model waterheater was not just
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peculiar to your company, was it?
A,

No.

Q.

Now, are you familiar with a report in

1975 put out by a company called Calspan, aren't you?
A.

Yes.

Q»

Let me show you a document marked as

Plaintiffs1 Exhibit Number 15. Are you familiar with
that document, sir?
A.

I've seen it before, yes.

Q.

You've seen it before?

You've

certainly seen it before 1990, didn't you?
A.

Yes.

Q.

You read it?

A.

I've read it before.

Q.

And you agree with it, don't you?

A.

I don't have any objection to what is

stated in here.
Q-

I'm sorry?

A,

I don't have any objection to what is

stated in here.
Q.

So, Mr. Moore, on page 48 of that

document, I take it -- and that was a document that was
disseminated throughout the waterheater industry, was it
not?

A.

Yes.
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1
2

Q.

And it caused a great deal of

discussion among the waterheater industry, didn't it?

3

A.

4

Yes.
I'd offer Plaintiffs1

MR. DOWNING:

5

Exhibit Number 15.

6

MR. MURPHY:

7

THE COURT:

No objection, Your Honor.
Introduce into evidence.
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 15
was filed in this cause.)

10

Q.

Now, on page 48 of that document, it

11

says, Mr. Moore, "In terms of frequency and severity of

12

injury, the accidental ignition of vapors from flammable

13

liquids was the number one hazard associated with the

14

mere presence of the appliances considered in this

15

study-"

Do you see that?

16

A.

What page?

17

Q.

Page 48.

18

A.

Which paragraph?

19

Q-

(Indicating.)

20

A.

Oh, yeah.

21

Q.

See it?

22

A.

Yes, sir.

23

Q.

You agree with t

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

Where it states in the next paragraph,
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"Adult victims generally realized the liquid they were

2

working with was flammable, but were totally

3

unappreciative of the distance the vapors could travel

4

and ignite.

5

behavior refueling a piece of equipment, often a toy.

6

Gasoline by far was the most common liquid.

7

location coincided with the general location of the

8

appliances; basement, kitchen, and garage."

9

with that, don't you?

Child victims were usually imitating adult

Accident

You agree

10

A.

Yes, sir,

11 I

Q.

Now, knowing this in 1975, what did

12

your industry do?

13

A.

In 1975?

14

Q.

Yeah, in response to this.

15

A.

In 1978 the Consumer Product Safety

16

Commission recommended that we apply a warning to the

17

product,

18

Q.

Well, before that happened -- let me

19

show you what's marked as P16 -- before that happened

20

didn't your industry get together and evaluate this

21

Calspan study and come up with a response to Calspan?

22
23
24
25

A.

I wasn't a part of the waterheater

subcommittee until 1978.
Q.

That's right, but in your work with

the waterheater industry, were you not aware of what was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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going on at the time?

3 J

A.

Yes.

Q.

So you were aware that the industry

4

got together in 1976 to make a response to what the

5

Calspan opinions were; right?

6 I

A.
Q.

Yes.
And you see what I've marked as P16,

you're familiar with that document, aren't you?
A.

I've seen it before, yes.

Q.

And you've read it before, haven't

A.

Yes.

Q.

Certainly, you read it before 1990;

A.

Yes.

Q.

Of course. And that report was

you?

right?

written by your industry; right?
A.

Came from GAMA, yes.

Q.

Nell, GAMA is the Gas Appliance

Manufacturers Association; right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And that is a trade organization for

waterheater manufacturers; right?
A.

Correct.

Q.

As part of that work, they have
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1

lobbyists in Washington, D.C. to lobby the Consumer

2

Product Safety Commission on behalf of your industry;

3

isn«t that right?
A,

Yes.
MR. DOWNING:
THE COURT:

I'd offer P16.

P16 is Plaintiffs1

Exhibit.
MR. MURPHY:

No objection, Your Honor
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 16
was filed in this cause.)

Q.

Page 19 of Exhibit 16, sir, under

flammable liquid problem, your industry responded, "From
a review of the NEISS investigation it appears that the
ignition of vapor from flammable liquids is the major
hazard associated with the presence of gas appliances.
Industry recognizes this problem."

That's in P16, isn't

it?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, so, in 1976 your industry

recognized the problem of the ignition of flammable
vapors by the standard gas-fired waterheater model;
right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And before that. your industry knew in

1975 that one of the locations where these fires were
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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occurring were residential basements; correct?
A,

Yes, sir.

Q.

And the reason why you all knew that

about basements is because you all knew, as a company,
that basements are one location where people have
gasoline; is that right?
A.

It's one of the locations that can be

Q.

And also there's other flammables that

found.

can be found in basements, and you all knew that; right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Other flammables that give off -- for

instance, paint, turpentine -- that give off these
flammable vapors that act just like gasoline; right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

So you knew, in 1976 to 1977, that the

hazard with this product (Indicating waterheater.) was
with the gasoline vapors or flammable vapors that would
travel on the floor; right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, cam you tell the Jury what the

hierarchy of engineering is?
A.
hazard.

First, you try to design out the

If you can't design out the hazard you try to

guard against it. And if you cannot guard against it,
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

BROWN & WINGO COURT REPORTING. INC.

1

then you warn against the hazard.

2 J

Q.

Is what I have in the chart correct as

the way you understand the hierarchy of engineering as a
designer?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Can you tell the Jury what efforts

your company made -- let's just pick from 1976 when your
industry recognized the problem, to 1980 — what efforts
did your company make to try to design out the hazard of
the ignition of flammable vapors by this standard
waterheater?
A.

We knew of no technology that could

prevent the ignition of flammable vapors, and we also
knew no way to guard against it, so we warned against the
hazard.
Q.

Are there any drawings, writings,

paper, any physical evidence that shows your company's
attempts to either design out the hazard on the drawing
board or design a guard against the hazard, from 1976 to
1980?
A.

I don't know that there is any

drawings.
Q.

So the answer to my question is, you

don't know of any paper?
A.

That's correct.
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list.
Q.

When asked in your deposition about

anything your company did for 1990 you told us you didn't
know of anything; isn't that right?
A.

Again, I tried to -- when I left the

company I tried to forget about this because I didn't
expect to have to come back and testify.
Q.

Your deposition was just a couple of

month ago.
A,

Yes, it was.

Q.

Now, you're telling the Jury that you

didn't know of amy way to design or guard against this
hazard we're talking about; right?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

And we just got to trust you that you

all kept thinking about this, but there's no paper to
show that; right?
A.

I didn't hear you.

Q.

We got to trust you that you all did

the work but we don't have any paper?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Now, you knew in the '70's that

elevation of the air intake would reduce the chamce of
these fires, didn't you?
A.

Reduce but not prevent.
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Q.

Reduce but not prevent?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You mean reduce but not eliminate?

A.

Eliminate, yes.

Q.

But it will prevent some of these

fires, won't it?
A.

Elevation?
If there's no interaction with an

individual stirring up the vapors, it probably would
prevent it.
Q.

Were you one of the people responsible

for this label on this waterheater?
A.

Yes.

I believe it has two warning

labels on it.
Q.

Where it says in here that elevation,

quote, "this will reduce but not eliminate the risk of
vapors being ignited."

This WILL reduce but not

eliminate, you agree with that?
A.

Yes, sir. Under certain instances it

Q.

So it will reduce the likelihood of

will.

ignition, true?
A.

In certain instances, yes.

Q.

Does it say in there in certain

instances?
No.
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1 I

Q.

Now, in fact, you've gone to meetings

2

with lawyers who represent your company to discuss how to

3

testify in these matters, haven't you?

4 I

A.

I don't understand what --

Q.

You've gone to product liability

seminars on behalf of your company; right?
A.

Yes, I've been to a couple.

Q.

And at those seminars, lawyers give

speeches and talks, who represent your company and other
companies; right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And at those meetings, in fact, don't

they recommend that when you're testifying like this in
front of a jury you say just that; that elevation will
reduce but it won't eliminate?
A.

That's always been my thought.

Q.

Isn't it true they recommend that's

the response you give?
A.

Yes, but that's not their words,

that's my words.
Q.

Isn't it true, sir, that elevation, in

fact, will act as a guard against the hazard of ignition
of flammable vapors?
A.

It doesf but elevating waterheaters

can cause other problems, other hazards.
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Q.

First thing, my question is, elevation

is a guard against a hazard; isn't that right?
A.

Yes, but if you guard against it you

don't want to introduce any other additional hazards.

So

a stand is one way to guard against it but it will, in
certain installations, cause other hazards.
Q.

But you took that into consideration

when you all recommended that they elevate it; didn't
you?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

So, when you all balanced the pros and

cons of recommending elevation to prevent this hazard,
you came down on it's better to elevate; right?
A.

In certain instances, yes.

Q.

Well, it's better to elevate it in a

basement, garage, storage area, utility room; right?
A.

Yes, and certain building codes

require elevation in garages.
Q.

And you all specifically identified

those locations because you all knew that's a place where
it's a high likelihood to find flammable vapors; right?
A.

Possibly, yes.

Q.

But rather than incorporate this

elevation feature into your product to make them safe
everywhere, you all just gave instructions for somebody
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else to do it; right?
A.
correct-

Your statement about everywhere is not

We don't say it will prevent it in every

location.
Q.

Well, you've seen this type of fire

where the waterheater is in the bathroom, haven't you?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Or hall closets?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Storage rooms?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So there's nothing magical about the

room, is it?
A*

In none of those that you mentioned,

elevation probably would not have done any good.
Q.

Isn't it true, sir, that there are

other people that recommend elevation, have recommended
elevation for years, to prevent these types of fires?
A.

Who are you talking about?

Q.

Let's talk about municipalities.

Are

there municipalities, code authorities that recommended
elevation since the '60's and '70's to prevent these
types of fires?
A*

Elevation in garages, yes.

Q.

And the purpose of the elevation was
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to prevent these types of fires; right?
A.

It was to prevent that type, and also

to protect the water waterheater from being damaged by
vehicles in garages.
Q.

And you're familiar with those

municipality requirements in the v60's and '70's, weren't
you?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Are you familiar with something called

the National Fuel Gas Code handbook?
A.

Yes.

Q.

That's a handbook that you used in

your work, isn't it?
A.

Yes, we make reference to it.

Q.

Let me show you a book, you recognize

this as the National Fuel Gas Code handbook?

97.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Let me direct your attention to page

You relied on this book in '88 to do your work,

didn't you?
A.

Yes. We included the pictorial here

in our manuals.
Q.

This picture, you all took it and

printed it in your manual; right?
A.

Yes. We got permission from National
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Fuel Gas Codes to use it in our manuals.
Q.

And in that book that you all relied

upon to take a picture, it said in there in the
justification, there they talk about recommending the
elevation 18 inches above the floor.

And they say in

there, "Available evidence indicates that elevating
burner-ignition devices 18 inches or more above the floor
locates them high enough so the vapors will not be
ignited."

That's what it says in this textbook, doesn't

it?
A.

Yes.

Q*

You agree with that?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you write to the man who wrote

that textbook and tell him you disagreed with it?
A.

No.

Q.

Do you know what expertise or

information he bases that textbook information on?
A.

No, I don't.

Q.

Did you ever question him about it?

A.

No.

I knew from my own knowledge that

it would not.
Q.

Do you know if that man is an engineer

or has any specific training in the engineering field?
A.

No idea.
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1 I

Q.

Show you a thing that I've marked as

2 J Plaintiffs1 Exhibit Number 66. Do you recognize what
this is?
A.

It's a waterheater stand.

Q.

You've seen stands like this before?

A.

Similar stands, yes, sir,

Q.

The one that you all made was similar

to this, wasn't it?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And when did you all first make one

that was similar to that?
A.

Sometime in the f 70 f s.

Q.

Could you tell the Jury how much it

cost for you to enclose one of these stands, how much it
cost you all to make this stand in the 1970's?
A.

The stands we had in the 1970's were

really more leg extensions than they were a stand like
that.

Approximately five dollars for the material.
Q.

Five dollars in the '70's.

Would you

tell the Jury how much it cost for you all to make the
stand that can pick up your waterheater in the v80's?
A.

Ten or twelve dollars.

Q.

About ten bucks; right?

A.

Somewhere in that neighborhood, yes.

Q.

And in 1990 when this waterheater left
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1

your factory, it would1 ve cost your company ten dollars

2

to make this stand; right?

3

A.

Approximately,

4

Q.

This stand is a safety device, isn't

A,

I guess you could call it a safety

Q.

Well, would you call something that

5

it?

6
7 I device.

can prevent or reduce the possibility of these
catastrophic burns a safety device?
A.

Yes, as long as it doesn't introduce

other hazards.
Q.
that?

I thought we already went through

I thought, on balance, you decided it was better

to elevate than not?
A.

That's the recommendation that we made

in certain locations, yes.
Q.

So, on balance, it was better to

elevate than not?
A.

As long as it doesn't introduce other

hazards, yes.
Q.

Did you say on here elevate it as long

as you don't introduce other hazards?
A.

We recommend it when they know there's

going to be flammable vapors and liquids in the vicinity
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of the heater.
Q.

Okay, good point.

So when the person

who's installing this knows flammable vapors are going to
be in the area, that's when they got to elevate it;
right?
A.

We recommend it be elevated, yes.

Q.

So, the person who's going to be

putting this in many times is the installer; right?
A.

Many times, yes.

Q.

So your company thinks the guy that

comes in, that's in that house for about an hour maybe,
from the outside, he's going make the decision whether
they're going to keeping gasoline in that room; is that
right?
A.

I would expect that the installer,

whether it's a contractor that's hired by the homeowner
or if they're doing the installation, I expect them to
read the warnings on how to install the product.
Q.

You think that the installer should

consult with the homeowner where he's installing it to
see if they'll have flammables in that room ever?
A.

I would think that the individual

that's installing it should look at the area it's being
installed and determine whether or not it needs to be
25 I elevated.
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1 I

Q-

Okay.

And the decision is made and

2 J the installer leaves; right?
A.

Yes,

Q.

Has anyone told you that in this case

the installer came in and installed this waterheater in a
home, looked at the space, installed it on the floor,
left, and the home is sold to the Mitchells. Now they
come in and that installer has made a decision for them.
Has anyone told you that?
A.

But the warnings are still on the

Q.

Has anyone ever told you those facts?

A.

No.

Q.

Instead of guarding with elevation,

product.

you all chose to warn?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

This label cost 35 cents; right?

A.

I believe so, at the time.

Q.

Was it, in the late , 70 l s,

technologically feasible for your conrpany to take the air
intake for this waterheater to a level of 18 inches above
the floor by design?
MR. MURPHY:

Objection, calls for

legal conclusion.
MR. DOWNING:

Was it technologically
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feasible.
THE COURT:

4 I
5

Overruled.

A.

Yes.

Q.

You all made this safety device,

instead of mandatory, optional with your products; right?

6 I

A.

The waterheater stand?

Q.

The stand.

A.

Yes, it's always been an option.

Q.

Do you expect that the consumer

understands the same hazard associated with the ignition
of flammable vapors that this product presents as do you
the manufacturer who has all these studies available to
them?
A.

No, that's the reason we place the

warnings on the product, to warn the consumer.
Q.

So you all are in a better position to

17 | know that; right?A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, in your work, was it important

for you to keep abreast of the numbers of persons being
burned as a result of these fires?
A•

Yes.

Q.

And was one source for you all

information from the National Fire Protection
Association?
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A.

Yes, sir,

Q.

And have you seen....
THE COURT:
MR. DOWNING:

You want to introduce 66?
Yes. At this time, Your

Honor, I would offer Plaintiffs1 Exhibit Number
66.
MR. MURPHY:

No objection, Your Honor.
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 66
was filed in this cause.)

Q«

Have you seen this document that I'm

going to show you that I've marked for identification as
40C(1)?
A,

Yes.

Q.

And did you consider that information

reliable to provide your company with information about
the statistics on the estimates of the number of persons
being injured as a result of ignition of flammable vapors
by this model gas-fired waterheater?
A.
to 1984.

Yes. This was for the period of 1980

I believe it's the information you presented to

the waterheater subcommittee.
Q.

You found that information reliable,

did you not, sir?
A.

Yes.
MR. MURPHY:

Object, Your Honor, ask
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in the waterheater industry; right?"
A,
Q.

Yes.
"Have you relied on that Exhibit as

information that you consider to be authoritative in
giving you an estimate of the numbers of injuries out
there that are reportedly associated with the ignition of
flammable vapors by these standard gas-fired
waterheaters?"
A.
Q.

Yes.
"And did your company accept as true

there was an average of 300 persons burned every year as
a result of the ignition of flammable vapors by this
standard model gas-fired waterheater?"

And what was your

answer?
A.

Yes.
THE COURT:

Overrule the objection.

MR. MURPHY:

Your Honor, may I voir

dire the witness on.this issue?
THE COURT:

Certainly.

VOIR DIRE BY MR. MURPHY:
Q.

Now, isn't it a fact, Mr. Moore, that

later during the course of that deposition you asked to
clarify that last question?
A.
Q.

Did that occur, Mr. Moore?

Yes.
And did you not indicate that you
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Q.

Now, do you know, sir, when this was

2 J prepared?
THE COURT: He's already answered
that.
MR. MURPHY:

Oh, did I ask that?

I'm

sorry, Your Honor. Withdraw.
Q.

When was the first time you saw this

particular document, sir?
A.

It was presented, I believe in

November of '91, to the waterheater subcommittee.
Q.

And was that presented to the ANSI Z21

Subcommittee by Mr. Downing?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And was it in his report, the document

that he prepared and submitted to the subcommittee?
A,

Yes.

Q.

And that was in 1991?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was that the first time you saw the

A*

Yes.

Q.

When was this waterheater

document?

manufactured, sir?
A.

1990.
MR. MURPHY:

I have nothing e l s e , Your
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presented, yes.
Q.

You accepted that as true, your

company did; isn't that right?
A-

Yes.

Q.

Mr. Moore, did your company stake a

short-model vaterheater in 1990?
A.
Q.

Yes.
. And how tall was your short-model

waterheater in 1990?
A.

I don't remember what the height of a

short-model would 've been.
Q.

Did you make one that was 40 inches

A.

Without looking at that specifics I

tall?

couldn't tell you today.
Q.
A.
Q.

Can't tell us today?
- No.
Did other manufacturers make something

called a Low-Boy?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And tell the Jury what a Low-Boy

waterheater is.
A.

The Low-Boy is a extremely short

squatty-type waterheater.

It's for installation in, a

lot of times, undercounter-type installations.
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Q.

So you would agree with me that in

1990 when this waterheater came out of your factory, if
the Mitchells needed a Low-Boy to fit in that basement
area, there was one on the market then; right?
A.

According to this report, yes.

Q.

Well, when you reviewed that report

did you write to anybody that you had any objection to
that report?
A.

No. We didn't offer a Low-Boy.

•.©•••

Your company didn't?

A,

No.

@*

That report was circulated to all of

13 | the waterheater manufacturers, wasn't it?
A.

Yes.
MR. DOWNING:

Your Honor, I would

offer Plaintiffs1 Exhibit P24.
- MR. MURPHY:

No objection, Your Honor,

except for the handwriting on the underlying.
MR. DOWNING:

We'll delete any

handwriting.
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 24
was filed in this cause.)
Q*

Your company, sir, made a conscious

decision in 1990 not to provide this safety device with
this standard waterheater; isn't that right?
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A.

You're saying made a decision not to

2 I include it?
Q.

Your company made a conscious decision

-- that means thought about it, decided not to do it - a
conscious decision not to enclose this safety device with
your standard waterheater; am I right?
A.

Yes. They made it as an option.

Q.

As an option, if the consumer

understood the need for it; right?
A.

I think the warnings and instructions

gave that information.
Q.

A 35-cent warning; right?

A.

You can put that dollar amount on it

but that's not what it cost to develop it.
Q.

You got together with the other -- how

many other manufacturers were there when you left the
industry?

How many other manufacturers in 1990 were

there in the industry?
A.

There was a total of five

manufacturers.
Q.

Five.

And all five of you guys got

together and developed this label; right?
A.

Yes. We formed an ad hoc label

committee, hired outside consultants to help us on
developing the label, and then we put it on the product
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in 1988.
Q.

Did you all do work with consultants

to try to figure out where on your product to put your
label?

If down here, up here?
A.

It was recommended to put it right

above the thermostat area, or control of the waterheater,
Q.

All right.

When you made that

conscious decision not to enclose a safety device with
your product in 1990, one of the reasons why you made
that decision was cost; right?
A.

Among other considerations, but the

main reason was not to introduce an additional hazard by
elevating waterheaters.

Replacement waterheaters would

require different venting, and piping, gas arrangements,
and a lot of installations would not be adequate height
to include a stand.
Q.

As a product designer, do you think

that consumers are willing to pay a little bit extra for
safety?
A.

Sure, they are.

Q.

Didn't you think that consumers would

be willing to pay a little bit extra if they understand
the importance of this ten-dollar stand?
A.

But this stand would not have allowed

you to install this waterheater in this installation.
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can be elevated off residential garage floors per 18-inch
code requirements and replace all model waterheaters with
minimal difficulty-n
Q.

So they concluded that there were

models that could replace tell-model waterheaters with
minimal difficulty; right?
A.

Yes# but that doesn't mean that where

this particular waterheater's bought that that Low-Boy
model was available to the consumer.
Q.

And what do you do when you go to a

store that doesn't have the product you need?

Go to

another store, don't you?
A,

Yes.

Q.

Your company knew that when you made a

conscious decision not to enclose this stand with your
product, or some other means to elevate the air intake 18
inches, you would continue to have persons burned in
these types of fires; right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And, in fact, wouldn't you agree, sir,

that even since you all started using this label, which
is what you all used to address the problem, the numbers,
the statistics, remained essentially the same?
A.

No, I wouldn't agree with that.

Q.

Have you state in the past that the
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Q.

And yet we see no decrease; isn't that

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did Mr. Murphy show you a piece of

2 J right?

paper or just told you that there was a decrease?
A.

I've seen another piece of paper that

shows a reduction.
Q.

Do you know what the name of the piece

of paper is?
A.

No, I don't.

I believe it was from

Consumer Product Safety.
Q.

But you've never seen 71, have you?

You've never seen P71 before I just showed it to you,
have you?
A.

I think Ifve seen that one too.

Q.

Let's talk just a minute about the

standards process.

You said you served on a standards

committee; is that right?

sir.

;

A.

The waterheater subcommittee, yes,

Q.

And that committee is the one that

-

writes the design standards for this piece of equipment;
right?
A.

We work on those standards, yes.

Q.

And your product has to meet those
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standards; right?

3 1

A,

Correct.

Q.

Your product can't exceed those

4 J standards, can't be less; right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, isn't it true that the time of

1990 there was approximately twenty people on that
committee?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And ten of them were representing

manufacturers; right?
A.

Waterheater manufacturers or

manufacturers?
Q.

In the code it says representing

manufacturers, doesn't it?
A.

Yes, but that's not just waterheater

manufacturers.
Q.

And then there were about ten or so

that were representing gas companies; right?
A.

I believe so.

Q.

Wasn't there approximately five people

on there that actually worked for waterheater
manufacturers like you?
A.

Yes.

Q.

So twenty-five percent of the
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1 I committee, essentially, was made up by people like you
2 I that work for waterheater manufacturers; true?
A,

Yes.

Q.

And what was the percentage it took to

pass something?

Eighty percent?

A«

Eighty percent.

Q.

So, mathematically, you all could

block any change; isn't that right?
A.

That's conceivable.

Q.

But you all never did that, did you?

A.

Not that I'm aware of.

Qv

Can you see this okay, Mr. Moore?

(Indicating chart on easel.)
A.

Yes.

Q.

(Adjusting chart.) Can you still see

it okay?
A.

Yes.

Q.

All right. We've already established

you were aware that waterheaters were installed in
basements, true, in 1990?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Already established that in 1990 you

were aware that gasoline could be found in basements;
right?
A.

Yes.
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1

Q.

Already established that you

2

anticipated, when this thing left the factory, that some

3

of them would be exposed to flammable vapors; am I right?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

And it was common knowledge by you and

6

your company in 1990 that there was a hazard associated

7

with this product that would ignite floor-disposed

8

flammable vapors but sucking them through holes in the

9

bottom; right?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

And you were also aware that other

12

manufacturers were having the same reports?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

And you were aware that there was an

15

average of 300 persons per year that were injured,

16

burned, in these types of fires; right?

17

A.

Yes, sir.

18

Q.

And you were also aware that this

19

waterheater was a passive appliance, didn't need constant

20

attention; right?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Then would you agree with me that this

23
24
25

waterheater was defective?
A.

No.
MR. MURPHY:

Objection.
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label, haven't you?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Wasn't it reasonably anticipated by

your company when this product left your factory in 1990
that it would be exposed to flammable vapors?
A.

Again, that's the reason we put the

warning label on the product.
Q.

So the answer is, yes, you reasonably

anticipated that it would be exposed to flammable vapors;
and as a result, you put the label on it; is that true?
A.

It was reasonably warned,

Q.

Is my answer yes?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So, our definition is that this

product is unsafe for that reasonably-anticipated
handling and use; right?
A.

I've already answered that question.

Q.

And it is?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, the average consumer, do you

think that the average consumer, when they move into a
home that has an existing gas-fired waterheater, that it
will ignite flammable vapors?
A.

Restate your question.

Q.

Okay.

Do you think the average
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(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 401
was filed in this cause.)
MR. DOWNING:

Thank you, Your Honor.

I pass the witness.
THE COURT: We haven't had a formal
break but you all did have a break few minutes
ago when you went out. Does anyone need a break
at this point.
(WHEREUPON, no response from
the Jury.)
THE COURT: Are the attorneys all
right?
MR. MURPHY:

One quick break, Your

THE COURT:

Let's go ahead and take

Honor?

about a ten-minute break.
(WHEREUPON, a brief
recess was had.)
THE COURT:
C R O S S

Cross-examination.

E X A M I N A T I O N

BY MR. MURPHY:
Q.

Mr. Moore, Mr. Downing asked questions

about this document that he didn't have, didn't show you,
which showed that, in fact, there has been a decline.
you recall that, sir?
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Do

2 1

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did Mr. Downing show you this

3 J particular document right here which we've marked for
identification as Defendants' Exhibit Number 40?

6 I
7

A.

No.

Q.

Now, sir, would you take a moment to

take a look at that Exhibit that Mr. Downing didn't give
to you?
A.

(Witness complies.)

Q.

Now, sir, I'll show you a copy of the

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 71. Now, would you tell the Jury
what the date is of Defendants' Exhibit Number 40?
A.

Number 40?

Q.

Yes, sir.

A.

I believe itfs the 16th.

Q.

Is it the 18th?

A.

It may be.

Q.

Of 1994?

A.

1994, yes.

Q.

And the document that Mr. Downing

It's not

real --

It's not real clear.

showed you was three days later, the 21st?
A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

Okay.

Now, does the document that Mr.

Downing showed you show an average number of these
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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estimates of incidents for the period 1986 to 1991?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And does that show that there is an

4

average number of incidents of gasoline ignitions?

5

Because that's what this case is involved with, gasoline,
A.

Yes.

Q.

Of 239?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, the document that Mr. Downing

10

didn't show you, the 1991, would you tell the Jury what

11

the estimate was for these incidents in 1991 was?

12

A.

165 injuries.

13

Q.

Okay.

Now, between 1986 and 1991,

14

would you tell the Jury what technical change had been

15

made to the waterheater which is the subject of this case

16

that would account for, in your view, this decrease in

17

the number of incidents?

18
19
20
21
22
23

A.

The pictorial label that is on the

front of this waterheater here.
Q.

Now, the pictorial label, I'll show

you, sir, this document.
A.

Is this a copy of the label?

Yes, it is.
MR. MURPHY:

Your Honor, we would

24

offer as Defendants' Exhibit -- if I can*find it

25

-- Defendants1 Exhibit Number 3, a copy of the
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1

pictorial label.

2 I

MR. DOWNING:

If it's the identical

size of the one that's on the waterheater we
4 I

have no objection.

5 I

then we do.

If it's a different size,

THE COURT:

I'm not going to measure

the size, I don't know what it is.

If you're

going to object to, object to it.
MR. DOWNING:

I object, without

foundation.
THE COURT:

Overruled .
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 3
was filed in this cause.)

Q.

Now, before I skip ahead here, Mr.

Moore, this April 18th, 1994 document, Defendants'
Exhibit Number 40, that's a document you've seen before,
sir?
A.

Yes.
MR. MURPHY:

We'll offer Defendants'

Exhibit Number 40, Your Honor.
MR. DOWNING:
THE COURT:

No objection.

Let it be introduced as

Exhibit 40.
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 40
was filed in this cause.)
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1

Q.

Now, this label -- why don't we put it

2

over here, Mr. Moore -- have you had a chance to see this

3

waterheater here?

Could you come down here and see if

4 I this is the condition of the label?
MR. MURPHY:

Is that all right, Your

Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
Q.

Please come down here and see if this

is the condition the label was in when it left the
factory, sir*
A.

No, it wasn't.

Q.

Could you describe for the Jury what

is the difference in the condition?
A.

It's had some fire, paint or whatever,

against it, and it's been discolored.

And the wording is

slightly blurred.
Q.

So if I put my hand at the top of the

can and came right down, is that where it appears that
somebody's painted over it?
A.

There's been a liquid of some kind, or

over-spray of paint or something.
Q.

Right on the side here, sir, there's a

piece of plastic.

Can you describe for the Jury what was

in this piece of plastic?
A.

That's the plastic pouch that the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

BROWN & WINGO COURT REPORTING, INC.

1

instructions that came with the waterheater, the manual

2

that goes to the homeowner.

3

Q.

Okay.

Now, the label, there was some

4

questions earlier, sir, that Mr. Downing had for you

5

using the chart where it's got right here it's defective,

6 J unsafe for reasonably -MR. DOWNING:
MR. MURPHY:
Q.

Excuse me.
Certainly, go ahead.

Now, if Mr. Mitchell had read this

warning label, is this waterheater unsafe for reasonably
anticipated handling or use?
A.

No.

Q.

Does the company do anything to

conceal this label from users?

It doesn't spray paint

over it, does it?
A.

No.

I think that the pictorial

adequately gives the consumer the information he needs to
use the product safely.
Q.

Okay.

And that's the reason for the

label, isn't it?
A.

Yes, to inform the consumer.

Q.

Now, as of October of 1990 when this

waterheater was manufactured, were you, as the
vice-president of engineering, aware of any technical
solution to the ignition of flammable vapors?
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2 I

A.

Not at that time, no.

Q.

Now, are you familiar, sir, with the

3 J opinion of the United States Consumer Product Safety
Commission about whether there was a technical solution
5 I to the ignition of flammable vapors?
6
7

A.

solution at that time.

8 1
9

Yes. They did not know of any

Q.

Okay.

Now, getting back here, sir, to

this diagram, Mr. Downing asked about the term

10

unreasonably dangerous.

11

it is on the waterheater, is this particular waterheater,

12

this 30-gallon waterheater, unreasonably dangerous?

13

A.

If the warning label is read as

No. When it's used for its intended

14

purpose and installed per our instructions, it is a safe

15

product.

16
17

Q.

Okay.

Now, your label, that's a label

you worked on, isn't it, sir?

18

A.

Yes, it is.

19 I

Q.

Mr. Downing was suggesting that this

20

label costs 35 cents, and I think you stated that that's

21

not the cost of development.

22

follow-up on that --

23
24
25

But then Mr. Downing didn't

MR. DOWNING:

Objection.

Leading,

argumentative.
THE COURT:

Sustained.

Does he need
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1

knew that handling gasoline around the product could

2

cause a hazard of injury.

3
4

Q*

Okay.

Why don't we go back to the

box, sir.

5

Could you explain to the Jury, sir,

6

what the American National Standards Institute's standard

7

is that applies to this particular waterheater?

8
9

A.

The standard that applies to this

waterheater is called Z2110.1 which is for residential

10

waterheaters.

11

certified that we meet the requirements of that standard,

12

and they're generally tested by American Gas Association.

13

It's a standard that we have our heaters

Q.

Okay.

I'll hand you what we've marked

14

for identification as Exhibit Number 7, it's the American

15

National Standards for Gas Waterheaters, Volume 1, it's

16

the ANSI Z2110.1, 1987.

17

THE COURT:

What number?

18

MR. MURPHY: Ifm sorry, Your Honor.

19

That's Number 7.

20

Q*

Actually, which one do you have there?

21

A.

1987.
Actually, Your Honor, I!m

22

MR. MURPHY:

23

sorry, I think this is Number 6.

24

apologize.

25

Q.

I have to

I'd like to also hand you what we've
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marked for identification as Defendants' Number 7.
2 | That's the 1988 ANSI Z2110.1; is that right, sir?

4
5

A.

Yes.

Q.

Are these the codes to which this

particular waterheater was certified?

6

A.

Yes, sir.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

these codes, sir?

9

purposes of the Jury?

10

A.

Now, how would you characterize

How would you describe them for

They're the state-of-the-art that the

11

particular time that these standards were written.

12

They're both performance and safety standards.

13

MR. MURPHY:

14

Defendants' 6 and 7, Your Honor.

15

MR. DOWNING:

16

THE COURT:

I'd offer into admission

They'll be introduced .

17

(WHEREUPON, Exhibit Nos.
6 and 7 were filed in
this cause.)

18
19

No objection.

Q.

Mr. Downing, sir, was asking you

20

questions about the makeup of the subcommittee, and I'll

21

turn your attention to page 6 of Exhibit 6.

22

many representatives are there from the manufacturers of

23

gas-fired waterheaters here, sir?

Now, how

24

A.

Four, I believe.

25

Q.

And you're one of them, aren't you.
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sir?
2 I

A.

Yes.

3 1

Q.

And how many people are there on the

4
5
6
7 J

committee as a whole?
A.

It varies at times. There's twenty to

twenty-two, twenty-four.
Q.

Why don't you please count there, sir,

for that particular number.
A.

(Witness complies.) There happen to be

twenty-four at this particular point in time.
Q.

Okay.

Now, this ANSI subcommittee, is

this a group that meets in the dark of night with black
pointed heads or do they have regular open meetings?
A.

It's open to the public, anyone can

attend the meeting.
Q.

Is there limited discussion about

issues or is it fairly vigorous discussion?
A.

There's a lot of discussion about the

items or the agenda that we're covering at that
particular time.
Q.

After all, sir, isn't the reason for

these discussions in these meetings to ensure that the
product is as safe as it can be?
A.

Absolutely.

Q.

And that's the reason why you were
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involved, wasn't it, sir?

3

A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, do representatives from

4

governmental agencies attend these ANSI Z21 subcommittee

5

meetings prior to 1990?

6
7

A.

Consumer Product Safety

Commission attended our meetings at different times.

8 1
9

Yes.

Q.

Did the Consumer Product Safety

Commission ever say that this waterheater that was in the

10

Mitchells' crawlspace, that that had to be recalled

11

because it wasn't on an 18-inch stand?

12

A.

No, did not.

13

Q*

Now, who other than representatives

14

from the Consumer Product Safety Commission were in

15

attendance at these meetings?

16

A.'-

There were representatives from gas

17

companies, control manufacturers, the LP gas association

18

was there, recreational vehicles. And we also had a

19

special-interest-group person that was not a member of

20

any manufacturer.

21 I

Q.

And he's reflected as a public

23

A.

General interest.

24 I

Q.

General interest?

25

A.

Michael Martin.

22

interest?
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1 I

Q.

Okay, thank you.

There was a question

2

put to you earlier, sir, about the issue of whether that

3

particular waterheater was to be left and ignored.

4

like to show you Defendants' Exhibit Number 2 and see if

5

you're able to identify this, sir?

6
7

A.

I'd

It's the operation and installation

service manual for residential storage-type waterheaters,

8 I June of '87.
Q.

Now, sir, is that the manual that

would accompany this particular waterheater?
A.

I don't know that this is the exact

one but it wouldfve been very similar to this one.
Q.

Now, this manual would've been found

right here in the pocket; is that right, sir?
A.

In that plastic pouch, yes.

Q.

Okay.

Does the manual, sir, call for

maintenance?
A.

Yes, there's a maintenance section in

Q.

Does the label also give a warning

there.

about the use or storage of gasoline within the proximity
of that particular -A.

Yes, sir.

The same warnings that's on

the front of the waterheater here are also on the front
of the manual.
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MR. MURPHY:

Your Honor, I'd offer

this a Defendants1 Exhibit 2.
3 I

MR. DOWNING:

4

THE COURT: All right, Exhibit 2 will

5 I

No objection.

be introduced into evidence.
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 2
was filed in this cause.)

8 I
9
10

Q.

Now, Mr. Moore, have you had an

opportunity to look at the waterheater to see if there's
only one warning on it concerning flammable vapors?

11

A.

No, there's additional warnings above

12

the pictorial label.

13

Q.

And I'll show you this Exhibit, see if

14 I this is a copy of that pictorial label?
15

A.

16

Yes.
MR. MURPHY:

Your Honor, we've marked

17

this for identification as Defendants' Exhibit

18

75.

19

Q.

20
21
22
23
24
25

This is a blow-up of the other warning

label which is on that,plastic, is it not, sir?
A.

Yes.
MR. MURPHY:

Wefll offer Defendants'

Exhibit 75, Your Honor.
MR. DOWNING:

Objection, it

mis characterizes the label.

I don't mind the
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exact same size but that one mischaracterizes
the label. Size.
3 I

THE COURT:

Objection is overruled.

4

The Jury can look at the Exhibit 71 and the

5

waterheater.

6

take the waterheater into the jury room when you

7

deliberate so you can tell the size of it.

8

you can see it right now.

If you want to, we'll even let fem

But

9

(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 71

10

was filed in this cause.)

11

Q.

Now, Mr. Moore, there were questions

12

to you, sir, about what the company had done in terms of

13

finding a technical solution to the issue, and I think

14

you explained that during direct.

15

than kind of design efforts, did the coxxipany engage in to

16

deal with the risk of accidental ignition of flammable

17

vapors?

18

A.

What efforts, other

Well, we went through a series of

19

different warnings that we put on the product.

1978 we

20

put the first warning against flammable vapors; that

21

label said do not use or store flammable vapors or

22

liquids in the vicinity of the waterheater.

23

changed the wording of that to include the word gasoline.

24

In 1982 to '84, the label that you see there above the

25

pictorial, that was put on the product.

In 1980 we

And then in 1988
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1

we added the pictorial label that was a development where

2

we went outside, hired consultants to help us design a

3

label that would inform the consumer.

4

In the early '90's we started the

5

consumer awareness education program, it was millions of

6

dollars spent on that.

7

spots out to warn against the ignition of flammable

8

vapors using gasoline around the product.

9

provided information to fire departments to use, it also

The waterheater industry took TV

That also

10

included information that was given to schools to

11

distribute and inform children about the use of flammable

12

vapors and liquids around the product.

13

And after that, the waterheater

14

industry formed a consortium to develop a solution design

15

of waterheater to reduce the ignition of flammable

16

vapors.

17

Q.

Okay.

Now, I think I've jumped ahead

18

of myself, I must apologize.

This manual that was

19

admitted into evidence as Exhibit 2, does that contain

20

instructions on the maintenance for this particular

21

waterheater?

22

A.

Yes, it does.

23

Q.

And does it call for periodic

24
25

maintenance?
A.

Yes, it does.
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Q.

Now, the waterheater that's on the

2 I stand over here, sir, this is not a complete picture of
3

what the waterheater would look like installed, is it,

4 I sir?

6 1
7

A.

No, it's not.

Q.

Now, what I need to place on top of

the waterheater, this device right here?

8 I

A.

Yes. That's a draft hood and vent

attached to it.
10 I
11

Q.

fashion, somewhat like that, sir?

12
13

A.

Q.

It goes over the flue outlet of

Now, this pipe has to go in an upward

direction?

16
17

Yes.

the waterheater.

14
15

So that would go on top in this

A.

It has to rise at least a quarter-inch

per foot.

18

Q.

Why is that, sir?

19

A.

So that the combustion products don't

20

spill out the draft hood opening and rise and go outside

21

the structure.

22 I

Q.

23

this?

24

chimney?

25

What is the typical installation of

Is it typical that this pipe would run into a

A.

It can.

Generally, it's a vent that's
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1

dedicated for the waterheater.

2

Q.

Now, is there a risk, sir, that if the

3

waterheater is placed on an 18-inch stand, that the

4

installer wouldn't change the hole in the vent and would,

5

in fact, run the pipe right back into that same hole?

6

A.

That would be the normal installation.

Q.

Now, I'm talking about the situation

where the waterheater is originally on the floor and the
pipe is going in an upward direction, as you've said, but
it's replaced now with a waterheater that's elevated,
okay?

Is there a risk that the installer is going to run

that pipe back into the same hole in the chimney?
A.

There's a risk of that.

If that

happens and there's not proper elevation to the vent pipe
you're going to spill products of combustion into that
area.
Q*

Okay.

A.

And products of combustion are carbon

monoxide.
Q.

Does carbon monoxide present a risk,

A.

Yes.

sir?
It can make you sick or even

kill you.
Q.

Carbon monoxide is a deadly poison, is

it not, sir?
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2 I
3

A.

It sure is.

Q.

Now, how much above the top of the

vent pipe does the company require there be a clearance

4 I for materials that can catch on fire?
A.

On the data plate of the waterheater

there is a dimension, I believe it's 6 inches from the
vent to combustible construction.
Q.

Okay.

Now, I just want you to assume,

sir, for purposes of this next question that the height
at the Mitchell basement was 70 1/2 half inches, and that
that height was approximately where I've put this piece
of black tape.

Which is always impossible to use, and

it's not very even, is it. (Tape is placed around top of
waterheater.)
To the extent this waterheater was
placed in the basement of the Mitchell residence, where
would the top of this waterheater have been?
A.

Would've been above the ceiling.

Q.

Okay.

And then to the extent we had

to have the necessary vent pipe on it, where would that
have placed the vent pipe?
A.

The waterheater couldn't have been

installed, first, on an elevated stand.
Q.

All right.

Now, Mr. Downing was

asking you about Low-Boy models, do you remember that?
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2 1
3

A.

Yes.

Q.

And I think you had some questions,

sir, as to whether -- well, perhaps not.

Did you have a

4 J question as to whether the conrpany manufactured a Low-Boy
in 1990?
A.

I said we made short models but not a

Q.

What is the height of the short model

7 I Low-Boy.
8 1
9

you made in approximately 1990?

10
11

A.

Like I said, without a specification

sheet I couldn't remember.

12

Q.

Okay.

Let me just show you this and

13

see if this will help you refresh your recollection about

14

what the height was of a short-model 30-gallon

15

waterheater in 1990, sir.

16

A/

Well, the height to the top of the

17

waterheater was 45 1/4 inches and the height to the top

18

of the vent would've been 48 1/2 inches.

19

Q.

Okay.

Now, sir, why was it that the

20

company did not manufacture the kind of Low-Boy, 40-inch

21

Low-Boy, that Mr. Downing was asking you about on direct?

22

A.

We, as far as I know, had never been

23

asked by anyone in the company to develop a heater that

24

short.

25

'GO'S -- early '60's, I mean -- up until I left the

We had been producing short models from the late
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1

company.

2

our company knew.

3

There just wasn't a market for a Low-Boy that

Q.

I think you had a question in your

4

mind, sir, about whether this Low-Boy could actually meet

5

the efficiency requirements.

6

Jury what efficiency requirements are for a gas-fired

7

waterheater?

8
9

A.

Could you explain to the

The Department of Energy has set

specific efficiency requirements for waterheaters, and

10

when you shorten the heater up as short as a Low-Boy

11

there's a real problem on getting the efficiency required

12

by federal law.

13

because there really wasn't a market for that type of

14

product, and we wanted to make sure we gave the consumer

15

a sufficient product.

16

Q.

And we chose not to try to develop one

Now, Mr. Moore, you use the word

17

efficiency, can you translate that into more concrete

18

terms for the Jury?

19

A.

20

that you're burning.

21

40,000 input, the efficiency is the amount of heat that

22

you burn that you actually put into the water to heat it.

23

And today, most products are around 80-percent efficient.

24

And a Low-Boy, I doubt that you'd be able to make an

25

80-percent efficient waterheater.

It's the amount of energy, the BTUs
A particular waterheater with a

If you did, it'd be so
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1

low input it wouldn't be of any advantage to the

2 I consumer.
Q.

Is it fair to describe it, then, sir,

4 I that the consumer would have to spend more for the gas
5

that's firing that particular Low-Boy waterheater and get

6

less hot water?

7
8

A.

You could characterize it in that

fashion, yes,

9

Q.

Okay.

Now, a question was put to you,

10

sir, about why is the burner down at the bottom on this

11

waterheater, and I don't know that you got an adequate

12

opportunity to explain that.

13

the bottom here, sir?

14

A.

Why is the burner down at

The burner is placed below the tank so

15

that you heat the entire tank of water instead of only a

16

portion of it.

17

at the top; the cold water side has a tube that brings

18

water to the bottom of it and you take the hot water off

19

the top of the heater.

20

maximum amount of hot water out of the unit.

21 I

The waterheater, you've got connections

That way, you're able to draw the

Q.

So the water comes down in here from

23

A.

Yes.

24 I

Q.

Is it then circulated throughout the

22

25

the top?

tank inside?
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1
2

A,
move in the tank.

3
4

The normal heating causes the water to

Q.

Now, would it be technologically

possible to put the burner compartment right here in the
middle of the waterheater shell?

6 1

A.

It would, but you wouldn't heat the

7 I entire tank.
Q.

So what you'd be doing then is heating

the top part of the tank but not the bottom part of the
tank?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

Now, the burner in this

particular waterheater is 6BF90333T, that's down here in
the bottom, is it not?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you get access through the door;

right?
Some access, yes.
And there's an inner door as well;
right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, I think I recall you saying that

the reason why air is drawn through the door on the
bottom is because it's the most efficient way of doing
it; isn't that correct, sir?
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1

A.

It's the most efficient design, yes.

2 I

Q.

Now, I'm not sure if I understood this

3

but I kind of understood that there's some great sucking

4

movement from far away that drew the vapors right into

5

the waterheater.

6

a hot waterheater operates?

7

A.

Is that a fair characterization of how

The waterheater pulls air from the air

8

surrounding it, and it draws it up through into the

9

burner.

It is burned there, and then a portion of the

10

surrounding air is used to help the venting at the draft

11

hood.

12

Q.

Isn't it a fact, sir, that the effect

13

of radius of where air is being actively pulled is right

14

within just a foot or so of the bottom of the

15

waterheater; isn't that right, sir?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

At the time this waterheater was

18

manufactured in October 1990, was this the

19

state-of-the-art?

20

A.

Yes*

21 I

Q.

Now, in 1990 approximately how many

22

gas-fired waterheaters were there in operation day in and

23

day out in the United States?

24

A.

Approximately fifty million.

25 I

Q.

And that was a design that worked, and
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1

continues to work, safely and appropriately; is it not,

2 I sir?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, we've skipped around a little

bit, Mr. Moore, and I have to apologize.

The ANSI

standard and ANSI certification, that's reflected right
here on the label, isn't it?
A.

Yes.

Q.

With the blue star?

A.

That's the certification symbol for

American Gas Association.
Q.

Could you describe for the Jury, sir,

the process with which you -- because, after all, you
were the developer and the designer of this waterheater
-- what was the process of testing that you went through
to come up with this design?
A.

Once we had designed the product the

ANSI standard was used to test the product in our
laboratory.

We went through all the testing requirements

that were in the standard before we would ship it.

I

shouldn't say we shipped it, our lab was certified by the
American Gas Association and they came directly to our
laboratory and did the required testing to certify the
product.

•~
Q.

Now, at the time you developed this
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model waterheater, you were the vice-president of
engineering, were you not, sir?

4 I

A.

Yes.

Q.

How many people did you have working

5 1 with you in the engineering department?
6 I

A.

When I started out in 1974 there was

only four of us. At one time we had approximately
twenty-two people,
Q.

And they were working under your

direction and supervision?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

Did they seem to have any problem,

sir, with the fact that you didn't have a college degree
in engineering?
A.

No.

In fact, most of the engineers

that I had working for me had at least a Master's degree.
Q.

Now, you recall the document that Mr.

Downing -- well, I'm jumping ahead again, I apologize for
that.

Did you do any field-testing of this particular

model before you had it tested for the ANSI
certification?
A.

Yes. All of new products that we

develop we field-test it before it actually went into
production.

This particular model, several of the

employees within the compauiy we installed them in their
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

houses and they were operated there. And we periodically

2

would pull them out, re-test them, cut 'em apart and

3

examine them.

4
5

Now/ you1 re responsible for this

Q*

design, are you not, sir?

6 J

A.

Yes, I am.

Q.

And when you designed this product did

you intend to design it safely, as safely as you could?
A.

Yes, it was.

Q.

And could you describe for the Jury

the process with which the company tries to ensure that
the quality of the product is maintained as it's being
built?
A.

Well, the production line, when the

product is finished on the line it goes through an actual
flame test.

The gas is hooked up to the unit, the burner

and pilot are operated, the control is turned on and off
to make sure that it will turn it on and off like it' s
designed to.
Beyond that, we periodically pull off
a number of units per day and the quality-control
department takes it into the quality-control lab and
they're tested.

The heater is actually filled up with

water, the thermostat is checked for calibration,
combustion is checked, a combustion analyzer is attached
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21
22

A*

Well, why was I was w i t h t h e company

t h e w a r r a n t y s e r v i c e group r e p o r t e d d i r e c t l y t o me and
ii I MI i 1 Ii ' qua I J I y c o n t r c: 1 cle|".

24
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product.
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1

Q.

Now, sir, I'll hand you what we've

2 I marked for identification as Defendants' Exhibit Number
4, which is the appliance certificate from the American
Gas Association Laboratories.

Is this the certification

5 I by the American Gas Association Laboratories that, in
6 I fact, the model that we have in front of us, this model
which was in the Mitchell crawlspace, was in compliance
with the ANSI Z2110.1 standards?
A.

This is the original certification for

that particular design of waterheater.
MR. MURPHY:

Your Honor, we'll offer

in evidence Defendants1 Exhibit Number 4.
MR. DOWNING:
THE COURT:

No objection.

Let it be filed.
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 4
was filed in this cause.)

Q.

Now, what I'm showing you, Mr. Moore,

is this a blow-up of the front page of that Exhibit
Number 4?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And is this what I show you a blow-up

of the front page of the manual for this particular
Exhibit 2?
A.

Yes, but I want to correct something.

That is not the exact manual that came with this product.
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The one that came with this product also had the
£>

pictoiia! IHIIHI mi I IIM I I I «• i f lr» n( lhr> manual.
Oh, inside the first front page?
/•••

A .

Y e h .

-^.

So we iieeci to add the pictorial label

msiae

that manual; Is that right, sir?
~.

yes.

~

1 1 l l Ill

So the consumer would get both the

manual?
• Yes,,

A.

Okay. Now, tu i*ii& extent, n i i
n

*•

I I Ml

the manual for some reason i s removed, does the company,
wxx

UXJLJU

• -

ill a r

label

i

•

•: llhij

i i iriHinm: 1 !

.fii'iiiB •

information a s to where to obtain the manual?
'•A.

assing the manual you

•ar- jet It fr om the manufacturer.
Q.

And what does i t say here right where

~*j finger -.^» *.wx. uuc u^ei, LU che extent the
ft

A.

6±

*

]

22

waterheater warnings and instructions

23

mi ssi ng

24
25

cont act the n i
Q.

i the manual is

^ or manufacturer.

And the company made manuals available

to people who would call i a -and say 1 need a manual?
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A.

Yes.

2 1

Q.

And they wouldn't charge for them?

3

A.

No charge.

4 1

Q.

Now, this label which was on the

5

waterheater, this does have some very specific

6

information right in this section right in here, does it

7 I not, sir?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And what was the reason for this

particular label, sir?
A.

It was a label to inform the consumer

of hazards related to the waterheater.
Q.

And the top portion of the label, why

is that in pictogram-type form, then?
A.

As I stated earlier, that was in that

form so if the person was not illiterate they could
determine what the hazard was associated with the
waterheater.
Q.

Isn't it also true, sir, that with

that pic togram on the waterheater you can see it from
some distance away.

And you would be able to see it here

if it hadn't been painted over; isn't that correct, sir?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And I guess the distance you can see

it is only controlled by the distance at which you can
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actua1"1" «~~

right, «•*•***

£

Yes
Now, you haven't been

the Mitchell

z esidenc e , h a « e "j z uf sir?

/

I haven1 1:

Nc

Q

And.yon,111 v e h a v e n ' t seen any oi

t.lie

photographs of t h e waterheater i n t h e M i t c h e l l basement?
n

•

I saw one p h o t o g r a p h t h a t

wdt priieat'ei WHSII I zc n n e c t e d

10
2

';

Ii

" '• '

the
;

•

Now, t h i s case involves gasoline;
u

s

unaersuanainc

12.

A.

Yes.

1? !

Q.

And the information you gave on your

1

15

l-:si-

I III

I

W H t f M ' l l P r l l I" I

! H i l l I VH 1 IP !

I 11

lkl J l»»||l

f 1 iflllllllJIllhlllll II il

products far away from the heater; i s that right, sir?

1

A."" '

i! e s .

Q

"'•••

And to keep them in approved "

containers?
19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Also says tightly sealed; i s that

23

J!!

right

•>

::

' Yes.

22
2
21
25

• ' .'.'••

Oright,

And c

aat

~—
Yes,
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1 I
2

Q.

Now, again, in the righthand side of

the label there's more information, teaching users of

3 J this waterheater about what, sir?
A.

That the waterheater has a main

burning pilot, that it is on all the time and will ignite
flammable vapors. And that the vapors cannot be seen,
they're heavier than air and they can go a long way on
the floor. And they can be carried from other rooms to
the pilot or main burner flame by air currents.
Q.

Now, I think when you were on direct,

sir, there was question asked of you about 18-inch
elevation and the capacity of a waterheater like this on
a stand to ignite flammable vapors. Do you recall that,
sir?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And I think you mentioned something

about air movement.

What did you mean when you used the

term air movement?
A.

Well, in testing in our laboratory

we've used a substance,called liquid smoke in our
development.
acid.

Liquid smoke is heavier than air, itfs an

And by using it, you can see air movement.

You

can spill it on the floor and it hugs the floor like
vapors do.

But if there's any air movement, you walk

through that, it will rise.

You can see it swirl around.
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iJibuti,

L Il ini1 h e i g h t

or

^ o v a t i o n Is not the answer to igniLioii of flammable
vapors because they can. be carri ed, like as our label

involvement/ any movement,

-. L ;

.i

ip ai i

Nov , sin , this liquid smoke that
vou've testified about, was this something you used -"the laboratories

il American Waterl-

oo tobex of 1990?
.-.• A .

<• .

went in there.

Mi

i i ' i f i I in t

II i m i l I l i t

11 i w ' l i e i i

I I mi mi i I

In fact, i LIIXIIK. Lliey stxll use xt today

for development.
Q. .

And pi ior to October

noticed this phenomena of liquid smoke, this

A. '

Yes

We had an incident where a

of. L..III. it.1 "'..jut knoL'k eel o v e r a n d :i t just covered the whole
_loor . As the person walked through it y ou could see die
sapors being picked up,by the movement of the person
walkinq through this l.n ;"pji;i.d smoke.
Q.

And that was something you saw
?

A.

Oh yeah.

Q.

Now

I think Mr. Downing has asked you
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1

questions about where is this piece of paper and where• s

2

that piece of paper, did you need a piece of paper to

3 J know that gas vapor could rise with air movement?
A.

No, I did not.

Q.

Has that something you understood

based on your time as an engineer and as a service man
and as a draftsman and as the head of engineering at the
American Waterheater Company prior to 1990?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And you understood, did you not, sir,

that an elevated waterheater could ignite flammable
vapors?
A.

Yes, sir.

I've investigated two

waterheaters that were elevated and did light off
gasoline vapors.
Q.

And that was before October of 1990,

was it not, sir?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, getting back to the label, there

is a reference here on, the label, says it very plainly,
does it not, about 18 inches above the floor?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And the company stands behind this

label, does it not, sir?
A.

Yes, we do.
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Q.

Okay.

Now # a s a m a t t e r o f fact, t h e

spec i, f i ? references:
room, those words were actually removed after this
pax t::::i oil a i: Ill a 1:: e .3 i i a s st a x ted? '
. .. A , ...
Q.

I believe s o ,
And weren't those specific

identifications removed because
.uare

. *:

;:^

COIDDA

:O

consumers didn"t just look

*e

areas

cunniaojLe
liquids?
A.

Yes

Q*

So -L - AJL i>uuw

uxiJLs

notogxaph

taker b y the Lenoir City Fire Department o n t h e evening

MR. MURPHY;

Yuut Honor, I think b o t h

] ,.« .,..r,,-LI xB ' audi Defendants' -MR. DOWNING:

May I see what y o u ' v e

marked?
MR. MIJPPWV
MR., DOWNING
I,

<

y

Exhibits, a n d at: * n > < i*r,

^. . - I2h

evidence Defendant
photograph c

_ _ _fiei — »~ ?
This ±? a

the waterheater.

MR. DOWNING:

N o objection.
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THE COURT:
2 I

MR. MURPHY:

3 I

Exhibit 12A.
Thank you.
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 12A
was filed in this cause.)

5 1

Q.

Now, this is a photograph, sir, of the

6 I waterheater as it was in the basement, and this is a
photograph taken by the Lenoir City Fire Department.

Do

you see the white paint on the waterheater, sir, as you
see it right now?
A.

No, the labels are clear there.

Q.

And that's both labels, both the older

one which was started in 1984 and the newer one which was
started in 1988?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, this label in 1988, was the

coxzrpany the first waterheater manufacturer that put that
label on its waterheater?
A.

Yes, we put it on a month or two prior

to our competitors.
Q.

Now* did the company simply attach

this label to any of its new products or did it do
anything to get this label out to be attached to
waterheaters which were already installed in the field?
A.

Our company distributed the labels to

our wholesale plumbing houses, we also distributed to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Southern California Gas Company there in Southern

3

that they come across that did not have the label on it.

4

I saw several waterheaters that were

5 I made pi: i or to 1988 that Southern California Gas actually
6 I appl ied the label to i t

And also, GAMA had a program

distributors.
'•: Isn , t ::i !:: a ] so true r si i: that GAKA had

Q

10 1 a program to distribute the new, label to the big gas
11 ! util ities throughout the United States?
A.'"

' Yes.

Il 1

And was the purpose for that the same

I "II

purpose tns

j[3

when they «

If

installed for their customers, thpy'ri go and put that

II >

II r i II i i III i i in in

IB
II

I

70
21

w were distributed I

*** ***** places where waterheaters aze

A
.I l l

Sni'aU-idu

Yes,

II I I I 1 II i l l III t i l I I I Jill

I f I hey, for any r e a s o n

I Il(JI P

illll I

W i I1

III I

| I L I t O J 1 r l III

III irl I If » II

w ,"iniIII t o
Ill

II III

Lhey'd p u t one o n the product at that time.
0

hurl Unit happened p r i o

itober <

22 I 199011 did it not, sir?
Yes. v.Q.
25 | sir, about a direct-vent waterheater

If II show «; ' on w h a t
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we've marked for identification as Defendants1 Exhibit
2 I Number 8.

Is that a copy of the manual for a direct-vent

3 I waterheater?
A.

Yes .

5 I
6 I

MR. MURPHY:

Your Honor, we'd offer

into evidence Defendants1 Exhibit 8.
MR. DOWNING:

May I just see it a

moment?
MR. MURPHY:

Certainly.

MR. DOWNING:
THE COURT:

Okay.

No objection.

It'll be admitted.
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 8
was filed in this cause.)

Q.

Now, Mr. Moore, was a direct-vent

waterheater designed for the purpose of preventing the
ignition of flammable vapors?
A.

No, the direct-vent waterheater that

was designed in 1986 was designed for a new type of
housing where the construction was very tight, good
weather stripping and all. And the contractors wanted an
appliance, a waterheater that did not pull its combustion
air from within the structure, they wanted the air pulled
from outside.

They did not want the heated air within

the structure to be used for the combustion of the
waterheater.
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"

loes t h e d i r e c t - v e n t do a

mi nil in il lli in il in u I.J r i i iiiir 11

i • Il

Yes.
n

Does,, the direct-vent

thai direct-vent

~> I right there, does that have a fan on it, an electric fan?
*'

an atmospheric-fired

w'cilitiiijeai

somebody came

:^if - .

aaies and gentlemen <~

old

JTWT

direct-vent waterheater had a fan on it which would
"" ' require electrical connections, would that be in error?

13

iIIi

14

I;,, - v e n t ,

••

I!

•-• •- -' .:-.

O .

Okay

lien I >\ ent

mi;

mH

t h a t a l s o subjec^ ~~ ~~w ANSI standards which we ^
1

marked and admitted i n t o evidence a s Exhibit 6 and 7?

± i

••••••:••...,..

18

1 a be!

I Ii

•

Yen , anil WL yu\ Lhiu .lariic, waiinnq

on the d i r e c t - v e n t : a s we do our s t a n d a r d

*al e i" he at. *,j,r
M

" • "• .

' . .' •

- :'- ••

.•

. _ :J is label right here, sir?

'

A.

Yes.

Q*

A U U nuj %*ww0 uhe company

^w uuxo

flammable-vapor label on the direct-vent waterheater?
2 il! I '

'.'••'. •,, .;:&• .• .: ,;,.., B e c a u s e

I Im' i"? iilf'Jhi ii(|iii

'iI I tiiiH" d i r e r . 1 1 : "< M-'III'

waterheater will not prevent the ignition of flammable
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1

vapors.

The design of a direct-vent waterheater that

2

we're talking about here, the standard allows a certain

3

percent of leakage on both the air-intake portion of the

4

appliance and the exhaust that has openings large enough

5

that will allow the flammable vapors to be pulled in.

6

And you can ignite off flammable

7

vapors with that product.

8

direct-vent of this type and it did light off flammable

9

vapors, which was gasoline that it was tested with.

10
11

Q.

Tests have been run on a

And were those tests done at the

American Gas Association Research Laboratories?

12

A.

Yesf they were.

13 I

Q.

Now, even if the direct-vent would

14

prevent the ignition of flammable vapors, what is the

15

cost to manufacture a direct-vent?

16

relationship between the cost to manufacture this

17

standard waterheater and the direct-vent waterheater?

18

A.

19

standard waterheater.

20

Q.

21

at the retail level?

22

A.

23

Q.

What's the

It's about three times the cost of a

And,would that difference also apply

Yes.
Is the direct-vent more difficult,

24

more cumbersome, more time-consuming to install, as

25

opposed to the standard waterheater?
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If you,• re r e p l a c i n g a standard
w a t f rJiwdl: t:,!l,f

V' ,|l! "
three-times difference would

li HI vi

II 11

i < u rurther as f* * comparison for

ixpande

installed cost; ±u that fair, six ?
A

Yes„

I i Ilf1-

tffitPI

| l I O't" >H I'll 1 y

Tt requires the relocation of

fHlllf.

II II II II I'111 Ml

Ill

a

different type of venting than the standard waterheater.
H rl " P

I I I I III

-I

III) I fl

I M r I HUM | l l

! Ill1 1

: S

and there are sections that have to be put together/ and
i silicuiit. thai; has to be put on the joint to seal it up
y .

•: . •

you about elevated *-.
1 in mi i mi II

II lllCIII II'11 "W I:i1 II P

N OK

intake

"" : IOIllf"

IIJ II if1'1'1! Ill II 111

, addition In a stand.

I

I

i 11 mi in in i

designs that you were asked about that experts had told
vnu you should ve corporated into your product?
A.

yes.

Q.

~- ~ e l e v a t e d a i r intake? .-.•.• •

A.
And, was one of t h o s e t h a t Mix: Downing
.wheel lib

gn?
A.

A Rheem bucket, ^uo.

• Q* ,-

'.:•' Now, why don't you tell the Jury what

you describe this bucket theory soundN II i
n III ii" i1
A.

The bucket as II knew it was a big pan
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with sides on it that went up 18 inches high and the

2 I waterheater was placed inside of it. But in the bucket
you've got to have an access door to be able to light or
service the appliance, which you also have to have a
drain hole in that device to get rid of water if the
waterheater leaks. And at some time it will leak.
So# without putting a hole in it and
having an access door to it, you've got the possibility
of leaving those open, and it's no better than the
standard waterheater.
Q.

We didn't see it as a solution.

Now, somebody proposed to you one of

these barriers that just went around the bottom of the
waterheater of just 18 inches, and what did you think of
that?
A.

I think you're referring to the one

where in an alcove they would put a device, a panel that
went down to the floor and covered that space and was 18
inches high.

And my question to the person that proposed

the design, I said well, what do you do about lighting
it?

He said you lift it up. I said how would you hold

it up, and he said well, you attach a string to it. And
my comment wa,s it looked like a guillotine to me,
something that could fall and injure a person.
Q.

Now, this bucket that you talked

about, does that introduce new risks?
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Yes

/on don f t have a drain on it,

v

wl""?!' M,'- ipp.l Ian- t« luak'.

i'
" j poii.j,«,iiil.e that the lt:vel . 1

waLei would ilse and you would have natural gas 01 LP yas
escaping, not being burned i n the heater.

As that wafer

Jix woula xiav

rose

Q.

No

guess the barrier
ucsicxe

the waterheater?
Y e s , i t woi ILI d •— -O 1 *-he' way a r o u n d

' A.
10

11 |

Q.

And about how ~

" would if: extend?

A.
13 1

Q.

And was there some something that

3i
15

aenagers from just,, throwing thei
j unfortunately do?

—

II 6

---.A A .

1 7"

Q .

18

•• N o .

--• •

I in ill II .1

Ill In

.1 i il : j"iiiijiIII

,"!i11'f,

that l i t t l e narrow area i s blocked

-.'" I

f- II, In,i;-]

;i, i ea,

potential

II S

20

Lothes,

;>efore?

:••.• A-.. •.
. •

••' ''Well , ::i £ you hail combustibles in ther e
danger of them being ignited

But i f you

22

closed off the air to it you'd have carbon monoxlilf" be m nq

23

expelled from the waterheater

24
25

.

I:] 1 ,, i :]

risks that the bucket introduces, sir?
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A.

As I said, we didn't consider the

2

bucket because you would have to have an access to be

3

able to service the bottom.

4

Q.

Sir, in addition to the risks that you

5 J talked about when you elevate a previously-on-the-floor
mounted waterheater and the risk of carbon monoxide if
somebody doesn't install it properly, is there any other
risk that you can think of that the 18-inch stand
introduces?
A.

The stand allows storage area below

the product.
Q.

So you could take the gas can and fit

it underneath the stand, sir?
A,

That's a possibility.

I've seen

flammable liquids that were stored in a cabinet that was
below the waterheater.

We had the person remove them at

the time I saw them.
Q.

Now, sir, I think you at one point

earlier today said that an 18-inch elevation can delay
ignition; is that a fair characterization, sir?
A.
Q.

Yes.
What happens when the delay period

runs out?
You have a bigger explosion.
So you literally have an explosion; is
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that right, sir?
A,

YRF .

.rge explosion.
• ... .. ions

Not

IIILJI

I

I ni I i

'|

in

Hi.

J ')r

i

You can blow windows out, you may exack

there's a IJ LuuJ of things that can happen.

Q.

Can you even shake a house with that

kind of explosion with.gas vapor that's gone up that far,
IB • i.uc J les?

' ". '

A

.Absolutely,

lull. mi ii1! mi il III,!"]!'

0.

ii question put

some kind of elevated air intake*

Did you

understand what Mr. Downing was asking yon about about
elevated air intake?
A.
wen,! J nil HI " Lowe

Yes
!,.JJIIII."" l,n ill. I i,inn

He was proposing that the design
HI wril.ei h e a l e r

and

I lie

air

i.nt.cike

would be raised at least 18 inches above the bottom ot
the • waterheater.
Q.

"

"'•- "

And are you aware, wou

to try and put it in ballfield terms

that be

111 :i I .€
elevated portion above«your head?
A'.

'Illiiil

!, I In. iiiMuiiiJ

LIIL)

Lliat

wub u. i d

in

that type of design.
Q.

And does this snorkel design prevent

the ignition of flammable vapors?
• ''""A.

' No.

That design'has been tested an :1
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1

it did light off flammable vapors.

2
3

Q.

Okay.

And when you have a small area

like this snorkel -- I guess it'd be coming up the side

4 I of the waterheater?
A.

It could be.

Q.

When you have a small area like that

for drawing combustion air, does that present a new risk
because you'd so localize the area that you're drawing
air from?
A.

It's easier to get closed off and

prevent the combustion air from coming into the unit.
Q.

I supposed I should've gone to this

point earlier, sir, it sounds to me as if what you're
talking about is that poor combustion can happen either
because the flow into the waterheater is restricted or
the flow of combustion byproducts out of the waterheater
is restricted; is that a fair characterization?
A.

Yes.

Q.

So, to the extent you have this small

snorkel on the side of.the waterheater, that presents a
risk of having a limitation on the inflow of combustion
air?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you know of any waterheater

manufacturer who has designed this snorkel-type device
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1

for drawing in combustion air for standard waterheaters?

2
3

A.

tested one but it lit off the ignition vapors.

4
5

Well, State Industries designed and

Q.

Do you know if anyone has a patent on

this snorkel air design?

6

A.

I "in .not aware of a patent.

7 I

Q.

Okay.

The bucket, the Rheem bucket

8

design that you're talking about earlier, sir, am I

9

correct that the patent on the bucket was obtained some

10

two or three years after this particular waterheater was

11

manufactured?

12

A.

I believe it was.

13

Q.

Okay.

Now, this patent, did the

14

manufacturer Rheem, have they been out there selling them

15

day in and day out?

16

A.

No. As far as I know, they never sold

17

one.

Their patent eventually was dedicated to the

18

public, which meant anyone could use the patent.

19 I

Q.

For any purpose?

20

A*

For* any purpose, yes.

21

Q.

Now, you had questions asked of you

22

about a direct-vent waterheater, have you ever heard of a

23

modified direct-vent where basically somebody takes the

24

top off of a direct-vent waterheater?

25

A.

I think what you're referring to is
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State Industries1 direct-vent waterheater.
2 1

Q.

That would be where somebody just

3

removed the top, which is intended to be there, remove

4

that top and just use the way it was without the top?

5 I

A.

Yeah# it'd be the same as the

snorkel-type design.
Q.

And did State Industries use that, the

test you talked about with the snorkel, did they also
test this modified direct-vent in the same series of
tests?
A.

Yes.

of the heater.

It pulled its air from the top

It was essentially a waterheater in a

larger diameter jacket, that the air openings were on top
of the heater.
Q.

And you've testified before, would

your experience with the liquid smoke clearly show to you
that that heavier-than-air vapor can get up to the top of
that 56-inch high waterheater?
A.

Yes.
THE, COURT:

Mr. Murphy, how much more

time do you need of this witness?
MR. MURPHY:

I'm probably going to

need at least half an hour, if not a little
more.

. ,
THE COURT:

We need to go ahead and
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1

break for lunch, then.

2

while we break for lunch just leave your

3

notebooks and pencils there on the seat.

4

fifteen 'til twelve, I would ask you be back by

5

one o'clock.

6

back into the jury room like you did before.
(WHEREUPON, Jury out.)

8

THE COURT:

9

Court will be in recess to

one o'clock.

10

(WHEREUPON, a lunch

11

recess was had.)

12

THE COURT:

13

We'll continue with the

cross-examination of the witness.

14

MR. MURPHY CONTINUES:

15

Q.

Now, Mr. Moore, I'll hand you what's

been admitted into evidence as Defendants' Exhibit Number

17 I 8.
18

It's

And when you come back, report

7

16

Ladies and gentlemen,

That's the installation manual for the direct-vent

waterheater, is it not, sir?

19

A.

Yes.

20 I

Q.

Now* sir, is there a limit, physical

21

limit, on how far from the wall your direct-vent that was

22

available in 1990 could be installed?

23

A.

Yes.

24 I

Q.

And how far is that?

25

A.

I believe it was approximately 22
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inches.
2 1
3

Q.

Okay.

Now, above a direct-vent

waterheater, what is the limit -- well, let me step back.

4 J Do you know what the height is of the direct-vent
waterheater?
A.

The height of it?

Q.

Yes, sir.

A.

Not without looking at the dimensions

Q.

Okay.

of it.
But is there a clearance above

the vent pipe on a direct-vent waterheater?
A.

No.

Q.

Was there a clearance above the top of

the waterheater?
A.

Yes, there is.

Q.

And what's that height?

A.

The minimum was 16 inches.

Q.

And that's for safety purposes; is

that right, sir?
A.

Yes, to install the vent.

Q.

Okay.

Now, if a direct-vent

waterheater was located in a garage, under the National
Fuel Gas Code would that have to be elevated on 18-inch
stand?
A.

Yes, it would.
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1 I

Q.

Now, you testified earlier today, sir,

2

about the public awareness campaign that your company

3

funded, to try and educate people on the uses of

4

waterheaters and gasoline, about the risk of gasoline.

5

Are you familiar with any of the materials that were

6

circulated in connection with that campaign, sir?

7

A.

Yes, I was.

8 I

Q.

I'd like to hand you what we've marked

9
10

for identification as Defendants' Exhibit 47, this is a
letter sent out on the GAMA letterhead.

11

A.

Yes, sir.

12 J

Q.

That is what it is, sir?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

And this is a letter from who to whom?

15

A.

It from GAMA to the plumbing

16

professionals.

17
18
19

Q.

And what's attached to that document,

A.

It's information about -- it's about

sir?

20

the flammable-vapor safety material kit that was made

21

available to plumbing professionals.

22 I
23

Q.

And is there an order form attached to

that for plumbing professionals, sir?

24

A.

Yes, there is.

25 I

Q.

And was that part of the public
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1

awareness campaign that the American Waterheater Company

2 I funded in order to educate consumers about the risks of
gasoline?
A.

Yes, it was.
MR. MURPHY:

Your Honor# we'll offer

Defendants' Exhibit 47.
7 1

MR. DOWNING:

8

THE COURT:

I have no objection.

It'll be filed.

9

(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 47

10

was filed in this cause.)

11

Q.

Now, I've got a tape here, a

12

videotape, Mr. Moore, this has been marked for

13

identification as Exhibit Number 49 and 50. As a part of

14

the public awareness campaign did the Gas Appliance

15

Manufacturers Association retain a consultant to prepare

16

public service announcements?

17

A.

Yes, they did.

18 I

Q.

And were those public service

19

announcements broadcast nationally on television?

20

A.

Yesf they were.

21 I

Q.

And was there a target audience for

22

these particular public broadcasts?

23

A.

Consumers.

24

Q.

Was there any emphasis on males

25

between the ages of 18 and 35?
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A.

That was one of the groups that was

targeted.
Q.

And why was that group targeted, sir?

A.

Because of the use of gasoline.

Q.

Okay.

And were the public service

announcements, were they broadcast in connection with
nationally-broadcast television programs?
A.

Yes, they were.

Spots were actually

bought in prime time.
Q.

Do you happen to remember amy of the

names of television shows on which these public service
announcements appeared nationally?
A.

No, but in Los Angeles I saw some of

the spots on local television.
Q.

Okay.

Now, in addition to educating

the plumbing wholesalers and males particularly the age
of 18 to 35, were there any efforts on the part of your
cosipany through this public education campaign to provide
information to teachers and educators about the risks of
flammable vapors?
A.

Yes. As I said earlier, there were

materials made available to schools to educate children.
Q.

Do you remember if there was a comic

book which was prepared in connection with the Marvel
Comic Book Company?
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2 1

A.

Yes, there was.

Q.

I'll show you what we've marked for

3

identification as Exhibit 56, see if you're familiar with

4

that, sir.

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Is that a copy of the DareDevil Comic

7

Book that your company and the trade association

8

contracted with to prepare a comic book for children to

9

learn about the risks of gasoline?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

And is the hero of this comic book

12
13
14

called DareDevil?
A.

Yes. And the villain, gasoline

vapors, is called Vapor.

15
16

MR. MURPHY:
Exhibit Number 56.

17
18

MR. DOWNING:

THE COURT: Yes.

20

a

21

(WHEREUPON, a bench conference
was had out of hearing.)

22

MR. MURPHY CONTINUES:

23

Q.

25

Your Honor, can we

approach?

19

24

Your Honor, we'd offer

And you had seen these public service

announcements, had you not, Mr. Moore?
A.

Yes.
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MR. MURPHY:

We'll offer as

Defendants' Exhibit Number 49 and 50, the public
service announcements.
MR. DOWNING:

No objection.

(WHEREUPON, Exhibit Nos. 49 and
50 were filed in this cause.)
MR. MURPHY:

Your Honor, was there a

ruling on the admissibility of Exhibit 56?

I

don't recall.
THE COURT:

I don't recall.

MR. DOWNING:

I don't recall it being

offered.
MR. MURPHY:

We would offer it, thenf

Defendants' Exhibit 56.
MR. DOWNING:

I have no objection.
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 56
was filed in this cause.)

Q.

Mr. Moore, were there also, as a part

of the consumer education campaign, materials that were
prepared for teachers,.elementary teachers and
kindergarten teacher -- actually, kindergarten through
third grade --to help children to better understand the
risks of ignition of flammable vapors?
A.

Yes, there was.

Q.

And, in fact, some of those even refer
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1

to waterheaters as a potential ignition source for

2 J gasoline; is that right, sir?
A.

Yes.

Q.

I want you to take a look real quickly

here, sir, at Exhibit 53. Are you familiar with that as
being a part of your consumer education campaign?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And, really, right on Exhibit 53, what

does it indicate in terms of potential ignition sources?
A.

Furnaces, stoves, waterheaters,

clothes dryers, space heaters, electric items, motors,
switches.
Q.

What about these items right here,

A.

Matches, lighters, candles,

14 | sir?

fireplaces, lanterns, space heaters, radiators, toasters,
clothes irons, dryers, hair dryers, hot curlers, curling
irons.
Q.

Here's another Exhibit, 55, see if

you1re familiar with that, sir.

That's Sparky the fire

dog from the National Fire Protection Association; isn't
that correct, sir?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And does that show a waterheater in

the corner of a room on the third page -- fourth page,
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sir?

3

A.

Yes, it does.

Q.

Okay.

I'd like you to also look at

4

these materials right here, these are more in the same

5

line.

6

book for young children, elementary school?

This is an activity book, Exhibit 52, activity

A.

Yes.

Q.

Is that part of that public education

campaign, sir?
10

A.

Yes, it was.

11

Q.

Okay.

And this Exhibit 58 which we've

12

marked for identification, is that more of that same

13

material, sir?

14

A.

Yes, it is.

15

Q.

And finally, what we've marked as

16

Exhibits 56 and 57, is that additional material in

17

connection with the public education campaign?

18
19

A.

Yes, it is.
MR. MURPHY:

Your Honor, at this point

20

we would offer into evidence Defendantss

21

Exhibits 52, 53, 55, 56, 57 and 58.

22

MR. DOWNING:

No objection.

23

(WHEREUPON, Exhibit Nos. 52,

24

53, 55, 56, 57 and 58 were

25

filed in this cause.)
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Q.

Now, you've testified earlier, sir,

that in 1990 there was approximately fifty million
waterheaters in operation, day in and day out, safely.
Of that fifty million, approximately how many were
American Waterheater Company waterheaters?
A.

Our company had about twenty percent

of the market, so that would be approximately ten
thousand.
Q.

Ten million or ten thousand?

A.

I mean ten million.

Q.

Now, we talked earlier about the

development of this particular pictogram label and I
don't know, sir, if I asked you what was the approximate
cause, if you could estimate, for the development of this
kind of label.

I think we talked about the consultants

and engineering time and so forth, could you -A.

Yes.

Q.

Is that in the range of tens of

thousands of dollars?
A.

I don't know what the consultants cost

but our engineering time, personnel involved, probably a
hundred hours of our time.
Q.

Now, could you describe for the Jury

the nature of the competitive relationship amongst the
various waterheater manufacturers?
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1
2
3

A.

It's a very competitive industry.

Extremely competitive.
Q.

Okay.

Now, sir, you were shown

4

Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 24, this is a document which is

5

stamped draft; is that right, sir?

6

A.

Yes..

7 1

Q.

Have you ever seen a final copy of

8

this report, sir?

9

A.

I don't know whether I have or not.

10 I

Q.

Do you know whether a final copy was

11

ever prepared?

12

A.

No. No, I don't.

13

Q.

Okay.

And so you wouldn't know, sir,

14

if any of the conclusions reached or the opinions stated

15

or the information contained in this document was changed

16

when the document was finalized; correct, sir?

17

A.

No, I don't.

18

Q.

Now, sir, this particular waterheater,

19

by virtue of the blue star, indicates that it's been

20

certified as being in compliance with the ANSI code; is

21

that right, sir?

22

A.

Correct.

23 I

Q.

If this particular waterheater did not

24

have that blue star on it, could this waterheater be sold

25

here in the State of Tennessee?
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1

A.

No, it couldn't.

2

Q.

Why not, sir?

3

A.

All agencies1 building codes and all

4

required it be a certified appliance.

5 J

Q.

And certified to the ANSI code?

A.

Correct.

Q.

Does the ANSI code call for 18-inch

legs on this waterheater?
A.

No, it doesn't.

Q.

Does the ANSI code require that only

direct-vent waterheaters be used as opposed to this
standard model?
A.

No, it doesn't.

Q.

Does the ANSI code require that a

bucket of some sort be used around the bottom of the
waterheater?
A.

No, it doesn't.

Q.

Do you know of any statute or code

that requires a bucket?
A.

No.,

Q.

If a bucket were on the bottom of this

waterheater, would it coarply with the National Fuel Gas
Code?
A.

No.

It would still have to be*

elevated.
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1

Q.

Do you have any understanding if the

2

National Fuel Gas Code is followed here in the State of

3

Tennessee?

4

A.

I believe it does.

5 1

Q.

Now, there was some questioning

6

earlier, sir, about statistics, statistics of reported

7

incidents. Do you know if those statistics that we

8

looked at, those estimates -- first of all, do you know

9

if they're estimates or not?

10

A.

As far as I know, they're estimates.

11 I

Q.

And is it your understanding that the

12

principal soixrce of those statistics are from something

13

called NEISS?

14

A.

Yes.

15 I

Q.

And is that the National Electronic

16

Injury Reporting System?

17

A.

Yes.

18 I

Q.

And is that maintained by the United

19

States Consumer Product Safety Commission?

20

A.

I believe so.

21 I

Q.

Okay.

Does the Consumer Product

22

Safety Commission warn people who use this data that the

23

data is not to be interpreted to mean that a particular

24

injury was caused by a particular identified appliance?

25

A.

No, I believe it says associated with
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1 I a particular appliance,
2 I

Q.

And isn't it correct that the CPSC

actually gives a specific warning don't make the false
assumption that because we have these statistics it means
a particular product, whether it's a waterheater or some
other appliance, caused the particular injury; is that
right, sir?
A.

That's right.

Q.

Now, the database which is used, is

that from tens of thousands of hospitals all across the
country?
A.

No, I think it's a limited number of

hospitals.
Q.

Well, could it be as few as a hundred

hospitals that this database is used for?
A.

It could be.

Q.

Now, this Calspan report Mr. Downing

asked you about before, this is a report, who paid for
that report, do you have any understanding?
A.

Mr., Downing did, I believe.

Q.

And was that report publicly issued?

You know, sent out by agencies and by the United States
Government and so forth?
A.

No.

Mr. Downing presented it to the

25 I waterheater subcommittee.
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Q.

After the date that this waterheater

was manufactured?

4 J
5

A,

November 1991,

Q.

Now, are you aware, sir, of any

patents that have been obtained which address the issue

6 J of attempting to prevent the ignition of flammable
vapors?
8 I

A.

By?

9

Q.

Well, let's start with an affiliate of

10

What company?

the American Waterheater Company.

11

A.

Yes.

12 I

Q.

And when was that patent obtained?

13

A.

I believe it was last year.

14

Q.

And that was am affiliate which was

15

located in Australia, sir?

16

A.

That's correct.

17

Q.

And you know some of the people who

18
19
20

actually got the patent, don't you?
A.

I believe I know at least one

individual who got it.,

21

Q.

Jeff Woodford?

22

A.

Jeffrey Woodford, yes.

23

Q.

And you've gotten patents yourself,

24
25

haven't you, sir?
A.

Yes, I have.
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1

J

2

Q.

What is getting a patent mean?

Does

that mean that this is a new idea, that it's one that a

3 J prior art doesn't reveal it and it is new and not
discovered before?

7

A.

Yes.

Q.

And that was what caused you to get

patents, wasn't it, sir?

8

A.

Yes.

9 I

Qv

Now, Mr. Downing brought out a page of

10

this Calspan report, I think it's page 48 he brought out.

11

Did Mr. Downing ask you about what was contained on page

12

52?

13

A.

No.

14 I

Q.

Did you have an understanding of the

15

fact that on page 52 of this report, four pages after the

16

cite that Mr. Downing gave you, that the CPSC, the

17

consultant, said that an 18-inch elevation gives no

18

positive guarantee of the prevention of ignition of

19

flammable vapors?

20

A.

Yes.

21 I

Q.

Now, do you have any understanding as

22

to whether the Consumer Product Safety Commission was of

23

that view after this particular waterheater was

24

manufactured?

25

A.

It's still in agreement with them.
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1 I

Q.

And that's based on testing that's

2 I been done?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, the testing that was done of

5 I 18-inch waterheaters (sic), was that done through funding
6

by, in part, your company?

7 f

A.

Yes. A.D. Little was contracted to do

tests on waterheaters, both at floor level and elevation,
with and without movement.
10 I

Q.

This is a big national consulting

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

I assume it didn't come cheap, then?

14

A.

No, they werenft.

15

Q.

Was A.D. Little paid to hook up some

11

firm?

16

tests to try and show that 18-inch elevation wouldn't

17

work?

18

A.

Well, the tests were to get the

19

information that the industry needed to decide what

20

technology or development should be done. And as

21

outgrowth of that, the consortium was started to develop

22

technology that could prevent the ignition of flammable

23

vapors.

24
25

Q.

Did A.D. Little, in a systemic,

organized, scientific fashion, try to explore the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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circumstances under which gasoline vapors ignited?
A.

Yes. During testing, winter blends of

gasoline were used and summer blends of gasoline, and
there were many, many tests run where there was a
simulation of a person involved in the operation of the
test where the gasoline was spilled and then the dummy
was moved back and forth to simulate someone moving
through the vapors.
Q.

And movement is very important to this

whole issue of the ignition of flammable vapors; isn't
it, sir?
A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

Now, you understand that A.D. Little

uses different temperatures of the room and the floor;
you understand that, sir?
A.

Yes.

Q.

They didn't conceal that, did they?

A.

No.

All the parameters that the tests

involved were reported in the report.
Q.

And,isn't it a fact that the A.D.

Little Company, after it was found that there were some
mistakes they had made, issued public clarifications, or
errata sheets?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, I'm not quite sure you understood
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1

my first question, but A.D. Little, this national

2

consulting firm, were they paid by the waterheater

3

industry to phony-up, to hoak-up a set of tests to show

4

the 18 inches wouldn't work?

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

Would you, in your position, have

7

Absolutely not.

permitted that to happen?

8

A.

No.

The tests that they were going to

9

do were presented, and on the tailend A.D. Little made a

10

presentation to the waterheater industry before the test

11

was done, and the industry picked A.D. Little to be the

12

one.

13
14

They we felt they could do the best job.
Q.

A.D. Little had actually done work

before for your company, had it not?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

And were you pleased with that work?

17

A.

Yes, I was.

18 I

Q.

Did you believe they'd done a

19

professional job, that they had exercised their best

20

professional judgment?,

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Mr. Moore, I'll have a few more

23

questions.

While you were at the American Waterheater

24

Company and the vice-president of engineering, did you

25

instill a safety policy of that company?
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A.

Yes.

2

Q-

And what was that policy, sir?

3

A.

First of all, I wrote the quality-

4

control manual that the company used for their billing of

5

their product.

6

during the years that I was vice-president, and, as such,

7

I was able to make sure that our product was built to

8

specification.

9

Q.

Quality-control actually reported to me

Was it your company, American

10

Waterheater Company's policy to produce the safest

11

waterheater you could?

12

A.

Absolutely.

13

Q.

And you're responsible for the design

14

of this waterheater, are you not, sir?

15

A.

Yes, I am.

16

Q.

Did American Waterheater build unsafe

17

waterheaters ?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

Even one injury is of concern to the

20

company, is it not, sir?

21

A.

Yes, it is.

22

ti-

If there was a technical solution to

23

the ignition of flammable vapors in 1990, would the

24

company have used it?

25

A.

Absolutely.
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Q.

1

This waterheater in front of the Jury

here, this complies with all industry and government

2

standards, does it not?

5

A.

Yes, it does.

Q.

Do you believe that there's anything

wrong with this waterheater?

6

A.

7

No, sir.
MR. MURPHY:

8
Moore.

9

Pass the w i t n e s s ,

R E - D I R E C T

10

Thank you very much, Mr.
Your Honor.

E X A M I N A T I O N

BY MR. DOWNING:

11

Q.

12

Mr. Moore, it's not only your

13

responsibility to make the safest product around but it

14

was your duty, wasn't it?

15

A.
1

16

Yes,
(

Q.

Can you tell the Jury how many times

17

those TV ads you're touting today were seen on the TV

18

here in Loudon County?

19

A.

No, I can't.

20

Q.

Do you know if they've ever been seen

21

here in Loudon County?

22

A.

I have no way of knowing that.

23

Q.

Do you know how many schools in Loudon

24

County have these materials that Mr. Murphy's brought

25

here today?
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guarantee it, what we should do is ban them; right?
A.

Well, they say strong consideration

should be given to prohibit other than direct-vents.
Q.

What would have happened to the sales

of your gas-fired waterheaters, sir, if they ban them?
A.

I guess we would have went into

direct-vent production.
Q.

Because they said direct-vent would

prevent these fires, didn't they?
A.

They said it but we proved otherwise.

Q.

Mr. Murphy asked you if you knew about

12 | this patent from Australia that was issued in '98?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, you've been out of business since

-- when did you retire, '96?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

How did you become aware of this

A.

Jack Langmead informed me of it, at

patent?

Calspan.

5

Q.

Oh, okay.

So you still keep in

contact with them?
A.

Sometimes.

Q.

You brought up the fact that you were

shown some statistics from the NFPA which you say that I
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
nDnLJXT r. LJTTJrm POTTPT T ? T ? D n P T T K m

TKTP

150
A.
it.

No, I think youfve mischaracterized

It will reduce the number of instances. And if it

does delay it, yes, there's going to be a larger
explosion.
Q.

Oh,

So you're telling me, see if I

understand this, you say that elevation of the air intake
18 inches will, in fact, reduce the number of victims;
right?
MR. MURPHY:

Objection,

mischaracterizes his testimony.

He's talking

about the stand.
MR. DOWNING:
Q.

Stand?

Did I understand you to say that

elevation will reduce the numbers of fires that occur by
the ignition of flammable vapors?
A.

We believe, so.

Q.

Okay, all right.

So, you're not

saying that if we elevate this we're still going to have
a fire, it's just going to be a bigger boom?
A.

Depends on the spill of gasoline.

Q.

So, if I understand you, you think

elevation is a good idea?
A,

In certain instances, yes.

Q.

You're not going to question the fact

that if the gas company Loudon Comity recommends
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elevation you wouldn't tell them that's a bad idea, would
you?
A.

No.

Q.

You would tell them that you believe

elevation will reduce the number of these fires; correct?
A. .

Yes.

Q«

And so, Mr. Moore, if you believe it

would reduce the number of these fires, you still also
believe that you shouldn't provide a device and let the
consumer do it, do you?
A.

Are you saying should we include the

Q.

Include the stand.

A.

No.

Q.

You've talked about this bucket

stand?

device, this Rheem patent you said you saw.

You've seen

it, haven't you?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And doesn't that patent say the

elevation of the air intake will substantially lessen the
possibility of ignition of flammable vapors?
A.

I'm sorry, repeat the question.

Q.

Doesn't that patent that you were

asked question about by Mr. Murphy state in there that
elevation of the air intake 18 inches substantially
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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at that point?
2 I

A.

Not at that point.

3

Q.

Do you all make a bucket?

4 J

A.

No, we do not.

Q.

Did you voice this concern to the

people who got the patent at Rheexn Manufacturing Company?
A.

I don't believe anyone in the industry

thought it was a good idea.
Q.

Well, you talked about the good things

about patents, you know that Rheem went out and got a
patent on that, don't you?
A.

Yes.

Q.

First question out of the box when you

hit the stand that Mr. Murphy asked you dealt with this
i

chart, remember that?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did Mr. Murphy talk to you about this

chart before you hit the stand?
A.

No# he did not.

Q.

He didn't?

A.

No.

Q.

Did he tell you you made a boo-boo

when you said something up there earlier?
A.

No.

Haven't talked to him.

Q.

Prior to 1990, your coapany knew that
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if the waterheaters had been installed on stands that
2 J that would substantially reduce the likelihood that
3 I someone gets involved in one of these fires; is that
right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And with that knowledge, you all made

the conscious decision, for whatever reasons, not to
enclose a stand with the product; right?
A.

I thought I answered that question

Q.

And that was yes; correct?

A.

Yes.

before.

THE COURT:

Let's stay with redirect.

MR. DOWNING:

He did answer the

question, Your Honor, I think.
Q.

When you made that decision, when you

made that conscious decision you knew that persons would
continue to be burned as a result of ignition of
flammable vapors as long as this standard model was sold
without a stand?
A.

That it was possible to happen, yes.

Q.

You knew that it would continue to

A.

Yes.

Q.

You mentioned about the number of

happen?
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1

waterheaters out there, you all said you had twenty

2

percent of thet market, fifty million waterheaters,

3 J twenty million waterheaters; right?
A.

No.

Q.

Ten million?

A.

Ten million.

Q.

How many waterheaters of this design

did you all put out on an annual basis?
A.

Probably about 700,000.

Q.

700,000 a year?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Is that a fair estimate to say for a

ten-year period of '85 to '95 700,000 of these
standard-model waterheaters each year?
A.

Each year, yes.

Q.

You were asked a lot of questions

about these standards, these are the same standards that
the committee on which you sat; correct?

The ANSI

Z2110.1 committee?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And that every change to the design of

this waterheater has to go through the committee that you
served on with the rest the manufacturer's reps; right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And that's a voluntary standard, it's

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

BROWN & WINGO COURT REPORTING, INC.

not the force of law, is it?
A.

It's the standard that is used to

certify that type of product.
Q.

It's a voluntary standard?

A,

It's not a government standard.

Q.

And there's no rule that says you all

can't make it better than the standard, is there?
A.

No,

Q.

In fact, when you all started using

this label for the first time it wasn't required by the
standard, was it?
A,

No, it was adopted later.

Q.

You all chose to go ahead and do it

because you thought it would make it safe?
A.

YeS.

Q.

So if you chose to enclose a stand,

your waterheater would still comply with that standard,
wouldn't it?
A.

Yes, it would.

Q.

Mr., Murphy asked you to explain why

the burner is located where it is, and he was holding up
his hand up here.

You still agree with me, though, that

there is no reason why you have to take your air for
combustion from the floor up, is there?
A.

It's the most economical way.
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1 I

Q.

Other than being the cheapest way,

2 I there's no reason that the air for combustion has to be
taken from the floor level; isn't that right?
A.

No, direct-vents take it from at the

Q.

So the answer to my question is

top.

there's no reason?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Weren't you aware when you left the

industry that there were other manufacturers making these
stubby waterheaters, the 40-inch-high waterheaters?
sorry, Low-Boy waterheaters.

I'm

Were you aware when you

left the industry that other manufacturers were making
these Low-Boys?
A.

I don't know if they were still in

production at that time but I knew other manufacturers
did make them, yes.
Q.

And they obviously found a market for

them, I presume?
A.

I assume they did.
MR. DOWNING:

Could I have one minute,

Your Honor?
(WHEREUPON, a pause in
the proceedings.)
Q.

You were asked some questions by Mr.
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Murphy about something that was marked as Defense Exhibit
Number 40, and he was telling you that the numbers for
1991 of these victims were 165 injuries; right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

That's just with gasoline; right?

A*

Yes.

Q.

The problem with this is not just

gasoline but other flammable vapors too; isn't that
right?
,

A.

Correct.

Q.

And so what happened is that this

committee went back, this staff went back four days later
and gave us the estimates including all flammable vapors;
isn't that right?

That was in Plaintiffs1 Exhibit Number

71?
A.

The number was different.

Q.

The number then went, when they looked

at all flammables it was 316 persons -A.
gasoline.
Q.

No, the majority of them involved
%

Right, but the total number involved

with flammables vapors and gasoline was 316 for 991?
A.

I believe so.

Q.

And that's the real hazard with this,

25 I is all flammable vapors; right?
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A.

Yes.
MR. DOWNING:
MR. MURPHY:

Thank you, sir.
Just a few more, Your

Honor.
R E - C R O S S

E X A M I N A T I O N

BY MR. MURPHY:

Q.

Mr. Moore, Mr. Langmead doesn't work

for the American Waterheater Company, does he?
A.

No, he doesn't.

Q.

He's just a friend of yours in the

industry, isn't he?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, Mr. Downing asked you about the

CPSC, that Calspan report, and the recommendation about
direct-vents in the garage, do you recall that, sir?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did the CPSC, any state, federal, or

local governmental agency, volunteer association, what
have you, ever require that only direct-vent waterheaters
be used in garages?
A.

No.

Q.

Now, let's talk about statistics here,

sir, and I think you indicated there has been a decrease
in the number, and I think you attributed it to this
label.

Sir, to the extent people read, pay attention to,
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JOHN R. LUND (A4368)
KARA L. PETTIT (A8659)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000

DaputyCtek

MICHAEL S. SUTTON
SUTTON & MURPHY
26056 Acero
Mission Viejo, California 92691
Telephone: (949) 206-0550
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance Manufacturing
and American Water Heater Co.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ANNA MARIE ALARID,
Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN LUND
vs.
AMERICAN APPLIANCE
MANUFACTURING, INC., etc., et al.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 980905332
Judge Anne M. Stirba

ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES,
INC.,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.
W.KENT NELSON, etal.,
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Third Party Defendants.

STATEOFUTAH

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

I, John R. Lund, being first duly sworn, state as follows:
1.

I am an individual over the age of 21 residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah

and have personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances alleged in this affidavit.
2.

I am an attorney at Snow, Christensen & Martineau and represent American

Appliance Manufacturing Corp. and American Water Heater Co. [hereinafter "American"] in
this case.
3.

On behalf of American, wefileda third-party complaint against the apartment

owners solely for purposes of apportionment of fault. We have not pursued this third-party
complaint whatsoever in light of the 1999 statutory amendments to allow fault to be apportioned
to non-parties. We have never sought to have the Nelsons answer the third-party complaint.

4.

On October 10,2000,1 attended a pretrial conference in Judge Stirba's chambers.

Keith Griffin was present via telephone as counsel for plaintiff. During this pretrial conference,
counsel discussed with the Court whether this case should be set for a bench or a jury trial.
Judge Stirba set the matter for a bench trial, and explicitly instructed Plaintiffs counsel to
promptly file a motion if Plaintiff desired to raise the issue of trial by jury. Plaintiffs counsel did
not object to the Court's directives.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5.

As counsel for American, we relied upon Judge Stirba's unopposed Scheduling

Order and have prepared for a bench trial. Preparation for a bench trial, especially one
encompassing punitive damages claims as this case does, entails much different strategies, witness
and evidentiary considerations than a jury trial. Due to work-product and attorney-client
privileges, it is not workable to publicly divulge the specifics of how our trial preparation would
have been different had this case been set for trial by jury. However, we would be willing to
discuss the details of the differences with the Court in camera outside the presence of all other
parties.
DATED this ±

day of May, 2001

JohnR^dnd

isy^flay
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thisV^
day of May, 2001.

u.

&*—^x^

My Commission Expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC
GAIL M1KOLASH
10 Exchange PI., 11th Rr.
tffeatogity, Utah 84111
My Commission ExptaM
July 15,2002
STATE OF UTAH
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third JudiciahDistrict

STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT

: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE }

ROBERT G, GILCHRIST, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

^ ^

1.
At one time I was the attorney of record for Eagle Hardware and Garden
Company ("Eagle") in a lawsuit styled Anna Maria Alarid v, American Appliance
Manufacturing, Inc. et al, Civil No. 980905332, in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.
2.

1 personally recall filing an answer on behalf of defendant Eagle in that lawsuit.

3.
I have been informed that the court records indicate that I included a jury demand
in that answer.
4.
1 have been informed that the court records indicate that the $50 jury fee was not
paid at the time a jury was requested.
5.

I have no personal knowledge as to whether the jury fee was paid.

6.
In my entire career as a lawyer, starting when I became a member of the Utah Bar
in 1982, until the current date, I have never filed a jury demand and then intentionally not paid
the jury fee; therefore, if my office did not pay the jury fee in Hie Alarid case, this was due to an
oversight.
Further, Affiant sacth not.

Robett G. Gilchrist

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on this ' f ^ d a y of May 2001, by Robert
G.Gilchrist
Notary PuWte
ANDREA R. MARTINEZ
7400 South State St. f12206
Mldvale UT 84047
My comtesion Expires
October 10,2004
State of Utah

T
I
*
I

Motary Public, State

I
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ANNA MARIE ALARID,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
JURY TRIAL

vs,

Case No: 980905332 PI

AMERICAN APPLIANCE MANUFACTURI
Et al,
Defendant.

: Judge:
: Date:

MICHAEL K. BURTON
October 29, 2001

Clerk:
marcyt
Reporter: YOUNG, BRAD

BRADY

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JAMES G O'CALLAHAN
MITCHEL ZAGER
Defendant's Attorney(s): MICHAEL S SUTTON
JOHN R LUND
Other Parties: GARY E. ATKIN
Video

TRIAL
The above-entitled case comes before the Court for the first day
of trial. Voir Dire is conducted and a panel of eight jurors and
one alternate is selected to wit: John Hancock, Travis Morris,
Mary Clark, Bruce Harvey, Tia Hill, Nedra Stott, Sheila Pea,
Don Clements and Peggy Ames.
The jury is excused and instructed to return at 9:30 a.m.
tomorrow. Out of the presence of the jury, defendant's motion for
bifurcation is argued to the Court by respective counsel and
denied. The Court hears argument regarding Mr. Lund and Mr. Sutton
representing separate defendants. The Court rules they are
allowed to represent separate defendants and Mr. Sutton would not
be required to obtain other local counsel.
This being the hour of adjournment, further trial is continued to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Tab 33

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

JOHN R. LUND (A4368)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
Attorneys for Defendants
American Appliance Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ANNA MARIE ALARID,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AMERICAN APPLIANCE
MANUFACTURING, INC., a California
Corporation, AMERICAN WATER
HEATER CO., a Nevada Corporation,
INSTALLATION PRODUCTS DIVISION
OF ARMSTRONG WORLD
INDUSTRIES, INC., a Pennsylvania
Corporation, and EAGLE HARDWARE &
GARDEN, INC., a Washington
Corporation, and DOES I through 25,
Inclusive,

MOTION FOR ADMISSION
PRO HAC VICE
OF MICHAEL S. SUTTON

Case No. 980905332
Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendants.

Defendants, American Appliance Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co., by and
through their counsel of records, John R. Lund of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, hereby moves
the Court for an Order allowing the admission ofpro hac vice of Michael S. Sutton of the law
firm of Sutton & Murphy, 26056 Acero, Mission Viejo, California 92691, for all purposes
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

relating to the representation of defendants, American Appliance Manufacturing and American
Water Heater Co., before this Court in this action. As is set forth in the Affidavit of Michael S.
Sutton, he has never been disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, he is competent to
represent the defendants, American Appliance Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co.,
in this litigation, and has, in fact, represented American Appliance Manufacturing and American
Water Heater Co. prior to the time of the filing of the Complaint in this Court. Mr. Sutton is
licensed to practice law in the State of California. The undersigned shall act as local counsel in
this matter and shall ensure that all pleadings, discovery and other proceedings in this litigation
conform to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Utah Rules of Evidence, the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration and other applicable Utah law.
DATED this Q£p day of October, 1998.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN^S^^TINEAU

C^^> J?*

By

John R. Lunjjx^
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance
Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co.
N:\19944\l\PROHACVL3RD
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
JOHN R. LUND (A4368)
Third Judicial District
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
JAN 1 5 1999
Post Office Box 45000
UNTY
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
By.
Deputy Clerk
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Attorneys for Defendants
American Appliance Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ANNA MARIE ALARID,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AMERICAN APPLIANCE
MANUFACTURING, INC., a California
Corporation, AMERICAN WATER
HEATER CO., a Nevada Corporation,
INSTALLATION PRODUCTS DIVISION
OF ARMSTRONG WORLD
INDUSTRIES, INC., a Pennsylvania
Corporation, and EAGLE HARDWARE &
GARDEN, INC., a Washington
Corporation, and DOES I through 25,
Inclusive,

ORDER FOR ADMISSION
PRO HAC VICE
OF MICHAEL S. SUTTON

Case No. 980905332
Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendants.

Based upon the Motion of the defendants, American Appliance Manufacturing and
American Water Heater Co., the Affidavit submitted by the applicant for admission pro hac vice,
and for good cause shown,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS that Michael S. Sutton, of the law firm of Sutton &
Murphy, 26056 Acero, Mission Viejo, California 92691, is hereby admitted to practice before
this Court, pro hac vice, for the purpose of representing the defendants, American Appliance
Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co., in this litigation.
DATED this ( J

day Of

C l a p IA&/UJ

. 199ff

BY THE COURT:

Ch
The Honorable Anne M. Stirba
Third District Court Judge

-2-
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MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968
3587 West 4700 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
801-964-6100

r

^!!»lC00HT
Judicial District

GIRARDI | KEESE
Thomas V. Girardi (36603)
James G. O'Callahan (126975)
1126 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90017
213-977-0211

c

^«yS5r

Attorneys for Plaintiff, ANNA MARIE ALARID
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ANNA MARIE ALARID
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)

PLAINTIFF, ANNA MARIE ALARID'S,
EXHIBIT LIST

)

)
AMERICAN APPLIANCE
)
MANUFACTURING, INC., a California )
Corporation, AMERICAN WATER
)
HEATER CO., a Nevada Corporation,
)
INSTALLATION PRODUCTS DIVISION )
OF ARMSTRONG WORLD
)
INDUSTRIES, INC., a Pennsylvania
)
Corporation, EAGLE HARDWARE &
)
GARDEN, INC., a Washington
)
Corporation, and DOES 1 through 25,
)
Inclusive
)
Defendants.
)

Civil No. 980905332
Judge Anne M. Stirba
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TO ALL PARTIES HEREIN AND TO THEIR RESPECTIVE ATTORNEYS OF
RECORD:
Plaintiff, ANNA MARIE ALARID, hereby submits the following exhibit list:
1. All discovery propounded by Plaintiff, Anna Marie Alarid, to Defendant, American Water
Heater Co., and responses thereto.
2. All discovery propounded by Defendant, American Water Heater Co., to Plaintiff, Anna
Marie Alarid, and responses thereto.
3. Container of Henry 263 Outdoor Carpet Adhesive involved in subject incident.
4. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Anna Marie Alarid (4.20.1999).
5. Deposition and exhibits thereto of James Berkely (11.17.1999). Ellis/Mitchell v. American
Water Heater Co.
6. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Ron Carbonc (11.16.1998). Ellis/Mitchell v. American
Water Heater Co.
7. Deposition and exhibits thereto ofKristyFarnsworth (3.28.2000).
8. Deposition and exhibits thereto ofBoydFjeldsted (3.27.2000).
9. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Rudolph Gomez, Sr. (4.21.1999).
10. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Deborah Hilton from Ellis/Mitchell v. American Water
Heater Co. (11.17.1999).
11. Deposition and exhibits thereto of John Hoffman (5.15.2000).
12. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Charles Jacobson (5.16.2000).
13. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Edward Karnes (6.7.2000).
14. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Edward Karnes (7.17.2000).
15. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Jean McDowell (5.8.2000).
16. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Henry Jack Moore, Jr. (1.8.1999). Ellis/Mitchell v.
American Water Heater Co.
17. Trial testimony of Henry Jack Moore. Ellis/Mitchell v. American Water Heater Co.
18. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Charles Morin (5.5.2000).
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19. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Stephen Morris (2.18.2000).
20. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Cameron Nelson (3.10.2000).
21. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Wayne Kent Nelson (12.8.1998).
22. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Donald Wandling (2.23.1999).
23. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Donald Wandling (6.23.2000).
24. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Harold Zeliger (4.13.2000).
25. Joseph Fandey, 1967-1969 Flammable Vapors Materials:
Meeting Minutes with Hand Written Note of the Subcommittee on Standards for
Installation of Gas Appliances and Gas Piping (12.12-14.1967)
Meeting Minutes of the Subcommittee on Standards for Gas Water Heaters (9.1011.1998)
Memorandum (9.19.1969)
26. Joseph Fandey, 1970-1976 Flammable Vapors Materials:
Third Annual Report (Fiscal Year 1971)
Subcommittee on Standard for Gas Water Heaters Meeting Minutes and Appendices
(12.4-5.1973)
Water Heater Division GAMA 223rd Meeting Minutes and Appendices (12.12.1993)
Heat Required to Supply Daily Quota of Hot Water Code (1974)
Flammable Liquid Fabric Ignition Accidents Special Report (4.1974)
Neiss News Volume 3, No. 2 (8-9.1974)
CPSA Fact Sheet #23-Flammable Liquids (9.1974)
CPSC Product Related Injuries Associated with Water Heaters (1.20.1975)
Calspan Report (2.1975)
Water Heating Division GAMA Meeting Minutes and Appendix (4.9.1975)
Water Heating Division GAMA Meeting Minutes and Appendices (6.12.1975)
Calspan Report (7.1975)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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•

Water Heating Division GAMA Meeting Minutes (8.7.1975)

•

Letter (9.19.1975)

•

Letter (9.19.1975)

•

Letter (2.27.1975)

•

Report (Fiscal Year 1976)

•

GAMA Review of Residential Gas Appliance Standards Report Results, Attachment and
Appendix (2.9.1976)

•

Calspan Report (2.1976)

•

Subcommittee on Standard for Gas Water Heaters Meeting Minutes (6.16-17.1976)

•

Letter (8.12.1976)

•

Switch to Nonflammable Solvents Pays Off in Safety Article Reprint (12.1976)

Joseph Fandey, 1977 Flammable Vapors Materials:
•

List of Questions Which May Be Addressed to the Speakers (1977)

•

CPSC Memorandum (1.3.1977)

•

CPSC Memorandum (1.4.1977)

•

Roberts Consolidated Industries, Inc. Letter (1.26.1977)

•

CPSC Memorandum (2.1.1997)

•

Pierce & Stevens Chemical Corp. Letter (2.8.1977)

•

A.D. Little Letter (2.23.1997)

•

ConTech, Inc. Letter (3.1.1977)

•

CPSC Letter (3.15.1977)

•

CPSC Memorandum (3.16.1977)

•

CPSC Memorandum (3.16.1977)

•

CPSA Meetings Minutes (4.1.1977)

•

A.D. Little Memorandum (5.3.1977)
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CPSC Federal Register (7.13.1977)
Letter (7.15.1977)
Letter (7.19.1977)
Letter (7.20.1977)
Letter (7.20.1977)
U.S. Department of Commerce Letter (8.12.1977)
Letter (8.12.1977)
Letter (8.16.1977)
Comments on 16 CFR Part 1145 and 1302 (8.17.1977)
West Shore Fire District Letter (8.18.1977)
Franklin Chemical Ind. Letter (8.19.1977)
Letter (8.22.1977)
Letter (8.22.1977)
Wilhold Glues, Inc. Letter (8.24.1977)
Letter (8.25.1977)
CPSC Memorandum (8.26.1977)
Presentation of Proposed Ban of Certain Extremely Flammable Contact Adhesives
(8.29.1977)
Borden, Inc. Letter (8.31.1977)
Dow Letter (9.2.1977)
Roberts Consolidated Ind. Letter (9.2.1977)
CPSC Memorandum (9.9.1997)
Economic Analysis/Environmental Assessment of Ban on Extremely Flammable Contact
Adhesives (11.1977)
Negative Declaration on Extremely Flammable Contact Adhesives (11.23.1977)
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CPSC Memorandum (11.28.1977)
CPSC Memorandum (11.29.1977)
CPSC Memorandum (12.2.1977)
Federal Register (11.19.1977)
Federal Register, Vol. 42, No. 243 (12.19.1977)
;eph Fandey, 1978-1987 Flammable Vapors Materials:
CPSP Hazardous Flammable Liquids (3.1979)
CPSP Ban on Hazardous Products Extremely Flammable Contact Adhesives Packed in
Containers in Excess of Vi Pint (7.5.1979)
CPSC Hazard Identification and Analysis National Injury Information Clearing House
(10.8.1979)
National Fuel Gas Code ANSI Z223.1 (1980)
State Industries Claim Department Retention Policy Memorandum (5.19.1980)
CPSC Revised Product Safety Fact Sheet (9.1980)
CPSC Fire Hazards Associated with Gas Water Heaters (11.1982)
Z21 American National Standard Committee Letter (5.6.1983)
Subcommittee on Standards for Gas Water Heaters Meeting Minutes and Appendices
(5.25-25.1983)
Z21 American National Standard Committee Letter (7.8.1983)
Residential Structure Fires Involving Flammable/Combustible Liquids Graph (1980-84)
Revision of 12.1983 Engineering Analysis of Gas-Fires Water Heater's In-Depth
Investigations (1.1984)
Subcommittee on Standard for Gas Water Heaters Meeting Minutes (11.27-29.1984)
Z21 Accredited Standard Committee Letter (12.14.1984)
CPSC Memorandum (10.8.1995)
Residential Gas Fired Water Heater Manual 0290785-21 (2.1986)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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•

Residential Gas Fired Water Heater Manual 0290785-22 (3.1986)

•

Residential Gas Fired Water Heater Manual 0290785-23 (5.1986)

•

Residential Gas Fired Water Heater Manual 0290785-24 (6.1986)

•

ANSI Z535.4 Product Safety Signs and Labels Draft Report (1.1987)

•

Residential Gas Fired Water Heater Manual 0290785-27 (4.1987)

•

White-Rodgers Division Memorandum (5.29.1987)

•

Residential Gas Fired Water Heater Manual 0290785-28 (6.1987)

•

Residential Structure Fires Involving Flammable/Combustible Liquids Graph (1980-84)

•

White-Rodgers Division Memorandum (7.12.1987)

•

Connecticut National Gas Corporation Letter (8.28.1987)

•

Memorandum (9.9.1987)

•

Memorandum (9.17.1987)

•

GAMA Memorandum (11.2.1987)

•

Residential Gas Fired Water Heater Manual 0290785-29 (11.1987)

Joseph Fandey, 1988-1990 Flammable Vapors Materials:
•

NFP A-AG A National Fuel Gas Code (1988)

•

GAMA Letter (3.24.1988)

•

GAMA Residential Gas Fired Water Heaters Manual (4.1988)

•

GAMA Committee Meeting Report (6.14.1988)

•

GAMA Committee Meeting Report (8.24.1988)

•

Survey on Safety Labels for Water Heaters (9.29.1988)

•

Southern Gas Association Letter (10.31.1988)

•

GAM A Committee Meeting Report (10.17.1988)

•

Preliminary Report (10.1.1988)
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Consumer Survey on Safety Labels (12.14.1988)
Final Report (1.16.1989)
GAM A Memorandum (1.23.1989)
National Estimates Approach to U.S. Fire Statistics, Volume 25, Number 2, Pages 99-113
(5.1989)
Gas Water Heaters National Standard for Volume I Storage Water Heaters with Input
Ratings of 75,000 Btu Per Hour or Less (1990)
30. Joseph Fandey, 1991 Flammable Vapors Materials:
American National Standard Criteria for Safety Symbols (1991)
Top Twenty Appliances Igniting Gasoline Vapors in Dwellings (1991)
Advances in Industrial Ergonomics and Safety III Report (1991)
Proceedings of the Human Factors Society Meeting (1991)
Memorandum (4.8.1991)
CPSC Memorandum (4.23.1991)
Meeting Minutes of Counsel Representing Members of the Water Heating Division
GAMA (5.14.1991)
Meeting Minutes Ad Hoc Committee on Consumer Information and Education of the
Water Heating Division GAMA (10.18.1991)
Presentation of Edward F. Downing, III of Gauthier & Murphy (11.13.1991)
CPSC Memorandum (11.21.1991)
31. Joseph Fandey, 1992 Flammable Vapors Materials:
National Fuel Gas Code Handbook, 2d. Edition (1992)
Standards for the Twenty-Fourth Edition of the Standard for Gas Water Heaters
(1.20.1992)
CPSC Memorandum (1.8.1992)
Minutes Legal Counsel and Risk Managers of Water Heater Division Members GAMA
(1.30.1992)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Position Paper-CPSC Working Group on a Standard for Gas Water Heaters to Prevent
Ignition of Flammable Vapors (2.1992)
U.S. Patent Documents (2.4.1992)
Letter (3.6.1992)
Minutes of Meeting of Working Group Addressing Suggested Revisions to Reduce
Possible Ignition of Flammable Vapors by Volume I Water Heaters (3.17-18.1992)
Letter (4.20.1992)
Report-Meeting of Technical Representatives of GAMA Water Heater Division Members
that Manufacture Residential Gas Storage Water Heaters GAMA (6.4.1992)
Memorandum (6.21.1992)
GAMA Water Heater Safety (6.23.1992)
Minutes of the Product Liability Counsel/Risk Managers and the Consumer Information
and Education Committee of the Water Heater Division GAMA (6.23.1992)
A.D. Little Preliminary Review of Issues Related to Water Heater Safety (6.24.192)
Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. Letter (8.5.1992)
Meeting Minutes Water Heater Division GAMA (8.12-13.1992)
Letter (8.28.1992)
Meetings Minutes (9.2.1992)
Meetings Minutes of Working Group Addressing Suggested Revision to Reduce Possible
Ignition of Flammable Vapors by Volume I Water Heaters (9.9.1992)
Engineering Sciences Proposal Distribution (9.9.1992)
Loran Nordgren & Company Letter (9.22.1992)
Z21 Accredited Standard Committee Letter (11.5.1992)
Final Report of Work Letter (11.10.1992)
Letter (11.12.1992)
Memorandum (11.17.1992)
HWH Flammable Vapor Incident Reports (11.17.1992)
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Meetings Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee on Consumer Information and Education of
the Water Heater Division of GAMA (11.30.1992)
Transmittal (11.30.1992)
Report (12.2.1992)
eph Fandey, 1993 Flammable Vapors Materials:
GAMA Meeting Report (1.11.1993)
Water Heater Division GAMA Membership Report (3.1993)
GAMA Report on Election of Water Heater Division Officers (4.1993)
Letter (4.6.1993)
Summary Report to GAMA (4.8.1993)
Letter (4.9.1993)
Settlement Papers for Edwin W. Peart v. State Industries (4.9.1993)
GAMA Notebook (3.4-4.13.1993)
Consumer Information and Education Committee of the Water Heater Division Gas
Appliance Manufacturers Association Report (4.25.1993)
Case Leaders Detail Report of Expenses as Reported on the Case Status Report
(4.30.1993)
Summary of Tests (5.3-21.1993
Z21 Meeting Announcement (5.17.1993)
Consumer Information and Education Committee of the Water Heater Division Gas
Appliance Manufacturers Association Report (7.1.1993)
Flammable Vapor Hazards Ignition Study GAMA Report (7.6.1993)
Fire Gas Voluntary Standards (7.13.1993)
GAMA Flammable Vapor Standards Study (6.16 & 7.15.1993)
A.D. Little Study (7.15.1993)
Letter (7.23.1993)
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Letter (8.20.1993)
CPSC Memorandum (9.16.1993)
Consumer Information and Education Committee of the Water Heater Division Gas
Appliance Manufacturers Association Report (9.29.1993)
Sub-Case Status Report (11.19.1993)
Letter (11.24.1993)

33. Joseph Fandey, 1.1994-8.1994 Flammable Vapors Materials:
GATC Focus Publication (1.1994)
Letter (1.19.1994)
Letter (1.20.1994)
GAMA Safety Awareness Program on Flammable Vapor Fires (2.1994)
Ballot Vote Sheet to CPSC Commission (2.4.1994)
Meeting of Z21 Committee (2.23.1994)
Letter (3.10.1994)
Letter (3.11.1994)
Letter (3.28.1994)
Memorandum (4.12.1994)
Letter (4.14.1994)
Letter (4.15.1994)
Letter (4.18.1994)
Letter (4.21.1994)
Letter (4.21.1994)
Letter (4.22.1994)
Letter (5.9.1994)
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Briefing Package on Gas Fired Water Heaters Concerning Ignition of Flammable Vapors
Certificate (6.8.1994)
Letter (6.27.1994)
Memorandum (6.27.1994)
CPSC Office of Commissioner Mary Sheila Gall Meeting Log (6.28.1994)
Z21/CGA Joint Subcommittee on Standards for Connectors for Gas Appliances
(6.29.1994)
Letter (7.7.1994)
Letter (7.28.1994)
Letter (8.1.1994)
Final Report and Appendix (8.15.1994)
Letter (8.17.1994)
Meeting Log Directorate for Engineering Services (8.30.1994)
34. Joseph Fandey, 9.1994-12.1994 Flammable Vapors Materials:
Memorandum and Minutes on Z21/CGA Working Group (9.12.1994)
Memorandum to Donald W. Switzer (9.16.1994)
Memorandum to Donald W. Switzer (9.22.1994)
Memorandum to Members of the Water Heater Technical Advisory Group (9.30.1994)
Flammable Vapor Tech. Advisory Group Minutes and Attachments (10.27.1994)
Flammable Vapor Test Results of a Snorkel Combustion Air Duct System (11.1994)
Memorandum to Ronald L. Medford (11.14.1994)
Briefing Package with Certificate (11.29.1994)
Donald Switzer Letter (12.6.1994)
35. Joseph Fandey, 1995 Flammable Vapors Materials:
•

Code of Federal Regulation Part 1000 to End (1.1.1995)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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•

Meetings Minutes of the Flammable Vapor Technical Advisory Group (1.10.1995)

•

Meetings Minutes of the Flammable Vapor Technical Advisory Group (3.30-31.1995)

•

Letter (4.5.1995)

•

FireXX Technology for Potential Publications as a Residential Water Heater Flame and
Explosion Arrcstor (5.4.1995)

•

Final Report (5.6.1995)

•

Memorandum (5.22.1995)

•

Flammable Vapor Technical Advisory Group Meeting Minutes (6.12-13.1995)

•

Flammable Vapor Technical Advisory Group Meeting Minutes (8.8-9.1995)

Joseph Fandey, 1996-1998 Flammable Vapors Materials:
•

CPSC Status Report on Gas-Fired Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors (3.1996)

•

Flammable Vapor Test Methodology Development for Gas-Fired Water Heaters Final
Report (4.1996)

•

Letter (5.6.1996)

•

Product Market Research (5.9.1996)

•

First Report for Attorney Dennis Brown (5.29.1996)

•

State Trial List on Flammable Vapors (6.7.1996)

•

U.S. Home Heating Fire Patterns and Trends Through 1994 Report (10.1996)

•

Memorandum (10.15.1996)

•

CPSC and Gas-Fired Water Heaters Network Newsletter (2.24.1997)

•

Letter (3.11.1997)

•

Letter Draft (4.9.1997)

•

CPSC Network Newsletter (5.6.1997)

•

Hot Water Heater Testing Report (5.8.1997)

•

Index of Consortium Documents (6.30.1997)
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•

CPSC Network Newsletter (7.7.1997)

37. John I loffman\s Elevation and Plainview Schematics Drawings
38. Plaintiff, Anna Marie Aland's, Medical and Billing Records.
39. Presentation and exhibits thereto of Edward Downing, 111 before ANSI Z21.I0.1
Subcommittee on Standards for Gas Fired Water Heaters (11.13.1991).
40. Donald Switzer, Briefing Package for Gas-Fired Water Heater Ignition of Flammable
Vapors.
41. Donald Switzer, Status Report on Gas-Fired Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors
(1).
42. Donald Switzer, Status Report on Gas-Fired Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors
(2).
43. Donald Switzer, Status Report on Gas-Fired Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors
(March 1996).
44. Trial Testimony and exhibits thereto of Henry Jack Moore, Jr. in Ellis/Mitchell v. American
Water Heater Co. (3.2.1999).
45. Video: American Water Heater Flame Guard; Ann Brown.
46. Water heater involved in subject incident.
47. NEISS News Injuries Associated with Water Heaters, Aug. 1974.
48. CPSC Fact Sheet No. 65 Gas Water Heaters, Aug. 1975.
49. Identification and Classification of Potential Hazards Associated with the use of Residential
Flame-Fired Furnaces, Hot Water Heaters, Clothes Dryers and Ranges, Report No. YG5569-D-2, Calspan Corporation, February 1975.
50. Investigation of Safety Standards for Flame-Fired Furnaces, Hot Water Heaters, Clothes
Dryers and Ranges, Report No. YG-5569-D-3, Calspan Corporation, July 1975.
51. Results of GAMA Review of Residential Gas Appliance Standards based on Review of
Investigation of Safety Standards for Flame-Fired Furnaces, Hot Water Heaters, Clothes
Dryers and Ranges (Calspan Corp), NEISS Data and Industry Service Experience, February
1976.
52. Z21/CGA Joint Water Heater Subcommittee Meetings, Appendix E to the Minutes of the
July 28-29, 1998 Meeting Including the Prefactory Statement for the GAMA Test Method.
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53. Z21/CGA Joint Water Heater Subcommittee Meetings, Report from Working Group
Addressing Suggested Revisions to Reduce Possible Ignition of Flammable Vapors by
Volume I Water Heaters, August 1997.
54. GAMA Letter from C. Reuben Autrcy (President) to R. Swit/cr (CPSC Project Manager,
Fire/Gas Voluntary Standards) responding to request for information, August 1, 1994.
55. GAMA Letter from C. Reuben Autrcy (President) to R. Mcdford (CPSC Acting Assistant
Executive Director Hazard Identification and Reduction) regarding Water Heater Ignition of
Flammable Vapors, July 1994.
56. GAMA Letter from C Reuben Autrey (President) to Honorable Ann Brown (Chairman,
CPSC) regarding Staff Option Package on Gas-Fired Water Heaters, June 1994.
57. Minutes of Meeting Working Group Addressing Suggested Revisions to Reduce Possible
Ignition of Flammable Vapors by Volume I Water Heaters, March 1992.
58. Minutes of Meeting of Subcommittee on Standards for Gas Water Heaters, Nov. 199U
59. Presentation of E.F. Downing III of Gauthier & Murphy before ANSI Z21.10.1
Subcommittee on Standards for Gas Fired Water Heaters, Nov. 1991.
60. GAMA Memorandum from f. Stanonik (Associate Director of Technical Services) to Water
Heater Division regarding GATC Draft Report on Garage Installation, May 7, 1991.
61. Gas Appliance Technology Center, White Paper Installation Options for Water Heaters
Installed in Garages for Gas Research Institute, G. Liljenberg, Aug. 1990, including An
Evaluation Code Requirement for 18 Inch Clearance or Appliances Above a Hazardous Floor
Environment prepared for ALAGASCO by M.J. Sasser, PE of Inspection Services Inc.
62. GAMA Letter from F. Stanonik (Associate Director of Technical Services) to A. Callahan
(AGA Laboratories) regarding Full Color Samples of Labels, Jan. 20, 1989.
63. GAMA Committee Meeting Report, Technical Committee of the Water Heater Division,
Dec. 5, 1988. Including Summary of Actions Taken at the Dec. 6-7, 1988 Meeting of the
Z21 Subcommittee on Standards for Gas Water Heaters.
64. Minutes Water Heater Division Gas Appliance Manufacturing Association Inc., April 16,
1984.
65. Minutes Water Heater Division Gas Appliance Manufacturing Association Inc., May 2,
1983.
66. GAMA Letter from J. P. Langmead (Director of Technical Services) to All US
Manufacturers of Consumer Products and Components Thereof Regarding CPSC Safety
Bulletin No. 31 Draft of Final Calspan Report, June 11, 1975.
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67. Arthur D. Little, Inc. Final Report Flammable Vapor Test Methodology Development for
Gas-Fired Water Heaters, April 1996.
68. Arthur D. Little, Inc. GAMA Flammable Vapor Hazards Ignition Study; Bowin Burner
Testing with Bowin Burner Study Final Presentation to GAMA, March 1995.
69. Arthur D. Little, Inc. GAMA Flammable Vapor Hazards Ignition Study Task 2; Analytical
Modeling and Experimental Testing, July 1993.
70. Arthur D. Little, Inc. GAMA Flammable Vapor Hazards Ignition Study Presentation to
GAMA, April 1993.
71. Arthur D. Little, Inc. GAMA Flammable Vapor Hazards Ignition Study Agreement (Sept.).
72. Arthur D. Little, Inc. Preliminary Review of Issues Related to Water Heater Safety, June
1992.
73. Flammable Vapor Test Results of a Snorkel Combustion Air Duct System for State
Industries, Douglas W. DeWerth, Nov. 1994.
74. White Paper Evaluation of a 14" Barrier Proposed as a Means to Prevent Accidental Ignition
of Flammable Vapors by a Gas-Fired Water Heater, Douglas W. DeWerth, AGA
Laboratories, R&D, July 11, 1994.
75. Final Report of Work June 1992-October 1992 Research Prospectus Revision I, May 12,
1992, Vincent Debo Project, Douglas W. DeWerth, Karl Weiser, AGA Laboratories, Nov.
10,1992.
76. Engineering Systems Inc. (Water Heater) Flammable Vapors Test Ledgers, Feb.-April, 1997.
77. Flammable Vapors Ignition Testing of a Gas Fired Water Heater on an 18 inch Stand, Wayne
McCain, P.E.Feb. 1998.
78. UL Report on Water Heaters, File El 1867, Project 79NK50555, Rheem Manufacturing Co.,
1979.
79. United States Patent, 3,659,560 Water Heater, Wilfred G. Carter, May 2, 1972.
80. United States Patent, 5,085,205, Fuel-Fred Water Heater With Combination Drainage Pan
and Combustion Air Flow Control Apparatus, Jacob H. Hall, Rheem Manufacturing Co.,
Feb. 4, 1992.
81. NFPA Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code Handbook, Fourth Edition, Heating
Equipment.
82. NFPA National Fuel Gas Code Handbook, ed. Theodore C. Lemoff, 5.1.10 Installation in
Residential Garages.
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83. NFPA 54 National Fuel Gas Code Handbook, ANSIZ223.1.5.1.8 Flammable Vapors; 5.1.9
Installation in Residential Garages, 1980.
84. NFPA Special Report Residential Structure Fires Involving Flammable, Combustible
Liquids, 1980-1984, Kenneth T. Taylor, prepared July 1987.
85. Gas Appliance Technology Center, 1990 Program, White Paper Installation Options for
Water Heaters Installed in Garages, for Gas Research Institute, Contract No. 5086-241-1220,
AGA Laboratories, prepared by G. Liljenberg, Aug. 1990.
86. US CPSC Letter from R. Medford to D. Hosier regarding the results of the ANSI Accredited
Water Heater Subcommittee Flammable Vapor Working Group meeting held November 1314,1997.
87. Report from working group addressing suggested revisions to reduce possible ignition of
flammable vapors by Volume I water heaters, August 1997.
88. US CPSC Status Report on Gas-Fired Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors, D.
Switzer, October 1996.
89. US CPSC Memorandum from R. Medford to The Commission regarding Status Report on
Gas-Fired Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors, April 1996.
90. US CPSC Status Report on Gas-Fired Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors, D.
Switzer, July 1995.
91. Statement of Vice Chairman Mary Sheila Gall on Gas-Fired Water Heaters and Flammable
Vapors, Dec. 15, 1994.
92. US CPSC Briefing Package for Gas-Fired Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors, D.
Switzer, November 1994.
93. US CPSC 16 CFR Part 1212 Gas Water Heaters Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
regarding unreasonable risks of injury and death may be associated with gas water heaters,
Nov. 14, 1994.
94. US CPSC Memorandum from R. Franklin (Economist) to D. Switzer (Project Manager for
Fire and Gas Voluntary Standards) regarding Some Economic Issues Related to Residential
Gas Water Heaters an the Ignition of Flammable Vapors, Nov. 8, 1994.
95. U.S. CPSC Memorandum from T. Johnson (ESEE) to D. Switzer (ESEE) regarding Analysis
of Data Contained in Tables 8-10 of the AD Little Task 2 Flammable Vapor Hazards Ignition
Study, September 22, 1994.
96. US CPSC Memorandum from William Rowe (Statistician) to D. Switzer (Manager Fire/Gas
Codes Standards Project) regarding Review of the Scenarios from A.D. Little Flammable
Vapor Hazards Ignition Study, Task I Report, Sept. 16, 1994.
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97. US CPSC Memorandum from J. L. Mulligan (ESEL) to J. Fandey (ESEE) regarding
Comments on the AD Little Study of Gasoline Vapor Ignition, March 10, 1994.
98. US CPSC Letter from D. Switzer (Project Manager for Fire and Gas Voluntary Standards) to
F. Stanonik (Associate Director of Technical Services, Gas Appliance Manufacturing
Association) regarding Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors, August 17, 1994.
99. US CPSC Meeting Log Directorate for Engineering Sciences, Industry Activities to Address
Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors, D. Switzer, Aug. 30, 1994.
100. CPSC Working Group on Gas Voluntary Standards, Position Paper on a Standard for Gas
Water Heaters to Prevent Ignition of Flammable Vapors, February 1992.
101. US CPSC Memorandum from Moira McNamara, Fire and Thermal Burn Hazards to The
Commission regarding the hazards associated with gas-fired heating equipment, 1992.
102. US CPSC Memorandum from R. Medford to The Commission regarding Options Paper;
Hazards Associated with Gas-Fired Water Heaters Igniting Flammable Vapors.
103. US CPSC Memorandum from R. Franklin (Economist) to J. Fandey (Project Manager for
Fire and Gas Voluntary Standards) regarding Updated Estimates of the Societal Costs of
Fires Associated with Gas Water Heaters and Flammable Vapors, April 1994.
104. US CPSC letter from R. Medford (Acting Assistant Executive Director for Hazard
Identification and Reduction) to C. Reuben Autrey (President, Gas Appliance Manufacturing
Association) regarding Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors, July 1994.
105. US CPSC Memorandum from D. Switzer (Project Manager for Fire and Gas Voluntary
Standards) to R. Medford (Assistant Executive Director for Hazard Identification and
Reduction) regarding Comments on Letter from C. Reuben Autrey, President Bas Appliance
Manufacturers Association, Nov. 1994.
106. US CPSC Memorandum from W. Rowe (Statistician) to D. Switzer (Chemical Engineer)
regarding Fires, Injuries, Deaths and Property Loss Associated with Gas Water Heaters and
Flammable Liquids.
107. US CPSC Letter from J. Fandey (Project Manager, Gas Voluntary Standards) to A.
Callahan (Manager, Standards Dept., American Gas Association Laboratories) regarding
CPSC Position Paper Water Heater Subcommittees Working Group on Flammable Vapor
Ignition, March 1992.
108. CPSC Working Group on Gas Voluntary Standards Position Paper on a Standard for Gas
Water Heaters to Prevent Ignition of Flammable Vapors, Feb. 1992.
109. US CPSC Memorandum from E. Leland (ECPA) to J. Fandey (Manager, Gas Voluntary
Standards) regarding Benefits of Preventing Accidents Associated with Flammable Vapor
Ignition by Gas-Fired Water Heaters, Jan 1992.
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110. US CPSC Memorandum from W. Rowe (EPHA) to Fandey ( Manager, Gas Voluntary
Standards) regarding Fires for Gasoline Ignited by Gas Water Heaters, Dec. 1991.
111. US CPSC Memorandum from G. Sweet (EPHF) to J. Fandey (Manager, ESEE) regarding
Gas Water Heaters, Nov. 1991.
112. US CPSC Memorandum from R. Medford (Project Manager, Household Structural
Products Program) to The Commission regarding Status Report-Gas Heating Systems
Project, 1983.
113. US CPSC Engineering Analysis of Gas-Fired Water Heater In Depth Investigations, D.
Switzer, Dec. 1983.
114. US CPSC Human Factors Analysis of Fires Associated with Gas Water Heater
Combination Control Valves, W. Mathers (Human Factors, Directorate for Epidemiology)
October 1983.
115. US CPSC Fire Hazards Associated with Gas Water Heaters, B. Harwood (CPSC
Directorate for Epidemiology, Hazard Analysis Division), November 1982.
116.

US CPSC Investigation Guideline Gas Hot Water Heaters, Sept. 1982.

117. Chart captioned: "Figure 1: Top Twenty Appliances Igniting Gasoline Vapors in
Swellings, 1991"; Sources: U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission and the U.S. Fire
Administration.
118. Williams v. Southcorp. Mor-Flo 2nd Amended Answers to Interrogatories with attached
citations, petitions and complaints.
119. Arbitration award in Franklin v. Doxol Gas Company, including opinion filed May 15,
1990.
120.

Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code Handbook.

121. Testing and analysis done by Safety Engineering Labs in evaluating the effectiveness of
elevation and other means of reducing the Potential for ignition of flammable vapors by gas
fired water heaters:
1.

Scott v. Rheem

2.

Nawn v. Bay State Gas, et al.

3.

Nina James v. Sears, et al.

4.

Stretch v.-Rheem

122. United States Patent No. 5,797,355 dated August 25, 1998 by SRP 687 Pty Ltd.
Australia, Ignition Inhibiting Gas Water Heater.
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123. American Water Heater press release kit regarding The Flame Guard Safety System
including the CPSC News Release (Release No. 99-157) announcing CPSC Chairman
Awards Safety Commendation to The American Water Heater Company (Aug. 12, 1999).
124. Media Release dated 13 August 1999 titled Southcorp's Ingenious Technology will Help
Produce a Safer Gas Fired Water Heater says US Consumer products Safety Commission
Chairman.
125.

Flammable Vapor Project Presentation by SRP-687 Pty. Ltd., Oct. 21, 1998.

126. AGAR Research Report and data regarding the Flammable Vapors Tests Conducted on
April 14,1998 with Direct Vent Water Heater Provided by American Water heater
Company.
127.

Flame Arrester Literature.

DATED: FEBRUARY 28,2001

GIRARDI AND KEESE

By/jg^ff
JAMES G. O'CALLAHAN
Attorney(s) for Plaintiff
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I'KOPOSMI) .11IKV INSTRUCTION

WHEN1^

^•^JLI^S^T'

IDENTIFIED
[STR

]

If the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence all of the
facts necessary to prove:
1.

thai (\iili (»l iln |IMMIIH is ilcsigiicd liy the defendants were
defective in design, and

2.

that one of the defendant's products was a cause of plaintiffs
•' • injury, and

3.

that the Iiiji ii ) ' w as si ich that it : : >i lid :>
the defendant's products, and

A

that ii oiii the circumstances of the accident the plaintiff
ejitiiiiHl iiiMisiiiiJiliill' n'Ml iliii1 Ii villi mi Ii milei tMiciaril sproducl was a
cause of the injury,

then you will find that each defendant is liable for plaintiffs injury.
H<i'W( .ii nihlci sin Ii I in imislinuvs, ;i defendant is not liable if it
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence all ol I he imls mvessarv MI pinyr
that its product was .not a cause of plaintiff s I njury.
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PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION
WHEN PRECISE CAUSE CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED
[NEGLIGENCE]
If the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence all of the
facts necessary to prove:
1.

that each of the defendants was negligent, and

2.

that the negligent act of one of the defendants was a cause of
plaintiff s injury, and

3.

that the injury was such that it could only result from the
negligent act of one of the defendants, and

4.

that from the circumstances of the accident the plaintiff
cannot reasonably establish which defendant's negligence
was a cause of the injury,

then you will find that each defendant is Uable for plaintiffs injury.
However, under such circumstances, a defendant is not liable if it
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence all of the facts necessary to prove
that its negligence was not a cause of plaintiffs injury.
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WHEN PRECISE CAUSE CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED

If the plaintiff establish.-' r~, «-.-. preponderance of the evidence all
of the facts necessary to prove \l) that eacr cr the defendants was
negligent, and (2) that the negligent act: of one of the defendants was a
cause of plaintiff's injury, and (3) that tre injury was such that it
could only result from the negligent act of one of the defendants, and
(4) that from the circumstances of the accident the plaintiff cannot
reasonably establish which defendant's negligence was a cause of the
injury, then you w:I ] 1 f:i nd that each defendant :s 1: ole for plaintiff's
injury.
However, under such circumstances, a defenaani _• ,^ liable i I
the] [she] establishes by a preponderance of the evidence all of th»
facts necessary to prove that [h i s] [h~- ' ne."-iI igenc* *M *iot a caus^ of
plaintiff"s injury.

Page 1 of 1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

B A J I J.OU

WHEN PRECISE CAUSE CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED

USE NOTE
This instruction should be used only in cases where
the defendants' acts were separate but concurrent, and
under circumstances where the negligence of only one
defendant might have caused the injury. Summers v. Tice
(1948) 33 Cal.2d 80, 84, 199 P.2d 1, 2, 5 A.L.R.2d 91.
This instruction, depending on the facts, may or may
not be appropriate in a multi-party traffic accident
case. Thornton v. Luce (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 542, 554,
26 Cal.Rptr. 3 93, 4 00 held, in appropriate. Vahey v.
Sacia (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 171, 178 Cal.Rptr. 559, 563
held, appropriate.
COMMENT
See, generally, 6 Witkin, Summary of Calif.Law (9th
ed.), Torts, § 971. Prosser on Torts (4th ed.), p. 243.
"In negligence and product liability cases, the
doctrine has evolved that the burden of proof on the
issue of causation may be shifted to the defendant when
demanded by public policy considerations... The essential
principle underlying this narrow exception...is that the
burden of proving an element of a case is more
appropriately borne by the party with greater access to
the information". Thomas v. Lusk (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th
1709, 1717, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 265, 269. This opinion cites
a number of cases for this proposition and sets forth the
circumstances which ordinarily would justify shifting the
burden of proof on causation.
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FiLED
!H:5<n DISTRICT COURT

MITCHEL ZAULK - 3>« ^
3587 West 4700 South
Suit Lake Citv, Utah 8411b
:•__ -9 *>+•-'_ .

T6 «M.7:^
/

i

-AH^OE

RTWEN1

BY/.
F P U T Y CLEPK

GIRARDI | KEESE
Thomas V. Girardi (36603)
James G. O'Callahan (126075^
1126 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90017
213-977-0211
Attorneys for Plaintiff ANNA MARIE ALARID

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ANNA MARIE ALARID

vs.

i
i
i
>

PLAINTIFF ANNA MARIE
ALARID'S OPPOSIITON TO
MOTION FOR DIRECTED
VERDICT

AMERICAN APPLIANCE
MANUFACTURING, nsir

i

(. ivilNo. 9X0903332

i

linh'i' Mirluu'l Minimi

Plaintiff,

I',-: •-

ARMSTRONG WORLD
INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Tlmil IVnly I'liiinliff,

'.

VS.

W KENT NELSON, et al.,
Third Party Delci.
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INTRODUCTION
Defendants American Appliance Manufacturing and American Water
Heater Company claim that plaintiff has not put forward any evidence that would
link either water heater to the subject fire. Defendants claim that because
plaintiffs expert did not opine as to which water heater was absolutely the initial
cause of the fire, plaintiff can not meet its burden of causation. Defendants
neglect to point out the extensive lay witness testimony that has been introduced
thus far concerning the origin of the fire. The jurors must be given the opportunity
to weigh all the evidence, judge the credibility of all the witnesses and render a
decision based on all the evidenced introduced at trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Anna Marie Alarid testified at trial that she saw flames initiate under the
left (east) door of the utility room.

2.

Rudolph Gomez, Sr. is expected to testify consistent with his deposition
that he first saw flames coming under the left (east) door at the utility room.
(Deposition, p.l03:22-25 and p.l04:l-7)

3.

Salt Lake City Fire Department Investigator Jeff Long testified that the
water heater on the right (west) had the most damage.

4.

Jeff Long also testified that when he investigates fires to determine the
origin, he goes from the area of least damage to the are of most damage.
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(west) door if the utility room.
Anna Marie Aland testified at trial that nobody was home in the west
apartment at the top of the landing at SMII S I mcoln. -

apartment at the top of 'the landing at 940 S. Lincoln were home
The Henry 263 adhesive "~3N applied in the same manner on the landing of
c

:>"36 S Lincoln \\ ithoi it

t.

.:

-

: •

Plaintiff's expert John Hoffman testified that the water heaters in the utility
room were defect! wU designed and unreasonably dangerous to th*
ordinary consumer
pi lull li) 'hi .1111

; toucan Dasc Lr> n ar -.>h> >n me lot.
•<

•

**..'':

Hoffman testified

that the pilot lights diew heavier than air flammable1 vapors to the flame of
the pilot light. Dr. Hoffman further testified that the water heater industry

ground was "the cause of an average of more than 'three hundred injuries per
year.
Dr

Hnlliltitli dls u U ' t l l l l n l llh

th e t w o

w a ter

I tit

'iiMil'i t i l l 1 ('ill Ull in I Hi i l l I 111™ l i l t ' >Sii'< u i l r i l l

heaters located in the utility room. Dr. Hoffman testified that

he wa% able n> rule out ihe otfvs potential sources of ignition including the
light fixture,. iii, - ..rnaces. cigarette smoking and the light switches nil 11 it"
a*

Koffman " v 'as not able to opine • \ \ hi :::! i of the water heaters \y\vt\.
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the fire. Dr. Hoffman did testify that the water heaters were of identical
design and materials and were made by subsidiaries of the same parent
company, although manufactured some three years apart.
The material that Dr. Hoffman reviewed included testimony from plaintiff
Anna Marie Alarid and from Rudy Gomez, who testified that they saw
flames emerging from the left (east) door to the utility room. Wayne Kent
Nelson testified that he saw flames coming from the right (west) door of the
utility room. Dr. Hoffman was not aware of the identity or the photographs
or the testimony of Salt Lake City Fire Department Investigator Jeff Long
who testified at trial that the water heater on theright(west) had the most
damage.
The jury has received more evidence as to the fire during trial than what
was available for Dr. Hoffman in forming his opinions. The jury has also
had the opportunity to observe the witnesses testifying, as well as their
demeanor and the nature and quality of the testimony given by the
percipient witnesses. This was not available to Dr. Hoffman, who only had
the conflicting testimony of Nelson, Alarid and Gomez, via their
depositions. As such, he was not in a position to judge their credibility and
their capacity for recollection.
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According to the Utah Supreme Court, when reviewing .any challenge to a
trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict, the Court will review "Ilie -.
iiiiniiT and iill leasoiiablc liikinia • llial iii*i\ I unit be uliauii llii/idtum in the
light most favorable to the party nun ni aj? aiiisl aiitil n ill •usijin the denial if
reasonable minds t onk! d; i \ -e with around asserted for directing a verdict."
Mahmood v. Ru.v

\2d 933 s i uu-. x *

i»l irvirw ml 'i <

tah Supreme Court's standard

*

t

Gravstone Pines, 652 P.2d at 898.
Under Utah law7, a party who moves for a directed verdict has the very •

material fact

\ 11. a Health Strategies, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Sei v 930 P.2d 280,

284 (Utah, Ct.App. 1996) If there is any evidence raising a question of material
liii I, judgment a -: L.M ..

.. .

the evidence aiiu Ui- -

"

ji idgethefaci- Grays-

improper /
'"

. court is not tree lo weigh
a h:

* 6vl P,2d at 897.

Specific to the issue of causation, courts should refuse to grant a directed

reasonable jury to find a causal connection between a breach and a subsequent
.

H-< Swift Stop, Inc. v.Wight 845 P.2d 250. ?^7 fTTtah Ct.App. 1902)
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questions of fact are to be decided by the jury. Harline v. Barker ,912 P.2d 433,
439 (Utah 1996)
DEFENDANTS INAPPROPRIATELY RELY ON DISTINGUISHABLE
CASELAW
Defendants' reliance on Clark v. Farmers Insurance Exch., 893 P.2d 598
(Utah App. 1995), 261 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, is misplaced. The Plaintiff in Clark
had no recollection of how he was injured, and there was no evidence as to the
mechanism that caused plaintiffs injuries. See id. at 28. More notable is the fact
that the plaintiff never raised the propriety of shifting the burden of proof to
defendants by a Summers v. Tice instruction. In the Alarid case, plaintiff has put
forth credible evidence that the water heaters were responsible for the ignition of
the flammable vapors.
Interestingly, the court specifically noted this failure in footnote 6, and
therefore declined to apply it. Id. at 29. This indicates that there are
circumstances under which the court envisions the application of Summers v. Tice
in Utah. Here, plaintiff Anna Marie Alarid has raised the alternative liability
theory under Summers v. Tice and requested its application based on the evidence
before the court.
Defendant also mistakenly relies on Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d
1360 (Ut. 1986). In Weber, a young child was injured when he strayed from an
apartment complex and was injured after falling into a stream. The plaintiffs
could not establish where (over whose property) or how the young child managed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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, ni /iiied properly abutting the stream and therefore could have been likely
tortfeasors in the case. Accordingly, the court chose not to apply Summers v. ,
:.. ,\ ?npra.bec<m<iK ,ic;ci.dan Is potentially responsible were
-'•

, **AJL*d Marie Alarid does not have the same problem. Plaintiff knows .tnJ
has offered credible testimony that one of the two water heaters at >4o s. Lincoln
w as responsible ioi ijjiiitiii}1 liir llatnni.ibli i.ii mr in Il i aiisuii1 Ihr lime thai
severely

burned Anna Marie Alarid. Plaintiff avoids the potential inequity found

in the Weber case because the only two potentially responsible water heater
companies are cum .*:

PLAINTIFF HAS PUT FORTH SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF

The plaintiff must introduce evidence which ai lords a reasonable basis for
the a

MOII thai

a cause in fact of the result, Prosser and Keeton on 2 arts §41. However, 'the
evidence need not show that the defectiveness of the product was the sole cause of
injury or damage, nor ftiwll il v,onelnsnvl) eliminate -ill wlhei possible c.iuses. • •
Bartlev v. Euclid, Inc. 158 F.3d 261, 272 (5th Or. 1998)
Prool ol eausation uut\ he made h\ eiicumstaiuial evidence, since more
j:

~ x t evidence may of ice *u UKKHIL Watson v. C.k Hard, inc., .VW So.id , J>{)
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(La.Ct.App.2d Cir 1990) In Sumison v. Streator-Smith (1943) 132 P.2d 680, the
court discusses what evidence is needed to show causation. The court stated that,
"The plaintiff must supply links in the chain of proximate cause . . . Some or all of
the links may depend upon inferences." Id. at 682.
Proof that illness or injury followed soon after the use of a product or that
the product alleged to be defective was found following the accident in a broken
condition have been held sufficient evidence that the injury was caused by a defect
in the product. Johnson v. Michelin Tire Corp., 812 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1987) See
also Hooper v. General Motors Corp., (1953) 123 Utah 515, 260 P.2d 549.
Proof of causation is often accomplished by the use of expert testimony, but
is not necessarily required to prove causation. The plaintiff may prove the causal
nexus between the event sued upon and the injuries suffered by lay testimony
alone in those cases in which general experience and common sense will enable a
layman to determine, with reasonable probability, the causal relationship between
the event and the condition. Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729,
733 (Tex. 1984) (stating "Generally lay testimony establishing a sequence of
events which provides a strong, logically traceable connection between the event
and the condition is sufficient proof of causation.")
Model Utah Jury Instruction 2.14, Expert Witness, states in pertinent part
"You should consider such expert opinion and the reasons, if any, given for it.
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V in ctirt not hound h v r urh nil npinnin rior HI 11 it* \HMJ'III V<HI liunk il dcscnes III
you should deciu. uxut div, opinions of an expert witness are not based upon
si ifficient education and experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons
gi en in support: ol the opinions ait: uoi viniiull HI (kill sin. In opuuoih an
outwoiphrd mi i niiiilin n idnier you turn disregard the opinion entirely."

DEFENDANTS CAN NO

i i i i i m m m mIKY

HI

'REJUDKJfc ABOUi ti. *
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T T V F I IARTT TTY

Defendants can not claim that plaintiff's proposed instruction is unfair 01
unwarranted Defendants have-long known that plaintiff has not speciU, >

Counsel took the deposition of John Hoffman, plaintiffs fire cause and on^m
sxpert, in May of 2000 Dr. Hoffman did not conclusively identify which of the
two water heaters w as the cause of the fire.
Defendants coi ild als> :: have easily interviewed Salt Lake City Fire
Department Investigator, Jeff Long, In fact, after defendants' motion in limine
regarding th, i • an master waster heater was denied, defendants were again on
notice that both IA< ater heaters w 01 lldbe the si lbject of causation testimony. Ilie
evidence has unfolded accordingly. Investigator Long testified that the water
heater on the right was the most damaged. A iury could reasonably infer that the
fire originated I in; uin llin

*

;
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also chose to believe the testimony of Anna Marie Alarid who testified that she
saw the fire develop under the left door of the utility room.
How can the defendants claim prejudice regarding alternative causation
theories when the defendants split into separate forms on the eve of trial.
Defendants have participated in the case jointly for several years, preparing a joint
defense. Mr. Sutton has taken depositions of plaintiffs experts as a representative
of both American Appliance and American Water Heater. On the day before trial,
counsel for the defendants informed the Court and plaintiff for the first time that
each company would now maintain separate counsel and defend their respective
cases separately. If anyone has been subjected to unfair surprise, it is certainly the
plaintiff.
Parties are entitled to have their theories of the case presented to the jury in
the form of instructions only if they are supported by the evidence. Powers v.
Gene's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977). Consequently, plaintiffs
proposed alternative liability instruction only becomes appropriate once the
evidence demonstrates a conflict as to causation. A Summers v. Tice instruction
does not even become ripe until the evidence has been introduced. If conflicting
testimony regarding causation has been introduced, the alternative liability
instruction becomes appropriate. In other words, plaintiff could not have proposed
this instruction until the close of evidence after multiple witnesses had offered
their perspective on where the fire originated.
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SUMMERS \ VI'K'li HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED IN UTAH AND
THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY
The landmark case of Summers v. 1 ke, supra, was followed by the court in
Hood v. Mosul, <»(»h I" J'nl V1H (< HI

.......

iw^iitify which one of two attacking dogs bit her. Id. at 44. The two dogs were
ow ned by separate defendants h / Ilie Hood court stated:
f * Illln'i! we tiiiisitki illIL"

.*

positioi

t

would flow if plaintiff was required to pm tin -sin \ on one of the
defendants only, a requirement that ihr bmdri
shifted to defendants be< *

•« oi,,u| -..n that subiec. be
••".*'

action m here the negligence ot •-ne wi th; defendants injured the •>* •» »»\
hence it should rest with them i aeh in absolve himself if he -.an !':*
injured party has been placed by defendants in the unfau p» • - i- ••
pointing

-

= '.

* . ••. v* •

may also and plaintiff is remediless.

-r- •

heir

. ai * . iting footnote -4

"As in the Summers case, we do not believe that the plaintiff should, under
line ejieuiiisliiiites, he pku etl in llie position oil li.iviuj1 lo pninl In \ Inch nil III I\
dogs actually bit her." Id. at 46.
The equitable conclusion reached, in Hood and Summers would be no
different if there had been a thi i d defendant, w ho sellled mil ol the suit < m ,i
premises liahilirv union III 'poi helically liml there been a premises claim against
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a landowner in Summers who let the hunters on his property to hunt in violation of
a statute, the applicability of Summers would be no different.
In the present case, the overwhelming and arguably the only credible
evidence before the court supports the theory that one of the two water heaters
caused the ignition which resulted in plaintiffs injuries. The jury has been
informed of settlements with other parties and will be charged with the obligation
to apportion damages amongst the settling parties. The application of Summers v.
Tice would not interfere with the jury's discharge of its duties.
The reasoning behind the holding in Summers v. Tice is embodied in the
Restatement Second, Torts § 433B(3). "Where the conduct of two or more actors
is tortious, and it is proved that harm has been caused to plaintiff by only one of
them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon
each actor to prove that he has not caused the harm." Id.
The Utah Supreme Court discussed the application of Summers v. Tice in
King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, 832 P.2d 858, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (UT, 1992).
In King, a woman became pregnant despite the implantation of a contraceptive
device. She sued two defendants, a doctor and a medical device manufacturer.
The liability of each, if any, was separate and independent from the other. Id. at
58.
The Court recognized the rule imposing liability on two or more defendants
who are concurrently negligent but only one of whom could have actually caused
the injury was applied in Summers v. Tice, supra. The Court found that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Summers rule was not appropriate given the facts because only one of the
defendants could have been negligent. In Summers, it was clear that both
defendants acted negligently in precisely the same manner and that one of the two
defendants had to have been responsible for plaintiff s injury.
In the instant case, plaintiff Anna Marie Alarid argues that both defendants
were negligent and/or strictly liable for the defective design of the water heaters
present at 940 Lincoln Street in July of 1996; however, it is likely that only one of
the two water heaters was the cause of the fire. Accordingly, the Summers rule, as
discussed in King, would apply.
The alternative liability principle of Summers was implicitly adopted in
Tingev v. Christiansen, 987 P.2d 588 (Utah 1999), 373 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (1999).
In Tingey, the plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries following a car accident.
However, evidence had been introduced at trial that pointed to other pre-accident
sources of her injuries. On appeal, Tingey argued that the trial court failed to give
a jury instruction that stated, in effect, if the jury could not apportion pre-existing
v. post-accident injury, then all damages must be apportioned to the tortfeasor on
trial. Id. at 11. The Utah Supreme Court agreed. In summary, "a defendant
should not escape liability because the amount of damage cannot be proved with
precision." Id. The court found this rule of law to be correct and adopted it. Id.
"[I]f the jury finds it impossible to apportion damages, it should find that the
tortfeasor is liable for the entire amount of damages." Id
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In Tingey, the Utah Supreme Court not only adopted the Summers v. Tice
alternative liability theory, but also expanded its scope to accommodate
conflicting damage testimony. This demonstrates a very liberal application of
alternative liability by the highest court in Utah.
Five months later, the Utah Supreme Court again confirmed the alternative
liability theory adopted in Tingev. See Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc. 992
P.2d at 969 (1999), 385 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (1999). In Robinson, the plaintiff
sought review of the trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction that stated if you
can not apportion damage between pre-accident and post-accident, then you must
determine that all injuries are attributable to the car accident before the court. See
Id. The court ruled that the trial court should have instructed the jury on
alternative liability.
The court also added that the facts of the case must merit the proposed
instruction. Id. Consequently, an instruction may not become ripe until the
evidence has been introduced at trial.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Anna Marie Alarid respectfully requests
this Court deny Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict.
DATED: November 5, 2001

GIRARDI & KEESE

Attorney(s) for Plaintiff
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